Prosecutor, generally
Category > Prosecutor, generally
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court erred in denying the motion to recuse the DA’s office where the DA and chief assistant would be called as character witnesses for the defendant. Defendant was charged as a coconspirator in a felony indictment alleging a quid pro quo scheme where members of the Santa Clara Sheriff’s Department would provide hard-to-obtain concealed firearms permits in exchange for contributions to the sheriff’s reelection campaign. Defendant was an attorney and fundraiser who was the campaign’s treasurer. He also engaged in fundraising for the DA. He moved to disqualify the DA’s office from prosecuting him due to his friendship with the DA, and his chief assistant. The trial court erred in denying the motion due to a conflict of interest where defendant intended to call the DA and chief assistant as character witnesses and no effort had been made in that office to create an ethical wall between the DA and the attorneys prosecuting.id: 27335
Updated 2/4/2024The trial court properly recused a District Attorney who was an open critic of the Black Lives Matter movement from prosecuting protestors following George Floyd murder.Defendants are college students charged with misdemeanor offenses arising from a protest following the murder of George Floyd in 2020. The trial court properly granted the motion to recuse the District Attorney’s office in the case because of the DA’s well-publicized association with critics of the Black Lives Matter movement. Evidence supported the trial court’s determination that in light of the DA’s political statements, he and his office were not likely to treat the defendants fairly.id: 27572
Updated 1/29/2024The trial court properly recused the entire DA's office after the election of a new DA who had earlier expressed strong feelings about the case.Brooke Jenkins was an assistant district attorney who left the office to join the campaign to recall San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin. Jenkins thereafter publicly criticized Boudin for the office’s handling of a murder case in which the victim was a relative. Jenkins thereafter became the District Attorney. The trial court did not err in granting the defense motion to recuse her entire office from prosecution in the case involving her relatives. She had strong feelings about the case, and despite the fact that she set up an “ethical wall” to keep her away from the case, all of the lawyers in the office knew about her strong feelings.id: 28078
The trial court properly recused the entire D.A.’s office from prosecuting the penalty phase case given the D.A.’s implicit or explicit participation in the sheriff’s department'S improper confidential informant program. The trial court did not err by recusing the entire Orange County D.A.’s office from prosecuting defendant’s penalty phase case after he pled guilty to capital murder. The D.A.’s office had a conflict of interest with the sheriff’s department as shown by its implicit or explicit participation in the sheriff’s departments’s confidential informant program that continued to produce valuable information for use in prosecutions. The evidence showed the D.A.’s office demonstrated its loyalty to the sheriff’s department in order to protect the department at the expense of the defendant’s rights.id: 24988
The trial court lacked authority to bar the investigating detective from participating in the case. Defendant moved to recuse the investigating detective who had allegedly tampered with witnesses and withheld discovery. He emphasized that the district attorney when arguing against recusal of the office suggested the option of removing the detective. However, there is no authority permitting a judge to direct that a particular police officer be barred from participating in the investigation of a specific crime. id: 23752
The trial court erred by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing after defendant moved to recuse the prosecutor in his capital case. The defendant in a capital case moved to recuse the prosecutor. In his written motion, the defendant claimed the prosecutor may have known one of the homicide victims, the prosecutor’s children may have known the defendant through a youth group, and the prosecutor’s daughter may have dated the defendant’s friend. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing because if these facts were found to be credible, the prosecutor would have had a conflict of interest that would have made a fair trial unlikely.id: 23908
The trial court properly recused members of the DA's office who repeatedly blocked defense counsel's access to the victim's records which were critical to the defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the recusal of members of the District Attorney's Office in a juvenile case. The minor, who was charged with a sex offense,
sought disclosure of the victim's medical and psychological records. The prosecution's repeated and significant efforts to prevent disclosure of the records demonstrated a one-sided perspective on the role of the prosecutor and an apparent attempt to represent the victim's interests while blocking defense counsel's access to records critical to the defense.id: 19349
The court erred in denying recusal where the defendant's parents were employees of the DA's office, but the error was not structural and did not deny due process.Not all erroneous denials of a motion to disqualify the prosecuting district attorney's office for a conflict of interest result in the denial of due process. The trial court erred in denying the recusal motion under Penal Code section 1424 where there was a close family relationship between the
defendant and longtime employees of the DA's office. The assigned deputy DA admitted that concerns of favoritism claims caused her to reject the defense proposal for a bench trial.
However, a violation of section 1424 is not structural error. Moreover, the prosecutor's desire to avoid an appearance of favoritism did not deprive defendant of fundamental fairness in the proceedings.id: 19140
Evidence supported a partial recusal of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office where defendant was the victim witness in a pre-existing case in which the instant victim was the defendant.Defendant was charged with assaulting victim Braverman. The District Attorney's office was recused on grounds that a conflict of interest existed because defendant is the victim witness in a pre-existing case in which Braverman is the defendant, making it necessary for the District Attorney's office simultaneously to rely upon defendant as a witness in the first case and prosecute him in the second. The court acted within its discretion in recusing those deputy district attorneys who were involved in the prosecution of Braverman, as well as those deputies who witnessed the aftermath of defendant's assault upon Braverman. However, evidence was insufficient to justify recusal of the entire District Attorney's office.id: 12434
Supreme Court says prosecutor has only qualified immunity for advising police to hypnotize suspect.The police believe that petitioner had multiple personalities, one of which was responsible for shooting her two sons. On the advice of the chief deputy prosecutor, they interviewed the petitioner under hypnosis and petitioner referred to the assailant as Katie and also referred to herself by that name. The next day, before a judge, the prosecutor elicited testimony that petitioner had confessed to shooting her sons. He did not explain that the confession was obtained under hypnosis or that petitioner had otherwise consistently denied shooting her sons. Based on this misleading presentation, the judge issued a search warrant. Petitioner's confession was later suppressed, the charges were dropped, and petitioner sued for damages. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor had absolute immunity for eliciting false statements in the judicial hearing, but only qualified immunity for giving legal advice to police officers. The majority did not reach the question of whether the prosecutor's initiation of the search warrant proceeding <197> as opposed to his participation in the hearing <197> was subject to absolute immunity. Justices Scalia, Blackmun and Marshall dissented on this issue, arguing that a prosecutor should have only qualified immunity for his role in seeking a search warrant.id: 12436
D.A.'s office was recused in case against the Orange County Controller for misconduct prior to county's bankruptcy where the D.A. was a victim and remained involved in the proceedings.The auditor-controller of Orange County was charged with willful misconduct during the period prior to the county's financial problems. There was an appearance of a conflict of interest so grave as to render it unlikely defendant would receive fair treatment from the Office of the District Attorney based on the following facts: 1) the defendant remains in office during the pendency of these proceedings and thus continues to perform the functions of his office in relation to the Office of the District Attorney, 2) the District Attorney and his staff were direct victims of the alleged conduct underlying the accusation, 3) the District Attorney's conduct may become an issue at trial, 4) the District Attorney, as part of a management council acted in an executive capacity and 5) there was evidence the District Attorney attempted to discourage the county from paying for the defense.id: 12431
The trial court did not err in recusing the entire San Francisco D.A.'s office based upon statements made by the District Attorney and ex parte communications with a judge where the case may have been connected with another case in which the D.A.'s close friend was killed.A close personal friend of the District Attorney's was killed on the same night as the victim in the present case. The District Attorney stated publicly that he believed the killings were related. The jury was instructed that there was no connection between the cases. The request to recuse the District Attorney's office in the present case was originally denied. During trial, the District Attorney improperly approached the trial court ex parte, seeking permission to publish a letter in a local paper regarding the case. The entire District Attorney's office was subsequently recused from the case. The ex parte incident, when considered with the circumstances of the District Attorney's prior actions, was sufficient to sustain the recusal order. Recusal of the entire office was proper as the trial court recognized the potential bias that might result from the fact that deputies are hired, evaluated and promoted by the District Attorney.id: 15911
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the prosecutor's taking the stand and testifying that she believed the key witness' earlier inculpatory statements to law enforcement.The credibility of the key prosecution witness was the critical issue as she was the only person to provide inculpatory information to law enforcement. Defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor took the stand to impeach the exculpatory testimony of that witness. On cross-examination, the prosecutor testified as to her personal belief in the witness' credibility at the time of the inculpatory information. The prosecutor later argued, without objection, that as an advocate and a witness, that defendant was guilty. However, the state bar rules of professional conduct prohibit a lawyer from action as an advocate and a witness. Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to protect her client against the abrogation of that rule.id: 16747
The trial court did not err in recusing the entire district attorney's office where a deputy DA witnessed the charged crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by recusing the entire district attorney's office, a relatively small office, where a deputy district attorney and an investigator in the office witnessed the charged crimes.id: 19119
Recusal may be required where the victim of an alleged crime contributes financially to the district attorney's investigation.When the victim of an alleged crime contributes financially to the costs of the district attorney's investigation, the district attorney may thereafter suffer from a disabling conflict of interest requiring recusal under Penal code section 1424, if the assistance is of such character and magnitude as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during portions of the criminal proceedings.id: 12376
Juvenile court referee who prosecuted the petition earlier is disqualified from hearing a supplemental petition alleging violation of probation terms.A juvenile court referee is disqualified from hearing a supplemental petition alleging violation of probation terms in an earlier order resulting from a petition prosecuted by the referee in his previous role as a deputy district attorney. However, because the minor in the instant case failed to assert the ground of disqualification at the earliest possible opportunity, he waived the issue.id: 11676
Updated 3/7/2024Recusal was not required where the workers’ comp fraud unit of the DA’s office was funded by the California Insurance Commission.Defendant (a chiropractor) was charged with conspiracy to commit workers’ comp fraud. He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse the entire worker’s comp fraud unit of the Kern County DA’s office given that the unit is funded by the California Insurance Commission. However, the agency providing the funding was not the actual victim and no actual or apparent conflict of interest existed.id: 26339
Recusal of the DA’s office was not required where the lawyer for a prosecution witness (before trial) later joined the DA’s office and steps were taken to keep him away from the case.Cassidy, the lawyer for a prosecution witness who pled guilty before trial, later joined the district attorney’s office. The plea deal had been worked out long before he applied for the DA job. Cassidy did not participate in any way in defendant’s case. Recusal of the DA’a office was not required simply because his work area was near those of defendant’s prosecutors.id: 26199
Recusal of the entire DA’s office was not required where the assault victim was the husband of the DA. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to recuse the District Attorney’s office from prosecuting his case. The fact that the victim and the district attorney were married did not establish a disabling conflict where there was no evidence that she influenced the prosecution, an ethical wall prevented her from influencing the case, and the DA waived any rights to participate in the case as a victim or member of the victim’s family.id: 25187
The trial court did not err by allowing the DA’s investigator to testify that the officer had assessed the victim and determined she should be placed in the witness protection program. The trial court did not err by allowing the DA’s investigator to testify that he had conducted a threat assessment and determined the key witness should be placed in the witness protection program. The testimony was relevant to the victims’ credibility, which the defense had vigorously attacked, as it explained how and why the DA’s office had financially assisted the victim.id: 24142
Trial court did not err in refusing to recuse the DA’s office due to a conflict where prosecutors took conflicting positions in different forums on the voluntariness of Massingill’s confession. Defendant argued the trial erred in denying his motion to recuse the entire DA’s office because of a conflict that arose where the prosecutor argued during a civil lawsuit that police had not improperly obtained a possible codefenant’s conviction, but argued at defendant’s trial that the confession was involuntary. Defendant failed to sow the conflict was so grave that it rendered his trial unfair. id: 23762
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to recuse the DA’s office from the restitution hearing where the counterfeit victim actively investigated the matter.Defendant was convicted of selling counterfeit merchandise. She moved to recuse the DA’s office before the restitution hearing due to a conflict of interest where the victims may have helped to finance the investigation and paid expenses normally paid by the prosecution. But defendant failed to serve the AG as required, and the court did not err in failing to continue the matter to allow the AG to respond. Any error in denying the continuance was harmless as defendant failed to show the victims’ assistance was of the nature to create a comparable sense of obligation on the part of the DA’s office.id: 23470
Defendant failed to make a prima facie case for recusal by showing the prosecutor’s family members knew defendant and other parties in the case, and the denial of an evidentiary hearing on the issue did not violate compulsory process.The trial court did not violate defendant’s compulsory process clause rights by denying defendant’s motion to recuse the prosecutor in the capital case after defendant indicated the prosecutor’s children (who used to be in a youth group with the defendant) would be defense witnesses. Compulsory process has not been extended to pretrial proceedings and the recusal statute (Penal Code section 1424) serves legitimate interests by conditioning a hearing on a prima facie case made with affidavits. Defendant did not make a prima facie case that the prosecutor could not be fair due to the fact that his family members had relationships with certain parties in the case.id: 23322
In a motion to set aside an indictment or accusation, a defendant claiming the prosecutor had a conflict of interest during the grand jury proceedings must establish a due process violation.When a defendant moves to set aside an indictment or accusation on the ground that the district attorney’s participation in the grand jury proceedings created a potential for bias or the appearance of a conflict of interest, the defendant must establish a due process violation.id: 22337
Defendant's Faretta waiver was not invalid where the court misinformed him that he, and not counsel, would decide the defense theory and where counsel presented a defense defendant did not initially endorse.Defendant argued his waiver of the previously asserted right to self-representation was invalid because it was conditioned on counsel's presentation of a defense that he did not ultimately present. However, defendant later agreed that counsel could present another defense so he could not claim error. For the same reason, he could not complain that the waiver was ineffective due to the court's misadvisement that the defendant, not counsel, decides the defense theory of the case. id: 21905
Recusal of the District Attorney’s Office was not required where the murder victim was the husband of a typist in the office who worked in a regional office 70 miles away from downtown San Bernardino.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the capital defendant’s motion to recuse the San Bernardino County DA’s office. The DA’s office had a conflict where the murder victim was the husband of a woman who had been employed as a typist in the office for 10 years. However, she worked in a regional office 70 miles from the central courthouse in San Bernardino where the trial was held. No one who participated in the charging decision knew her or the deceased. Because the office took steps to screen the case from anyone who knew the affected employee, there was no real likelihood the conflict would result in unfair treatment of the defendant.id: 21463
The mere fact that a support staff employee of the DA’s office might testify as to an uncharged incident did not require recusal of the entire DA’s office.Defendant was a police officer charged with false imprisonment and sexual battery. The prosecutor intended to call as a witness, an employee of the DA’s office who could testify as to a similar encounter with the defendant. The trial court erroneously recused the entire DA’s office based on the assumption that it would be improper for the prosecutor to vouch for the credibility of an employee in a support staff position at the office. The potential for a conflict in this case was remote and the recusal was not necessary to ensure defendant received a fair trial.id: 21197
The prosecutor’s advocacy of a third party’s interest in a criminal discovery dispute did not create a conflict of interest requiring recusal. The trial court found that a prosecutor who advocates a position of benefit to a third party in a discovery dispute effectively assumes representation of that party and thus has a conflict of interest justifying recusal. However, the ruling was erroneous as a matter of law because the prosecutor has independent standing to participate in a juvenile delinquency case where the state had an interest in minimizing the trauma to minor victims in sexual assault cases. Because the trial court’s decision relied on an error of law, the ruling was an abuse of discretion. id: 20312
The prosecutor’s consulting with movie makers about the capital defendant’s story did not create a conflict of interest requiring recusal of the prosecutor at the later trial. The prosecutor, bent on tracking down a fugitive in the capital case, gave his case files to the screenwriter/director to make a movie based on the defendant’s life and crimes. He also consulted with filmmakers during production of the movie. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse the prosecutor from the trial as there was no showing of a conflict of interest that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. Moreover, the fact that it was a capital case did not require a higher standard of appellate scrutiny for the recusal motion. id: 20314
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding recusal was not required where the lead prosecutor published a novel that involved a fact pattern with similarities to the present trial.Defendant was charged with the rape of an intoxicated victim. The lead prosecutor wrote a fictional account of a heroine prosecutor’s decision whether to try a rape case involving an intoxicated victim. The novel was published shortly before the scheduled trial. The trial court found there was no disabling conflict of interest as the evidence did not show she was unable to exercise her discretion fairly. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no conflict and the record supported the court’s conclusion. The Court of Appeal erred by exercising its independent judgment and ordering recusal.id: 20313
The trial court erred by recusing the entire LA County DA's office where defendant was charged with the murder of the parent of a deputy DA.Defendant was charged with murder and other crimes after driving at high speeds on the wrong side of the road causing a fatal accident. One of the deceased victim's sons was an LA County deputy DA. The trial court recused the entire staff after ruling the office might "feel extra pressure" and be "more
uncomfortable" than a prosecutor in another agency. However, the ruling was reversed since the court applied the wrong standard. No member of the DA's office was a direct victim or a
percipient witness and there was no evidence that the victim's deputy DA son was involved in the case. In fact, the case was assigned to someone who did not know the victim's son.id: 18980
The trial court erred in refusing to recuse the entire DA's office where defendant's parents had worked in the office for years.Defendant was charged with murder. His stepfather had been a prosecutor in the D.A.'s office for many years, and his mother had worked in the office as an administrator for 13 years. The deputy D.A. who was prosecuting the case claimed to be unfamiliar with defendant's parents. The trial court erred in failing to recuse the entire D.A.'s office. That defendant's parents worked in the office created too much pressure from, and scrutiny by, colleagues in the office. Moreover, pressure from the victim's family likely resulted in unusually harsh treatment for defendant. However, defendant failed to establish prejudice from the erroneous denial of the recusal motion where the record showed he received fair, if not favorable, treatment during the proceedings.
id: 18113
Trial court did not err in denying a motion to recuse the entire DA's office where an investigator working in the juvenile division had previously worked with defense counsel representing defendant's brother.Defendant moved to recuse the entire district attorney's office based on an asserted conflict of interest arising out of the office's employment of an investigator who had previously worked as an investigator for defense counsel representing defendant's brother who was charged with murder. The investigator was working with the civil section of the juvenile division several miles away from the prosecutor's office. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as there was no showing as to what confidential information the investigator might have obtained about defendant's case while working on his brother's case, except for their common upbringing. Moreover, the investigator did not disclose any confidential information to the district attorney's office.id: 17992
Statutes requiring that prosecutions be conducted in the name of "The People of the State of California" do not violate due process.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his pretrial motion to preclude the prosecution from being called "The People" or "The People of the State of California." However, California statutes mandate that prosecutions be conducted in the name of "The People of the State of California" and defendant failed to show the applicable statutes are unconstitutional on their face or as applied.id: 17680
Subpoenaed prosecutor did not violate the order disqualifying her from the case where she assigned an attorney to prosecute the case and provided that attorney with questions to ask the jury.Berrett filled in as a prosecutor for Stone who was sick during the early voir dire process. The defense had subpoenaed Berrett as a witness because she had been at the crime scene and had relevant information regarding a prosecution witness. The court then discharged Berrett from direct participation in the case. The trial court's order did not prohibit Berrett from assigning an attorney to represent the prosecution or from giving that attorney questions to ask the jury.id: 17369
Recusal of the L.A. County D.A.'s office was not required where two deputy D.A.'s were expected to be witnesses in the capital trial.Defendant moved to recuse the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office from the capital case since two deputy district attorneys employed by the office were expected to testify. One was the prosecutor in defendant's earlier robbery case. The other was, at the time of the killing, a police officer involved with the investigation. However, recusal of an entire district attorney's office, especially one as large as L.A. County's, has not been required merely because one or more employees of that office are witnesses in the case. The court correctly refused to recuse the office without a showing that prosecution by that office would render fair treatment unlikely.id: 17266
DA's use of consultant who was employed and compensated by the victim did not require recusal of the DA's office.Defendant owned and operated a trash collection business which had a contract with the City of Orange. Following an investigation for possible fraudulent conduct in connection with the contract he was charged with multiple offenses including grand theft, presenting false claims and commercial bribery. He argued the superior court erred by failing to recuse the Orange County District Attorneys's office where the victim (the City of Orange) privately paid a forensic accountant $450,000 for his work on the District Attorney's investigation. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the District Attorney's office since defendant failed to show that any conflict was so grave as to render it unlikely he would be treated fairly. The amount of money the victim paid for the investigation did not, by itself, require recusal. Moreover, the consultant did not direct the course of the investigation. Finally, the fact that the consultant under the terms of his contract, had to report his work to the victim, did not give the victim control over the prosecution.id: 16761
Court did not err in refusing to order a prosecutor to prepare a declaration or be questioned about specific acts of negligence by a coroner despite the prosecutor's interoffice memorandum describing such "gross errors" where the prosecutor later stated he could not recall any specific cases.Two articles appeared in a Riverside newspaper stating that the District Attorney's Office complained to the coroner's office about quality of work and testimony of Dr. Hunter. After the death verdict, defendant moved to discover information pertaining to the doctor's competence. The prosecutor produced interoffice memorandum by prosecutors in the D.A.'s office. One prosecutor had written about gross errors and referred to two cases. However, the prosecutor later told defense counsel he could not recall any specific cases demonstrating the doctor's gross negligence. The trial court did not err in refusing to order the prosecutor to prepare a declaration or submit to questioning on the subject.id: 16385
Trial court erred in recusing DA's office based on appearance to the public that the prosecutor would not be evenhanded.Defendant's death sentence was vacated on the ground the authorities violated his right to counsel. The case was remanded. Defendant successfully moved to recuse the District Attorneys office claiming bias, after the DA had stressed in his campaign that they would seek the death penalty in defendant's case. The trial court forbade the prosecution from seeking the death penalty. The recusal order was an abuse of discretion where it was based on the appearance to the public that the new DA would alter his charging decision in the case. Moreover, there was no error in allowing the DA's office to prosecute the case pending the appeal from the recusal order.id: 15912
Where defendant is accused of soliciting the murder of the prosecutors assigned to his case, those prosecutors were recused as to the solicitation counts only, and no further recusal was warranted.Defendant was charged with 27 felony counts including eight counts of first degree murder. For most of the counts defendant was charged with other codefendants. Counts 25 and 26 allege that defendant solicited the murder of the two deputy district attorneys assigned to the case. Because of that circumstance he moved to recuse the Los Angeles District Attorney and all of his deputies. The court found the two prosecutors listed as victims in the solicitation counts were recused as to those counts. However, no other recusal was warranted.id: 15913
Prosecution of defendant after securing a conviction of another person for the same crime did not violate due process or judicial estoppel absent improper conduct by the prosecutor.Defendant was convicted of robbery, along with a finding that he personally used a firearm. The prosecution proceeded on the theory that defendant was the gunman although two other men were present. The prosecution had earlier tried a case against one of the other men on the theory that person was armed with the firearm. Defendant argued his conviction for the offense violated due process and judicial estoppel, since under any version of the evidence, only one man held a gun to the victim's head as she attempted to open the safe. However, there was probable cause to believe defendant had the gun. The evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the earlier jury was mistaken. The prosecutor's charging decision comported with due process. Moreover, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not prevent the state from taking inconsistent factual positions in separate proceedings absent some indication that misconduct on the part of the prosecution was a cause of the inconsistency.id: 15266
Court did not err in refusing to allow the defense to call the prosecutor as a percipient witness to an interview where they could have called an investigator who was also present.Defendant, a prison guard, was convicted of assaulting and conspiring to assault an inmate previously convicted of child molest. He argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to call the prosecutor as a percipient witness since he was present at interviews conducted of various witnesses. However, prosecutors should only be called as witnesses when there is no other source for the evidence sought. Here, an investigator was present during the interviews and he could have been called by the defense to present the same evidence.id: 15005
Trial court erred in disqualifying the district attorney's office in the prosecution of a hotel owner based on a contract between the D.A.'s office and a development agency which funded a position in the D.A.'s office.Defendants were charged with 250 misdemeanor counts arising out of their ownership of two contiguous motels. The trial court entered an order disqualifying the district attorney's office. The court concluded that a contract between the district attorney's office and the Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency (SHRA), by which SHRA partially funds a position in the district attorney's office for the purposes of prosecuting nuisance actions, was contrary to public policy and void. However, the contract was not contrary to public policy and the evidence was insufficient to support the disqualification order.id: 15007
District attorney's duty to commence prosecution of an accusation found by the grand jury is mandatory.Government Code section 3063 specifies the procedure to be followed after the grand jury has found an accusation. The district attorney's duty to comply with section 3063, thus commencing prosecution of an accusation found by the grand jury, is mandatory and there is no discretion to refuse to comply.id: 12433
Prosecutor's reliance on the results of investigations reported to him by others did not constitute bad faith.During the cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked about an event that a third party had described to an investigator. The prosecutor had never personally interviewed that third party. However, the prosecutor may properly rely on the results of investigations reported to him by others and he was not required to personally interview each witness before relying on statements the witness made to the investigator.id: 12435
The court erred in ordering recusal of the entire Los Angeles District Attorney's office based on the improprieties of a single investigator.An investigator employed by the district attorney's office engaged in misconduct in withholding exculpatory information, suggesting that a witness conceal facts and possibly commit perjury, and making sexual advances toward the witness. Defendant's motion to recuse the entire district attorney's office was granted, although the court specifically found no fault with the deputy district attorneys assigned to the case. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering recusal of the entire office. The order was modified to preclude participation by the investigator involved in any further investigation or decision making in the case.id: 12437
Appellants failed to show the District Attorney was so biased in favor of one witness-a former judge-and against them that the entire District Attorney's office should be recused.Appellants were convicted of giving perjured testimony to a grand jury that was investigating the drug use of a municipal court judge. They argued the court abused its discretion in failing to recuse the entire District Attorney's office, on the grounds that the long-term interrelationship between the District Attorney's office and the major prosecution witness<197>the judge originally under investigation<197>created a substantial conflict of interest. However, appellant's failure to demonstrate that the District Attorney's office was so biased in favor of the judge and against them that the entire office should be recused.id: 12429
Court did not err in denying motion to recuse the prosecutor who committed Wheeler error the first time the case was tried.Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motion to recuse the prosecutor who was the same person that prosecuted defendant in the first trial in which the judgment was reversed for <i>Wheeler</i> error. However, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. That the prosecutor erred in the first case did not mean he would not exercise his discretionary function in making peremptory challenges in an evenhanded manner in the second trial.id: 12430
Defense counsel's filing of a complaint against the district attorney with the state bar did not require recusal.Defendant, without notifying defense counsel, contacted the district attorney prior to his preliminary hearing. The district attorney sent an investigator to talk with defendant. Defense counsel then filed a motion to recuse the district attorney and filed a complaint with the state bar. On appeal, defendant argued the filing of the complaint might have made the district attorney antagonistic toward counsel and his client, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying the recusal motion. However, defendant presented no evidence of antagonism or bias. Failure to grant the recusal motion was not erroneous.id: 12432
Attorney General properly undertook prosecution of a state official where several counties were involved and it would have been difficult for any local prosecutor to initiate the action.Defendant, the state superintendent of education, was charged with making official contracts in which he had a financial interest in violation of Government Code sections 1090 and 1097. He argued the state Attorney General lacked authority to prosecute the action. However, such prosecution is appropriate if the A.G. is of the opinion the law is not being adequately enforced by a county. No pattern of inadequate enforcement is necessary. The instant case involved several counties statewide and lacked a clear situs. These factors and the fact that defendant was a state official, made it difficult for a local prosecutor to take action. The Attorney General did not abuse its discretion in deciding to undertake prosecution.id: 10844
Civil sanctions provision does not apply in criminal actions.Prosecutor refused to dismiss a drug sale charge after admitting the evidence was weak. As penance for his intransigence, the trial court ordered the District Attorney to pay defendant $3,000 in sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. However, the order was erroneous since section 128.5 does not apply in criminal actions.id: 10810
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245