Shackles/Medication
Category > Shackles/Medication
Updated 2/2/2024The trial court erred in requiring defendant to wear a restraint belt during jury selection because of the pandemic absent findings that he posed a risk of disruption.The trial court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to wear a restraint belt during jury selection, which was held in an unsecured jury assembly room instead of a courtroom because of the pandemic. The court erred by failing to make an individualized finding at the time of jury selection that defendant posed a safety or flight risk or that he was likely to disrupt the proceedings.id: 27873
Updated 2/1/2024The trial court erred by ordering courtroom restraints based on defendant’s prior acts of fleeing from police to avoid apprehension.The trial court abused its discretion by ordering the capital defendant shackled with ankle cuffs that were partly visible to jurors. The defendant had presented no problems in court, but the court ordered the restraints based on the fact that he had twice fled from police before his apprehension. However, his prior escape attempts did not justify restraints in the courtroom. The error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 27960
The trial court prejudicially erred by placing an armed bailiff behind defendant while he testified and in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard the bailiff.The trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant’s due process rights by authorizing a uniformed and armed deputy sheriff to stand or sit behind him during his testimony. The record did not show that defendant posed any threat to courtroom security. The trial judge informed the parties it used this procedure in all of its cases. The court further erred by denying the request for a cautionary instruction informing the jurors not to infer defendant was dangerous. The error was prejudicial where defendant’s credibility was a major factor in the trial and the presence of the guard would suggest defendant was dangerous and likely committed the charged assault.id: 21192
The trial court erred by ordering defendant to wear a stun belt during
his trial. The trial court erred by ordering defendant to wear a stun belt at
his capital trial absent a showing of manifest need. However, the error was harmless where there was no evidence that the jurors saw the stun belt, or that it affected the defendant’s demeanor in any way.id: 23519
The trial court erred by stationing a courtroom deputy next to the testifying defendant without a case-specific decision regarding the need.Stationing a courtroom deputy next to a testifying defendant is not an inherently prejudicial practice. However, the trial court must exercise its own discretion and determine on a case-by-case basis whether such heightened security is appropriate. The trial court erred here in failing to make a case-specific decision, deferring instead to the generic policy of stationing the deputy at the witness stand. However, the error was harmless under the Watson standard as defendant wore street clothes, the officer’s demeanor was respectful, and the evidence against the defendant was strong. id: 22095
The trial court abused its discretion in having a deputy escort defendant to the witness stand and remain nearby while he testified.At defendant’s indecent exposure trial, a deputy sheriff accompanied defendant from the defense counsel table to the witness stand and remained near the jury box when defendant testified. When defendant finished testifying, the deputy followed him back to the defense counsel table. The trial court did not voice any case-specific concerns to justify the procedure. The trial court abused its discretion in adopting this procedure as the deputy’s presence was inherently prejudicial. However, the error was harmless where it was unlikely the defendant would have obtained a better result absent the presence of the deputy when he testified.id: 22454
The trial court erred by ordering defendant shackled without a hearing and by telling the jurors that he was shackled. The trial court ordered defendant’s leg be shackled under his pants during trial. However, the order was improper where the court failed to hold a hearing on the need for restraints. Moreover, absent any evidence that the jury saw the shackles, the court erred by instructing them that defendant was physically restrained and in custody.id: 22061
The court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was improper as it failed to identify which drugs would be used and the potential side effects. The trial court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was erroneous. The doctor's testimony that medication would have a good chance of rendering defendant competent to stand trial failed to identify which drugs would likely be used, what the side effects might be, and whether the drugs would be medically appropriate in treating defendant's condition. id: 21934
The trial court prejudicially erred by ordering defendant shackled at trial without a showing that he might become violent.The trial court abused its discretion by ordering defendant shackled at trial absent a showing of violence, threatened violence or other nonconforming conduct. There was no evidence that the jurors saw the restraints, but it can be inferred that they did since the court instructed the jury to disregard them. The error was prejudicial as the shackles may have affected defendant’s mental state (and decision not to testify), the visual may have impacted the jury and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.id: 20987
The trial court erred in authorizing the state hospital to forcibly administer antipychotic drugs to an MDO without having the MDO present at the hearing. A mentally disordered offender’s right to refuse antipsychotic drugs is qualified and may be overcome in nonemergency situations by a judicial determination that he is dangerous. The trial court erred in conducting the hearing in defendant’s absence, although the error was harmless in light of the evidence that he was dangerous. Contrary to defendant’s claim, he did not have a right to a jury trial on the issue of the involuntary administration of the antispychotic medication.id: 20916
The trial court prejudicially erred by ordering the self-represented defendant from the courtroom following repeated annoying objections.The trial court granted defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation. The trial court later erred by ordering defendant removed from the courtroom during the direct examination of a critical witness based upon defendant’s repeated and annoying objections to the prosecutor’s questions. The removal violated defendant’s rights to be present and to legal representation and required reversal of his convictions.id: 20309
The trial court prejudicially erred by ordering defendant shackled without taking precautions to keep the jury from noticing the shackles.After granting defendant pro per status, the trial court ordered that he be shackled during trial. The order was not a response to actual or threatened disruption. The court prejudicially erred by ordering defendant shackled without taking precautions to keep the jury from hearing or seeing his shackles.id: 20308
Evidence that psychotropic medication might help defendant become competent to stand trial did not justify the order authorizing the involuntary administration of the medication.The record did not contain substantial evidence showing it was
"substantially likely" that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication would render defendant competent to stand trial. That the evidence showed that defendant might
benefit from the medication was insufficient to support the trial court's order authorizing the involuntary drugging.id: 19334
The trial court prejudicially erred in ordering the defendant to appear at trial in shackles without stating supporting reasons on the record.The trial court erred by ordering defendant to appear at trial in shackles because the decision was not individualized,
adequately supported and made on the record as required. The error was prejudicial in light of the impact it may have had on defendant's mental state, particularly while he was testifying.id: 19285
Evidence did not meet the Sell requirement that forcibly medicating defendant was necessary to further government interests.The evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that involuntary medication of the defendant was necessary to further governmental interests. Neither medical expert identified the specific antipsychotic medication
defendant should be given or any potential side effects. Therefore, there was no evidence before the trial court upon which it could base its finding that involuntary administration of drugs was medically appropriate and in the defendant's best interest.id: 19172
The evidence did not support the court's authorization to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to defendant.There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's order authorizing the hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The trial court did not consider the factors in defendant's case but simply noted the crimes were serious and the state was entitled to a speedy trial. Moreover, the hospital never specified the condition it was proposing to treat or the medication it was proposing to administer. Therefore, the court had no evidence before it to evaluate the appropriateness of the medication for defendant.id: 18356
The trial court erred in denying defendant's request to remove his shackles at the trial to extend his commitment under section 1026.5.In a trial to determine whether defendant's commitment in a state hospital should be extended, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to determine the need for shackling. The jurors saw defendant in shackles and one juror commented on the shackles during voir dire. The question whether defendant represented a danger to others was before the jury as fact finders under Penal Code section 1026.5 and the physical restraints spoke to that issue. The error was prejudicial under any standard.id: 19169
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the trial court's order that defendant be shackled and wear prison clothing at trial. The trial court violated defendant's due process rights by ordering that he be shackled and wear a prison jumpsuit at trial. Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the order and there was no plausible tactical reason to not object in light of the inherently prejudicial nature of prison garb. The failure to object was not harmless.id: 19274
Defendant's conviction of a capital murder did not by itself create a need for shackling at the penalty phase.The trial court erred by ordering the defendant restrained by shackles at the penally phase without a showing of manifest need. The error was harmless where the restraint was barely noticeable and there was no indication in the record that defendant walked in front of the jury or that the jury was otherwise made aware of the device.id: 16815
Defendant may not be ordered shackled during trial based on rumors that he might attempt an escape.Based on rumors from the jail that defendant might try an escape, the defendant was ordered to be shackled during the entire trial. The court erred in ordering the defendant shackled based on rumor even though the rumor was corroborated by the defendant's own attorney. The error was harmless where the jurors were never aware that defendant was handcuffed to his chair.id: 12213
Court abused its discretion in having defendant shackled at the preliminary hearing absent a showing of necessity.Defendant was shackled and dressed in jail garb at the preliminary hearing. Defendant argued the court erred in refusing to have the shackles removed and the error prejudicially tainted the witness' identification of defendant as the perpetrator. As at trial, shackles should not be employed at a preliminary hearing absent some showing of necessity for their use. The court abused its discretion in ordering defendant shackled absent a showing of necessity. However, the error did not require reversal where the only witness to identify defendant at the preliminary hearing had previously identified him at both a photographic and a live line up.id: 11603
Court erred in ordering defendant shackled during the bifurcated trial on the priors, absent a showing of necessity.During defendant's bifurcated trial in which the jury considered his alleged prior felony convictions, defendant was placed in shackles, although the reason for the physical restraint was not revealed in the record. He was restrained at the time he took the witness stand to testify and the restraints were visible to the jury. Since no reasons for the restraints appear on the record, the court abused its discretion in ordering defendant shackled and in denying counsel's request that defendant be permitted to testify from counsel table. The court further erred in failing to instruct the jurors to disregard the restraints in determining guilt. However, the error was harmless where defendant admitted the alleged priors.id: 12208
The court erred in ordering defendants shackled without a prior on the record determination of the need for shackles.Defendants were charged with committing several violent felonies. At the beginning of the trial the court ordered the defendants shackled with leg irons which were visible to the jury. There was conflicting testimony at subsequent hearings as to whether the court abdicated its responsibility for courtroom security to the bailiff and/or sheriff's personnel. The court abused its discretion if it did abdicate this responsibility. Even accepting the court's later statement that it did not abdicate its responsibility, it erred in imposing shackles without a prior on the record determination of the need for the shackles. However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the restraints used were inconspicuous, defendants did not testify in chains, and the court made a subsequent determination of the need for restraints.id: 12225
The trial court erred in failing to decide for itself whether shackling the defendant was necessary.The trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine whether restraints on defendant in the courtroom were necessary. Instead, the court deferred to the Sheriff's decision that shackles were necessary. By failing to determine independently whether, in its view, there existed a manifest need to place defendant in restraints, the court abdicated its responsibility and abused its discretion.id: 15868
The trial court prejudicially erred by requiring the defendant to wear a stun belt while testifying on his own behalf.Requiring an unwilling defendant to wear a stun belt during trial may have significant psychological consequences that may impair the defendant's capacity to concentrate on the trial, interfere with his or her ability to assist trial counsel, and adversely affect his or her demeanor in the presence of the jury. There have also been a troubling number of instances in which the stun belt has been activated accidentally. The stun belt also poses medical risks for a person with heart problems or other conditions. A court should not approve the use of this type of stun belt unless a person has been medically approved and it is determined the belt represents the least restrictive measure that will satisfy the court's legitimate security needs.id: 16993
Supreme Court protects incompetent defendants from being forcibly medicated to secure competence to stand trial.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that compelling state interests, i.e., the need to bring the accused to trial or safety concerns, may justify the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to ensure competence to stand trial. Once a defendant requests to stop forcible medication, however, the State must demonstrate that less intrusive measures were considered and that forced medication is necessary and medically appropriate. The trial court here failed to inquire whether forced medication was necessary. Accordingly, the conviction was reversed. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, and Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that regardless of whether the forced medication deprived the defendant of a protected liberty interest, his trial was nevertheless fundamentally fair.id: 11773
Updated 3/19/2024Expert opinions provided substantial evidence in support of the court’s order allowing the state hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication.Evidence supported the trial court’s authorizing the state hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to the defendant. The two examining doctors testified that serious harm would likely result without the medication.id: 28219
Updated 3/7/2024Any error in ordering physical restraints at trial was harmless absent evidence that the jurors saw the restraints.Defendant argued the trial court erred by ordering that he wear physical restraints at trial based on violent acts he committed in prison. However, any error was harmless where there was no evidence showing the jurors actually saw the restraints.id: 26298
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on security measures including having four deputies in the courtroom. The trial court did not err in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine manifest need for certain security measures. The visibility of defendant’s jail armband on the first day of jury selection was harmless given the court’s instruction that capital defendants have no right to bail and are in custody. The presence of four deputies (three sitting right behind the defendants) was not unreasonable, and there was no inherent prejudice when the deputies shined flashlights on the defendants when the power went off in the courtroom.id: 26544
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court did not err in ordering stun belts for the defendants at the penalty phase retrial following an outburst at the original penalty trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that the three defendants wear stun belts at the penalty trial where one defendant had an outburst in court at the end of the first penalty trial.id: 27784
Updated 1/31/2024Stun belt was justified for violent defendant even though he never acted violently in court.The trial court did not err in ordering that the defendant wear the REACT stun belt at trial given his in-custody fights and weapons offenses. The decision need not be based only on a defendant's courtroom conduct. The stun belt was justified over other forms of restraint given defendant’s size, history of violence, and the fact that the device was less restrictive than the restraint chain that was also discussed.id: 28032
The court, not the bailiff, made the decision to shackle defendant after a violent outburst.After a violent outburst, the trial court ordered defendant be restrained with chains and handcuff that may have been visible to the jurors. Defendant argued the court erred by allowing the sheriffs to make the security decisions. However, while the asked asked the bailiff’s opinion, he made the ultimate decision on the restraints.id: 26205
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring shackles for the violent defendant during the capital trial, and denying him a writing instrument. Defendant argued the restraints placed on him during the penalty phase trial, and the denial of a writing instrument, violated his right to participate in his defense, and to due process. However, the court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion even though the sheriff found one hand could be freed and he could be given a short pencil. Moreover, the sheriff did not err by failing to remove the lockbox while defendant was feeling ill. Finally, any error regarding the security arrangements was harmless absent a showing that defendant was unable to participate in the trial. id: 25972
Evidence of defendant’s violent behavior in custody established a manifest need for him to wear a remote controlled stun belt at his capital trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred by ordering him to wear the stun belt at his capital trial, by finding “good cause” rather than a “manifest need” for the belt. However, even if the court used the wrong term, the evidence established a manifest need given defendant’s dangerous behavior in custody and potential danger to others in the courtroom.id: 24826
The trial court made proper accommodations after ordering that the self-represented defendant be shackled.The trial court did not err by ordering the self-represented defendant to wear physical restraints given defendant’s history of violence and current assaultive conduct at the jail. The court imposed the least intrusive means to accomplish its goal as defendant (who dressed in civilian clothes) had one free hand for note taking, the prosecution agreed to remain at counsel table as much as possible, sidebars were conducted during breaks, and both sides used “runners” to deliver exhibits to the witnesses.id: 25193
The trial court did not err by allowing a deputy to be seated near the testifying defendant.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it allowed a deputy to be seated near defendant when he testified as it gave the impression that he was dangerous. The court’s decision to allow the practice was erroneous because it provided no case-specific reasons, and simply said that was a standard practice for in-custody witnesses. id: 25095
The court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic meds was justified by the evidence that defendant needed the medication for his own safety and lacked the capacity to make the decision for himself.The trial court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was proper under Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, and was supported by the evidence showing that he had a mental disorder requiring treatment with antipsychotic medication and that he lacked the capacity to make decisions about his need for the medication.id: 24698
The trial court did not err by ordering defendant to wear the REACT belt after he punched a deputy, and was given the option of shackles instead.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the capital defendant to wear the stun belt during trial. Defendant’s unprovoked attack on the deputy in the holding area justified the option, and the defense chose the stun belt over shackles when given the option, and after a medical exam to ensure defendant was not susceptible to physical harm from wearing the device.id: 21657
Shackling order did not coerce defendant into waiving his right to be present.The trial court excused defendant from numerous pretrial proceedings in the guilt phase of his capital case. Defendant argued that his waiver of the right to be present was coerced by the court’s order that he be shackled. However, defendant was only restrained while being transported to court and that action did not coerce him into waiving his constitutional right to be present. His absence did violate Penal Code sections 977 and 1043 but the error was harmless as he failed to show how he could have improved his defense if present.id: 24177
The use of physical restraints while transporting defendant down the courthouse hallway was not improper.There was no due process denial where defendant was shackled during transit through the public hallways of the courthouse without a showing of need. id: 24178
The trial court did not err by ordering defendants to wear the REACT belt where they were thought to be part of a violent drug organization. The trial court did not err by ordering defendants to wear the REACT belt for security purposes at trial even though during the years leading up to the trial the defendants had never been disruptive in court , or in custody and had never been involved in an escape plot. However, defendants were thought to be part of a violent large scale drug organization that had attempted to disrupt proceedings in other cases.id: 23754
NGI’s, like MDO’s and SVP’s have the right to refuse antipsychotic medication in certain circumstances. People who are found not guilty by reason of insanity have the same constitutional right as mentally disordered offenders and sexually violent predators to refuse antipsychotic medication in certain circumstances. Denying NGI’s this right would violate equal protection principles. id: 23659
The court’s order authorizing defendant’s involuntary medication did not have to describe the proper drugs and dosages to be given where that information was included in defendant’s treatment plan.Defendant appealed an order authorizing his involuntary medication for purposes of restoring him to competency to stand trial. He argued the order was fatally nonspecific in that it failed to identify the medications he was to be given, as well as the dosage and duration of any treatment. However, the medications and dosages were specifically detailed in defendant’s treatment plan. It was not necessary that they be repeated in the court’s order. The order cannot be read to give the hospital the authority to administer medication beyond what the record revealed to be the treatment plan.id: 22860
The trial court did not err by ordering defendant to wear a stun belt during the penalty phase where he was found hiding a staple in his mouth while being transported to court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to wear a stun belt during the penalty phase of his trial after he was caught hiding a staple in his mouth while bing transported to court. The deputies testified he was a genuine escape risk and he was seen attempting to use the makeshift key to unlock another inmate’s handcuff.id: 22267
Any error in requiring defendant to wear a stun belt during his capital trial was harmless where he never mentioned it among his many complaints to the court.Defendant argued the trial court erred by requiring him to wear a stun belt during his capital trial. But the record does not show that the trial court followed through in its original stated intent to wear a stun belt. Assuming defendant was required to wear the belt during trial, and that the court erred by failing to make a finding of manifest need, the record showed no prejudice where neither defendant nor counsel complained during trial, and defendant made no reference to the stun belt when providing details to the court regarding his mental state during the trial. id: 21946
The trial court did not err in refusing to order a competency hearing where defendant announced for the first time before sentencing that he took psychotropic medication during the capital trial. The jury rendered a death verdict. After the trial court denied the new trial motion, but before formal sentencing, defendant informed the court that he had been taking psychotropic medication during trial, and believed it affected his demeanor at trial and the ability to cooperate with counsel. The trial court did not thereafter err by failing to hold a competency hearing before proceeding with sentencing. Defense counsel declined to join in defendant’s request and the court properly relied on its own observations that defendant had been coherent and unimpaired during trial.id: 21945
The trial court did not err in ordering both leg restraints and a stun belt in light of the evidence that defendant intended to escape from the courthouse.The trial court did not err by requiring the capital defendant to wear leg shackles and an electronic security belt during trial. Evidence supported the trial court’s findings that defendant was a genuine escape risk and it was only after evidence that defendant would free himself from the shackles that the court ordered the stun belt which was hidden from the jury.id: 21462
The stationing of a courtroom deputy next to a testifying defendant is not an inherently prejudicial practice that must be justified by a showing of manifest need. Defendant argued that the stationing of a courtroom deputy next to him as he testified was akin to "human shackle" and required a showing of manifest need that could not be demonstrated. However, the practice was not inherently prejudicial and defendant showed no prejudice.id: 21090
Defendant could not raise for the first time on appeal the claim that he was denied due process because drugs were administered to him during the proceedings.Defendant argued the trial court, having been alerted to the circumstance that defendant was taking medication, deprived him of due process by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether it was being administered involuntarily, or what side effects defendant was experiencing. However, defendant did not move to terminate the administration of medication, or otherwise assert that he was being medicated involuntarily. Defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal the claim that he was denied due process of law because drugs were administered to him to control his mental condition during the proceedings.id: 12212
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant in a serious case to wear a shock belt to prevent violence, disruption or escape.Defendant was charged with murder, in a three strikes case, and his criminal history included two robberies. The court ordered defendant to wear a React belt under his clothing, which was capable of delivering 50,000 volts of electricity if activated by an attending officer in the event of a disruption. The trial court determined the belt was not a physical restraint because it did not confine defendant's movement. Moreover, it did not carry the same potential for prejudice as shackles, since the jury would never see the belt. The court further rejected counsel's claim that wearing the belt may have impaired defendant's communication with trial counsel.id: 12108
Shackles were justified where defendant was found with a key to his handcuffs and the courtroom door could not be locked.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant shackled during the trial after finding that he deliberately obtained a key to his handcuffs, indicating he might attempt an escape. That circumstance, together with the fact that the courtroom was not equipped with a lock, supported the finding that restraints during the courtroom sessions were necessary.id: 14994
The record did not support defendant's claim that the trial court permitted him to testify while he was drowsy from medication.Defendant was medicated during trial, and some of his medications caused drowsiness and other side effects. He argued the trial court violated his due process rights by insisting that he testify when he was still experiencing the side effects. However, the court observed defendant throughout the trial and did not notice drowsiness or other effects. Nor did the content of his testimony suggest he was confused or impaired when compared to his testimony eight days later.id: 16383
Information gathered from the probation report after trial cannot be used to justify the shackling of a defendant at trial where the trial court failed to make the necessary inquiry.Defendant was denied due process by being visibly shackled at trial. The trial court had ordered that he have one hand free to write notes and it was unclear what the jury actually saw. However, he did testify and the court later instructed the jurors to disregard the fact that he was shackled. This instruction is only given when shackles become visible. Contrary to the Attorney General's claim, the information collected from the probation report prepared after trial could not be used to retrospectively justify the shackling. The error required reversal.id: 20075
Juvenile court's general policy of shackling all minors in delinquency cases was unlawful.The juvenile delinquency court's general policy requiring that all minors be shackled was contrary to the controlling law. The use of such restraints must be based on a showing that such restraints are necessary.id: 19629
The order to shackle defendant at his MDO trial was supported by evidence that he was a flight risk.Defendant argued the court erred when it ordered that he be shacked for his mentally disordered offender trial. However, the record supported the finding that defendant was a flight risk. Even if the order was erroneous there was no evidence the restraints were seen by the jurors, so any error was harmless.id: 18901
Shackling of a violent defendant was not improper despite the lack of an escape attempt or disruptive courtroom behavior.Defendant argued that three fist fights in jail after being housed there for one and one-half years is not unusual and was insufficient to justify the shackling. He claimed that shackling a defendant is appropriate only when a defendant has attempted to disrupt courtroom proceedings or to escape from jail. However, when, as in this case, there were multiple instances of violent and nonconforming behavior while in jail, as well as an extensive background of criminal and violent activity, the court's decision to restrain the defendant was not improper.id: 12223
Shackling of defendant at jury viewing of the crime scene did not violate defendant's due process rights.The prosecution successfully moved to permit the jury to view the crime scene. Defendant exercised his right to personally attend the viewing. Although defendant had not been shackled during the trial, the court ruled that he would be handcuffed and shackled during the jury view of the crime scene. Although defendant had no history of violence, the court did not abuse its discretion in shackling defendant concluding the danger of flight or escape was greater outside the courtroom.id: 12224
Trial court was not required to instruct that the physical restraints on defendant had no bearing on the determination of guilt.Where one or more jurors or veniremen merely witnessed defendant being transported to or from the courtroom in visible restraints, the trial court has no duty, <i>sua sponte</i>, to instruct the jury that the physical restraints on defendant have no bearing on the determination of guilt. Moreover, defense counsel's failure to object to the restraints was a tactical choice and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.id: 12230
Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering additional bailiffs in the courtroom as defendant threatened to become disruptive.Defendant indicated he did not wish to remain in the courtroom during the penalty phase. He stated that if forced to remain, he might become disruptive or even violent. The court did not abuse its discretion in providing for additional bailiffs to be stationed in the courtroom. The court did not utilize physical restraints such as handcuffs or leg irons and reduced the number of bailiffs as the threat of disruption appeared to diminish.id: 12198
Court did not err in ordering defendant shackled at trial where he committed multiple attacks on the officers transporting him to court.The court did not err in ordering defendant shackled during trial. Following a two-day hearing, the court found that defendant had struck correctional officers at the jail on several occasions, that the frequency of the assaults had increased dramatically within the last month, and that this conduct had caused the court to have concern for the safety of court attaches, jurors, and witnesses.id: 12202
Court did not err in ordering defendant temporarily restrained for a short time during trial where he had a history of escape attempts.Defendant argued the trial court erred in ordering him to wear a leg brace for one day during jury selection as well as the handcuffing during the testimony of a prosecution witness. However, the information regarding the possible escape plans, together with defendant's history of prior escape attempts was a sufficient basis for the temporary leg brace. Moreover, the court did not err in handcuffing defendant during the testimony of a former hostage. Defendant had terrorized her for 13 hours during which time he cold bloodedly murdered two other bound hostages laying next to her on the floor. The court's attempt to alleviate this fear by requiring handcuffs invisible to the jury and for a short time was not improper.id: 12203
Court did not prejudicially err in refusing to permit defendant to remove his in-custody wristband in the jury's presence.Defendant argued that the trial court's refusal to permit him to remove his wristband, indicative of his custodial status in the presence of the jury, was violative of his due process and equal protection rights. However, there was no error because he was permitted to dress in civilian clothes, no mention was made of the wristband at trial and it did not appear his credibility was at all influenced by the wristband as a symbol of defendant's incarceration. Thus, even if defendant's constitutional rights were violated any error was harmless.id: 12206
Court had no discretion to decide a defendant's freedom from shackles during a jury view when the view was to occur in prison.Defendant was charged with the murder of a fellow prison inmate. He argued the court erred in compelling him to choose between appearing at a jury view of the crime scene in shackles or not at all. However, these were the rules established by the prison officials and the court had no power to compel the officials to alter the rules that exist perforce in a prison setting.id: 12210
Decision to have defendant shackled during trial was not improper where the court was virtually percipient to appellant's unprovoked attack on his attorney.Appellant punched his attorney in the nose while the jury was beginning to file into the courtroom. The punch resulted in a nose bleed and there was a scuffle in the courtroom before appellant was subdued by the bailiff. Appellant argued the court erred because it heard no evidence prior to ordering the defendant shackled during the trial and failed to consider less prejudicial means of preserving courtroom security. However, the prosecutor requested the shackles stating that appellant's attack on his attorney was unprovoked. Absent any objections to the prosecutor's remarks the court was entitled to consider them.id: 12211
Maximum security measures were justified for defendant subsequently accused of murdering a man in a carjacking during an escape while awaiting trial.Defendant argued the trial court erred in adopting the maximum security measures possible rather than considering less prejudicial alternatives during the trial. The security measures included leg chains, waist chains and handcuffs attached to the waist chains as well as two extra bailiffs in the courtroom. However, the record reflected defendant had shown a remarkable propensity for violence as well as a determination not to remain in custody, no matter what. The record more than amply demonstrated a manifest need for maximum security measures in a public trial.id: 12221
No abuse of discretion in ordering defendant shackled, even though shackle was viewed by jurors in court where he presented a risk of escape.Hearsay evidence indicated defendant may have had a handcuff key and that he was facing a life prison term in Nevada. Such evidence provided a sufficient basis for shackling defendant, for it indicated a substantial risk that he might attempt an escape. Moreover, the court made a good faith, although inaccurate determination that defendant's shackles would not be viewed by the jury.id: 12222
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245