Mental Competency - PC 1368
Category > Mental Competency - PC 1368
Updated 3/7/2024The trial court erred in failing to declare a doubt as to defendant’s competency once it became clear he could not separate his delusion from his defense.Defendant was twice found incompetent due to his persistent belief that his actions were controlled by a “mind control project” run by the government. He was later found to competent due to his ability to compartmentalize any lingering delusion and separate it from his defense. At trial, he took the stand against counsel’s advice, admitted guilt and explained the “project” controlled his actions. The trial court erred by failing to declare a doubt as to defendant’s competency once it became clear he could not longer separate his
delusion from his defense.id: 26430
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court erred in failing to suspend trial and initiate competency proceedings based on changed circumstances where the mentally ill defendant representing herself had stopped taking her medication. Defendant, a former attorney, was convicted of the murder of her husband in a case where she represented herself. There were always questions about her mental competency, but the court should have been aware of the changed circumstances that rendered defendant incompetent to stand trial or represent herself. The court knew of her mental illness, her failure to take medication and her observed problems. The failure to suspend proceedings violated her due process rights. id: 27491
Updated 3/4/2024The two year maximum commitment described in section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of restoration and includes the time up until the court's decision whether to accept the certificate.Defendant was found to be incompetent to stand trial. Since his sentence, if convicted, would exceed 2 years, the period of commitment due to incompetency is limited to two years under Penal Code section 1370(c)(1). That two year period ends when the court determines defendant has been restored to competency, not when the medical treatment provider files a certificate of restoration.id: 28168
Updated 2/7/2024A health official’s certification of competency does not initiate court proceedings to consider whether a defendant has regained competency, terminating the commitment. The trial court has the responsibility to determine whether a defendant found incompetent for trial has been restored to competency. The trial court was correct in finding the health official’s certification of competency did not terminate the defendant’s commitment so as to prevent the three year maximum commitment term from accruing.id: 27203
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court erred in failing to suspend trial and initiate competency proceedings based on changed circumstances where the mentally ill defendant representing herself had stopped taking her medication.Defendant, a former attorney, was convicted of the murder of her husband in a case where she represented herself. There were always questions about her mental competency, but the court should have been aware of the changed circumstances that rendered defendant incompetent to stand trial or represent herself. The court knew of her mental illness, her failure to take medication and her observed problems. The failure to suspend proceedings violated her due process rights.id: 27439
Updated 2/4/2024Minors not returned to competence may not be retained beyond the 12 month period for remediation. Welfare and Institutions Code section 709, which describes incompetency proceedings for minors who are subject to delinquency petitions in juvenile court, does not allow the secure confinement of those minors beyond the statutory period for remediation of their competency.id: 27349
Once a doubt was declared as to defendant’s competency, the trial court had to make a finding even after defense counsel withdrew the request.Before trial, defense counsel declared a doubt regarding defendant’s mental competency. On the date set for the jury trial regarding his competency, defense counsel withdrew the issue. However, the trial court was thereafter without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial without first finding that defendant was competent. id: 26174
Federal law did not preempt prosecution for illegally acting as an immigration consultant.Defendant was in the business of providing immigration services - typically obtaining visas for clients that would allow them to stay in the U.S. legally. Under the Immigration Consultant Act (Business and Professions Code section 22440-22449) one cannot act as an immigration consultant absent certain requirements including passing a background check and filing a bond. Defendant failed to comply with the requirements and was convicted of unlawfully acting as an immigration consultant. Contrary to defendant’s argument, federal law does not preempt application of the Act to defendant.id: 26175
Defendant’s inability to speak properly eight months after he was found to be competent was a changed circumstance requiring new competency proceedings.After a question arose about defendant’s mental competency before trial, proceedings were suspended, a jury found he was competent, and proceedings were reinstated. Six months later, on the eve of trial, defense counsel again expressed a doubt regarding defendant’s competency. The trial court erred by failing to reinstate competency proceedings because counsel had presented substantial evidence that defendant was experiencing new and worsened symptoms that constituted a change in circumstances. The primary issue was defendant’s “word salad” problem where he was juxtaposing words in sentences as he spoke. While the court referred to hygiene issues that was not relevant to the claim.id: 26146
Mental health diversion statute applied retroactively to defendant’s case that was not yet final on appeal. Defendant was convicted of making a criminal threats. Recently enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, allowing for pretrial mental health diversion, applies retroactively to defendant whose case was on appeal at the time the law became effective, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing on defendant’s eligibility for diversion.id: 26256
The trial court erred by failing to suspend proceedings after learning that the formerly incompetent defendant had stopped taking his meds.When a formerly incompetent defendant has been restored to competence solely or primarily through the administration of medication, evidence that the defendant is no longer taking his medication and is again showing signs of incompetence will generally establish a change in circumstances that requires formal investigation before the trial can proceed. The trial court’s failure to suspend proceedings under these circumstances violated defendant’s due process rights.id: 25948
New mental health diversion program provided in section 1001.36 applies to all cases not yet final on appeal. Recently enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, which allows for the diversion of defendants with mental disorders, applies retroactively to cases that are not yet final on appeal. id: 25876
Remand was ordered for a determination as to whether defendant was incompetent for a period of time after her Faretta motion was granted. Defendant argued that after the trial court granted her Faretta motion, her mental state deteriorated to the point that she was not competent to stand trial. Advisory counsel was not permitted to address the court with concerns regarding defendant’s condition. The matter was remanded for a determination as to whether defendant was competent during that time period.id: 25859
The prosecution failed to show the defendant later found to be incompetent was actually competent at the time of his trial in 1996.The trial court erred by failing to hold a mental competency hearing at the time of defendant’s trial in 1996. The error was reversible unless it was feasible to conduct a retrospective hearing to determine defendant’s competence in 1996. The prosecution failed to show that such a retrospective hearing was feasible. In addition to the passage of time, the circumstances included evidence before the trial court of defendant’s history of mental illness and incompetency, and reports by mental health experts who examined him before the trial.id: 25658
Evidence was insufficient to support the competency findings for the mildly mentally retarded defendant who allegedly regained his competence after being drilled by hospital staff regarding basic relevant concepts.After the trial court found defendant was incompetent and committed him to a state hospital, psychologists found it was unlikely his competence could be restored due to his mild mental retardation, which limited his capacity for understanding. Hospital staff members thereafter drilled defendant until he could answer basic questions about the judicial system. He was then found competent and entered a guilty plea. However, his competency was again questioned before sentencing. A year later he was found competent again and sentenced to three years. However, the court’s finding of competence was based on the reports prepared nine months earlier that had simply been copied and failed to address any later concerns. The competency findings were not based on substantial evidence and the judgment was reversed.id: 25620
Defendant’s acts of self-mutilation, shouting at voices in his head, disrupting trial and defecating in his pants established evidence of incompetence and the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a competency hearing. Defendant was charged with several crimes including domestic violence causing injury, and mayhem. He committed multiple acts of self-mutilation, shouted to voices in his head, disrupted court proceedings, defecated in his pants and was placed on medical watch at the jail where was medicated and put on suicide watch. His behavior provided substantial evidence that he was not mentally competent to stand trial, and the court’s refusal to hold a competency hearing violated defendant’s due process rights.id: 25554
The expert’s finding regarding defendant’s paranoid delusion concerning the prosecutor required a full competency hearing, and the failure to order one required a reversal. Defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant’s competence, and the trial court appointed a psychologist to assess him. The psychologist found defendant was schizophrenic and hearing voices, and had an irrational fear of the prosecutor. However, the expert found defendant to be competent to stand trial based on his understanding of the law since defendant understood the proceedings and could assist counsel. However, the evidence was sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether defendant could rationally assist counsel, and the court erred in not ordering a full competency hearing. The error required reversal of the conviction.
id: 24992
If defendant is released after serving three years in the hospital while incompetent he can later be recharged but if incompetent can’t be subject to another involuntary commitment. Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily committed for three years during which he did not regain competence. The law requires that he must be released after that time unless made the subject of a conservatorship. He was released but then recharged under a new case number as permitted by Penal Code section 1387. A defendant in this situation can be rearrested on refiled charges. But if the court finds he’s not competent, it can recommit him only for a period not exceeding the remaining three year balance under Penal Code section 1370, subd.(c). After that, defendant must be placed in a conservatorship if gravely disabled or released.id: 25454
Section 859 required that a preliminary hearing be held within 10 days after reinstatement of criminal proceedings unless the defendant entered a time waiver. Proceedings were suspended on the day set for defendant’s preliminary hearing. Proceedings were reinstated about six months later after his competence was restored. The court set a new date for the prelim approximately six weeks later but defendant objected and requested a hearing within 10 days under Penal Code section 859b. The trial court erred in denying his request and in later denying his motion to dismiss the case.id: 25474
Section 1368 did not authorize a new competency hearing for the defendant who was determined to be incompetent with no likelihood that competence would be restored, and had served his three year maximum commitment. Defendant was determined by the trial court to be incompetent to stand trial. His commitment facility subsequently found there was no substantial likelihood he would be restored to mental competence in the foreseeable future, he completed the three-year maximum commitment period and was not determined to be subject to a conservatorship as gravely disabled. Under these circumstances, Penal Code section 1368 did not authorize a new competency hearing.id: 25291
The trial court erred by failing to recognize it had discretion to order a second competency hearing when presented with new evidence of defendant’s mental illness.There was conflicting evidence about defendant’s competence to stand trial. The trial court found he was competent based on one expert’s opinion. Thereafter, defense counsel discovered additional evidence of defendant’s mental illness. Counsel requested a continuance to seek the appointment of another mental health expert. Defendant opposed this action and thereafter sought (and was granted) self-representation. The trial court erred by failing to understand it had discretion to initiate a second competency hearing, and given the new evidence, the court should have ordered a second competency proceeding. id: 24995
The trial court erred by instructing the priors to consider defendant’s intellectual disability only on the murder charges.consider defendant’s intellectual disability on the issue of whether he formed the intent to kill only, thereby precluding consideration of the issue on the dissuading a witness charge and the witness killing special circumstance. The error required reversal of the dissuading a witness conviction and the special circumstance finding but did not require reversal of the death judgment where there was also a multiple murder special circumstance finding.id: 24678
Trial court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a competency hearing once the hospital finds the defendant is unlikely to regain competency. A trial court does not have jurisdiction to convene a competency hearing after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to stand trial, is not likely to regain competency.id: 24559
The state cannot initiate SVP proceedings against a defendant who is mentally incompetent.The state may not proceed with an initial SVPA commitment trial while the defendant is incompetent - that is, unable as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist his or her counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner.id: 21482
The burden at a retrospective competency hearing lies with the prosecution to show by a preponderance the defendant was competent at trial.Following his appeal, defendant’s case was remanded to the trial court for a retrospective determination of his mental competency at the time of trial. The trial court erred at the hearing in placing on defendant the burden of showing he was incompetent when tried and convicted. The burden at a retrospective hearing lies with the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was competent at the trial.id: 20914
Fleeing from the scene of an accident was not a “felony involving death” and so defendant who was found incompetent to stand trial was entitled to outpatient treatment. Criminal defendants deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial were eligible for outpatient treatment unless charged with a “felony involving death.” Defendant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 2001, subd. (a). However, this was not a “felony involving death” under the relevant provision where there was no evidence that the victim’s death resulted from the defendant’s flight from the accident.id: 24205
The juvenile court’s finding that the minor was competent was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the expert opinion to the contrary. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709, a minor is presumed competent to stand trial and must prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court erred by finding the minor to be competent given the sole expert’s compelling and unequivocal opinion to the contrary.id: 24098
Defendant’s challenge to the incompetency finding was not rendered moot by the subsequent finding that competency had been restored following a guilty plea.Defendant was determined to be incompetent before trial and was committed to a state hospital under Penal Code section 1370. He appealed claiming errors had been made in the process. While his appeal was pending, the trial court found he had been restored to competency and reinstated criminal proceedings. He then entered a plea and the court granted probation. Contrary to the state’s claim, the appeal issues were not rendered moot due to the restoration of competency finding and subsequent actions. Because the incompetency finding might impact future proceedings, defendant was entitled to challenge it.id: 23818
The juvenile court erred by finding the minor was competent without complying with Welfare and Institutions Code section 709.The juvenile court applied the standard used in adult court when addressing the issue of minor’s competence. The court further erred by failing to make a finding regarding the minor’s ability to consult with counsel and assist in his defense. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court for a competency hearing with findings as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 709.id: 23870
The trial court committed reversible error by permitting the capital defendant to represent himself during proceedings to determine his mental competence.The trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent the capital defendant during the second competency proceeding violated his statutory rights resulting in a reversible miscarriage of justice. The appointment of advisory counsel for the competency proceedings did not satisfy the statutory requirement. The matter was remanded for a determination of whether a retrospective competency hearing was feasible, and if so, for the trial court to hold such a hearing.id: 22767
A minor detained in Juvenile Hall must be provided with mental health services necessary to help attain mental competence.A minor detained in Juvenile Hall pending attainment of competency must be provided with mental health assessment services. The court should have required the probation department to specify which services the minor needed to help him become competent and to initiate those services despite the fact that no “program” had been established.id: 23266
Information a minor provides to a psychologist who is assisting defense counsel in a competency evaluation is protected under the attorney-client privilege. A minor facing criminal charges moved for the appointment of Dr. Scarf as an expert witness to assist defense counsel in assessing the minor’s competency to stand trial. Dr. Scarf was not on the panel of psychologists used by the juvenile court. She had indicated to the minor that, unlike the other experts on the panel, she would keep information obtained during an evaluation that related to child abuse or threats confidential and would report the information only to defense counsel. The trial court erred by denying the minor’s request for Dr. Scarf and all statements made to her would be covered by the attorney-client privilege.id: 23085
The trial court erred in failing to initiate competency proceedings after the pro se defendant informed the judge his defense would be that the assault victim was not human. The trial court conducted pretrial competency proceedings under Penal Code section 1368, and defendant was found to be competent as long as he was taking his medication which he refused to take. He represented himself at trial and told the court his defense would be that the victim was not a human being, and lacked shoulder blades which was symbolic of angels. His only question of the victim was whether he could shrug his shoulders. The trial court erred in failing to initiate further competency proceedings following this conduct. id: 22126
The court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was improper as it failed to identify which drugs would be used and the potential side effects. The trial court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was erroneous. The doctor's testimony that medication would have a good chance of rendering defendant competent to stand trial failed to identify which drugs would likely be used, what the side effects might be, and whether the drugs would be medically appropriate in treating defendant's condition. id: 21934
The county jail erred by failing to transfer defendant to Patton for treatment to restore his competence in a reasonable period of time. Following defendant’s commitment order under Penal Code section 1370, he was kept in the county jail for 84 days before being transferred for treatment and evaluation. The prolonged detention in county jail was a due process violation and the fact that he was given antipsychotic medications while in the jail was no substitute for a timely transfer to the hospital. The trial court should have granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus and delivered him to the hospital.id: 21455
The court's reasons for denying defendant's application for outpatient status and placement in a secure nursing facility at the section 1604 hearing were erroneous and unsupported.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder. Thereafter, the trial court found he was not sane at the time of the offense pursuant to Penal Code section 1026, and he was committed to a state hospital until such time as his sanity was restored. After the hospital later recommended outpatient status, the trial court ordered a formal hearing pursuant to section 1604. The court's later reasons for denying defendant's application were inadequate or not supported by the record. First, the court cited defendant's age (79) and frail condition. If anything, these facts supported the application. Next, the persistence of defendant's mental illness was not alone sufficient to deny him outpatient status if he was not dangerous. While he was still mentally ill there was no evidence of danger if he took his medication, and the recommended outpatient program was to a locked nursing facility where he would be under constant supervision.id: 18394
The trial court erred by failing to instruct that the jury in a section 6500 commitment proceeding must find defendant’s mental retardation was a substantial factor in causing her inability to control her dangerous behavior.Defendant was committed to a state hospital for a year under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 after it was determined that she was mentally retarded and dangerous. The trial court erred at the hearing by failing to instruct that in order to find that defendant met the criteria of section 6500, the jury must find defendant’s mental retardation was a substantial factor in causing her serious difficulty in controlling her dangerous behavior.id: 21051
Due process requires that the jury, not the trial court, determines whether the charges involve death or great bodily injury for purposes of a section 6500 commitment.Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 authorizes a mentally retarded person to be committed to the Department of Developmental Services if she is a danger to herself or others. The definition of this term includes a finding of incompetence to stand trial if the defendant has been charged with a felony involving death, great bodily injury or an act, which poses a threat of bodily harm to another person. It is for the jury, not the trial court, to determine whether the charge involves death or great bodily injury.id: 21049
A defendant cannot be subjected to an SVP trial while mentally incompetent.As a matter of constitutional due process, a defendant cannot be subjected to trial as an alleged sexually violent predator while mentally incompetent. The liberty interest at stake in SVP proceedings with the trial against an incompetent defendant poses an unacceptable risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. The government’s interest in protecting its citizens and treating SVPs is not significantly burdened by providing for competency determinations. Finally, the defendant’s dignitary interest in providing his side of the story is protected by ensuring the defendant is competent to stand trial.id: 20998
The failure to try the forfeiture actions in conjunction with the
criminal case or obtain a waiver of the right to a jury trial precluded
forfeiture of the cash seized at the time of the arrest.Police seized $10,158 at the time of defendant’s arrest for possession for sale of cocaine base. However, Health and Safety Code section 11470 requires that the prosecution bring the forfeiture matter to trial in connection with the criminal proceedings. The failure to do so precluded the forfeiture of the cash.id: 21002
The juvenile court’s finding that the minor was competent to stand trial was vacated where the comments preceding the finding showed the court was using the incorrect standard.The juvenile court’s finding that the minor was competent to stand trial was flawed where it was based in part on statements by the court that the minor knew right from wrong, and that he could become competent over time with some assistance. These comments showed the court used the wrong standard in making its determination even when combined with the correct comment that the primary test is whether the minor could assist his attorney in conducting a defense. id: 20575
The trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to hear defendant's Marsden motion during the Penal Code section 1368 proceedings.During proceedings to determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand trial, defendant made a Marsden motion seeking the appointment of new counsel. The trial court's refusal to hear the motion required the reversal of his subsequent conviction.id: 18368
Evidence of defendant's mental retardation along with a lack of understanding as to the proceedings and inability to assist counsel required the trial court to order a competency hearing.While litigating the issue of the voluntariness of defendant's statements and Miranda waiver, expert witnesses testified that defendant was mentally retarded under the governing standards. The record contained substantial evidence showing that defendant did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings and could not properly consult with counsel. The matter was remanded to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing could be held. If so, and if the hearing shows defendant was competent to stand trial, the court would then resolve the remaining issues on appeal.id: 17887
Instructing with CALJIC 2.01 at defendant's section 1368 trial affected the standard of proof and was prejudicial error under the Chapman standard.The trial court erred at defendant's Penal Code section 1368 competency trial by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.01 regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. The instruction effectively placed the burden on defendant, not only of producing evidence of his incompetence that was more convincing that not, but also the additional burden of disproving every rational conclusion of the evidence except that which pointed to incompetence. The error was prejudicial under the Chapman standard as it affected the standard of proof and the court could not say it had no effect on the finding of competence.
id: 18076
Trial court erred in failing to order a section 1368 competency hearing for defendant who suffered from retardation.The trial court had before it substantial evidence that defendant, who is mentally retarded, was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. The trial court's failure to order a Penal Code section 1368 competency hearing deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial. The court remanded the matter for a retrospective competency hearing.id: 17774
The juvenile court erred in failing to appoint an expert after counsel expressed a doubt as to petitioner’s competency.The juvenile court erred by failing to appoint an expert after counsel expressed a doubt as to petitioner’s competency, instead determining that it first needed to proceed with the settlement conference and fitness hearing.id: 20533
Evidence that psychotropic medication might help defendant become competent to stand trial did not justify the order authorizing the involuntary administration of the medication.The record did not contain substantial evidence showing it was
"substantially likely" that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication would render defendant competent to stand trial. That the evidence showed that defendant might
benefit from the medication was insufficient to support the trial court's order authorizing the involuntary drugging.id: 19334
The evidence did not support the court's authorization to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to defendant.There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's order authorizing the hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The trial court did not consider the factors in defendant's case but simply noted the crimes were serious and the state was entitled to a speedy trial. Moreover, the hospital never specified the condition it was proposing to treat or the medication it was proposing to administer. Therefore, the court had no evidence before it to evaluate the appropriateness of the medication for defendant.id: 18356
The trial court's failure to appoint counsel at the preliminary hearing after expressing a doubt as to defendant's competency required reversal of the conviction. Defendant appeared at the preliminary hearing without counsel. During proceedings the court twice expressed a doubt about his mental competence, and discussed the possibility of a
competency hearing but never ordered one. The court's failure to appoint counsel at the preliminary hearing required reversal of the judgment.id: 19511
Defendant's jump from the second tier of the jail constituted substantial evidence of changed circumstances requiring a second competency hearing. At the beginning of the proceedings, the trial court determined defendant was competent to stand trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Nine months later, at the beginning of trial, defendant jumped from the second tier of the jail, and defense counsel questioned his competence. The court was presented with substantial evidence of a change in circumstances which required the court to conduct a second competency proceeding. The existence of conflicting evidence was irrelevant. The matter was remanded to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing could and should be held.id: 19531
Allowing impeachment of a testifying defendant with statements he made to mental health professionals appointed to determine his mental competency violated his privilege against self-incrimination.The trial court violated defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination when it allowed the prosecution to impeach him at trial with statements he made to the two court-appointed mental health professionals who were to determine his competency to stand trial.id: 19258
Capital defendant may not be examined by psychiatrist as to future dangerousness without notifying counsel.On the day of petitioner's arrest the trial court, at the State's request, ordered that a psychiatric examination be conducted to determine his competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. Neither petitioner nor his attorney were notified that he would be examined on the issue of future dangerousness. He was not informed of his right to remain silent. At his penalty hearing, the psychiatrist and a psychologist who examined petitioner testified that based on their examinations, he would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Reaffirming <i>Estelle v. Smith,</i> 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the petitioner's death sentence because he was not informed of the right to remain silent, and his attorney was not notified that the examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness.id: 11731
A defendant proceeded against under involuntary commitment proceedings must be advised of his right to a jury trial.Before adjudicating a Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 proceeding for commitment or recommitment in a trial by court the record must show an advisement and waiver of the right to a jury trial. The application of this decision is limited to those whose appeals are pending and to section 6500 hearings conducted after this decision became final.id: 11723
Supreme Court protects incompetent defendants from being forcibly medicated to secure competence to stand trial.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that compelling state interests, i.e., the need to bring the accused to trial or safety concerns, may justify the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to ensure competence to stand trial. Once a defendant requests to stop forcible medication, however, the State must demonstrate that less intrusive measures were considered and that forced medication is necessary and medically appropriate. The trial court here failed to inquire whether forced medication was necessary. Accordingly, the conviction was reversed. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, and Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that regardless of whether the forced medication deprived the defendant of a protected liberty interest, his trial was nevertheless fundamentally fair.id: 11773
If the defendant was properly found competent to stand trial he was necessarily competent to waive counsel and represent himself.The trial court determined defendant was incompetent to represent himself. Proceedings were subsequently suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial. He was found competent to stand trial. He then moved again for self-representation but the motion was denied. The court erred in denying the motion or self-representation because the finding of incompetence to stand trial equates to competence to waive the assistance of counsel. The court's error required reversal of the conviction.id: 11760
When it is determined a defendant was incompetent at his preliminary hearing the law provides for a second hearing once the defendant's competence is restored.A defendant was found to be incompetent five months after his preliminary hearing, and criminal proceedings were suspended. After his competence was restored he made a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the case. He argued he was incompetent at the time of the preliminary hearing which rendered his commitment unlawful. The trial court properly granted his motion. Pursuant to the amendment to Penal Code section 1368.1, the correct procedure is to conduct a second preliminary hearing once the defendant's competence is restored.id: 15758
The trial court erred in refusing to appoint the director of the regional center for developmentally disabled to determine defendant's competency to stand trial.When there is substantial, objective evidence that the defendant may suffer from a developmental disability, the defendant's competence to stand trial cannot be ruled upon until at a minimum, the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled has evaluated the defendant, submitted a report, and the trial court has considered that report as required by section 1369. Defendant's low I.Q. constituted substantial evidence warranting the appointment of the director of the regional center. The failure to do so deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.id: 15783
Juvenile determined to be incompetent was erroneously ordered committed under section 1370 which applied to incompetent adults.The juvenile court determined the mentally disordered minor was incompetent in that he could not assist in his defense. The court erred in ordering him committed under Penal Code section 1370 for treatment to regain competency. Such a commitment is reserved for adults found incompetent to stand trial. Penal Code section 4011.6 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 6550 set forth the procedures for civil commitment of juveniles. He should have been referred for treatment and evaluation under these provisions.id: 11683
A defendant must be competent at the preliminary hearing.The prosecution argued the passage of Proposition 115 has so eroded the purpose of a preliminary hearing that it is now permissible to conduct a hearing while the defendant is incompetent. However, a defendant maintains fundamental statutory and constitutional rights to be present at his or her preliminary hearing and to be afforded the right to counsel. These rights are denied if a defendant is incompetent.id: 15754
Penal Code section 1367.1 violates equal protection principles by requiring misdemeanor defendants to undergo evaluation and treatment under the LPS prior to a competency determination.Penal Code section 1367.1 pertains to evaluations of misdemeanor defendants whom a trial judge believes may be incompetent to stand trial. The provision calls for treatment pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act before competency proceedings. A felony defendant is not required to undergo evaluation and treatment under the LPS prior to a competency determination. Using a strict scrutiny analysis, the court found section 1367.1 deprives misdemeanor defendants of the equal protection of the laws, and that it cannot be construed or reformed to preserve its constitutionality.id: 17179
Supreme Court says rule allowing trial of defendant who is more likely than not incompetent violates due process.Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Stevens held that Oklahoma violates due process by requiring criminal defendants to prove their incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence rather than mere preponderance. Incompetent defendants cannot be forced to stand trial because they cannot rationally consult with their lawyers or understand the proceedings. While defendants may properly be required to prove their incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, neither historical nor contemporary practice justifies Oklahoma's heightened standard of proof of incompetence, which it shares with only three other states.id: 9526
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court’s failure to appoint a mental health expert in section 1368 competency proceedings was not prejudicial where it was unlikely the appointment would have resulted in a finding of competency.Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code section 1368. Although she was later found competent and returned to the trial court for criminal proceedings, her challenge to the incompetence finding was not moot since it could affect her custody credits. On the substantive issue, the court’s failure to appoint a second mental health expert to evaluate her was prejudicial where it wasn’t reasonably probable that the appointment of a second expert would have resulted in a finding of competency.id: 26555
Updated 3/6/2024SB 1187 is not retroactive and the maximum term of commitment for restoration of defendant’s competency remained at three years.Senate Bill 1187, which went into effect on January 1, 2019, amends Penal Code section 1370 to reduce the maximum term of commitment for competency restoration to two years instead of three. The new law does not apply retroactively.id: 26563
Updated 2/23/2024Trial counsel’s testimony about his tactics in seeking a competency hearing did not violate the attorney-client privilege and was not otherwise improper. Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s trial counsel about his tactics and motive in seeking a competence hearing where defendant was being represented by a different lawyer at the competency hearing. However, trial counsel’s testimony was not irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, and was not protected by the attorney-client or work product doctrines.id: 26877
Updated 2/7/2024The trial court did not err in failing to suspend trial and order a section 1368 hearing where a psychiatrist had said defendant was mentally ill but did not connect it to his ability to understand or assist counsel. Defendant acted irrationally during pretrial proceedings and was examined for a possible Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 commitment, which was rejected. During trial, defense counsel declared a doubt about defendant’s competence and said a psychiatrist had concluded he was suffering from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, but the doctor indicated he was not qualified to opine on competence. This evidence of mental illness was troublesome but did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence because it did not link the mental illness to the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel. The trial court did not err by failing to suspend trial and initiate a full competency hearing.id: 27136
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court prejudicially erred by rejecting the sole psychiatric report finding defendant was incompetent to stand trial in his capital case.During pretrial proceedings, a psychologist examined defendant at the request of the court and issued a report finding that due to a severe mental illness, defendant had a misperception of his lawyers’ motives, a misunderstanding of the risk involved in his case, a minimizing of his situation, and impaired judgment. The report found defendant was incompetent to stand trial. There was no expert evidence contradicting that conclusion. The trial court thereafter erred in rejecting the opinion without initiating the applicable competency procedures. The error required reversal of the guilt and death verdicts.id: 27458
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court’s ruling that the DSH was not meeting its responsibility to provide treatment to defendants found incompetent to stand trial did not violate separation of power and was not an abuse of discretion.The trial court’s finding that the Department of State Hospitals was not adequately meeting its primary responsibility for the assessment and treatment of defendants found incompetent to stand trial did not violate the separation of powers doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion. The matter was remanded however, to allow the trial court to consider a recent opinion and two statutory amendments.id: 27654
Updated 2/3/2024Under the newly enacted section 709, the court had jurisdiction to review the minor’s competence after one year.Assembly Bill 1214 established Welfare and Institutions Code section 709, which provides that for juveniles found not competent to stand trial, the total remediation period shall not exceed one year from the finding of incompetency. The minor was in custody for 15 months until the court found he had been restored to competence. The court did not lose jurisdiction to act on the case after one year under section 709, and its jurisdiction continued for a reasonable amount of time to allow the court to resolve any disputes regarding the minor’s competency.id: 27720
Updated 1/31/2024Due process does not require an overt act to establish dangerousness for purposes of an involuntary commitment under section 6500.Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 permits the involuntary commitment of persons with a developmental disability if they are found to be a danger to self or others. Due process does not require proof of a recent overt act to support a finding of dangerousness.id: 28042
The trial court did not err in failing to order a competency hearing after witnessing defendant’s disruptive conduct.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to suspend proceedings (on its own) and hold a competency hearing following defendant’s disruptive conduct that resulted in a physical attack on defense counsel. However, before a mistrial was declared defendant was disruptive yet assisted counsel. His unwillingness to cooperate did not demonstrate incompetence.id: 25998
The trial court did not err by denying a request for a new competency trial based on counsel’s vague claim of defendant’s “deepening” lack of understanding. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for a second competency trial. However, the claim of “deepening” of defendant’s lack of understanding and ability to cooperate with counsel may have simply been an unwillingness to cooperate. Absent a more specific offer of proof the court did not err by finding insufficient evidence of changed circumstances to warrant a new competency proceeding. id: 25973
Evidence of mental illness presented at the penalty phase did not require the trial court to suspend proceedings and hold a competency hearing. No issue of mental competence was raised at defendant’s capital trial, but at the penalty phase he did present considerable evidence of mental illness as part of his case in mitigation. This evidence did not require the court to suspend proceedings and hold a hearing on defendant’s competence to stand trial.id: 25748
The trial court did not err by failing to hold a competency hearing based on passing references in an unrelated motion to a psych report that was never presented to the court.Defendant argued the trial court was required to conduct a full competency hearing prior to trial after learning about a psych report that was prepared in New Hampshire before defendant’s extradition to California. However, the report was referenced in a lengthy unrelated motion but it was never directly presented to the court. The issue of whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present the report and argue the issue to the court could not be addressed on the direct appeal and was properly left for a habeas petition.id: 25036
Evidence of bizarre behavior during trial didn’t require competency proceedings before the death verdict where the record showed defendant understood the nature of the proceedings and could assist in presenting his defense.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing prior to ruling on the motion to modify the death verdict (Penal Code section 190.4(e)) because of his bizarre behavior during trial. However, defendant’s behavior was a factor but the record also showed he understood the proceedings. And he was helpful in presenting his own defense as he submitted well-researched briefs, argued effectively and cross-examined witnesses.id: 25037
Defendant did not have a due process right to be mentally competent during civil SVP proceedings.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to stay his SVP proceedings because he was not competent at the time. However, in Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, the court found due process didn’t require mental competence for someone undergoing SVP commitment proceedings. It did not matter that the mental illness supporting the SVP diagnosis was different from the illness that served as the basis for the competency claim.id: 25003
The trial court did not err by failing to order a competency hearing where the expert believed defendant’s refusal to assist the defense team may have been motivated by his desire to not protest the death penalty. The trial court did not err by failing to conduct a competency hearing where the expert and defense counsel believed defendant may not have been cooperating with counsel due in part to his preference to not contest the death penalty. While the expert believed defendant’s decision might have been the product of a mental disorder, he could not determine whether the belief was rational.id: 24862
Incompetent minor detained beyond the protocol limit of 120 days was not denied due process.Juveniles (like adults) have a due process right to be free from indefinite commitment if found incompetent to stand trial. In an effort to protect this right, the juvenile court in Los Angeles issued a protocol limiting the detention of incompetent minors to 120 days. While courts may adopt such protocols, the violation of protocol by itself does not establish a due process violation.id: 25297
Defendant could not challenge his confinement on new charges after serving the maximum term allowable in the state hospital without showing evidence that he was presently incompetent and unlikely to regain competency in the near future.Defendant was charged with certain crimes in 2008. In 2010, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the state hospital in 2012. He was released in 2015, after serving the maximum time of commitment authorized by law. (Penal Code section 1370, subd.(c)(1).) The prosecution then filed additional charges in connection with the 2008 incident. Defendant argued he could no longer be confined. The court rejected the claim, but urged the Legislature to amend section 1370, subd.(c)(2) to provide clarity to trial courts faced with a defendant who has been committed as incompetent for the maximum period allowed by law but does not meet the criteria for a conservatorship.id: 24713
Trial testimony regarding defendant’s intellectual disability did not require the court to suspend trial and reinstate competency proceedings. The trial court conducted mental competency proceedings before the preliminary hearing and determined defendant was competent to stand trial. During the guilt phase, the defense presented the testimony of a psychologist who evaluated defendant and found him incompetent due to an intellectual disability (rather than a mental illness) This testimony did not require the court to suspend trial and conduct further competency proceedings.id: 24679
Defendant’s trial outbursts and counsel’s repeated claims of mental problems did not require a new competency hearing several months after defendant was deemed competent.Defendant argued that after originally being found competent, the trial court later erred by failing to conduct additional competency hearings during trial. However, neither defendant’s outbursts during testimony nor his counsel’s repeated assertions of mental problems required new competency proceedings as defendant’s conduct and demeanor were consistent throughout the trial. Moreover, the passage of time between the competency hearing and the trial did not require a new hearing. Finally, defendant’s rambling religion-infused comments at sentencing were no different from his earlier actions.id: 24546
The juvenile court did not use the adult standard of competency in finding the minor had regained his competence to stand trial.The minor named in two delinquency petitions was declared incompetent and detained in juvenile hall for 294 days while receiving services to help restore his competence. The juvenile court then reinstated proceedings. The court did not err by rejecting a doctor’s report that was written months before the hearing. Moreover, the record showed the minor understood what was happening at the attainment of competency hearing. Finally, the court did not hold him to the adult competency standard in finding he possessed the necessary mental ability to stand trial.id: 24394
The 294 day juvenile hall detention for the minor receiving services to restore his competency did not violate due process.The minor was found incompetent to stand trial and was detained in juvenile hall for 294 days, receiving services to help restore his competence. The prolonged detention did not violate due process where it was caused in part by the minor’s attempt to avoid a finding of competency. Moreover, while the presiding judge of the juvenile court had drafted a protocol saying detention beyond 120 days violated due process, that protocol was not entitled to the force of law, but rather was a laudable goal. In any event, the minor could point to no prejudice caused by the prolonged delay.id: 24395
The juvenile court erred by failing to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to perform the competency evaluation.The juvenile court erred when, after suspending proceedings and ordering a competency evaluation by a licensed professional who could address whether the minor was “mentally retarded”, it failed to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to examine the minor. The error was prejudicial where the record did not otherwise establish the minor was competent.id: 21477
Defendant who was found incompetent in 2005 but released years later without being found competent was still subject to 1368 proceedings absent a certificate of restoration.Defendant was charged with robbery in 2005, but was found incompetent to stand trial. Later attempts to restore his competency were unsuccessful and he was eventually released although the charge remained. In 2011, he was charged with a new offense and found competent to stand trial in that case. The prosecutor sought to reinstate the 2005 case. Competency proceedings under section 1370.1, subd.(d)(2) were inappropriate. However, defendant’s competency could be tested under section 1368 without the need for a certificate of restoration. If he is found incompetent as to the 2005 case he must be released from confinement and the charges remain subject to dismissal under section 1385.id: 24228
Factors that led the court to deny self-representation did not establish substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial.Defendant argued the same evidence that led the trial court to conclude he was incapable of representing himself during the penalty phase retrial due to his impaired rationality should have led it to declare a doubt as to his competency, and start Penal Code section 1368 proceedings. However, the court explicitly declared it had no doubt about defendant's competency. A lack of objectivity and a possibly self-destructive emotional approach to self-representation does not equate to substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial.id: 19832
Defendant was not entitled to precommitment custody credits for time served against his three year commitment to the state hospital under section 1368. Penal Code section 1370, subd.(e)(1) authorizes commitment for the maximum term for the most serious offense, charged against a defendant adjudged incompetent to stand trial. The provision does not require that the court deduct defendant’s precommitment custody credits from the maximum term of commitment. Denying these credits does not violate due process or equal protection principles. id: 23856
The juvenile court lacked the authority to allow defense counsel to withdraw her doubt as to the minor’s competency.The minor was charged in juvenile court with attempted burglary. The minor’s counsel later declared a doubt as to his mental competency and the court suspended proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709. The prosecution then offered a favorable pleas deal that the minor accepted after counsel withdrew her doubt as to the minor’s competency. However, the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to allow counsel to withdraw her doubt and could not make a competency determination pursuant to section 709 without the input of mental health experts.id: 23486
The appointment of a psychiatrist to examine defendant did not amount to a competency trial requiring suspended proceedings where defense counsel presented no evidence of defendant’s incompetence.Before the capital trial, defense counsel asked for a hearing to discuss questions of defendant’s competence but offered no facts or observations as to why defendant might have been incompetent. The court appointed a psychiatrist to examine defendant but did not suspend proceedings under Penal Code section 1369. Defendant argued the court’s actions amounted to holding a section 1369 competency trial but violated due process by failing to suspend the proceedings. However, it is only where counsel presents evidence of incompetence that the trial court must suspend proceedings. The court’s appointment of Dr. Davis did not transform the proceedings into a competency trial. id: 23642
Placing the burden in a retrospective competency hearing on defendant to prove his incompetency by a preponderance was not unconstitutional.The trial court at the retrospective competency hearing did not violate defendant’s federal due process rights by assigning to him the burden of proving that, at the time he was tried, he was not mentally competent.id: 22031
The juvenile court properly ruled that the minor bore the burden of proving incompetency.The juvenile court suspended proceedings after trial counsel questioned the minor’s competence to stand trial. The court did not err by ruling that the minor bore the burden to prove incompetency. Moreover, the evidence supported the court’s subsequent finding that the minor was competent where the expert’s report, the minor’s statements and school records showed that he understood the nature of the proceedings and charges against him. id: 23222
The trial court was not required to appoint a second attorney to advocate defendant’s conflicting interest on establishing her competency.The trial court was not required to appoint a second attorney to assist defendant in asserting that she was competent to stand trial.id: 22944
Defendant’s throwing of apples at judge and jury did not show evidence of incompetence and did not require mistrial or individual questioning of the jurors. During the presentation of the defense case at the guilt phase, defendant stood up and threw apples at the judge and jurors. The trial court did not err by not suspending proceedings to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial or by not questioning the jurors to see if defendant’s misconduct had prejudiced them against him. And the prosecutor did not later err during the penalty phase by telling jurors they could consider the issue in determinating penalty.id: 22584
The competency evaluators erred in evaluating the minor’s knowledge of the system. The mental health experts evaluating the minor applied an incorrect test to determine if he was competent to stand trial. It did not matter how much he knew about the juvenile court system. The only thing that mattered was whether he could consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he understood the proceedings against him.id: 22683
The trial court was not required to apply defendant’s precommitment custody credits when determining whether his previous confinement at Patton exceeded the three year limit set forth in section 1370(c)(1).Defendant was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and committed to a state hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1370. The commitment order was proper since defendant had not be confined at the hospital in excess of the maximum term of three years. In determining whether defendant’s previous confinement exceeded the three year limit, the court correctly disregarded defendant’s precommittment custody credits, and there was no equal protection violation in doing so. id: 22236
The trial court did not err by refusing to conduct a second competency proceeding before imposing the death sentence where defendant refused to cooperate with the experts and was upset with his counsel for arguing insanity.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to hold a second competency hearing before sentencing in the capital case. However, defendant refused to cooperate with the court-appointed doctors. The fact the he was upset with counsel for arguing insanity when he insisted he did nothing wrong was not evidence of incompetence. That counsel questioned his competence for this reason did not constitute substantial evidence of his incompetence and did not require the appointment of an independent counsel to represent him on the matter.id: 22438
Evidence of defendant’s courtroom behavior and interactions with courtroom personnel was relevant to defendant’s ability to assist counsel.Defendant argued that because the issue at his competency proceeding was the ability to assist counsel (rather than to understand the nature of the charges) the court erred in admitting evidence of his courtroom behavior because it was irrelevant to the issue of his ability to assist counsel. However, evidence of defendant’s courtroom behavior and interactions with court personnel was relevant to the issue of defendant’s ability to assist counsel.id: 22421
The trial court did not err by holding a single mental competency hearing for three separate cases.While trial was pending, defendant picked up two new cases, one for threatening the prosecutor and the other for threatening defense counsel. The trial court did not later err by holding a single mental competency proceeding for the three separate cases.id: 21973
The trial court did not err in refusing to order a competency hearing where defendant announced for the first time before sentencing that he took psychotropic medication during the capital trial. The jury rendered a death verdict. After the trial court denied the new trial motion, but before formal sentencing, defendant informed the court that he had been taking psychotropic medication during trial, and believed it affected his demeanor at trial and the ability to cooperate with counsel. The trial court did not thereafter err by failing to hold a competency hearing before proceeding with sentencing. Defense counsel declined to join in defendant’s request and the court properly relied on its own observations that defendant had been coherent and unimpaired during trial.id: 21945
The trial court's orders finding defendant incompetent and authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication were appealable.The trial court's order determining defendant to be incompetent to stand trial, and the order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs are appealable orders. id: 21933
The trial court need only appoint a second expert under section 1369 where the defense expressly informs the court it is not seeking a finding of incompetence.The trial court did not err in failing to. appoint a second mental health expert to evaluate his competence under Penal Code section 1369 where neither defendant nor counsel expressly informed the court that defendant was not seeking a finding of incompetence.id: 21902
The trial court erred by allowing defendant to testify, over trial counsel’s objection, at his Penal Code section 1368 competency trial. Trial counsel representing a defendant whose competency is in doubt should be in charge of the trial proceedings, including whether the defendant should testify as to his own competency.id: 21395
The trial court did not err in allowing defendant’s mental health expert to be impeached with the reports of the court appointed competency experts. Defendant presented expert testimony in support of a mental health defense at the guilt phase. The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the expert with the evidence on which he based his opinion, including the hospital records and reports of the court appointed competency experts.id: 21530
Due process does not prevent the trial and commitment of SVP’s while mentally incompetent.Defendant argued that the diagnosed mental disorders that allegedly made him a sexually dangerous predator also impair his mental competence to stand trial, and that the state therefore cannot try or commit him as a SVP unless or until his competence is restored. However, due process does not prevent the trial and commitment of SVP’s while mentally incompetent. id: 21765
Defendant was not entitled to have arrest records destroyed under
factual innocence claim where he was found NGI, and prosecution could not rely on statute of limitations to dismiss petition where it had not raised
the issue below. Defendant was found to have committed the aggravated assault but at the second phase of the trial, was determined to be not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to a state hospital
for four years. Five years after that he filed a factual innocence petition
under Penal Code section 851.8 to have his arrest records for the underlying offense destroyed. The prosecution argued the petition was untimely because it was not brought within the statutory time frame – two years from the filing of the accusatory pleading. However, the prosecution forfeited the issue of the statute of limitations by failing to raise it below. Nevertheless, section 851.8 was inapplicable to defendant who committed the charge offense but was determined to be NGI where there was
reasonable cause to arrest him for the offense. id: 20997
Defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s refusal to conduct an earlier Marsden hearing during the time proceedings were suspended to determine his mental competency. Defendant argued the trial court erred when it refused to hear his Marsden motions during the period when criminal proceedings were suspended. The court should have conducted a hearing even though defendant’s competence to stand trial was undetermined. However, the error was not prejudicial where the court eventually conducted a Marsden hearing before it adjudicated the competency issue. Moreover, defendant’s dissatisfaction stemmed from his belief that counsel had no basis for doubting his competency and the court ultimately declared him competent, relieved counsel and appointed new counsel so defendant effectively received what he wanted.id: 21041
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence obtained at a conditional examination taken at a time when proceedings were suspended where it was later determined that defendant was competent at the time. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting at trial evidence obtained at a conditional examination of his late wife, because his competency was in question at the time of the conditional examination. Testimony taken at a conditional exam should be excluded if the defendant is incompetent under Penal Code section 1367 et al. at the time of the examination. However, in this case, proceedings had been suspended due largely to defendant’s intransigence and he was later determined to be competent. The court did not err in going forward with the conditional exam subject to the later determination regarding its admissibility.id: 20981
Supreme Court places limitations on forcibly medicating a defendant to restore competency.The Supreme Court held that the government may involuntarily administer anti-psychotic drugs to a defendant facing serious criminal charges solely to restore his competency only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial interests. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, explained that this standard would allow involuntary medication to restore competency only in "rare cases". The Court also made clear that a court need not consider this standard when involuntary medication is necessary for other purposes, such as to prevent the defendant from being a danger to himself or others.id: 20155
Wende review is not required in an appeal from the denial of outpatient status pursuant to a petition for restoration of competency. Anders/Wende review is not required in an appeal from the denial of outpatient status pursuant to a petition for restoration of competency (Penal Code section 1026.2) if appointed appellate counsel represents he or she has found no arguable issue.id: 20303
Supreme Court allows interlocutory appeal of order showing forced medication to restore defendant's competency.By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court held that when a district court enters a pretrial order allowing the government to forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant solely to render the defendant competent to stand trial, the defendant may take a pretrial, interlocutory appeal of that order. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that such orders fell within the "collateral order" doctrine because the right to avoid forced medication would be lost if the defendant had to wait until after trial to appeal the order.id: 20153
The trial court did not err in admitting at the competency hearing, a tape recording of defendant's lucid statements following an earlier Kansas arrest.The trial court did not err by admitting at the competency hearing a tape recording of defendant's statements following his previous arrest for several murders in Kansas. The tape, where defendant spoke clearly, was relevant to the theory that he was malingering a mental illness to avoid punishment for the present crimes. Moreover, the tape was not unduly prejudicial or cumulative of other evidence presented at the hearing.id: 18898
Evidence supported the finding of defendant's competence as the defense expert had not reviewed evidence showing defendant's comprehensible behavior.Defendant argued the jury erred by finding him competent to stand trial. However, the defense expert admitted the information she reviewed was limited to that provided by defense counsel, and was unfamiliar with evidence showing him to be competent. Moreover, the prosecution presented abundant evidence contradicting the testimony of the defense expert, most of which came from the defendant' mouth. Finally, defendant's statements and conduct further showed he could assist counsel in the conduct of the defense. , ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.2d ____, (2003) . <$IPeople v. Marks, ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.2d ____, 2003 D.A.R. 8173 (2003) July 24, 2003.>
id: 17461
Defendant's decision to plead guilty based on the distrust of his attorney was not substantial evidence of incompetency.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing prior to sentencing. Contrary to the Attorney General's claim, this was not a challenge to the validity of the plea and no certificate of probable cause was required. However, the court did not err in not holding a hearing as defendant had previously been found competent, and the new evidence that defendant decided to forego a trial because he distrusted his attorney was not substantial evidence of incompetence.id: 20031
The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel at defendant's second competency hearing.The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent
defendant at the second competency hearing during a trial in which he was representing himself. Whenever the trial court declares a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial and
suspends proceedings under Penal Code section 1368, counsel must be appointed to represent defendant. Since a competency report was prepared a new trial may not be required and the matter was remanded for a retrospective competency hearing.id: 19646
The juvenile court erred in using the wrong standard to determine whether the minor was competent to stand trial. The juvenile court erred in ruling that to be found incompetent under former California Rules of Court, rule 1498(d), the minor must have a mental disorder or developmental disability, thereby rejecting the competency claims of the minors based on age-related developmental immaturity. The appropriate competency test is that set forth in Susky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 - that is whether a minor can understand the proceedings and engage in meaningful consultation with counsel.id: 19599
The failure to appoint the Regional Director for the Developmentally Disabled to examine defendant during the competency proceedings was not prejudicial error. Defendant's epilepsy constituted a developmental disability and the trial court erred in failing to appoint the regional director of the center for the developmentally disabled to examine him as part of the competency proceedings following an outburst in court where he announced his guilt. However, the failure was not a jurisdictional error requiring reversal. In fact, defendant was not prejudiced by the error since the experts who examined him considered his developmental
disability in reaching their decision.id: 19614
The evidence did not show defendant was incompetent at trial but rather, that he slit his wrists to manipulate the proceedings.The trial court did not err in finding no substantial evidence of incompetence during the trial after the defendant slit his wrist and engaged in other bizarre behavior including an attack on counsel. Notwithstanding Dr. Davis' opinion that defendant could not assist counsel, the remaining evidence showed defendant was fit for trial and malingering. The evidence further showed Dr. Davis' opinion was "pre-fixed" and that he did not consider several important factors in reaching his conclusion.id: 19250
Defendant's suicidal tendencies, without more, did not constitute substantial evidence of his incompetence to stand trial.Defendant's suicidal tendencies did not constitute substantial evidence of his incompetence where they were not accompanied by his bizarre behavior, testimony from mental health experts regarding his competence or any other indications of an inability to understand the proceedings or to assist counsel. Counsel's claim in a suppression motion that defendant was not "psychologically fit" to waive his Miranda rights
was not a statement that he was incompetent to stand trial.id: 19220
A new competency hearing was not required before the start of the penalty phase proceedings absent evidence of changed circumstances.Defendant argued a competency hearing was required before the penalty phase began because a substantial period of time had passed since his earlier competency hearing. However, a second competency hearing was required only on a showing of changed circumstances or new evidence casting doubt on defendant's competency.id: 19009
Requiring defendant to submit to competency examinations did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to counsel.The trial court did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by requiring him to submit to competency exams by the court appointed evaluators. The immunity provided was sufficient to protect against the claimed violations.id: 18897
Memory impairment alone does not establish incompetence.Memory impairment by itself does not establish a mental disorder rendering a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, defendant failed to request elaboration on the instruction to suggest impaired memory function could be evidence of a mental disorder.id: 18900
The trial court's competency finding was not conditioned on his continued ingestion of psychotropic medications.The trial court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial was not "conditioned" on his continued ingestion of psychotropic medication or reflective of a misunderstanding of the relevant legal standard. Moreover, the trial court did not err in refusing to hold the competency hearing at a time when defendant was not receiving psychotropic medication.id: 18705
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the legal consequences of a verdict of incompetency.Because the outcome of any future effort at restoring a defendant to competency is uncertain at the time when the jury must decide on competency, the trial court is not required to instruct on the legal consequences of a verdict of incompetency.id: 18706
Evidence did not show defendant's competence to stand trial was predicated on his taking antipsychotic medications.Defendant argued the trial court should have instructed the jury that to return a verdict of competency on a theory that defendant was competent only if administered psychotropic medication, it must find either that he would voluntarily take his medication or that the factors in Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, were present. However, there was no foundation for a jury finding that defendant was competent based on an assumption that he would be administered psychotropic medication, voluntarily or otherwise.id: 18707
Counsel's assertion that defendant's mental condition had deteriorated was not enough to require a new competency hearing.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to hold another competency hearing several weeks after the first hearing, based on his counsel's assertion that his condition had deteriorated. However, counsel's assertion did no more than state the legal standard for a second hearing. Moreover, the information that led to counsel's statement was previously considered and was not a new development.id: 18708
Evidence supported the jury's competency finding even though certain experts found he was psychotic and incompetent.The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding where the opinions of the various experts stood in conflict, and in assessing the testimony of the doctors, the jury was entitled to consider that the expert who had the most contact with defendant, found him to be competent. While evidence may have showed he was psychotic, or a paranoid schizophrenic, it did not show he was incompetent as other evidence supported the doctor's finding that he understood the proceedings and was able to assist counsel.id: 18709
There was no error in allowing the prosecutor to mention the potential penalty during voir dire of the competency trial.The trial court did not err during voir dire of the competency trial by informing the prospective jurors that the underlying criminal charges involved multiple murders. The subject of penalty was appropriate at the competency trial, in that the psychiatric expert's testimony touched on defendant's understanding of the potential outcome of his criminal trial and his possible motive to delay proceedings. Moreover, defendant suffered no undue prejudice by the prosecutor's mention of the possible penalty during voir dire.id: 18710
The trial court did not err in failing to declare a doubt as to the competence of the pro per defendant to stand trial despite comments from advisory counsel questioning his competence.Defendant argued the trial court should have declared a doubt about his competence to stand trial when, during proceedings that occurred between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, defendant's advisory counsel questioned his competence. However, advisory counsel only questioned defendant's "legal competency," rather than any "mental problem." Moreover, nothing about defendant's failure to prepare for trial or that he refused advisory counsel's suggestion for a psychiatric exam, showed that he did not understand the proceedings. The fact that the crime was irrational and that he had been found insane in a trial 15 years earlier did not change the result.id: 18694
The trial court erred by placing defendant directly in outpatient treatment after a finding he was incompetent to stand trial.After the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial, the court placed him in alternative outpatient treatment. However, after defendant was found to be incompetent, Penal Code section 1601, subd.(a) required that he be delivered to a state hospital or other secure treatment facility.id: 18331
Penalty phase evidence that defendant suffered from a paranoid personality disorder and lived by his own code of conduct did not require the court to initiate 1368 proceedings.Defendant argued evidence presented at the penalty phase showed a "changed circumstance" which required the trial court to suspend proceedings and conduct a Penal Code section 1368 competency hearing. While a doctor testified that defendant suffered from a paranoid personality disorder, that disorder did not render him mentally incompetent to understand or assist in the proceedings. The other evidence showing that he lived his by own rules without regard for others did not amount to evidence of incompetence. The court did not err by failing to conduct a section 1368 hearing.id: 18209
The mention of irrelevant or inflammatory remarks by the court or counsel at defendant's competency trial were harmless where all appointed experts agreed defendant was competent.Defense counsel requested that Penal Code section 1368 competency proceedings be initiated in the midst of defendant's special circumstance retrial. Several doctors testified at the hearing as did defense counsel. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by informing the jury at the competency trial about irrelevant and inflammatory matters such as defendant's prior murder convictions and the original special circumstance findings. However, any improper comments by the court or prosecutor were harmless where the jurors were told such comments were not evidence, and all three court appointed experts concluded defendant was competent.id: 18169
Evidence of defendant's severe physical pain during trial did not establish incompetence or mental absence.Defendant argued that he was suffering from such debilitating pain (severe headaches and back pain) during trial that he was "mentally absent" and the court's failure to suspend the proceeding denied him of his rights to be present and competent. However, the record did not show defendant was irrational, incoherent, or in a general state of collapse during trial. To the contrary, the record showed defendant was alert and coherent during the proceedings. There was no evidence the pain medication he ingested on the first day of trial impaired his ability to participate in the trial. He was examined by a health professional who did not conclude defendant was unfit to proceed. That defendant may have been distracted by physical pain or other symptoms of physical distress did not establish mental absence or incompetence.id: 17819
That defendant was found incompetent two days after the start of trial did not show that he was incompetent when he waived jury trial and the court did not err in resuming trial after the restoration of his competency.After the start of the court trial, defendant was found to be mentally incompetent, causing the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which later resumed with the consent of defendant and his counsel when his competency was restored. Defendant argued his competency necessarily predated by at least a
few days the suspension of the criminal proceedings, and as such, his waiver of a jury trial was not competently made and he was not competent during a portion of the trial. However, there is
no evidence that defendant had any problems understanding the proceedings or participating at the early stages, and any claim that his incompetence began then was simply speculation. Since
there was no evidence of his incompetency earlier in the trial, the court did not err in resuming proceedings (rather than starting over) after the restoration of competency.id: 17444
The trial court was not required to appoint a second attorney to argue in favor of defendant's competence.Against his wishes, defendant was adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial. He argued he should have been appointed a second attorney to argue for his competence. However, counsel's interest in seeking a finding of incompetence was presumably based upon her judgment that it was in defendant's best interest to do so. Although there was a conflict between client and counsel on how to proceed, there was no actual conflict affecting counsel's ability to advocate for her client's best interests and no necessity to appoint an additional attorney to argue the opposite position.id: 17437
Defendant impliedly waived his presence at the competency hearing by not cooperating with counsel or the examining doctors.The trial court did not violate due process by failing to obtain defendant's personal waiver of the right to be present at the competency hearing. After being advised of his rights to be present and participate in the competency proceeding, defendant vowed not to cooperate with the appointed mental health experts or his lawyer, and actually refused to speak with the examining doctors. Defendnat's absence was a result of his refusal to cooperate, an implied waiver.id: 17438
An accused has no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to a competency exam by a prosecution expert and no right to counsel at the examination.An accused person cannot on the basis of the Fifth Amendment refuse to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a Penal Code section 1368 hearing. The Fifth Amendment does not apply because a judicially declared rule of immunity protects the accused from the use of any information gathered. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment does not require that an accused be accompanied by counsel at a mental examination in connection with a competency proceeding.id: 16895
A court may appoint a prosecution expert to conduct a competency exam under certain circumstances. A court that has ordered a hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1369 may not only appoint its own expert but also order the defendant to submit to examination by an expert retained by the prosecution. However, the trial court did not properly exercise its authority since Code of Civil Procedure section 2032 requires notice of the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination, and does not allow unidentified examiners to videotape the examination.id: 16896
Trial court did not err in failing to conduct a section 1368 competency hearing for self-representating capital defendant despite evidence of his rambling and marginally relevant speeches.Defendant, who represented himself in his capital trial, argued the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on his competency pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. However, despite evidence of defendant's rambling and marginally relevant speeches, the evidence did not show he did not understand the proceedings or could not assist in his defense. Defendant conducted cross-examination, testified, and worked well with his investigators. The defense did not contain bizarre content, the jury just believed it was based on exaggeration or lies. Moreover, use of the term "competent" by the magistrate hearing defendant's Faretta motion was a reference to defendant's legal knowledge or ability, rather than any mental disability or disorder.id: 16787
Court was not required to appoint a third expert in determining defendant's competency where the two appointed doctors reached opposite conclusions.Defendant argued the competency hearing held in his case violated his due process rights. First, although the two experts reached opposite conclusions, the trial court could properly assess the findings and conclusions without the need to appoint a third expert to "break the tie." Next, it was not necessary for the judge who initiated the competency proceeding to conduct the hearing. Finally, the court did not err in failing to secure a waiver of the right to a jury trial since there is no constitutional foundation for that right.id: 16640
Pro per defendant's signs of drug use during trial did not necessitate a second competency determination.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to declare a doubt as to defendant's competence at his capital trial, after the court had determined pretrial that he was competent. However, the prosecutor's request during penalty phase closing argument to examine the pro per defendant for drug use (which resulted in a negative finding) did not constitute new evidence requiring a competency hearing.id: 16641
Trial court properly relied on the public defender's representation that it was in defendant's best interests to waive jury trial on the issue of competence.Defendant was represented by the public defender when his competence to stand trial was put in issue. The trial court appointed special counsel, in addition to the public defender to represent defendant's "wishes" on the issue of whether he wanted to waive jury trial on the competence issue. The public defender opined it was in defendant's best interest to waive jury trial. Special counsel informed the court defendant wanted a jury. The court correctly relied on the public defender's representation that it was in defendant's best interests to waive a jury. Moreover, in an ordinary case such as this one, the trial court should not appoint special counsel to represent defendant's "wishes" with respect to whether he or she wants a jury to try the issue of competence.id: 16600
Defense counsel's submission of the competency determination on the psychiatric reports did not violate due process.Contrary to defendant's argument, the law does not prevent defense counsel from waiving a jury trial, foregoing the right to present live witnesses, and submitting the Penal Code section 1368 competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court.id: 16451
Psychiatrist's belief that defendant was incompetent based on his brief observation in the courtroom did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence.A psychiatrist testified for the defendant at the sanity phase regarding a 1977 psychiatric evaluation. While testifying, the doctor stated that the defendant appeared to be incompetent at the present time due to his demeanor. However, the doctor's observations were not the product of any examination, and did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence requiring the initiation of competency proceedings.id: 16452
Court was not required to order a competency hearing based on doctors' testimony that stress would make it difficult for defendant to testify.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to order, sua sponte, a Penal Code section 1368 competency hearing. However, nothing in the testimony of the two doctors raised a reasonable doubt about defendant's ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel. Both experts emphasized his inability to tolerate stressful situations and both stated stress would make it difficult for defendant to testify. It does not follow from such testimony that he was incompetent - only that he might be unable to recapture memory if called to the stand.id: 15779
Section 1370 allows only a three year total period of confinement for treatment to restore competence to stand trial on the same charges.Petitioner's confinement in the state hospital, which exceeded three years, was unlawful because the time limit set forth in Penal Code section 1370 applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same charges.id: 15782
Two of the three experts' conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial supported the jury's verdict of competency.On the first day of penalty phase proceedings, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant's competency and the court initiated proceedings under Penal Code section 1368. Evidence supported the jury's subsequent verdict of competence where two of the three court-appointed experts found defendant competent to stand trial. Moreover, defendant's anger with the jury who convicted him and frustration over his predicament as he sought to absent himself from the penalty phase did not constitute a change in circumstances warranting a second competency determination.id: 15784
Under section 1372 a party claiming a defendant has recovered his mental competence must prove it by a preponderance.For a trial of a defendant's mental competence, Penal Code section 1369 establishes a presumption that a defendant is mentally competent unless he is proved by a preponderance of the evidence to be otherwise. The party claiming the defendant to be incompetent must prove the fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Penal Code section 1372, which applies to a hearing on the defendant's recovery of mental competence, is silent on the issue but the same burden applies.id: 15785
Commitment for a mentally retarded person is proper under section 6500 without proving the retardation was a cause of his dangerous condition.A mentally retarded person who is a danger to himself or others may be committed to the State Department of Developmental Services under Welfare and Institution Code section 6500. Such a commitment is proper without proving that mental retardation was a cause of the dangerous condition.id: 14970
Supreme Court holds that competency standard for guilty plea is same as for trial.Reversing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in <i>Moran v. Godinez</i>, 972F.2d 263 (9th Circ. 1992), the Supreme Court in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Thomas, held that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. The majority found no reason why the competency standard for either of these decisions should be higher than that for standing trial. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined. Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 11772
The appearance of drowsiness did not constitute new evidence of incompetence necessitating a third competency hearing.Prior to his capital trial, defendant had been found incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code section 1368. He was treated and was returned to the court. A second competency hearing was held where a jury determined defendant was competent to stand trial. During voir dire defendant appeared to be sleeping frequently and was drowsy from medication. However, there was also evidence that he may have been exaggerating his symptoms. The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a third competency hearing and the appearance of sleepiness did not constitute new evidence of incompetence necessitating a third competency hearing.id: 11774
The trial court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction when it fails to hold a competency hearing, but rather acts in excess of jurisdiction by depriving defendant of a fair trial.At an earlier trial, the court committed reversible error in failing to hold a competency hearing under Penal Code section 1368, after expressing a doubt as to defendant's ability to proceed with the guilt phase. Moreover, the verdict did not specify the degree of the murder of which defendant was convicted. When the matter was returned to the trial court, the People reinstated all charges including first degree murder. The court held the prosecution could not retry him on any offense greater than second degree murder and the People responded the court's section 1368 error rendered it without jurisdiction except to hold a competency hearing. However, the court did not proceed without jurisdiction, but only in excess of jurisdiction because the failure to hold the competency hearing denied defendant's due process rights. Since the proceedings were not void, double jeopardy prevented retrial for first degree murder.id: 11778
Trial court did not err in denying defendant's outpatient status at the Penal Code section 1600 hearing despite testimony from the doctors that defendant was no longer dangerous.At the restoration of sanity proceeding to determine outpatient status defendant argued the court abused its discretion in finding that he did not meet his burden of proof. Defendant presented the opinions of doctors and other experts who believed defendant was no longer a danger to society. However, in forming their opinions the doctors never considered what would happen if defendant did not take his medication while on outpatient status. Moreover, the court considered the issues of additional stress in defendant's marriage and potential problems with alcohol as well as the fact that defendant would not be supervised on weekends. Having failed to convince the trial court that the expert opinions were valid defendant failed to carry his burden of persuasion.id: 11780
Trial court need not conduct a second competency hearing unless it is presented with new evidence or a substantial change of circumstances.After the trial court denied defendant's motion for modification of the death verdict, but before it pronounced judgment, defense counsel asked the court to suspend proceedings under Penal Code section 1368. In pretrial proceedings, after a section 1368 hearing, defendant was found competent to stand trial. However, the trial court was not required to suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it was presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting doubt on the original finding. Defense counsel in the instant case merely stated that a psychiatrist was present and would testify as to defendant's incompetence. The offer of proof gave no reason to believe the testimony would demonstrate the requisite change of circumstances.id: 11781
Two experts must be appointed for mental competence determination where defendant or counsel informs the court that defendant is seeking a finding of mental incompetence.At the Penal Code section 1368 hearing appellant claimed to be competent, yet defense counsel sought a finding of incompetence. The court erred in appointing only one psychiatrist. The appointment of two experts in such circumstances provides a minimum protection for the defendant against being incorrectly found incompetent to stand trial.id: 11782
Court did not express a doubt as to defendant's competence where he granted defendant's request to appoint an expert to conduct an exam based on sections 1026 and 1368.Defense counsel requested the appointment of an expert for the dual purpose of assisting counsel in making a decision on whether to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and to render an opinion as to defendant's competence. Neither counsel nor the judge expressed a doubt as to defendant's competence. The granting of the motion did not demonstrate an intent to express a doubt that would have required a hearing under Penal Code section 1368, especially where competence was never mentioned again and there were no psychiatric reports on record.id: 11738
Court is not without jurisdiction to entertain a Faretta motion while proceedings are suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1).The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial. Two weeks later and before he was transported to the state hospital, defendant filed a motion to represent himself. Without a hearing, the court denied the <i>Faretta</i> motion without prejudice because defendant had not served the district attorney. Defendant argued the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the <i>Faretta</i> motion while criminal proceedings were suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1). However, the court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion while proceedings were suspended.id: 11743
Court was not required to conduct a hearing regarding defendant's competency based on anxiety due to an eye problem or unsatisfactory jail conditions.Defendant argued the court should have ordered sua sponte a hearing on his competence to stand trial due to his anxiety based on an opthamological problem as well as the fact that the conditions of his confinement at the jail were unsatisfactory. However, the court was not required to hold a hearing where it had no reason to believe these circumstances were due to or caused mental incompetence.id: 11744
Court was not required to conduct a hearing into defendant's competence at the penalty phase where his anger at the guilt phase verdict rendered him unable to cooperate with counsel.During the penalty phase defense counsel informed the court defendant had a severe and serious behavior problem in the wake of the guilt verdict. Counsel claimed defendant's mental state was such that he was no longer able to cooperate with defense counsel. However, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to conduct a hearing on defendant's competence as no doubt arose in the court's mind as to his competence. The court expressed the view that defendant's apparent anger over the verdicts was normal under the circumstances.id: 11745
Court's comment that it was unclear whether there was a 1368 problem did not amount to a doubt requiring commencement of competency proceedings.During jury selection, the court noted that defendant was extremely upset and stated that it was unclear whether we have a 1368 problem or not. The court then appointed a psychologist to examine defendant regarding his competence to stand trial. The doctor found defendant to be competent and the court proceeded with trial. The trial court did not err in failing to commence formal competency proceedings because the court's statement did not amount to a doubt for purposes of competency proceedings. In fact, the judge stated he was not expressing any such doubt.id: 11746
Defendant bears burden to show incompetence to stand trial.Due proces prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause permits a state to require that a defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial bears the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that the fact that the burden of proof has been allocated to the state on a variety of other issues implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights did not mean that the burden must be placed on the state here. Nor does the presumption of competence violate due process. Thus the court found no reason to disturb the state Supreme Court's conclusion that in essence the presumption is simply a restatement of the defendant's burden to show competence by a preponderance of the evidence. Justices O'Connor and Souter concurred in the judgment, and Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 11747
Defendant was not entitled to 26 peremptory challenges for each position being represented on his behalf at the 1368 trial that interrupted his capital trial.During the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial the court suspended proceedings under Penal Code section 1368 and ordered a trial on the issue of his competence. Defense counsel argued defendant was incompetent to proceed while the trial court appointed another attorney to represent defendant's view that he was competent. Defendant argued that since the underlying trial involved the possibility of the death penalty that the court erred in failing to accord each defense attorney 26 peremptory challenges. The court, instead granted 10 each. However, the rule applicable to civil trials applied and defendant was only entitled to six peremptory challenges.id: 11748
Defendant's right to be present at trial does not control in a section 1368 proceeding.Appellant argued that he was deprived of his right to be present at the Penal Code section 1368 hearing. Counsel waived appellant's presence (following disruptive behavior) and agreed to submit the issue of competence based on the report of the court-appointed psychiatrist. Defendant's right to be present at trial does not control a section 1368 proceeding, since it is not a felony trial but rather is a civil proceeding collateral to the criminal trial. Even if appellant's right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings applies to a section 1368 hearing there was no prejudice where the matter was submitted on the expert's opinion and appellant's presence could not have affected the outcome.id: 11749
Defendant's voluntary ingestion of state provided anti-psychotic medication did not deprive him of due process of law.Defendant argued he was denied due process of law because anti-psychotic drugs were administered to him to control his schizophrenia during the proceedings. However, defendant did not move to suspend the administration of the drugs at trial and he could not complain he was denied due process for the first time on appeal. Moreover, the law does not suggest that a competent criminal defendant's voluntary ingestion of medication that has been provided by the state denies the defendant due process of law.id: 11751
Defense counsel had the authority to stipulate to an 11-person jury in mental competency hearing.Over the objection of his client, defense counsel stipulated to the use of an 11-person jury in a hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial for felony charges. Because of the nature of competency proceedings and of the right to a jury trial in those proceedings, counsel had the authority to waive entirely a jury trial over defendant's objection. Included within this is the lesser authority to stipulate to an 11-prison jury.id: 11752
Defense counsel may waive the right to a jury trial in a Penal Code section 1368 hearing over the objections of his client.Appellant argued that defense counsel may not waive the right to a jury trial in a Penal Code section 1368 proceeding over the objections of his client. However, the right to a jury trial in a section 1368 proceeding is not a constitutional right. Therefore, counsel had the authority to waive this right without the consent of his client because trial counsel had the power to exercise independent judgment with respect to strategic decisions at trial.id: 11753
Evidence supported the finding of competency to stand trial despite the experts' conclusions to the contrary where deputy sheriffs testified as to their observation of defendant.Evidence supported the jury's finding defendant was competent to stand trial notwithstanding the conclusion of the two psychiatric experts to the contrary. The experts' conclusions were tentative, and were undermined by the testimony of two sheriff's deputies who had observed the defendant for a two to three day period. Moreover, defendant's subsequent bizarre statements during trial did not constitute a substantial change of circumstances requiring the trial court to hold a second competency hearing.id: 11755
Evidence that appellant had used PCP in the past and that he was violent and not very intelligent did not necessitate a competency hearing.Appellant argued the court knew the following information and that it constituted substantial evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial: he had a long history of PCP use; despite not having a violent background he killed someone without knowing why; he struck his attorney in the courtroom; he had an I.Q. of 70 and stated he did not understand the proceedings. However, there was no evidence he had used PCP in recent years. Moreover,the record showed that on all occasions, appellant was responsive and articulate. Finally, none of the three attorneys who at different times represented appellant, ever suggested that he might be incompetent. The trial court had no duty to conduct a competency hearing.id: 11756
Finding that defendant was not competent three months after his preliminary hearing did not entitle him to a new hearing once competency was restored.Three months after defendant was held to answer on felony charges he was found not presently competent pursuant to Penal Code section 1368, et seq. Defendant was not entitled to a new preliminary hearing once competency was restored where there was no evidence that he was not competent at the time of the earlier hearing.id: 11759
Limited testimony from a deputy sheriff regarding defendant's awareness while in jail was not improper at the competency hearing.At the hearing to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial (Penal Code section 1367, et seq.) the trial court did not abuse its direction in permitting the prosecutor to elicit an opinion from a non-expert witness, a deputy sheriff, regarding defendant's mental state and degree of awareness while in jail.id: 11761
No denial of due process in requiring the defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial.Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (f), which places on the defendant the burden of proving his incompetence to stand trial is not an unconstitutional denial of due process under the state or federal constitution.id: 11765
No prejudicial error in allowing reference to defendant's prior criminal conduct during the competency hearings under section 1367.The prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct at the competency hearing in presenting evidence and argument regarding defendant's prior criminal acts and convictions. The prosecutor explained to the jury that the sole issue before them was defendant's competency and not his guilt of any crimes. Moreover, the court similarly stated that the prosecutor's comments were not evidence and should only be considered if relevant to the competency issue.id: 11766
Nothing in the appellate record suggested defendant's refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege at the competence hearing was the product of defective judgment.At defendant's Penal Code section 1368 competence hearing, his trial attorney was called to testify. He stated that he could not give an opinion as to defendant's competence unless defendant personally waived the attorney-client privilege. Defendant refused to waive the privilege. On appeal defendant argued that since the court implicitly expressed a doubt as to his competence in initiating the proceedings he was presumptively incapable of personally deciding whether to waive the privilege. However, nothing in the record suggested defendant's refusal to waive the privilege was the product of impaired judgment. Moreover, defendant's statements to the court about the attorney-client privilege were coherent and precise, and strongly suggested that he was capable of asserting it.id: 11767
Submission to the court of the issue of competence to stand trial based on psychiatric reports was not per se unconstitutional.Defendant argued he had a right to a full, "trial-type," adversarial hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial. However, Penal Code section 1368 entitled defendant to a "hearing" on the issue of competence and he received one. Submission to the court of the issue of competence to stand trial based on psychiatric reports was not per se unconstitutional or a violation of statute.id: 11770
A capital defendant may not appeal a competence determination in the Court of Appeal.The verdict finding defendant competent to stand trial is a non-appealable, interlocutory ruling. It may be reviewed on appeal only from a final judgment in the underlying criminal proceeding.id: 11722
Allocating to defendant the burden of proving his incompetency to stand trial does not violate due process.Defendant argued that the presumption of competence codified in Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (f), denied him due process of law by irrationally allocating the burden of proving incompetence to someone who may not have been able to assist his attorney prior to and during the hearing. However, the presumption of competence and resultant allocation of the burden of proof to a defendant under California's statutory scheme affords due process under both the federal and state constitutions.id: 11724
Appellant is not denied substantial rights if he is unable to cooperate with appellate counsel.Appellant moved to stay the appeal following a death verdict pending a determination of his current competency. He attached to the motion declarations of mental health experts and attorneys stating that he was not competent to cooperate with appellate counsel. However, a massive record confirming appellant's mental competence already existed, including opinions reached by neutral experts not chosen by either side. Moreover, the considerations that prohibit an incompetent person from being tried do not apply after the judgment as the issues on appeal are limited to the appellate record.id: 11725
At a restoration of competence hearing there is a presumption of competence unless defendant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.When a defendant challenges a certification that he has regained mental competence and demands a hearing under Penal Code section 1372, subdivision (c), the section 1369, subdivision(f) presumption <197> It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent <197> applies at that hearing.id: 11728
Court did not err in granting the motion to withdraw the request for a competency hearing where the court never expressed a doubt as to defendant's competence.Defense counsel advised the court that there was a matter regarding a competency hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 on the calendar. The court declined to set a formal hearing on competency until further evidence was presented after receiving two medical reports concluding the defendant was competent, defense counsel moved to withdraw the request for the hearing. At no time did the court ever express a doubt about defendant's competency and no evidence was presented that defendant was incompetent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to withdraw the request for the competency hearing.id: 11733
Court did not err in instructing at 1368 trial that defendant had to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.During the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial the court suspended proceedings under Penal Code section 1368 and ordered a trial on defendant's competence. Trial counsel argued defendant was incompetent while the court appointed another attorney to represent defendant's view that he was competent. Defendant argued the court should have declined to instruct the jury that either side bore the burden of proof. However, the court did not err in instructing defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally incompetent.id: 11734
Court did not err during penalty phase in appointing another attorney to represent defendant's view that he was in fact competent.During the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial, after the prosecution presented its case, the trial court suspended proceedings under Penal Code section 1368 and ordered a trial on defendant's competency. Defendant argued the court erred in appointing an attorney to represent defendant's view that he was in fact competent at the same time that his trial counsel argued he was incompetent. However, a defendant in a competency proceeding has a right not to be sent to a mental institution with his criminal case unresolved, if he is competent. That the court, without objection, acted further to protect defendant's interest by appointing an additional attorney to represent defendant's personal point of view did not deprive defendant of due process or effective assistance of counsel.id: 11735
Court did not err at the competency hearing in excluding the testimony of an attorney regarding the nature of a penalty trial.At defendant's Penal Code section 1368 hearing to determine his competence to stand trial, defendant called an attorney to the stand to testify about the kind of cooperation needed between a capital defendant and counsel, and the varieties of evidence admissible at the penalty phase. Exclusion of this evidence by the court did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial because nothing in the offer of proof indicated the witness would describe the particular facts or complexities of the instant case.id: 11737
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245