Conflict of Interest
Category > Conflict of Interest
Updated 2/24/2024The appointment of one attorney to represent two defendants with competing interests at an evidentiary hearing violated defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel. The trial court appointed one attorney to represent both co-defendants at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had failed separate petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. At the hearing, counsel argued factors favorable to each defendant but the factors did not favor both and counsel argued that one had the stronger case. The appointment of only one attorney in this circumstance violated defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel.id: 28154
Defendant was represented at his preliminary hearing by counsel with a conflict as counsel had been arrested by the same officer and was being prosecuted by the same DA’s office.At the time of defendant’s preliminary hearing, his attorney had also been arrested and was facing charges by the LA District Attorney’s office, and the same police officer arrested both men and would be a witness in both cases. Defendant was not aware of the circumstances. The facts show a conflict of interest in counsel’s representation of defendant at the preliminary hearing, and required a dismissal of the information without an affirmative showing of prejudice. Defendant’s nonstatutory motion to dismiss was the proper vehicle to challenge the issue.id: 23567
The trial court improperly forced defendant to choose between his right to speedy trial or the assistance of counsel when it relieved counsel a few days before trial based on counsel’s assertion of a conflict of interest. The trial court erred in relieving defense counsel just a few days before trial based on the attorney’s assertion that a conflict of interest existed. While counsel spoke of threats by the client, he did not say he was afraid and said the threats were directed to his staff, not him. To the extent the “conflict” was a product of counsel’s conclusion that defendant might perjure himself if he testified, this was conjecture on his part since he did not personally know the truth, and counsel could have allowed defendant to testify in the narrative. By relieving, counsel, defendant was improperly forced to choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to counsel. The conviction was reversed where the appellate court was not convinced the result would not have been different if defendant had the assistance of counsel at trial.id: 20581
Counsel was ineffective where he represented capital defendant in a penalty retrial as well as a plaintiff in a civil case alleging defendant's arson.Defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because, at the time of his penalty retrial, his attorney simultaneously represented a plaintiff in a federal civil action against a business competitor that was based on defendant's alleged burning down of the plaintiff's brothel.id: 12360
A defendant may waive his right to conflict free counsel if he does so knowingly and intelligently.A defendant in a criminal case may foreclose a trial court from recusing retained counsel who has a potential conflict of interest by purportedly waiving his right to conflict free counsel. The Court of Appeal offered general guidelines for the trial court to follow when confronted with a potential conflict.id: 12356
Court failed to inquire into the possibility of a conflict of interest arising from counsel's firm's prior representation of an accomplice.The trial court did not fail to satisfy its duty to inquire into an alleged conflict of interest where a capital defendant and his attorney had entered into a literary-rights fee agreement because the court had no reason to know of the possibility of such a conflict of interest. Moreover, while the topic was raised during a substitution of counsel hearing, the evidence was insufficient to trigger the duty of inquiry. However, the court did fail to discharge its duty to inquire into a conflict of interest arising from defense counsel's firm's former attorney-client relationship with an accomplice who was permitted to plea-bargain in exchange for testimony.id: 12366
An affair with a client's spouse raises a conflict of interest.Defense counsel's sexual relationship with his client's wife deprived defendant of his constitutional right to undivided loyalty and effort of his attorney. Since the relationship may have affected counsel's decision making, the conflict was prejudicial.id: 12358
Court committed reversible error in precluding defendant from going forward with counsel of his choice after receiving the appropriate waiver.Defendant retained the same attorney that had represented his brother (codefendant) at the preliminary hearing. Defendant was advised of the potential for conflict of interest and waived any error resulting from the conflict. The court had a duty to allow defendant to proceed with counsel of his choice once it determined the parties affected by the conflict made appropriate waivers knowingly and intelligently. Because the court precluded defendant from going forward with counsel of his choice regardless of the presence of the appropriate waivers, the judgment was reversed.id: 12363
Supreme Court again reverses death case where lawyer also represented key prosecution witness.In Burden v. Zant , 498 U.S. 433 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed the 11th Circuit's denial of habeas relief where the defendant claimed that his first lawyer simultaneously represented the key prosecution witness. On remand, the 11th Circuit once again rejected defendant's claim that he had been deprived of the right to be represented by counsel free of conflict of interest. The 11th Circuit refused to accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's statement in an administrative report that the witness was granted immunity from prosecution. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and ruled that the 11th Circuit's failure to defer to the trial court's finding was a manifest mistake, requiring the case again to be reversed. The case was remanded to determine whether defense counsel's representation created an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] [his] performance.id: 12377
Court erred in removing counsel over defendant's objection without first attempting to determine whether defendant wished to waive his right to another attorney.During a meeting at the jail defendant gave defense counsel a packet containing broken acrylic fingernails to be examined by a manicurist. The prosecutor argued on the first day of trial that counsel had become a potential witness. Counsel argued against his removal but the court removed counsel out of an abundance of caution. There was no evidence that counsel's testimony might be harmful to the defense. To the contrary it appeared helpful. The court erred in removing counsel over defendant's objections without first attempting to determine whether defendant wished to waive his right to another attorney. The error involving the right to <U>continue</U> with appointed counsel, as opposed to <U>choosing</U> appointed counsel, did not require reversal. The error was harmless as defendant was provided with an equally effective appointed counsel.id: 12365
Recusal may be required where the victim of an alleged crime contributes financially to the district attorney's investigation.When the victim of an alleged crime contributes financially to the costs of the district attorney's investigation, the district attorney may thereafter suffer from a disabling conflict of interest requiring recusal under Penal code section 1424, if the assistance is of such character and magnitude as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during portions of the criminal proceedings.id: 12376
Public defender's disclosure of a conflict which he could not explain without breaching client confidences was sufficient to permit withdrawal of the public defender's office.A supervising deputy public defender requested that the deputy assigned as trial counsel be relieved because of a conflict. He asserted he was unable to relate the facts that generated the conflict without beaching client confidences. He declared the conflict was strictly between the client and the public defender's office, it was created by a statement from the client that had caused a complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship and it had nothing to do with threats to witnesses as the prosecution suggested. The trial court nevertheless conditioned withdrawal on divulging the facts underlying the conflict and denied the motion. The public defender's disclosure was sufficient to permit withdrawal, and the trial court should have granted the motion instead of placing the attorney in the untenable position of asserting the client's constitutional right to effective assistance only by sacrificing client confidences.id: 12375
Conflict could not be waived where defendant hired his sister to represent him for an assault charge against his sister's former husband where his sister would have to cross-examine her own children.The trial court did not err in recusing an attorney on its own motion where she appeared on behalf of her brother, accused of assault with a deadly weapon against her former husband and father of her children, who were themselves percipient witnesses to the altercation.id: 12359
The trial court erred in denying retained counsel's request for funds for ancillary services on the ground that the funds from the fee agreement were adequate to pay for those services.Defendant's mother retained an attorney to represent him in a capital murder case. Counsel was paid $300,000 for legal services. Counsel then sought funds from the superior court for expert and investigative fees. The trial court denied the request and concluded sufficient funds were available under the retainer agreement to cover the cost of ancillary services. The trial court erred in denying the request based on the fact that counsel's fee greatly exceeded the "ordinary and customary charges in the community." The fee in the present case was not exceedingly high, and the trial court's order would have created a potential conflict of interest in that every dollar spent on experts would be a dollar subtracted from defense counsel's fee.id: 16517
Updated 3/6/2024Trial counsel’s agreement to obtain media and literary rights after the capital judgment was entered did not require a new trial.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He argued that his agreement with trial counsel granting her exclusive media and literary rights to his story created a conflict of interest. However, the agreement was not entered into until two months after the penalty verdict, one day before counsel resigned from the state bar. The record did not show any similar arrangement while counsel was representing defendant at trial.id: 26648
Updated 2/4/2024Supreme Court holds defense counsel's representation of victim in a prior case did not require reversal.Defendant's appointed counsel in a capital murder trial had been representing the murder victim on unrelated criminal charges at the time of the murder. When he was appointed to represent defendant he did not inform either defendant or the court of the prior representation, and the court did not inquire into whether counsel had a conflict of interest that prevented effective assistance of counsel. Dividing 5-4, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to inquire into the conflict of interest did not relieve defendant of his obligation to show that counsel's successive representation of the victim and defendant adversely affected counsel's performance. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented.id: 20136
Updated 2/3/2024Automatic reversal was not required for conflict of interest where the same public defender’s office who represented defendant at his section 1170.95 proceedings had earlier represented the codefendant at trial. Defendant argued there was a prejudicial conflict of interest where he was represented on his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition in the trial court by a deputy public defender whose office also represented the codefendant years earlier at the joint trial. Automatic reversal was not required where there was no joint representation of codefendants but rather a successive representation. Also, defendant’s counsel never objected to the conflict.id: 27088
Updated 2/2/2024Conflict of interest claim based on the appointment of original counsel for the penalty trial with pending IAC claims was speculative.Defendant’s death sentence was reversed on appeal. A penalty retrial was scheduled before the California Supreme Court had ruled on his habeas corpus petition. The petition alleged the ineffective assistance during the original guilt and penalty trials. Appointing counsel from the first trial to represent defendant at the penalty retrial was not improper. There was no conflict of interest where the claim that counsel’s decisions at the retrial were impacted by pressure from the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations before the court were speculative.id: 27886
Defense counsel had no disabling conflict of interest where the trial judge had earlier found him to render ineffective assistance in another case.Judge Spinetta (the trial judge) had ruled in an earlier case that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Defendant argued that counsel would be more concerned with repairing his relationship with the judge than vigorously defending him. However, the earlier ineffective assistance finding would only motivate counsel to work harder for the defendant.id: 25536
Trial counsel’s report to the deputies that defendant was hearing voices and needed help did not create a conflict of interest.Defendant argued there was a conflict of interest in his capital case because he told his attorney that he had been hearing voices and counsel then related that to the deputies. Counsel’s fixed fee arrangement (providing an incentive to stay on the case) did not create a conflict as that claim was purely theoretical and any fee arrangement could be argued to create a conflict. Neither did counsel’s report to the deputies create a conflict by making counsel a potential witness since evidence that defendant was hearing voices could have been presented in other ways. And the court did not err in denying defendant’s Marsden motion based on counsel’s report to the deputies where counsel noted defendant had agreed to the report.id: 25459
The deputy public defender did not have a conflict of interest where his office had previously represented one of the prosecution’s penalty phase witnesses. Defendant argued his deputy public defender had a conflict because his office had previously represented one of the state’s penalty phase witnesses. However, there was no disabling conflict where trial counsel did not personally represent the witness and didn’t possess any confidential information about that case. id: 24265
Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to properly address the conflict created by the prosecutor in threatening members of the defense team where it was not reasonably probable that more action would have led to a better result.The prosecutor precipitated a serious conflict of interest between defendant and defense counsel by threatening to prosecute the defense investigator and perhaps defense counsel for reasons the parties would later agree were groundless. Defense counsel failed to do all it could to remedy this problem when it occurred. However, the record did not establish prejudice for purposes of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim where it was not reasonably probable that defendant would have received a better result absent the error in properly addressing the potential conflict created by the prosecutor.id: 23984
The juvenile court erred by refusing to appoint the public defender to represent the minor just because of a conflict in an earlier case that required the appointment of a conflict attorney.When a minor, who in earlier juvenile proceedings was represented by a conflict attorney and declared a ward of the court, is charged in a subsequent petition, the public defender must re-evaluate the minor’s situation and offer representation if the conflict no longer exists and other statutory requirements are met. That representation must commence immediately, before arraignment, and the court may not appoint private counsel to replace the public defender absent a showing that the public defender is unavailable.id: 23612
Defendant validly waived a conflict of interest where his attorneys may have been witnesses or even suspects in a federal case charging conspiracy to murder a witness in his state capital case.While Defendant’s capital case was pending, he was indicted on federal charges of conspiracy to kill a witness in the case. The defense investigator was also indicted and his two attorneys were potential witnesses in the federal case. He pled guilty to the federal charges and ultimately entered a “slow plea” to his state charges at the guilt phase. Defendant’s waiver of his counsel’s conflict of interest was valid even though he was never expressly advised counsel would only be witnesses in the case, but might themselves face charges. A waiver of an attorney conflict is not invalid simply because all ramifications were not disclosed. Moreover, the conflict never materialized where there was no evidence that they were called as witnesses or were the focus of an investigation. And contrary to defendant’s claim, the federal plea did not cause the state slow plea. Finally, the conflict was not shown by adverse performance at the penalty phase even though counsel didn’t challenge aggravating evidence, or pursue or present mitigating evidence as defendant wanted to forego such evidence for moral and ethical reasons.id: 23345
The trial court did not err in relieving the PD’s office in light of conflicts based on the prior representation of witnesses and victims associated with the case.The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to relieve the public defender’s office as defense counsel in defendant’s capital case based on a conflict of interest arising from the PD’s office’s representation of victims and witnesses in the case. Defendant had a good working relationship with his deputy public defender who had not personally represented any witness or victim involved in the case and wanted to remain as counsel. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the motion in light of the number of witnesses involved and the early stage of the proceeding. Assuming there was an error, defendant did not show that his replacement of counsel affected the outcome of the trial. id: 23569
The trial court did not err by removing the entire PD’s office as defendant’s counsel due to the potential conflict of interest where they had previously represented codefendant.Defendant was originally charged along with Glover in the capital case although the court eventually granted Glover’s severance motion. The trial court did not err by removing the public defender’s office as defendant’s counsel since the office had previously represented Glover in juvenile delinquency matters and defendant was likely to take a position adverse to Glover’s in this case.id: 22802
There was no conflict of interest preventing counsel from representing defendant at the penalty phase retrial where counsel had been used by defendant’s family to help smuggle him drugs.During the first penalty phase trial, defendant’s family members gave defense counsel clothing to be delivered to defendant, which had drugs hidden in the lining. The incident did not create a conflict of interest preventing counsel from representing defendant at the penalty phase retrial. The prosecutor assured the judge that defense counsel bore no responsibility for the incident and there was no evidence that the incident affected counsel’s representation.id: 22328
The trial court properly appointed conflict counsel after defendant threatened to kill the deputy public defender representing him. Before trial, defendant threatened to kill both the prosecutor and his public defender. The court thereafter removed both the district attorney (appointing the attorney general) and the public defender (appointing new defense counsel). Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court did not err when it appointed conflict counsel, rather than the public defender to represent him at his competency hearing. The trial court correctly observed that defendant’s death threat against his public defender created a potential conflict of interest and the appointment of new counsel was proper. id: 21974
The trial court did not err by refusing to substitute in as counsel a lawyer who previously represented another person involved in the underlying crime who might be a witness in this case.Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to substitute in as counsel an attorney who had represented his codefendant in the underlying fraud an identity theft trial, thus denying his constitutional right to counsel of his choice. The former client refused to sign the waiver. Given the potential conflict of interest arising from counsel’s representation of defendant and his prior representation of the former client, a potential witness facing additional charges, the refusal to appoint counsel did not violate defendant’s rights.id: 21193
The conflict created by the PD’s office’s representation of a witness in a prior case was not prejudicial where counsel impeached the witness with several other criminal incidents.Because of the conflict of interest created by the public defender’s office’s representation of a prosecution witness in a hit-and-run case, defense counsel was precluded from impeaching the witness with that conviction. However, there was no prejudice where defense counsel impeached the witness with numerous other criminal violations.id: 21196
There was no conflict of interest where defense counsel’s office (PD) had previously represented a prosecution witness but did not have any confidential information about him.Defendant argued that his deputy public defender’s representation of him after the disclosure of a prosecution witness’s prior representation by her office was a conflict of interest. However, there was no conflict where defendant’s counsel never represented the witness or had confidential information about him, nor did any other attorney in defense counsel’s office receive anything confidential from the witness, and finally defense counsel was ordered not to read the witness’s file or speak to the lawyer who represented him.id: 20688
The appointment of private counsel to determine the reasonableness of the PD’s time estimate did not create a conflict of interest.The public defender was appointed to represent defendant, but for a variety of reasons, it was impossible to determine when counsel would be ready for trial. The trial court then appointed private counsel to determine the reasonableness of the PD’s estimate and to estimate how long it would take him to be ready. The appointment of private counsel did not create a conflict of interest that would create a financial incentive for private counsel to rush his preparation. Counsel said he would only accept an appointment if he could be fully prepared for trial and the court would have granted a reasonable request for a continuance from private counsel. id: 20506
There was no prejudicial conflict of interest where defense counsel also represented the son of a key prosecution witness who was facing a murder charge. Defendant argued that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest as he represented Bonilla, the son of a prosecution witness on murder charges at the same time as his trial. However, there was no allegation that counsel possessed confidential information from Bonilla or Bonilla’s mother and there is no California authority holding that current representation of a prosecution witness’s relative creates a conflict of interest. Assuming a conflict of interest existed, there was no prejudice as it was impossible to show her testimony was somehow influenced by her son’s subsequent arrest.id: 20399
The trial court’s removal of defense counsel where there was no dispute about a potential conflict did not violate defendant’s constituional rights.Defendant argued the trial court erred in removing his public defender where that office had represented a potential prosecution witness and he was willing to waive the conflict. However, the removal of counsel where there was a clear potential conflict did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights especially where the parties explored alternatives that could have allowed counsel to remain, but none was satisfactory.id: 20398
Defense counsel labored under a conflict of interest which affected his inquiry of witnesses while investigating juror misconduct, where counsel's wife provided the report to counsel and effective questioning could have affected her job at the local newspaper.The wife of defendant's cocounsel worked for a newspaper and was told by a colleague covering the capital trial that he had overheard the jury foreman (a doctor) mention in the hallway that he would be violating the Hippocratic Oath if he accepted the defense version of the case. Defense counsel labored under a conflict of interest and "pulled punches" during the questioning of the reporter as further questioning would have revealed the involvement of counsel's wife which would have jeopardized her job and perhaps the marriage. However the presumption of prejudice did not apply where it was not shown that more extensive questioning of the witness by conflict free counsel would have achieved a better result.id: 20273
Failure to inform appellant of counsel's suspension from practice for conviction of a crime was not a per se denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.Counsel's suspension from the practice of law for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude did not per se deny appellant his federal and state institutional rights to effective assistance of counsel. While counsel's failure to inform petitioner of his bar status and conviction may have constituted a breach of duty to him, there was no evidence that such breach created an actual conflict of interest between counsel and appellant or placed counsel in an adversarial position relative to appellant. Counsel's failure to inform appellant was insufficient to show a denial of effective assistance of counsel.id: 12371
The improper removal of appointed counsel based on the perceived conflict of interest violated defendant's right to counsel under the state constitution.Over defendant's objection, the trial court removed his court-appointed counsel, because another attorney in the same public defender's office had earlier represented one of the prosecutor's witnesses. However, the disqualification and removal of the public defender was an abuse of the trial court's discretion and violated defendant's right to counsel under the California Constitution. The error was reversible per se.id: 20051
Capital defendant did not have an irreconcilable conflict with defense counsel over the decision to enter an unconditional guilty plea.Defendant argued that she had an irreconcilable conflict with defense counsel in that she wanted to plead guilty to the capital
charges unconditionally in order to help show remorse for the penalty phase, whereas trial counsel would only allow a guilty plea on condition that the prosecutor agreed to an LWOP ssentence. Penal Code section 1018 requires the consent of counsel before a capital defendant may plead guilty. Defendant argued the right to plead guilty was a fundamental choice that was in her control. However, the record did not support defendant's claim because her desire to plead guilty was not motivated by a desire to set up a remorse defense later, but rather because she wanted to avoid testifying against another person who counsel wanted to implicate as an accomplice. Therefore, the trial court properly found defendant's dispute with counsel did not implicate a constitutionally protected fundamental interest that might override the plain terms of
section 1018.id: 19794
The trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the possibility of a financial conflict of interest where defense counsel had separate agreements with defendant and his family.Retained defense counsel entered into separate contracts with defendant and his family. The court conducted an extensive inquiry into defendant's awareness of the possibility of
a financial conflict of interest, offered defendant separate counsel to advise him on the issue, and obtained assurances from retained counsel that no conflicts existed or were likely. Contrary to defendant's claim, the court was not required to review the terms and conditions of the retainer agreement.id: 19191
Disqualification is not automatic when the public defender's office previously represented a prosecution witness.A public defender whose office has previously represented a witness for the prosecution is not subject to automatic disqualification for conflict of interest. In the present case, disqualification was not requested as trial counsel had no
personal relationship with the witness, and direct acquisition of confidential information should not be presumed. Counsel did not even join the public defender's office until four years after the witness's case which was trivial and disposed of without trial.id: 19138
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to substitute retained counsel where counsel had represented defendant's brother in the same action and the waiver signed by the brother was inadequate.The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to substitute retained counsel, Hove, for his appointed counsel. The court denied the motion because attorney Hove had an actual conflict of interest in that he had previously represented defendant's brother Rodney in two other incidents as well as the very offenses involved in defendant's case. Defendant's anticipated trial strategy was to implicate his brother in the offenses. The written waiver provided by Rodney was inadequate where it did not acknowledge that defendant might attempt to shift the blame to him or that attorney Hove might be forced to disclose privileged attorney-client communications.id: 19085
Conflict of interest due to advisory counsel's friendship with a burglary victim did not require reversal where the relationship was disclosed and counsel was effective.Defendant argued the friendship between a victim and his advisory counsel created a conflict of interest that denied him due process. However, counsel immediately disclosed the relationship to defendant, and defendant failed to show the friendship adversely affected counsel's performance. In fact, counsel was effective in cross-examining his friend. The trial court's failure to inquire further or obtain a written waiver of the conflict was not an abuse of discretion.id: 18847
The record did not support defendant's claim that trial counsel rejected defendant's request to testify.Defendant argued he was denied the right to conflict free counsel where counsel refused to let him testify. However, the law does not require an affirmative waiver on the record when a defendant fails to testify. Moreover, defendant made no mention of the issue during three Marsden hearings where he was critical of defense counsel. The record does not support defendant's claim.id: 18744
Counsel was not required to withdraw from his penalty phase representation and testify even though he testified at the earlier competency hearing.Defendant argued defense counsel harbored a conflict of interest at the penalty phase and the trial court erred in failing to properly inquire. Defendant claimed that because the penalty phase defense focused on defendant's mental state, and counsel had earlier testified at the competency hearing, he was ethically obligated to withdraw from the case and testify for the defense. However, there was no conflict and counsel was not required to withdraw from his penalty phase representation.id: 18704
Defendant's threats against defense counsel's life did not create an actual or potential conflict of interest.Defendant argued reversal of his conviction was required due to a conflict of interest stemming from defendant's threats against counsel's life. He argued counsel's concern for his own safety prevented him from presenting a vigorous defense. However, while these were difficult circumstances for defense counsel, they did not show counsel was burdened by an actual or potential conflict of interest.id: 18501
Trial court did not err in removing P.D.'s office from capital case where the P.D. announced the assigned deputy was unprepared and acting strange, and defendant had no right to be represented by that lawyer if he left the P.D.'s office.The public defender declared a conflict of interest relating to his appointment in defendant's capital case. However, the deputy PD announced there was no problem and wanted to try the case. It was later learned the conflict involved the deputy PD's lack of preparation and bizarre behavior. The court found no conflict but removed the case from the PD due to the inability to receive competent counsel. Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. Further, defendant suffered no infringement of his right to counsel where the court refused to appoint the deputy PD as defendant's private counsel after indicating he was willing to leave the PD's office to represent defendant.id: 17486
Judge's prior representation of capital defendant did not create a conflict of interest.The trial judge had once represented the capital defendant in a felony case which resulted in a guilty plea. That fact did not create a conflict of interest violating defendant's right to an impartial judge. If anything, the judge's duty of loyalty to defendant would have helped him. There was no evidence the judge knew of prejudicial information that would have impacted his rulings.id: 17370
Defendant could show no conflict resulting from counsel's brief representation of a prosecution witness.Defendant argued he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to conflicts arising from his attorney's prior representation of four prosecution witnesses. Three of the four witnesses were previously represented by other attorneys in counsel's firm in unrelated matters, and counsel was appointed to represent the fourth, but never spoke to the witness before being replaced. Defendant made no showing of actual or potential conflict that adversely affected defense counsel's performance.id: 17378
Defendant's waiver of conflict free counsel was valid after she was informed defense counsel had previously represented the cellmate of her testifying accomplice.Defendant was convicted of capital murder where she was found to have hired Luna to kill the victim. She argued defense counsel had a conflict of interest because of his previous representation of Luna's cellmate, with whom Luna regularly had sex. However, defendant was advised of the conflict, was appointed independent counsel on the issue, and expressly waived her right to conflict free counsel. This right can be waived even in capital cases.id: 16964
Evidence supported the finding that advisory counsel did not have a conflict of interest even though he represented a prosecution witness on pending charges since those charges were dismissed before counsel had any real communication with the client.Pro per defendant argued he was coerced into accepting advisory counsel who had a conflict of interest. Counsel represented a prosecution witness on several charges. Most of the charges against the witness were dropped at an early stage due to her illness. She thereafter recovered and the final charge was dismissed in exchange for her testimony. The trial court found no conflict of interest based on counsel's representation that his contact with the witness was limited and he received no confidential information from her. Evidence supported the finding that counsel's duty of loyalty to the former client would not hamper his assistance of defendant. In the event that a conflict existed, defendant failed to demonstrate how it adversely affected counsel's performance as advisory counsel.id: 16643
Defendant was not denied conflict free counsel when his trial lawyer accepted a job in the D.A.'s office prior to sentencing.Defendant was represented at trial by an attorney who accepted a position in the district attorney's office prior to sentencing. He was represented at sentencing by another member of the law firm who was actually the attorney of record. The issue of a conflict of interest was raised at sentencing by the prosecutor. By then any possible conflict had dissipated, and the trial court was not required to make further inquiries. Moreover, the record did not suggest that a potential conflict compromised defendant's right to vigorous representation or that counsel "pulled this punches" as a result of his future employment.id: 15896
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where defense counsel declared a conflict which would limit his participation in defendant's testimony and the trial court refused to inquire into the nature of the conflict.Before the defense case, counsel informed the court that defendant wished to testify but that there was an ethical conflict that would prevent counsel from asking certain types of questions. The trial court refused to ask questions of defendant. Trial counsel then engaged in a limited direct examination which provided the defendant the opportunity to deny his involvement in the crimes and explain the circumstances of his confession. Contrary to defendant's claim, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel due to the court's refusal to inquire into the asserted "ethical conflicts" and to take remedial measures such as warning the defendant of the dangers of proceeding without the full assistance of counsel. While the trial court should have made some inquiry, there was no prejudicial error where there had been off the record discussions and defendant never complained about his attorney's performance.id: 15897
There was no error in denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw based on the inability to pay his trial fees where defendant was effectively represented at trial.Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to withdraw from the case on the ground that he had only been retained "to settle" the case and the family was unable to pay his trial fees. Defendant argued the inability to pay the fees created a conflict of interest. The motion was denied and trial proceeded with defendant being represented by an associate of defense counsel. However, since the attorney who represented defendant at trial was an effective advocate there was no harm in denying the motion to withdraw. Moreover, defendant never requested that counsel be removed from the case.id: 15898
Counsel did not err in failing to present new evidence post-trial where the witness said he was lying, and only corrected that statement after counsel said they would not present perjured testimony.After trial, defense counsel informed the court a witness provided new information that might exonerate defendant. The witness originally said the information he could present was a lie, but he later said it was the truth. Defense counsel did not know whether it was true or not but informed the court they were not comfortable presenting the information. While attorneys may not present false testimony, they may present evidence they suspect is false. Defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the evidence since there was no ethical problem regarding knowledge of the falsity of the evidence. However, the record shows counsel acted properly since the witness changed his story only after counsel informed him they would not present perjured testimony.id: 15878
Court did not err in failing to inquire into the potential conflict where the court relieved counsel only to reinstate him at defendant's request.Defendant argued the trial court was aware of his potential conflict of interest with defense counsel, that the court had a duty to inquire into the nature of the conflict and to elicit a knowing waiver of conflict-free counsel. However, on two occasions the court relieved defense counsel only to reinstate him when defendant asserted his desire that counsel continue representation. Defendant knowingly and intelligently chose to continue being represented by his attorney.id: 12364
Court is not required to appoint counsel with a conflict of interest even if the client is willing to make a voluntary and informed waiver.At defendant's capital trial, private counsel was appointed cocounsel with the public defender. The People moved to revoke the appointment because it was their intention to call counsel as a witness. The court vacated the appointment citing a possibility of a conflict of interest. The court is not required to appoint counsel with a conflict of interest even if the client is willing to make a voluntary and informed waiver.id: 12367
Court was not required to advise appellants of the dangers of multiple representation when previously retained counsel was appointed.The trial court was not required to advise appellants of the dangers of multiple representation when previously retained counsel was appointed. Moreover, appellants failed to show that an actual conflict of interest existed and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.id: 12368
Defendant was provided conflict-free representation at the preliminary hearing where counsel was unaware at the time that his office had previously represented a prosection witness.It was error to set aside the information solely because the defendant was represented at his preliminary hearing by a deputy public defender, who thereafter discovered for the first time that a prosecution witness had previously been represented by the public defender's office. No substantial right of the defendant was denied at the preliminary hearing, since the deputy had no knowledge that his office had a conflict of interest.id: 12369
Defendant's counsel was conflict free despite being a member of a panel that shared office space and services with the codefendants' attorneys.Defendant argued his plea was invalid because his attorney was operating under a multiple-conflicts contract panel in which four codefendants were represented by four associated attorneys operating as independent contractors, but supervised by one lead attorney. He claimed that because the attorneys shared office space, investigative services, and support staff, they were not sufficiently independent of each other. However, no evidence was presented to show the attorneys did not maintain the required independence. Moreover, packaging defendant's plea offer with that of his codefendants did not constitute an actual conflict of interest.id: 12370
Good faith tactical differences among cocounsel do not create a conflict of interest in the constitutional sense.After the first day of jury selection lead counsel and appointed cocounsel informed the court of a proposed division of labor which would result in cocounsel primarily performing legal research outside the courtroom. Earlier that day, cocounsel had met ex parte with the judge to inform him that she was concerned about the manner in which lead counsel was handling the case. Defendant later argued he was denied his constitutional right to conflict-free representation. However, good faith tactical differences among cocounsel are not uncommon and they do not create a conflict of interest in the constitutional sense.id: 12372
No actual conflict of interest existed where defendant named counsel as a defendant in a federal lawsuit.After having a Marsden motion denied, defendant named counsel as a defendant in a federal lawsuit. Defendant argued that because of the lawsuit, counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest and as a result provided ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the record established defendant was merely attempting to manufacture a conflict of interest to try and delay his trial. No actual conflict was shown on the facts.id: 12373
No conflict of interest existed due to previous representation of certain prosecution witnesses by the Mendocino County Public Defender.Defense counsel relinquished her position as county public defender when she was elected district attorney. Brown assumed the office of public defender and became cocounsel with Allen in the case. During trial several conflicts regarding Brown arose as the public defender had previously represented certain prosecution witnesses and Brown had personally represented one prosecution witness. However, regarding the first three witnesses previously represented by the public defender's office, Brown represented to the court that he possessed no confidential information regarding the witnesses and cross-examination of these witnesses would not be affected by the prior representation of the public defender's office. Regarding the witness Brown personally represented, Brown withdrew from his representation of the witness, the defense agreed that cocounsel would cross-examine the witness and both counsel represented to the court that Brown did not provide Allen with confidential information regarding the witness.id: 12374
The presentation of conflicting defenses did not create a conflict of interest.Defendant was granted cocounsel status at his capital trial. He argued the inconsistency in defenses presented by counsel and himself created a conflict of interest. However, he confused conflicts of interest with trial tactics. Because the difference of opinion on strategy did not create a situation in which counsel's efforts on defendant's behalf were threatened by responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interest, there was no conflict of interest.id: 12378
There was no actual conflict of interest where defense counsel ran for and was elected district attorney during the time she represented him.Defendant argued a conflict of interest was created when his first public defender, ran for and won the office of county district attorney during the time she represented him. However, a public defender does not create a conflict of interest merely by seeking employment with the district attorney's office. Moreover, defendant was also represented by a second attorney who was experienced in criminal defense and death penalty cases. The record supported neither a finding of actual conflict nor impaired representation.id: 12379
There was no conflict of interest where the client made no showing that confidential information was obtained or used by his former attorney.Defendant had discussions with an attorney anticipating that he would soon be charged with Medi-Cal fraud. Defendant never retained her services, however, and she later represented other individuals in the scheme. The attorney's testimony established that nothing in her conversations with defendant in any way assisted her representation of the others or contributed to defendant's conviction. Her representations as an officer of the court were accepted in the absence of proof to the contrary.id: 12380
There was no conflict of interest where one defendant was represented by the Public Defender and the other by the Alternative Defender Office.Defendant argued the trial court erred in permitting the Contra Costa County Public Defender's Office to represent codefendant and the alternative Public Defender Office to represent him. Defendant claimed that because both offices are under the supervision of the Public Defender they are not separate entities for conflict of interest purposes, and the joint representation of defendant and codefendant denied defendant the right to conflict-free and independent counsel. However, the two offices are separate firms for purposes of conflict analysis, coinciding only for matters of administrative convenience and only at the top administrative level.id: 12381
Trial court did not err in denying appointed counsel's motion to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest caused by defendant's filing of a malpractice claim.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to permit appointed counsel to withdraw in defendant's capital case on the asserted ground the filing of a malpractice claim by defendant created a conflict of interest between defendant and counsel. However, there was no error where the assertion by defendant of frivolous claims of malpractice did not create an actual conflict between the interests of defendant and those of his appointed counsel.id: 12382
After recusal of the D.A.'s office following the election of defense counsel as D.A. there was no conflict where the court allowed a deputy D.A. to consult with the A.G.Defense counsel ran for and was elected district attorney during the time she represented him in the capital case. After recusal of the district attorney's office following the election, defendant argued a conflict of interest was created when the court permitted a deputy district attorney to consult with the attorney general's office, which had substituted as the prosecutor. However, there was no suggestion that any confidential information was made known to the prosecution. Moreover, there was no support for an inference that defense counsel actually violated the court's orders by breaching her ethical duties to defendant.id: 12357
Counsel's alleged fear of a State Bar investigation did not give rise to a conflict of interest.Defendant argued that at some point during the proceedings all parties knew that the State Bar was investigating defense counsel for his conduct involving defendant's property arising out of the original fee arrangement. He claimed counsel's fear of facing State Bar disciplinary proceedings created a conflict of interest. However, fear of such an investigation would inspire an attorney to perform more, rather than less, competently.id: 12361
Counsel's declared conflict as to representation regarding a 1982 prior conviction did not require the appointment of a new lawyer where a conflicts attorney was appointed to argue the limited issue of the prior.Defendant argued the trial court denied him of the right to conflict free counsel when it allowed his deputy public defender to continue to represent him after she declared a conflict of interest on the issue of the validity of defendant's 1982 prior conviction. After the appointment of a conflicts attorney and a hearing, the motion to strike the prior was denied. However, while counsel declared a conflict she never explained what it was and the court made no investigation on the record. Nevertheless, the existence of a potential conflict did not require a change of counsel. Since the conflict only affected counsel's representation on a discrete, preliminary matter, the court properly appointed separate counsel for the limited purpose of litigating it.id: 12362
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245