Self-Representation (Faretta)
Category > Self-Representation (Faretta)
Updated 3/4/2024Defendant’s ignorance of legal procedure and language was an improper basis to deny her Farreta motion.The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s Faretta motion to represent herself at trial. While many of her answers to the court’s questions were rambling and showed a lack of understanding of the law, they did not show she was illiterate. Her ignorance of legal procedure and language was not a proper basis to deny self-representation. The Attorney General argued that evidence also supported a finding that defendant was disruptive and her request untimely, but the court never made those findings and they were not supported in the record. The convictions were reversed.id: 26865
Updated 2/23/2024The court’s delegation to the coordinator the authority to grant pro per defendant’s request for investigative and ancillary services violated the separation of powers doctrine. he trial court erred in delegating to the coordinator for pro per cases the disposition of investigative and ancillary defense services. Delegation of these services violated the separation of powers doctrine. id: 26926
Updated 2/4/2024A second judge erred in granting defendant’s request for self-representation without considering the earlier denial by the first judge and the evidence supporting it.Defendant moved to represent himself at his capital trial. The trial judge found him to be delusional and denied his request. A second judge erred in granting the request one year later without considering the first judge’s denial or the evidence on which it was based.id: 27622
Updated 2/3/2024Defendant’s confusion as to two questions on the Faretta form did not constitute evidence of mental illness that would preclude self-representation.The trial court erred by finding defendant was unable to represent himself and thereafter denying his Faretta motion. The fact that the defendant showed confusion about two questions on the Faretta form - one about his need for an interpreter, and the other about his involvement in prior criminal proceedings, did not show that he suffered from a mental illness that would have prevented self-representation.id: 27548
The trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment to counsel by removing the pro se defendant for disruptive conduct before the victim testified, and reversal was automatic.Defendant elected to represent himself at trial. The trial court removed defendant from the courtroom for disruptive conduct before the direct examination of the victim. No stand-by counsel was appointed in defendant’s absence. The denial of counsel during the testimony of a key witness was a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment that required reversal without analysis for harmless error.id: 24984
The master calendar court erred by granting defendant’s Faretta request without first determining whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. In the master calendar court, the defendant exercised his right to represent himself after the court agreed to continue trial where appointed counsel was engaged in another trial. However, the master calendar court failed to properly advise defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The judge simply asked whether defendant initialed and signed the Faretta advisement form, and whether he had any questions. The court did not ascertain on the record that defendant read and understood the form, and the court failed to inquire about ambiguities in defendant’s responses regarding his understanding of the nature of the charges against him.id: 25265
The trial court erred by granting defendant’s Faretta request without understanding it had discretion to conduct an inquiry into defendant’s mental competency.The trial court erred in granting defendant’s request for self-representation under Faretta because it was unaware that it had discretion under Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, to determine whether defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel.id: 24994
The trial court erred by terminating the capital defendant’s Faretta rights as the record did not show an intent to delay.The trial court erred by terminating the capital defendant’s right of self-representation. The court found defendant had been “dilatory” and was “stalling” but the evidence did not support the claims as there was no evidence to show defendant’s discovery requests were made in bad faith or intended to cause delay. The trial court’s abrupt ruling without giving defendant a chance to respond suggested the ruling was a first impulse rather than a last resort. The judgment was reversed.id: 24771
Faretta motion made before penalty phase retrial was timely and the trial court had no discretion to deny it.Defendant was convicted of two counts of capital murder with the multiple murder special circumstance. At the penalty phase the jury recommended LWOP as to one count but was unable to reach a verdict as to the second count, and a mistrial was declared as to that count. Defendant moved for self-representation before the jury selection in the penalty retrial began. The motion was timely and the trial court had no discretion to deny it. The erroneous denial of the motion required reversal of the death verdict.id: 19831
The trial court erred by revoking the defendant’s self-representation under Faretta based on conduct that occurred outside the courtroom.The trial court erred by revoking defendant’s pro per status by applying an incorrect legal standard. The court relied on out-of-court conduct relating to the abuse of the defendant’s pro per privileges at the jail, when it should have been concerned with misconduct at the trial. The matter was remanded for a hearing to determine whether defendant should be permitted to represent himself in a new trial. id: 23825
The trial court erred by allowing the trial to proceed in the absence of the pro-per defendant who had not waived several fundamental trial rights.The trial court granted several pretrial Marsden requests before ultimately (during jury selection) granting defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation. Defendant failed to appear for the second day of trial and the court allowed the trial to proceed in his absence. However, the trial court erred by allowing the trial to proceed because defendant did not knowingly waive several fundamental trial rights. The error was structural requiring automatic reversal. id: 23981
The trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for a one-day continuance after granting his Faretta motion during jury selection.The trial court granted defendant’s request to replace appointed counsel several times before trial. During jury selection the court ultimately granted defendant’s request for self-representation, a request defendant initially made several days earlier. The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s request for a one-day continuance.id: 23982
The trial court prejudicially erred in denying defendant’s Faretta request after finding self-representation would be too difficult because of jail restrictions. Defendant was convicted of capital murder for the stabbing death of a fellow jail inmate (after having been convicted of murdering two college students). The trial court prejudicially erred by denying defendant’s request for self-representation after deciding that he could not adequately represent himself because of jail restrictions resulting from his disciplinary infractions. The judgment was reversed in its entirety. id: 21288
The trial court committed reversible error by permitting the capital defendant to represent himself during proceedings to determine his mental competence.The trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent the capital defendant during the second competency proceeding violated his statutory rights resulting in a reversible miscarriage of justice. The appointment of advisory counsel for the competency proceedings did not satisfy the statutory requirement. The matter was remanded for a determination of whether a retrospective competency hearing was feasible, and if so, for the trial court to hold such a hearing.id: 22767
The trial court erred by failing to admonish defendant regarding his right to counsel at a probation revocation/deferred sentencing hearing.The trial court erred by failing to inform the defendant of his right to counsel at the probation revocation and deferred sentencing hearings. The probation revocation/sentencing orders were conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for a hearing to determine whether defendant wishes to waive his right to counsel after proper admonishments.id: 23003
California courts may deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the capacity to represent themselves at trial. In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, the court found the states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial - persons the court referred to as “gray-area defendants.” In this case, the court found that California courts may deny self-representation when the United States Constitution permits such denial, and the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking defendant’s self-representation status.id: 22572
The trial court improperly granted the Faretta request at the motion to modify the death verdict by failing to explain the dangers of self-representation. Defendant asked to represent himself for the limited purpose of the trial court’s reconsideration of his application to modify the death verdict under Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(e). However, the trial court erred in granting the motion without obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. While the court explained certain benefits of self-representation, it did not properly explain the risks. The death judgment was again reversed and the matter remanded for another hearing on the motion to modify the verdict. id: 20960
The magistrate violated defendant's Faretta rights by denying the request for self-representation where defendant announced he was ready to proceed alone.Defendant informed the court at the beginning of his preliminary hearing that he wanted to represent himself. That appellant expressed frustration with counsel was no reason to deny the request, and the law does not require a "compelling" reason. The request need only be timely and unequivocal. Timeliness was not a problem where defendant indicated he was prepared to proceed without counsel and did not require a continuance. Because Faretta error is structural in nature, defendant's commitment was unlawful and the information was set aside.id: 18864
The trial court prejudicially erred by ordering the self-represented defendant from the courtroom following repeated annoying objections.The trial court granted defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation. The trial court later erred by ordering defendant removed from the courtroom during the direct examination of a critical witness based upon defendant’s repeated and annoying objections to the prosecutor’s questions. The removal violated defendant’s rights to be present and to legal representation and required reversal of his convictions.id: 20309
The Faretta error which occurred when the court appointed the public defender over the pro per defendant’s objection did not require reversal where defendant then retained counsel who represented him throughout the trial.Defendant waived his right to counsel and was representing himself at the early stages of the proceedings. The trial court committed Faretta error at the pretrial proceeding when it reappointed the public defender to represent defendant over his stated wish to remain in pro per. However, reversal of the conviction was not required since, before trial, defendant appeared with retained counsel who represented him at trial, and neither he nor his counsel revisited the Faretta issue once retained counsel was substituted in as his attorney.id: 20454
Defendant had an absolute right to represent himself at sentencing and the trial court erred in denying his postverdict request.Defendant requested self-representation after the jury returned the guilty verdict and his new trial motion had been denied, but well before sentencing. The trial court was required to grant the request which was timely since defendant had an absolute right to represent himself at sentencing. The court erred in denying the request likening it to a midtrial motion for self-representation.id: 19774
The trial court erred in relieving advisory counsel previously appointed by the arraigning judge.While a self-represented defendant has no constitutional right to the assistance of advisory counsel, the trial court erred in relieving advisory counsel previously appointed by the arraigning judge. However, the error was harmless as there was no reasonable likelihood that he would have received a better result had advisory counsel remained.id: 19437
The trial court properly recused members of the DA's office who repeatedly blocked defense counsel's access to the victim's records which were critical to the defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the recusal of members of the District Attorney's Office in a juvenile case. The minor, who was charged with a sex offense,
sought disclosure of the victim's medical and psychological records. The prosecution's repeated and significant efforts to prevent disclosure of the records demonstrated a one-sided perspective on the role of the prosecutor and an apparent attempt to represent the victim's interests while blocking defense counsel's access to records critical to the defense.id: 19349
The right of self-representation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial.After the jury returned its guilt verdict a conflict arose between the pro per defendant and advisory counsel concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence. Defendant rejected counsel's advice to investigate a penalty phase strategy that included an investigation of his psychiatric state. Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Moreover, permitting defendant to preclude any investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase did not violate his right to a reliable penalty determination.id: 18697
Defendant may represent himself during the penalty phase of a capital case.The defendant's right to self-representation is not limited to defense during the guilt phase of trial but extends to the penalty trial in a capital case.id: 12406
Pretrial Faretta warnings are inadequate for subsequent probation revocation and sentencing hearing.If, at a deferred sentencing hearing where the defendant represents himself or herself, there is a complete absence of a waiver of the right to counsel and of any self-representation warnings, reversal is required.id: 12423
Faretta motion was timely when made four weeks before the capital trial was scheduled to commence and the court was contemplating another continuance.Capital defendant moved to represent himself four weeks before trial was scheduled to commence and defense counsel had not yet announced ready for trial. Moreover, a continuance was expressly contemplated by the court in the event defense counsel had to be replaced due to a calendar conflict. Additionally, the trial court, although concerned with the age of the case assured defense counsel that it did not believe that the defense was trying to delay the proceedings. The Faretta motion was timely and the erroneous denial of a timely motion for self-representation is per se reversible.id: 12419
Court erred in denying mid-trial Faretta motion as untimely without discussion or inquiry.After the jury returned its verdict on the robbery charge, and the court proposed to take up the allegation of the prior conviction the defendant moved to represent himself. The court erred in denying the request as untimely without discussion or inquiry. Defendant should have been permitted to recount specific examples of claimed inadequacy and the court should have considered whether any delay would be necessary. However, the error was harmless where the case proceeded to a court trial on the prior conviction allegation and it was inconceivable that defendant, representing himself, could have achieved a more favorable result.id: 12400
Court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's pro se status because of a language problem and the fact that he did not understand legal terminology.The trial judge terminated defendant's pro se status for the following reasons: 1) the language problem it had experienced with defendant; 2) defendant's lack of familiarity with legal language as demonstrated by his ignorance of the meaning of the word motion; and 3) the court's doubts as to whether defendant had sufficient understanding of the proceedings. However, the first two reasons are irrelevant to a decision to revoke pro se status. The only two valid reasons for revoking such status are disruptive in-court behavior or incompetency, neither of which was present. The subsequent conviction was reversed.id: 12389
Trial court abused its discretion in denying Faretta motion where there was no request for a continuance.Defendants were charged with robbery and first degree felony murder. Six days before jury selection defendants moved to represent themselves. There was no request for a continuance and no hint that one would be forthcoming if pro per status was granted. Where self-representation is requested for legitimate reason, where there is no request for a continuance and where there is no reason to believe there would be any delay or disruption, the trial court's denial of a <i>Faretta</i> motion is an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the error was prejudicial as the denial of a timely motion is reversible per se and even if the instant motion was untimely, it may have been to their advantage to conduct voir dire, present opening statements and closing arguments and allow the jury to hear from them without the inconvenience of cross-examination.id: 12425
Trial court improperly created a criterion of extreme dangerousness to deny defendant his absolute right of self-representation.The trial court erred in denying defendant's Faretta motion based on the fact that he was a security risk and sought self-representation only to acquire privileges in jail which might have assisted an escape. The court exceeded its jurisdiction by relying on unauthorized grounds and the order denying the Faretta motion was vacated.id: 12427
Court erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial but incompetent to make the decision regarding self-representation.During pretrial proceedings the trial court expressed a doubt as to defendant's mental competence. Proceedings were suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1368, et seq. A determination was made that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court then denied defendant's pending motion for self-representation finding that defendant was competent to stand trial but not competent to represent himself. This ruling constituted prejudicial error. Competence to waive the right to trial is not judged by a higher standard than competence to stand trial.id: 12401
Chapman harmless error standard applied where defendant voluntarily waived the right to counsel but the court failed to advise him of the dangers of self-representation.The waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary where defendant was offered an attorney, refused to accept, and demanded to proceed in pro per. However, the trial court erred in failing to admonish defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The failure to so advise was subject to the harmless error test set forth in <i>Chapman v. California</i> (1967) 386 U.S. 18. The instant error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not contribute to the verdict and there was uncontroverted evidence of guilt.id: 12388
Court erred in denying Faretta motion where defendant knew how much was at stake and was ready to proceed.The trial court erred in denying defendant's <i>Faretta</i> motion. He did not request a continuance and was prepared to proceed to trial. Moreover, defendant had not demonstrated a proclivity to substitute counsel but argued that he had a profound difference of opinion with defense counsel regarding the manner in which the case should proceed. He was ready to proceed and knew how much was at stake. However, the error did not require reversal in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 12399
The trial court's failure to give adequate warnings of the dangers of self-representation as required by Faretta was prejudicial error.When informed by defendant that he wished to represent himself, the trial court questioned defendant about his ability to understand and appreciate his right to counsel. The court did not ask whether defendant understood the charges against him and the potential consequences if he lost. The court did not warn him that he would receive no special treatment and would be treated like an attorney. The court did not point out his lack of legal skills as compared to his experienced opponent. The failure to give necessary warnings required reversal of the conviction.id: 15907
While the court erred in finding competence to waive counsel imposes a heavier burden than competence to stand trial, the denial of the Faretta motion was justified based on defendant's disruptive conduct in the courtroom.Having found defendant competent to stand trial, the court erred in imposing upon him a higher standard of competence to waive the assistance of counsel. The court further erred in relying upon the standard that a defendant must possess some minimal ability to represent himself in order to be granted the right of self-representation. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's <i>Faretta</i> motion based on the disruptive behavior he had exhibited in the courtroom.id: 15910
The trial court improperly denied repeated Faretta requests since, after the denial of the Marsden motion, the defendant's requests were unequivocal.Defendant made repeated pretrial requests for self-representation. The requests were made after the trial court denied defendant's <i>Marsden</i> motion to have appointed counsel replaced. The trial judge found the assertions for self-representation were equivocal or based on impulse after the denial of the <i>Marsden</i> motion. However, defendant's motivation was immaterial and his requests were timely and unequivocal. The trial court prejudicially erred in denying the requests.id: 15003
Court erred in denying Faretta motion where defendant was competent and fully advised even though he did not understand certain matters on the waiver form.Defendant seeking self-representation was mentally competent and fully informed of his right to counsel. He demonstrated that he was literate and understood the dangers of self-representation. Nothing more was required under <i>Faretta</i>. That he did not understand every matter set forth on the waiver form did not mean the waiver of counsel was not knowing or intelligent. Defendant understood there were deficiencies in his understanding of the law pertaining to his case, but he wanted to represent himself. It was reversible error to deny him that right.id: 15002
Trial court may not find a criminal defendant who files numerous pro se petitions and motions to be a "vexatious litigant."Defendant, who was represented by an attorney, filed numerous pro se motions, petitions and other documents. The trial court prohibited further pro se filings by finding defendant was a "vexatious litigant" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391. However, the court exceeded its authority in issuing the order since the vexatious litigant statutes may only be employed in civil cases.id: 16493
Court's failure to readvise self-representing defendant of his right to counsel at the superior court arraignment was harmless under the Watson standard.When a defendant charged with a felony has been fully and adequately advised at the municipal court stage of the proceedings (or now at the equivocal stage in a unified superior court) of his or her right to counsel throughout the proceedings (including trial) and the defendant has waived counsel under circumstances that demonstrate an intention to represent himself or herself both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, a superior court's failure to readvise the defendant and obtain a new waiver of counsel at the arraignment in superior court, although erroneous, does not require automatic reversal of the conviction. The prejudicial effect of such error is measured under the Watson standard.id: 16870
Defendant's statement that he wanted to represent himself if the court would not replace his attorney was not an equivocal Faretta request.Defendant argued the court erred in granting his request to represent himself because his request to do so was not unequivocal. Rather, he made it clear that he only wanted to represent himself if the court refused to replace his appointed attorney. However, defendant's request was not "equivocal" it was "conditional." When the court decided not to remove counsel, defendant had the choice of going forward with counsel, or representing himself. He chose the latter, and there was nothing improper in putting the defendant to that choice.id: 16905
Court erred in revoking defendant's right of self-representation based upon his receipt of discovery to which he was not entitled.Defendant was granted the right to represent himself. He engaged in no disruptive or obstructive conduct. His investigator left him with some information to which he may not have been entitled. Instead of a sanction of some type, the court rescinded his pro per status because of the out-of-court conduct. This was prejudicial Faretta error.id: 17392
Defendant demonstrated legal knowledge and the fact that he represented himself at the earlier trial showed he understood the Faretta warnings and his waiver of counsel in the capital case was knowing and intelligent.Defendant represented himself at a trial which resulted in a death verdict. He argued that no judge conducted the type of "searching inquiry" this is required to support a valid waiver of counsel. However, the record shows defendant was familiar with the facts and difficulties of the case, and the risks he faced in representing himself. He demonstrated considerable legal knowledge, and represented himself at the previous trial on the attempted murder charges involving the same underlying events. The record shows that he understood the Faretta warnings and that his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent.id: 18692
Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a continuance to prepare a defense where defendant had just taken over his own defense.On August 5, 1988, the date initially set for trial, and the first time appellant was in court after his arraignment, appellant requested to represent himself in propria persona. On that date appellant requested time in which to prepare a defense. During the trial appellant regularly asserted he was unprepared, had not yet received pro per privileges and needed access to legal materials. All appellant's requests for a continuance to properly prepare were denied. Failure to grant the continuance deprived appellant of his right to counsel and to due process. Moreover, appellant was denied his statutory right under Penal Code section 1049, to at least five days to prepare a defense.id: 11933
Court prejudicially erred in denying continuance request of defendant who was deprived of pro per privileges following his transfer from county jail to state prison.Defendant chose to proceed in pro per regarding retrial of the great bodily injury enhancement. His theory of defense was that the gunshot wound was minor. The trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance made on the day of trial. He was diligent in attempting to prepare his defense and timely requested the trial transcript of the prosecution's medical expert which he never received. Moreover, his defense materials were lost by jail personnel and the court prevented him from having meaningful pro per privileges through apparently arbitrary removal to state prison three days after his full pro per privileges had been restored at the jail.id: 11934
If the defendant was properly found competent to stand trial he was necessarily competent to waive counsel and represent himself.The trial court determined defendant was incompetent to represent himself. Proceedings were subsequently suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial. He was found competent to stand trial. He then moved again for self-representation but the motion was denied. The court erred in denying the motion or self-representation because the finding of incompetence to stand trial equates to competence to waive the assistance of counsel. The court's error required reversal of the conviction.id: 11760
Court committed harmless error by excluding a self-represented defendant from a portion of the prosecutor's opening argument after repeated spurious objections and warnings.A defendant who was representing himself was excluded from the courtroom following repeated spurious objections during the prosecutor's opening argument. The court erred by proceeding in defendant's absence while standby counsel was available. However, the error was harmless where the defendant was left unrepresented for only a brief period of time.id: 17032
Updated 2/24/2024The trial court did not err in failing to advise defendant who made a Faretta request that he could not plead guilty without the consent of counsel. Defendant argued his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the municipal court failed to advise him that, even if he waived his right to counsel, he still could not plead guilty. However, the record shows defendant was aware of the disadvantages of self-representation, and because defendant did not make his intent clear, the municipal court was not obligated to inform him that he would not be able to plead guilty if he waived his right to counsel. The court’s inquiry in this regard was sufficient.id: 26641
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court properly revoked defendant’s pro se status after finding he attempted to intimidate a witness.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s right of self-representation after finding that he engaged in an attempt to intimidate a witness.id: 26780
Updated 2/7/2024The denial of defendant’s request for advising counsel was not based on the court’s blanket policy but rather on its assessment of defendant’s abilities.After granting defendant’s request for self-representation, the court did not err in denying his request for advising counsel. The court made reference to a blanket policy that advisory counsel were not appointed in that courthouse. However, the record showed the court’s decision was based on his assessment of the defendant’s abilities.id: 27159
Updated 2/3/2024A defendant may represent himself at a capital trial.The trial court did not err by allowing defendant to represent himself at his capital trial, and the court did not err by rejecting the request for advisory counsel given defendant’s background, education, and demonstrated abilities.id: 27545
Updated 2/3/2024Failing to actively participate in the capital trial despite self-representation was not tantamount to a slow plea.Defendant represented himself at both phases of his capital trial. He waived opening statement and closing arguments at each phase, declined to cross-examine several witnesses and testified against himself. He argued this was tantamount to allowing him to plead guilty in a capital case without the consent of counsel, which is prohibited. However, that principle did not apply where this was not tantamount to a “slow plea.”id: 27546
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court did not err in granting the capital defendant’s Faretta request after denying his sick lawyer a 60 day continuance. Counsel for one of three defendants charged with capital murder moved for a 60-day continuance due to a medical problem. The court denied the request, which was made shortly before trial, and ultimately removed counsel. Defendant ultimately waived his right to counsel and represented himself. He argued on appeal that he lacked the education and background to try the case. However, the court had provided adequate warning and defendant insisted so there was no error in granting the request for self-representation.id: 27786
Updated 2/3/2024Defendant’s motion for self-representation made on the day before resentencing was properly denied as untimely.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for self-representation at sentencing which was raised on the day before sentencing and sought to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a late claim obstructed the orderly administration of justice.id: 27664
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court did not err in finding the capital defendant’s Faretta motion to be untimely where it was raised two days before trial even though the request was made based upon recent events. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation made two days before trial. He claimed that he could not have made the motion earlier because his concerns had not arisen until right before he brought the motion. However, he acknowledged he would need the continuance and did not know how much time he needed. Counsel had been acting competently, the court noted he did not appreciate what he was getting into, and granting his request would cause delay and disruption.id: 27739
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s mid-trial Faretta request in the capital trial even where defendant indicated she would not need a continuance. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her request for self-representation that was made during trial in her capital case. Mid-trial Faretta requests are governed by People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d. 121, which identifies five criteria for a trial court to consider, including whether the request will require a continuance. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the factors other than delay (including counsel’s performance and the stage of proceedings) are also important and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s mid-trial request. id: 25975
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to represent himself during penalty phase closing argument.The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to represent himself at the penalty phase closing argument during his capital case. Contrary to defendant’s claim, a court’s ruling on a mid-trial Faretta request may properly consider the possibility of disruption, the quality of counsel’s representation, the reasons for the request and defendant’s proclivity for substituting counsel.id: 25676
Faretta waiver was valid despite the lack of a specific admonition regarding the monetary fine following a conviction.Defendant represented himself at trial, and argued on appeal that his Faretta waiver was invalid because the court failed to warn him that a conviction for the money laundering offense could result in a fine of up to $250,000. The court warned defendant of the other consequences. The pretrial waiver of counsel can be valid even if the court fails to advise the defendant of monetary fines. Assuming there was such a duty, any error was harmless under the Chapman standard.id: 25056
The trial court was not required to obtain a new Faretta waiver after it learned the prosecution was seeking the death penalty.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting him to represent himself at the capital trial without determining whether he was sufficiently competent to present his defense. However, defendant’s conduct in writing and arguing motions, and his cooperative and articulate manner during the trial showed he was capable of the basic tasks of self-representation. Contrary to defendant’s claim the trial court was not required to obtain a new Faretta waiver once it learned the prosecution was seeking the death penalty.id: 25038
The trial court did not err by allowing the defendant who did not seek to change the death verdict to represent himself at the hearing on the motion to modify the verdict.The trial court did not err by allowing the defendant to represent himself at the Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(e) hearing, which allows the court to modify the jury’s death verdict even though defendant expressed a desire to leave the death verdict intact. The trial court adequately explained the dangers of self-representation and took efforts to make sure defendant’s decision was considered and not impulsive.id: 24853
The trial court made proper accommodations after ordering that the self-represented defendant be shackled.The trial court did not err by ordering the self-represented defendant to wear physical restraints given defendant’s history of violence and current assaultive conduct at the jail. The court imposed the least intrusive means to accomplish its goal as defendant (who dressed in civilian clothes) had one free hand for note taking, the prosecution agreed to remain at counsel table as much as possible, sidebars were conducted during breaks, and both sides used “runners” to deliver exhibits to the witnesses.id: 25193
The violation of defendant’s right to counsel at sentencing was harmless where the parties had previously negotiated the terms of the sentence.Trial counsel did not appear for sentencing after the negotiated plea, and the defendant suggested that he just represent himself. However, because the record did not support a waiver of counsel and an unequivocal right of self-representation, defendant’s right to counsel at sentencing was violated. Nevertheless, any error was harmless where the sentencing was simply a process to put on the record what the parties had previously negotiated.id: 25195
The trial court did not err by proceeding with an already commenced trial where defendant failed to appear after the court granted his Faretta request.After going through several appointed lawyers, defendant moved for self-representation. During jury selection the court indicated it would not grant defendant even a one day continuance, and then granted his request for self-representation. Defendant finished the voir dire and appeared for full examination of the prosecution’s first witness. Defendant failed to appear in trial the next day, as the court tried to locate him (he was out of custody). The next day the court found defendant had voluntarily absented himself and resumed trial without him. The court did not err by failing to reappoint counsel as defendant waived the right to counsel and to be present. The court also did not err by refusing to grant a one day continuance.id: 24805
Defendant waived his right to represent himself at the Prop 47 hearing by failing to assert the right, and waived the right to be present for the misdemeanor resentencing. Defendant had represented himself in the earlier case and later filed a Prop 47 petition. The trial court appointed counsel, granted the petition, and sentenced him on the misdemeanor convictions. Defendant argued the trial court deprived him of the right to represent himself at the Prop 47 hearing. However, the record shows defendant did not continue to assert, but rather waived his right of self-representation. Defendant also argued that he had a right to be present at the resentencing, but counsel indicated defendant had waived his right to be present for the misdemeanor resentencing.id: 24609
There is no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal from an SVP commitment.The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself on appeal following the jury’s verdict finding him to be a sexually violent predator.id: 21485
Defendant’s complaint about losing law library privileges was not a renewed Faretta request after counsel had been appointed.The trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s pro se status where he accepted the appointment of counsel. His complaint about losing his library privileges was not a renewed request for self-representation.id: 24113
The Faretta waiver was knowing and voluntary even though the defendant had mental health issues (that were brought out more fully during trial) and the court failed to thoroughly question the defendant about his decision to represent himself. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by granting his motion for self-representation without determining whether his mental health issues prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and by failing to further inquire once the mental health issues were brought to the court’s attention during trial. However, defendant filled out the waiver form and answered “yes” when asked if he wanted to represent himself. The court’s failure to conduct a more thorough inquiry did not require a different result. The record showed the Faretta waiver was knowing and voluntary.id: 24092
The trial court did not err by denying self-representation to a defendant who refused to come to court and be interviewed by a mental health expert.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a criminal defendant the right to represent himself when he repeatedly refused to come to court and be interviewed by a mental health expert. The court was not required to explain why defendant’s refusals would interfere with his trial.id: 23899
Factors that led the court to deny self-representation did not establish substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial.Defendant argued the same evidence that led the trial court to conclude he was incapable of representing himself during the penalty phase retrial due to his impaired rationality should have led it to declare a doubt as to his competency, and start Penal Code section 1368 proceedings. However, the court explicitly declared it had no doubt about defendant's competency. A lack of objectivity and a possibly self-destructive emotional approach to self-representation does not equate to substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial.id: 19832
The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for self-representation following the expert’s report concluding that he was not competent to represent himself.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to represent himself after the expert’s report concluded he was not competent to do so. While defendant was not obstreperous and was otherwise lucid, the trial court clearly believed that defendant, due to his mental illness, was not capable of carrying out the basic tasks required to present his defense.id: 23875
The trial court adequately warned a defendant seeking self-representation by advising him that he faced “life in prison.”When defendant moved for self-representation, the trial court warned him of various consequences, including the fact that he faced “life in prison.” Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court was not required to describe the full range of sentencing options. The advisement the court gave adequately notified defendant of the punishment he faced if convicted.id: 24071
Defendant’s mid-trial Faretta motion was not connected to the court’s earlier mistaken comment that the ADW count was not a strike offense.Defendant argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily exercise his right of self-representation (mid-trial) because the trial court incorrectly advised him that the assault with a deadly weapon count was not a strike offense. While the court misspoke at one pretrial hearing, the record showed that by the time defendant elected self-representation he had been repeatedly informed the assault count was a strike offense. And the record did not show that defendant’s Faretta motion was related to the earlier misinformation.id: 23523
The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on the Faretta motion mentioned by counsel where defendant never informed the court he wanted to represent himself.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing following his second Faretta motion. However, defendant failed to inform the trial court that he wanted to represent himself even though there had been some discussion with counsel. Also, counsel’s brief mention of the issue just moments before the trial began was untimely.id: 23496
Defendant’s request to dismiss counsel and stated desire to forego mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was not a clear invocation of his Faretta right to self-representation. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s right of self-representation because defendant never made an unequivocal demand to proceed in pro per. Defendant said he didn’t want his current counsel and he didn’t want to put on any mitigating evidence at his penalty phase. He never said he wanted to represent himself if his request to dismiss counsel was denied.id: 23725
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s pro per status after finding he engaged in delay tactics.The trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s in pro per status after 10 and one-half months. Defendant subpoenaed no witnesses during that time and provided no discovery. Rather, he used the time to seek to disqualify the judge and prosecutor, and he filed a change of venue motion. The record shows he did not engage in efficient investigation and preparation and the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his self-representation after finding he engaged in delay tactics.id: 23430
The trial court’s Faretta warnings were not deficient where the defendant repeatedly interrupted during the standard admonition.The trial court did not err in failing to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry where the trial court attempted to provide the standard admonition on the record but the defendant repeatedly interrupted with frivolous objections. Defendant was trying to create reversible error by preventing the court from giving the standard warning. In any event, the trial court did ascertain on the record that defendant understood many of the consequences of self-representation. id: 23238
The trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel for the pro per defendant at sentencing where defendant never unequivocally requested the appointment of counsel.Defendant represented himself at trial, and argued the court erred by failing to appoint counsel to represent him at the sentencing hearing. However, defendant never made an unequivocal request for counsel at sentencing and so there was no error.id: 23239
The trial court had no duty to inform the defendant of his option to request advisory counsel after it granted his request to represent himself.Defendant argued that after granting his request to represent himself, the trial court erred by failing to advise him that he had the right to ask for “advisory counsel” or request an attorney to act as both advisory and standby counsel. However, the trial court had no duty to inform defendant of his right to standby counsel.id: 23157
The trial court did not err by denying the pro per defendant’s request to reappoint counsel for the sentencing hearing. The trial court granted defendant’s request to represent himself for posttrial proceedings but denied his requested continuance. Defendant later asked that counsel be reappointed. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reappoint counsel as he was told originally about the problems with self-representation. In any event, defendant did not show that reappointment of counsel during the sentencing would have helped him.id: 22943
The trial court did not err by refusing to reinstate full in propia persona privileges at the jail after defendant was found with a sharpened object.Defendant was representing himself at the capital trial. A deputy in the jail found him in possession of a sharpened object and his law library privileges were revoked. However, defendant was provided with other reasonable resources to prepare his defense including a court-appointed advisory counsel, an investigator and a legal runner who had the ability to provide him with legal materials and to make telephone calls on his behalf.id: 22254
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a second attorney to act as “cocounsel” in a capital case where defendant chose to represent himself. Defendant represented himself during the pretrial proceedings. The trial court did not err by denying his repeated requests for the appointment of an attorney to serve as his “cocounsel.” The court did appoint advisory counsel who could help with certain things but not actively participate in the trial. The court’s ruling also did not violate the state law right to the appointment of a second attorney because Penal Code section 987, subd.(d) does not apply when a defendant proceeds in pro per.id: 22253
The error in allowing defendant to represent himself at the MDO extension trial was harmless. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at the proceeding to extend his commitment as a mentally disordered offender. However, his rights to counsel and self-representation at that trial are statutory, not constitutional and are reviewed for harmless error. No reasonable probability existed that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result if he had been represented by counsel at trial. id: 22238
Defendant’s right of self-representation was not violated due to his lack of direct access to the law library.Defendant argued that he was compelled to waive his right to represent himself at trial because he was refused direct access to a law library while in custody and was provided insufficient access to legal research materials, and had to use a “paging” system that provided legal material upon request. However, defendant was provided “reasonable access” to the services necessary to prepare his defense as he had access through trained legal research assistants to a comprehensive list of legal materials.id: 22535
Faretta motion was untimely where it was raised on the date set for “motions/trial”.The trial court did not err in finding defendant’s motion to represent himself was untimely where it was raised on the day the trial could have started even though trial did not start for about two weeks due to the need to argue a fairly complicated motion.id: 22161
Claim that the statements were coerced did not preserve a challenge as to the adequacy of the Miranda warnings and there was no IAC by failing to object where the defendant represented herself at the retrial. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting statements she made to the police because the Miranda warnings were defective. At her first trial where she was represented by counsel, she argued the statements were coerced but did not challenge the adequacy of the warnings. She represented herself following a mistrial, and again argued coercion but did not challenge the warnings. This was not sufficient to preserve the issue of defective Miranda warnings for the appeal. Because she represented herself at the second trial she could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to make a proper objection. Even though retained counsel failed to object at the first trial, the court at the second trial permitted new arguments.id: 21939
A defendant has no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal from an SVP commitment.After a jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator, he sought to represent himself on appeal. However, there is no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal from an SVP commitment. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's original request to represent himself or his renewed request at oral argument.id: 21806
The trial court did not err by denying the motion to reconsider its order removing counsel who was appointed as advisory counsel but acted and sought the appointment as lead counsel.Counsel was not on the official list of lawyers qualified to represent capital defendants, but represented defendant at the preliminary hearing and was thereafter appointed as advisory counsel after defendant moved to represent himself. She prepared for trial as though she would be lead counsel but had earlier been denied the appointment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider its order removing counsel as the court believed that would reward counsel for acting as lead counsel when she was only advisory. While defendant liked and trusted her, this confidence was not unique as defendant later enjoyed a good relationship with the attorney that was appointed.id: 21691
The trial court did not err by failing to appoint counsel for the pro per defendant at sentencing where defendant never made an unequivocal request for counsel. Defendant who represented himself at trial, made vague references for a "JAG" or his uncle (a nonlawyer) to represent him at sentencing. However, he never made an unequivocal request for counsel at sentencing, and the court's failure to appoint counsel was not prejudicial error.id: 21621
Defendant who intentionally interfered with the court's Faretta admonitions knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. Defendant argued the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry to determine whether he was competent to waive counsel. However, the trial court attempted to provide the standard Faretta admonitions, but defendant repeatedly interrupted with frivolous objections showing that he was trying to inject reversible error into the case by insisting on proceeding without counsel, and thwarting the court's ability to complete the admonitions. Moreover, the record showed defendant understood the risks of waiving counsel and chose to do so.id: 21620
The trial court did not err in considering the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the Faretta motion was timely. The trial court did not err by denying the capital defendant’s motions for self-representation as untimely even though they were raised weeks before the start of trial and not made for purposes of delay. But in ruling on such a motion, a trial court may properly consider all of the circumstances. Here, the court properly considered the facts that certain witnesses were elderly, defendant offered no justification for his requests, and granting the motion would likely result in a substantial delay of the proceedings.id: 21791
The trial court did not err by denying as untimely, defendant’s Faretta request made prior to closing argument. The trial court did not err by rejecting as untimely, defendant’s mid-trial motion for self-representation even though he advised the court he would not need a continuance to present his own closing argument. The trial court’s failure to recite the appropriate factors in denying the request did not require a different result. id: 21795
Supreme Court rejects right to self-representation for defendant who is not competent to represent himself.Prior to defendant’s state trial on attempted murder and other charges, the trial judge found him mentally incompetent to stand trial. Defendant’s condition later improved, and he was found competent to stand trial. Defendant then sought to represent himself at trial. The trial court found that defendant was competent to stand trial but not competent to represent himself. Accordingly, it denied defendant’s request to represent himself. In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that when a court finds a defendant competent to stand trial but not to represent himself, it may deny his request to represent himself. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.id: 21426
Supreme Court declines to overrule Faretta. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Court held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to proceed without counsel when the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives his right to the assistance of counsel. In a case involving a defendant who was competent to stand trial, but not competent to represent himself, the State asked the Supreme Court to overrule Faretta and hold that a defendant has no right to represent himself. In a decision by Justice Breyer, the Court declined to do so. The Court noted that some trial judges had expressed concern that Faretta leads to unfair trials, but found insufficient empirical evidence to call Faretta into question.id: 21427
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request to revoke his pro se status once the joint trial started.Defendant waived his right to counsel and the trial court granted his Faretta request. During trial he sought to revoke the waiver and have counsel appointed. Considering all of the circumstances, especially defendant’s failure to articulate a compelling reason for revoking his Faretta waiver and the likely delay and disruption that continuing a joint trial after the jury was empaneled would cause, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the revocation request. id: 20925
Defendant’s inability to control his courtroom behavior justified the denial of his timely Faretta request.The trial court properly denied defendant’s timely request to represent himself. First, he repeatedly requested self-representation after an adverse ruling, but then withdrew the request after he settled down. It was questionable whether his requests were unequivocal and not a function of pique. Nonetheless, the denial of defendant’s Faretta request was justified by his demonstrated inability to conform his behavior to the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.id: 20924
There is no right of self-representation at an SVP trial.Defendant argued the trial court committed Faretta error by denying his right to self-representation at his sexually violent predator trial. However, a right to self-representation does not exist in a civil commitment proceeding under the SVPA, under either the rationale of Faretta or the Due Process clause.id: 19032
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the capital defendant’s Faretta motion raised on the day of sentencing after the court denied a Marsden motion and defendant made a vague reference to a new trial motion.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for self-representation made for the first time on the day of sentencing at this capital trial. He never requested self-representation at the guilt or penalty phases, and only raised the issue at sentencing after the court denied his request to replace his appointed lawyer with a new one and to secure a continuance. While he referred to a motion for a new trial he wanted to file, he had no evidence to support such a motion. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s ruling was well within the scope of its discretion. id: 20741
Capital counsel’s fee agreement which allowed him to keep unspent defense expense funds did not create an inherent and irreconcilable conflict of interest.In a capital case, the County of Fresno agreed to pay the fees of appointed defense counsel. Under the contract, counsel received an $80,000 flat fee that included $60,000 for defense expenses, and counsel was allowed to keep any money not spent. Counsel spent about 20% of the money allocated for defense expenses and kept the rest. Defendant argued the compensation agreement created a conflict of interest under the state and federal constitutions as it provided a financial disincentive for counsel to adequately investigate and prepare the case. The court first ruled conflict claims are no longer analyzed differently under state and federal constitutional analysis. The federal analysis now controls. The record did not show whether defense counsel’s trial preparations were unreasonable, and so there can be no informed speculation that the representation violated defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel.id: 20740
The trial court erred in refusing to issue removal orders for the self-represented defendant's prison witnesses due to his mistaken belief that the defendant was first required to serve subpoenas on the witnesses.The trial court required the self-represented defendant to serve subpoenas on his prisoner witnesses before they could be brought to court. A witness incarcerated in prison is brought to criminal court to testify by means of a removal order issued pursuant to Penal Code section 2621 or 1567. The judge would not issue removal orders for defendant's witnesses due to his mistaken belief that defendant was first required to have subpoenas served on his witnesses within the prison - a hurdle defendant never overcame. However, the error was harmless under the Watson standard.id: 20092
Court did not err in conditioning its grant of a Faretta motion on proceeding to trial as scheduled and refusing to grant a continuance.Prior to jury selection the defendant moved to proceed in pro per. The court believed the motion was a tactic to obtain a continuance and told defendant that pro per status would be granted, but there would be no continuance. The court did not abuse its discretion in conditioning its grant of a Faretta motion on proceeding to trial as scheduled and in refusing to grant a continuance.id: 12394
Denial of defendant's Faretta motion was reviewable after a plea of no contest.The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's Faretta motion based on the court's conclusion that defendant's skills were inadequate in this serious case. Moreover, the denial of the motion is reviewable on appeal after a plea of no contest.id: 12412
Court did not err in permitting self-representation at the penalty phase where defendant may have sought the death penalty.Defendant argued the court erred at the penalty phase in granting his motion for self-representation because he had made it clear that he, in effect, wished to commit suicide. However, the record does not support this claim. Moreover, a court does not violate the public policy against state-assisted suicide by permitting a defendant self-representation at the penalty phase, even with the knowledge the defendant will seek the death penalty.id: 12396
Denial of pro per's request to withdraw his Faretta waiver was structural error.After a half-day of jury selection, the pro per defendant thought better of his decision and asked that counsel be appointed to represent him at trial. The trial court refused to permit defendant to withdraw his Faretta waiver. The denial of defendant's request violated his constitutional right to counsel and constituted structural error requiring automatic reversal of his conviction.id: 20027
There was no due process violation in allowing defendant to represent himself, as he was determined to be competent by an expert, (without a full hearing) and showed a rational understanding of the proceedings throughout the trial.Defendant argued the trial court violated his right to due process by allowing defendant to represent himself while he was mentally incompetent. However, the evidence showed he understood the proceedings and was effective in certain respects for several days before he started making vulgar comments to the court. He was thereafter examined by a court appointed expert and found to be competent. A full competency hearing was not required absent substantial evidence of incompetence. Allowing him to represent himself did not violate due process where he always maintained a rational understanding of the proceedings. Stand-by counsel was not ineffective in failing to demand a full competency hearing.id: 20056
Defendant's Faretta request before the preliminary hearing was equivocal and appeared an attempt to get an attorney who would subpoena the witnesses defendant wanted to produce.The record showed defendant's statements that he wanted to go pro per were the impulsive reactions to his frustrated attempts to secure an attorney who would subpoena the witnesses he desired, rather than an unequivocal Faretta request. Even if the early Faretta request was wrongfully denied, defendant abandoned the request after the preliminary hearing as he proceeded with retained counsel of his choice. Moreover, any error in denying the Faretta request prior to the preliminary hearing was harmless (harmless error analysis applies at this stage) as there was no showing that the trial defense was impaired by the denial of the right of self-representation at the preliminary hearing.id: 19910
The trial court did not err in admitting as evidence portions of defendant's closing argument made at the first trial where he represented himself.The trial court did not err in admitting as evidence his closing statement from the first trial in which he represented himself. Admitting the statement did not penalize him for his earlier self-representation and did not violate due process by admitting a statement he made while acting as constitutionally inadequate counsel.id: 19651
Defendant's request to represent himself before the preliminary hearing was equivocal and later abandoned, and any error in denying the request was harmless.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for self-representation at a pre-trial proceeding and the preliminary hearing. However, defendant made his request only after the denial of his Marsden motion and his remarks were impulsive attempts to secure an attorney who would subpoena the witnesses he desired. The request was not unequivocal for Faretta purposes. Moreover, defendant's conduct following the preliminary hearing shows he abandoned the desire to represent himself. In any event, the improper denial of the Faretta request at the preliminary hearing was harmless, where he did not seek writ relief after the ruling and was represented by
counsel of his choice at trial.id: 19663
Defendant's waiver of right to counsel was valid despite the missing transcripts and the failure to readvise him following arraignment was harmless. Transcripts from the Faretta hearing were missing so there was no record of the text of the advisements given before defendant waived his right to counsel. The failure to readvise defendant of these rights at the arraignment in superior court was harmless as defendant insisted on representing himself throughout the protracted proceedings.id: 19669
The trial court did not err by refusing to appoint advisory counsel for defendant who competently represented himself.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing defendant's repeated requests for an appointment of advisory counsel during the trial where he represented himself. Defendant demonstrated his competence and ability throughout
the course of the trial and the court was not required to appoint advisory counsel.id: 19670
The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel at defendant's second competency hearing.The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent
defendant at the second competency hearing during a trial in which he was representing himself. Whenever the trial court declares a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial and
suspends proceedings under Penal Code section 1368, counsel must be appointed to represent defendant. Since a competency report was prepared a new trial may not be required and the matter was remanded for a retrospective competency hearing.id: 19646
Defendant's Faretta request was not knowing and intelligent where he did not understand that granting the motion would end his right to court-appointed counsel.Defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied because the record showed he did not fully appreciate that he would be foregoing his right to the assistance of appointed
counsel if permitted to represent himself. As such, the waiver of his right to counsel was fully knowing and intelligent. Moreover, by accepting several court-appointed lawyers to represent him at various stages, defendant ultimately abandoned his request for self-representation.id: 19227
Defendant was not denied the right to counsel and forced to represent himself at his MDO trial where the court refused to order his attorney to try the case before a jury.Counsel for defendant challenging a mentally disordered offender certification waived jury trial without defendant's consent. Defendant argued he was thereafter forced to waive counsel in order to assert his right to a jury trial. However, defendant was not forced to do anything. After allowing defendant to represent himself, the court assisted with cross-examination of the state's witnesses and the presentation of the defense case.id: 18902
The trial court properly denied defendant's Faretta request after inquiring about his knowledge of the law and after defendant changed his mind and agreed to continue with appointed counsel.The trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for self-representation. Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not improperly condition its decision on defendant's legal knowledge, and was obligated to inquire into defendant's understanding of the charges and the law to determine whether he understood the risks of self-representation. Next, while defendant's request was initially determined to be unequivocal, it was later apparent that it was an equivocal request since defendant withdrew the request and agreed to continue with appointed counsel. Finally, it was not improper for the court to ask Marsden-related questions since defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was associated with his request to represent himself.id: 18874
Pro per defendant assisted by advisory counsel was not denied access to the courts.Defendant was granted pro per status, and the court appointed advisory counsel. Defendant argued that he was denied meaningful access to the courts as he was denied access to legal research, police reports, a telephone, and the law library. However, defendant never mentioned any problem in this regard until several days into the trial. Moreover, advisory counsel helped protect defendant's interests. Advisory counsel cross-examined witnesses, argued motions, made objections, and gave the closing argument.id: 18846
Judge's knowledge that defendant had been found insane at a trial 15 years earlier did not require a finding that he was not competent to waive counsel in the present capital case.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to declare a doubt about his competence to waive his right to counsel based on knowledge that Judge Nelson, who briefly presided over pretrial proceedings in this case long after defendant had been granted the right to represent himself, had gained during defendant's earlier trial on the related attempted murder charges. However, that defendant had been found insane at a criminal trial 15 years earlier was insufficient, without more, to compel a doubt about whether he understood the present proceedings. That Judge Nelson referred to defendant as a "psychopath" in the earlier case did not show he doubted his competence. Finally, nothing about defendant's military record (he was repeatedly AWOL) or inability to keep a job, showed he was not competent to waive counsel in the present case.id: 18693
Pro per defendant was not denied the same level of ancillary services available to defendants represented by counsel.Defendant, who was granted pro per status at his capital trial, argued that he was denied equal protection since capital defendants who are represented by counsel are afforded more ancillary services. However, defendant was appointed advisory counsel (two lawyers), investigators, experts, a runner, and library services. Any denial of access to resources was minimal and defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice.id: 18696
The authority to revoke a defendant's right of self-representation is not limited to in-court misconduct.The trial court's authority to terminate a defendant's right of self-representation is not limited to in-court misconduct. The Court of Appeal erred in finding the trial court erred by revoking defendant's in propria persona status based on out-of-court conduct relating to discovery matters. The matter was remanded for a full hearing as to the reasons for and necessity of terminating defendant's right of self-representation.id: 18345
The trial court did not err by denying the untimely Faretta motion even after confusing the issue by insisting on a Marsden motion.Defendant argued the trial court erred by insisting that he make a Marsden motion before the court would hear his Faretta motion. While defendant initially failed to make an unequivocal request for self-representation, he later did so. However, the request was untimely as it was made during trial. While the court may have been confused the issue by insisting on a Marsden motion, defendant finally agreed before his Faretta request. However, since the motion was made at such a late stage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.id: 18332
Defendant did not unequivocally invoke the right of self-representation by suggesting it when expressing frustration over his inability to get counsel of his choice.Expressing frustration over his inability to get counsel of his choice, defendant asked if it was possible for him to represent himself. However, this was not an unequivocal request for self-representation. This conclusion is supported by defendant's later comment that any counsel later appointed would be disadvantaged by limited fees when compared to the prosecutor's unlimited resources.id: 18052
Defendant's violent tendencies and accusations that he had threatened potential witnesses did not suggest he was not competent to stand trial.Defendant was permitted to represent himself during the nine months of pretrial proceedings following the preliminary hearing. His previous lawyer was appointed to serve as advisory counsel during this time. Defendant argued on appeal that because he had been accused of threatening witnesses, the trial court was required to find that he was not competent to waive counsel at that time. However, defendant's threats or violent tendencies did not provide a basis for questioning his competence to stand trial or waive counsel.id: 17984
The trial court did not err by refusing to appoint counsel to represent the pro per defendant at sentencing.Defendant represented himself at trial but moved to relinquish his pro per status and be represented by the public defender for sentencing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reappointment of counsel during the sentencing hearing. His request was made late in the proceedings and appeared to be the product of hindsight as he believed he made a mistake by representing himself at trial. Moreover, he represented himself effectively at trial and appeared capable of doing so at sentencing.id: 17814
Defendant's statement that he might go pro per was not an unmistakable demand for self-representation.Following the denial of defendant's Marsden motion, he said "If I want to go pro per in this case I could do that." Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, his statement was not an articulate and unmistakable demand for self-representation. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion during pretrial motions when ruling defendant could represent himself at that time only if he was ready to proceed to trial without delay.id: 17698
Supreme Court will only consider represented capital inmate's pro se petitions to matters outside the scope of counsel's representation or matters concerning representation.The Supreme Court will not file or consider a represented capital inmate's pro se petitions that challenge the legality of the inmate's death judgment or otherwise fall within the scope of counsel's representation. The court will file and consider a represented capital inmate's pro se submissions that pertain to matters falling outside the scope of counsel's representation. The court will also file and consider pro se petitions limited to matters concerning the inmates representation.
id: 17506
The trial court did not err by allowing defendant to testify in the penalty phase against the advice of counsel following the necessary warnings and waiver.Defendant testified at the penalty phase, against the advice of counsel. He testified in the narrative form. He said, among other things, that he believed death was the appropriate penalty. On appeal, he argued the court erred in failing to determine whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and in failing to adequately caution him against giving narrative testimony. However, the court repeatedly admonished defendant regarding his refusal to take counsel's advice and the dangers of testifying. The court did not err in allowing defendant to exercise his right to testify. Moreover, since counsel was present it was not necessary that the warnings about self-representation be as complete as would be necessary for a defendant who sought to conduct the entire defense.id: 17350
Withdrawal of defendant's Faretta motion was valid as it was not a product of confusion over the appointment of advisory counsel or defendant's prisoner status in the library.Defendant argued the withdrawal of his Faretta motion was ineffective because it was motivated by confusion over whether the court was willing to appoint one of his current attorneys as advisory counsel and by counsel's unfulfilled promise to try to get him cocounsel status. Initially, there was no confusion regarding the court's willingness to appoint one of his appointed lawyers as advisory counsel. The court twice expressly stated it would do so. Next, the record shows defendant indicated a desire to withdraw the Faretta motion before counsel suggested he would file a motion regarding special status allowing defendant better access to legal materials. id: 17264
An accused may forfeit his right to counsel by serious misconduct against a succession of appointed counsel, but defendant is entitled to a hearing with counsel present before such forfeiture.Balancing the importance of the right to counsel and the orderly administration of justice, the court found an accused may forfeit his right to counsel by a course of serious misconduct towards counsel that illustrates lesser measures will not protect counsel, and the appointment of successor counsel is futile. Forfeiture of counsel should be a last resort only after lesser measures, including but not limited to a warning and physical restraints or protections, have failed. Further, forfeiture of counsel can only occur after a hearing at which defendant is afforded full due process protections, including the assistance of counsel.id: 17274
Trial court need not advise a self-represented defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination before testifying.A trial court is not required to advise a self-represented defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination. The so-called Kilpatrick-Kramer rule stating otherwise is invalid. However, the trial court remains free to provide such an advisement, so long as its words do not stray from neutrality toward favoring any one option over another.id: 17239
Defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel under Faretta at the capital trial despite minor missteps, or lack of familiarity with courtroom procedure.The record did not support defendant's claim that he was incompetent to waive his right to the assistance of counsel and to represent himself in the capital trial. That he took missteps in his self-representation or occasionally expressed some perplexity at courtroom procedure reflects his lack of legal knowledge, not mental illness or incompetency. Moreover, while the warnings were not precise in certain respects, they adequately informed defendant of the risks of self-representation. Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation should not apply to capital trials.id: 16788
The defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary even where appointed advisory counsel was not ready to proceed at the penalty phase.Defendant represented himself at his capital trial. He argued his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary because advisory counsel was not ready to assume appointed counsel status at the penalty hearing. However, defendant was advised of and accepted the restrictions on advisory counsel's role. He cannot thereafter complain that his waiver of counsel and assumption of responsibility for his own defense were involuntary.id: 16642
Court did not err in denying untimely request to terminate pro per status prior to the penalty phase.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to terminate defendant's pro per status at the penalty phase. The motion was untimely since it was made right before the penalty trial commenced. Moreover, the record did not support a conclusion that defendant was incapable of presenting a penalty phase defense.id: 16644
Court did not err in denying Faretta motion made six days before trial and immediately after the court denied the Marsden motion.Six days before defendant's aggravated assault trial was to begin he filed a Marsden motion seeking to relieve appointed counsel. When the motion was denied he asked to proceed in pro per. However, he informed the court he would need a continuance to prepare for trial. The court did not err in denying the untimely motion. Defendant filed another Marsden motion four months earlier which was also denied. He had ample opportunity in that four month period to make a timely Faretta motion. Moreover, the present request was equivocal where it was made immediately after the denial of a Marsden motion suggesting defendant's primary objective was to rid himself of appointed counsel.id: 16468
Court need not advise a defendant seeking pro se status of each limitation upon his ability to act effectively as counsel.Defendant argued his waiver of counsel at the penalty phase was not knowing and intelligent because the court did not warn him of the restrictions that would be imposed on his ability to meet with his investigator and to interview witnesses. The court need not advise a defendant seeking pro se status of each limitation upon his ability to act effectively as counsel that would flow from security concerns as long as the record as a whole shows defendant understood the dangers of self-representation. Moreover, when defendant sought pro se status he asserted that he already had contacted the witnesses and knew what they would say.id: 15899
Court properly revoked defendant's pro per status after finding deliberate delaying tactics.The trial court did not err in revoking defendant's right of self-representation after finding he was deliberately delaying the trial. Defendant's feigned mental illness, escape, continuous motions for continuance, and "over a year" readiness estimate support the trial court's revocation order.id: 15900
Court's finding that defendant was incompetent to waive counsel did not require the court to initiate a competency hearing.The trial court's finding that defendant was incompetent to waive his right to counsel did not, as a matter of law, constitute substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence to stand trial. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to declare a doubt as to defendant's competence to stand trial, despite the court's finding that defendant had a paranoid distrust of the judicial system and believed his counsel was in league with the prosecution. While the court could have ordered competency proceedings on this evidence, the failure to do so did not constitute an abuse of discretion.id: 15901
Court's reference to Marsden motion after defendant requested self-representation was simply meant to suggest the motion could be heard outside the presence of the prosecutor and the public.After defendant's mid-trial motion to represent himself, the trial court indicated it would treat the first prong of the motion as a Marsden motion. Defendant argued the court erred in denying the Marsden motion. However, the record shows defendant raised a Faretta motion. The court's reference to a Marsden motion was simply meant to suggest the motion would be heard outside the presence of the prosecutor and the public. There was no Marsden motion before the court.id: 15902
Defendant has no constitutional right to self representation on appeal.There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment, which is the foundation on which <i>Faretta</i> is based. The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees.id: 15903
Defendant's mention of right of self-representation during Marsden hearing was not an unequivocal assertion of his Faretta rights.After the magistrate initially refused to discuss defendant's Marsden motion, defendant moved for self-representation. However, the assertion was not unequivocal as required and was simply an impulsive response to the court's action. Later, at the close of the Marsden hearing when the court asked if there were other motions, defendant did not repeat the request for self-representation.id: 15904
Testimony of witnesses from the first trial was admissible under the hearsay exception despite the denial of defendant's right of self-representation at that trial.Defendant argued the testimony of certain witnesses from his first trial was inadmissible under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule because, having been denied his right to represent himself at the first trial, he never had the opportunity to personally cross-examine the witnesses. However, defendant's opportunity to cross-examine, albeit through appointed counsel, at the first trial was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of both the former testimony exception and the federal and state confrontation clauses. Moreover, the violation of defendant's right to represent himself does not require the exclusion of the former testimony as a remedy.id: 15905
The appointment of advisory counsel is not required in non-capital cases.Defendant who represented himself at trial argued he was incompetent in presenting a defense and that the court erred in not appointing advisory counsel to assist him. However, appointment of advisory counsel is not required in non-capital cases. While the courts have the authority to make such an appointment, there is no requirement that they do so.id: 15906
There was no error in revoking defendant's pro se status where he made the request two days before trial, promised to be ready for trial, and appeared at trial with no materials and claimed he was not ready for trial.On the 58th day of the 60 days during which a defendant must be tried, defendant moved to represent himself, promising he would be prepared to proceed on Monday, the 60th day. The motion was granted. On Monday, defendant appeared without any materials and announced he was not ready to proceed. The court thereafter reappointed the public defender who had been relieved. Seven months later, on appeal, defendant argued the court erred in revoking defendant's pro se status. However, defendant's right to represent himself was not unqualified given the lack of a timely request. Moreover, defendant never objected to the order revoking his pro se status and therefore waived the issue. Even if there was no waiver, the revocation did not violate defendant's Sixth amendment rights because he acquiesced in the order. Finally, there was no Sixth Amendment violation where defendant's conduct on the day of trial amounted to an obstruction of justice.id: 15908
Trial court did not coerce a withdrawal of the Faretta motion by making false assurances that counsel would have plenty of time following the guilt phase to prepare for the penalty phase.Prior to the guilt phase trial, the defendant was concerned that counsel had done little to prepare for the penalty phase case. The trial court did not coerce defendant into withdrawing his motion for self-representation by falsely assuring him there would be plenty of time between the guilt and penalty phases for counsel to prepare. Moreover, the court did not suggest self-representation would result in increased hostility by the court. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a subsequent motion made after the start of trial in light of defendant's stated intention to disrupt the proceedings.id: 15909
Supreme Court holds states need not allow defendants to represent themselves on appeal.In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that there is no federal constitutional right to self-representation on appeal. In this case, the defendant was a self-taught paralegal who was convicted of embezzling a client's money. The California Court of Appeal denied him the right to represent himself. The Supreme Court held that <i>Faretta v. California</i>, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) does not require a State to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. The court said the historical evidence relied on in <i>Faretta</i> is not useful because it pertained to times when lawyers were scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the average person accused of crime. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment, on which <i>Faretta</i> was based, deals only with trial rights. Finally, a defendant's interest in autonomy is not sufficient to form the basis for a due process right to self-representation on appeal. Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Scalia concurred separately.id: 15060
Trial court did not err in denying untimely motion for self-representation in light of defendant's previous disruptive behavior.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely defendant's motion for self-representation. The motion was made a few days before trial was scheduled to begin. Moreover, the defendant had a lengthy and consistent history of disruptive behavior and refusing to come to court. The trial court could properly find that defendant posed a real risk of disrupting future proceedings if the motion was granted.id: 15004
Court did not err in failing to give Faretta advisements at the arraignment when defendant made a motion for co-counsel status.At defendant's arraignment he requested that he be appointed co-counsel along with retained counsel. No Faretta warnings regarding the dangers of self-representation were given. Whatever the initial arrangement between defendant and co-counsel, defendant eventually took a significant if not dominant role in the defense, Faretta warnings are required where defendant assumes responsibility for the case but they are not required where he assumes a limited role as co-counsel and the defense attorney retains control of the case. The trial court did not err in failing to give Faretta warnings at the arraignment when defendant moved for co-counsel status. Even if the failure to advise defendant at the arraignment was error, it was harmless under the facts.id: 12395
Court did not err in revoking defendant's self-representation where he threatened to stand mute.Defendant argued his self-representation was improperly revoked because he had a right to conduct his defense by standing mute. However, the trial court justifiably viewed defendant's statement that he would stand mute not as a conscious decision simply to force the prosecution to its proof, but as part of a deliberate course of conduct designed to cause as much disruption as possible. The court properly revoked defendant's in propria persona status until he chose to continue defending himself.id: 12397
Court did not err in threatening to revoke defendant's pro se status where defendant's attempt to stand mute was motivated by a desire to disrupt the proceedings.Defendant argued the court substantially impaired his ability to conduct his defense by threatening to revoke his pro se status in a dispute over tactics. He pointed to two instances in which he assertedly attempted to stand mute but was told by the court that it would deprive him of his pro se status unless he put on a defense. However, when a defendant's threat to stand mute is not motivated by a sincere desire to take that route, but by a desire to disrupt or manipulate the proceedings (as the court found in this case), the court does not err in terminating the defendant's pro se status.id: 12398
Court has no duty to advise a self-represented defendant of his right to testify.When the prosecution rested its case, the defendant, who was representing himself, told the court he did not wish to present a defense. On appeal, he argued that the court was required to inform him of his right to testify just as a court is required to warn a self-represented defendant who is about to take the stand regarding his privilege against self-incrimination. However, the court has no obligation to give general advice or suggestions to a self-represented defendant as to the presentation of a defense.id: 12402
Court was not required to hear testimony regarding defendant's capacity to waive counsel where there was no indication of mental impairment.Defendant argued that when the court finally granted his motion for self-representation it was required to hear psychological testimony regarding his capacity to waive his right to counsel. However, defendant gave no indication of mental impairment which prevented a valid waiver of counsel. Defense counsel's statement that defendant was crazy relating to the disruptive courtroom behavior did not necessarily show incompetence to waive counsel.id: 12403
Court's brief suggestion that a decision on self-representation was irreversible taken in context was not misleading and not prejudicial.Defendant argued the trial court erred in telling him if he chose to represent himself he could not reassert his right to counsel. However, the court's brief statement was simply an admonition that a request for self-representation was serious, and if granted would cause substantial delay. During the lengthy proceedings, defendant never referred to the court's statement or sought to change his pro se status.id: 12404
Defendant did not have a constitutional right to change his decision to represent himself on the day of the preliminary hearing.A defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at a felony preliminary hearing. Defendant gave up that right and elected to proceed in pro per. Defendant did not have a constitutional right to change his mind on the day of the hearing, without advance notice to the prosecution, whose witness was at the hearing ready to testify. The court did not abuse its discretion by conducting the preliminary hearing without providing counsel for defendant. Even if the magistrate had committed an abuse of discretion in not granting defendant's late request, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as defendant was unable to suggest how he was prejudiced, or even affected by the preliminary hearing.id: 12405
Defendant never made an unequivocal assertion of his right to proceed in pro per.At the Faretta hearing defendant stated that he was unhappy with his counsel because he believed counsel was not a real attorney, and because counsel had encouraged him to plead guilty. The only mention by defendant of his desire to proceed without an attorney came at the hearing one year earlier and even then the request was ambiguous.id: 12407
Defendant with a severe speech impediment may not exercise his right to self-representation.A criminal defendant with a speech impediment so severe that it renders him unable to communicate with the judge and jury is unable to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. Such defendant may not exercise the constitutional right of self-representation. Moreover, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to appoint co-counsel in such a situation.id: 12408
Defendant's lack of eduction, poor reading ability, and ineffective communication skills supported the denial of the Faretta motion.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motion to represent himself. However, there was no abuse of discretion in finding that defendant's lack of education, poor reading ability, and obvious inability to effectively communicate his thoughts demonstrated that he did not possess the ability to present a rudimentary defense.id: 12409
Defendant's motion for self-representation made after the jury had returned its penalty verdict was untimely.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motion for self-representation, first made after the jury returned its penalty verdict. However, the motion was untimely where all parties agreed the resulting delay in the proceedings would be at least six months. Even though a jury would not have been kept waiting during this period, the delay would compromise the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.id: 12410
Defendant's request to represent himself was neither timely nor unequivocal but in fact was made for the purpose of delay.Defendant asserted his right to represent himself and did so until his case was sent out for trial. He then persisted in an attempt to select counsel of his choice. His meritless <i>Marsden</i> motions and his civil suit against appointed counsel were designed to delay proceedings and allow personal selection of appointed counsel. He never made a timely and unequivocal request to represent himself after abandoning pro per status and both are required to invoke <i>Faretta</i> rights.id: 12411
Faretta motion brought minutes before jury selection began and after a request for a continuance was properly denied as untimely.One day before trial was scheduled, defendant made another <U>Marsden</U> motion to substitute his fourth attorney. The motion was denied. The next day and minutes before the jury selection was scheduled to begin, defense counsel moved for a continuance and informed the court defendant wanted to proceed pro per. The court then asked if defendant was prepared to start trial and counsel indicated defendant was not ready. The motion was then denied as untimely. This was a legitimate basis for the court's ruling.id: 12413
Faretta motion made after the case was called for trial was untimely.Defendant invoked his right to self-representation after his case had been called for trial and both counsel had answered ready. Defendant had several opportunities before the case was called for trial to move to represent himself, and he failed to state any cause for the delay in his request. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion.id: 12414
Faretta motion made after the guilt phase verdict is returned is untimely.After the guilt phase verdict but seven days before the start of the penalty phase, defendant moved to have trial counsel relieved and represent himself. However, a motion for self-representation made after the guilt phase verdict has been returned is untimely. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion where it found defense counsel conducted the defense in an adequate manner.id: 12415
Faretta motion made as soon as defendant became aware of counsel's deception was untimely where it was raised after the jury had been selected and motions disposed of.Defendant's motion for self-representation was made as soon as he became aware of defense counsel's deception. However, timeliness of such a request is measured with respect to the time trial commences. Although no evidence had been presented, the trial had commenced as the jury had been sworn, and pretrial motions had been heard and disposed of. Moreover, defendant stated that if the motion was granted, a continuance would be necessary. Since the motion was not timely, it was addressed to the discretion of the trial court and there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion.id: 12416
Faretta motion made on the eve of trial over ten months after counsel had been appointed was not timely.Defendants <i>Faretta</i> motion on the eve of trial over ten months after counsel had been appointed was not made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. The court thoroughly investigated the quality of counsel's representation, the reasons for the request, and the expected delay. Its denial of the motion was within its discretion.id: 12417
Faretta motion made prior to the bifurcated trial on the priors is untimely and subject to the court's discretion.Defendants moved to proceed pro se on the trial of the prior convictions after the jury returned its verdict on the primary offense. A prior conviction trial is merely a phase of the larger proceeding. Defendants' motion was therefore made at midtrial and, as such, is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Defendants did not have an unconditional right to self-representation.id: 12418
Faretta warnings were not required where defendant was granted cocounsel status at his capital trial.Defendant argued that before permitting him to become cocounsel at his capital trial, the court should have warned him of the dangers of self-representation and should have conducted a hearing to determine whether he was competent to waive his right to counsel. However, defendant did not waive his right to counsel and he was represented by counsel. The court therefore had no duty to warn him of the dangers of self-representation.id: 12420
Juvenile court properly denied the minor the right of self-representation where it was clear the minor did not understand the charges.A minor has a Sixth Amendment right of self-representation if he or she is otherwise competent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the minor was not competent to represent himself. The minor was 17 years old with no experience with the juvenile court system. His father appeared in court and applied some pressure upon the minor to choose self-representation. When the court questioned the minor it was clear he did not understand the charges or process.id: 12421
Once the court appointed defendant advisory counsel, the court properly limited advisory counsel's role to preparation of motions to be argued by defendant.The trial court granted after initially denying defendant's motion for self-representation at the penalty phase. Advisory counsel was then appointed. Advisory counsel prepared legal motions but the trial court required defendant, rather than counsel, argue the motions. Having granted defendant's requests for self-representation and for advisory counsel, the court was not obligated to accede to the defense's requests for both self-representation and for whatever degree of participation in the proceedings it desired for advisory counsel.id: 12422
Standby counsel's presence was not so intrusive as to deny defendant his right to self-representation.Defendant represented himself at the capital trial and standby counsel was appointed. Defendant argued that standby counsel's presence at trial was so intrusive that he was denied his right to self-representation. However, there was no support for the claim where counsel was not introduced to the jury, defendant never consulted with him in front of the jury, and he was instructed to sit away from defendant.id: 12424
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for his appointment as cocounsel in his capital case.Defendant was represented in his capital case by two attorneys. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion to have defendant appointed as cocounsel. Defendant did not indicate that he was dissatisfied with the representation he was receiving or that he intended to assume control of the case rather than merely assisting his attorneys in its presentation.id: 12426
Trial court properly denied Faretta motion which was equivocal and made for the purpose of delay.Defendant, in response to the court's order that he supply blood and other bodily tissue samples, and defense counsel's role in securing that order, moved for self-representation in the capital trial. However, defendant's statements did not represent an unequivocal and sincere invocation of the right of self-representation, and the record showed they were made for the purpose of delay. The trial court did not err in denying the request.id: 12428
A defendant represented by counsel has no right to co-counsel status.Defendant, seeking a third reversal of his capital conviction, argued the trial court erred in denying him co-counsel status. However, a defendant represented by counsel has no right to co-counsel status.id: 12383
A defendant who has exercised his right of self-representation by absenting himself from trial may not later claim error resulting from that exercise.Defendant elected to represent himself. He sought a continuance on the day of trial which request was denied. He then requested appointment of counsel which was also denied. He then refused to participate further in the proceedings, and thus was absent from trial. Where a defendant has chosen to represent himself, he is entitled to conduct that defense in any manner he wishes short of disrupting the proceedings, and thus is free to absent himself physically from trial.id: 12384
Appellant failed to show his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent where he experienced first hand the complexities of self-representation.Appellant argued his guilty plea was invalid because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. However, this was not a case where a request for self-representation was simply denied or granted. Instead, appellant's request was originally denied, then granted, then denied again, finally granted again. During this course of events, appellant experienced, first hand, the complexities of self-representation. Therefore, he did not meet his burden of showing that his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent.id: 12385
Appellant's post motion conduct established that he abandoned his request for a Faretta hearing.Appellant argued his conviction must be reversed because the trial court inadvertently failed to hold a hearing on his timely motion to represent himself under <i>Faretta v. California</i>, (1975) 422 U.S. 806. However, appellant's post motion conduct established that he abandoned his request for a <i>Faretta</i> hearing. Once appellant was returned from Santa Clara County to San Mateo County, his conduct throughout the proceeding indicated unequivocally that he acquiesced to being represented by counsel. Where appellant had both time and the opportunity to follow up on his request for a hearing on a <i>Faretta</i> motion and failed to do so, he must be deemed to have abandoned or withdrawn that motion.id: 12386
Capital defendant who chose to represent himself was not entitled to the appointment of co-counsel.Capital defendant chose to represent himself pursuant to <i>Faretta v. California</i> (1975) 422 U.S. 806. He was not entitled to the appointment of co-counsel. The fact that, under certain circumstances, California law affords a capital defendant's counsel the right to co-counsel was of no legal consequence.id: 12387
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting self-representation motion made for the stated purpose of seeking a death verdict.The trial court granted competent defendant's midtrial motion for self-representation after defendant announced the motion was made for the purpose of seeking a verdict of death. Defendant's stated intention to incur the death penalty does not, in and of itself, establish an abuse of discretion in granting the self-representation motion.id: 12390
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Faretta motion prior to commencement of penalty phase and trial counsel was not ineffective for opposing the motion.Defendant moved for self-representation after the guilt phase but prior to the penalty phase. For the purposes of assessing the timeliness of a motion for self-representation, the guilt and penalty phases are not separate trials but are part of a single trial, and therefore addressed to the court's discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion after finding defense counsel had performed well, defendant's stated reasons were not compelling and some disruption would inevitably result. Moreover, trial counsel did not provide ineffective representation when they took a position in opposition to their client's stated wish to represent himself.id: 12391
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mid-trial motion to change from self-representation to counsel representation.Following very thorough warnings from the court, defendant invoked his right of self-representation at the capital trial. Late in the guilt phase defendant informed the court that he changed his mind and wanted an attorney appointed. The court asked two attorneys who were familiar with the case and each conditioned acceptance of the appointment upon the court's granting of a mistrial. The court's refusal to accede to counsel's demand of a mistrial as the price of their return did not render the court's decision an abuse of discretion.id: 12392
Court did not err in conditioning its grant of a late Faretta motion on waiver of any necessary continuance or assistance of advisory counsel.Defendant argued the court improperly granted defendant's <i>Faretta</i> motion on waiver of any necessary continuance or assistance of advisory counsel. However, an untimely <i>Faretta</i> motion may be denied on the ground that a continuance may be required. Moreover, defendant had been afforded research facilities for many months so that he had a full opportunity to prepare for trial even when he was represented by counsel.id: 12393
Court is not without jurisdiction to entertain a Faretta motion while proceedings are suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1).The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial. Two weeks later and before he was transported to the state hospital, defendant filed a motion to represent himself. Without a hearing, the court denied the <i>Faretta</i> motion without prejudice because defendant had not served the district attorney. Defendant argued the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the <i>Faretta</i> motion while criminal proceedings were suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1). However, the court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion while proceedings were suspended.id: 11743
Guilty plea was validly entered notwithstanding defendant's pro se status.Defendant argued his guilty plea was invalidly entered because Penal Code section 859a, subdivision (a), forbids the entry of a plea of guilty to a felony offense without counsel at the preliminary hearing stage. However, the right of self-representation emanating from the Sixth Amendment prevails over the statutory prohibition against a pro se defendant entering a guilty plea under section 859a, subdivision (a).id: 11497
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245