Restoration of SanityPC 1026.5
Category > Restoration of SanityPC 1026.5
Updated 2/24/2024Extension of commitment under section 1026.5 was improper where evidence of defendant’s verbal outbursts during adjustments in his medication did not establish that he was dangerous.The trial court ordered defendant’s not guilty by reason of insanity commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5 be extended for two years. However, evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that due to defendant’s schizophrenia, he represented a substantial danger of harm to others. Evidence that defendant had verbal outbursts while under a doctor’s care during periods of adjustment in his medication was not sufficient to demonstrate a danger to others.id: 26631
Updated 2/22/2024The evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that the NGI defendant was dangerous 45 years after his offense despite continuing mental illness.Defendant who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity extended his civil commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. The evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that his mental illness prevents him from controlling his potentially dangerous behavior. Defendant was an old man in his late 70's after 45 years of hospitalization who continues to exhibit delusions and paranoia, but despite his condition defendant hasn’t committed a violent or aggressive act (or spoken in a violent or threatening way) in 45 years. The appeal was moot because defendant was recently released but the court considered the issue because it was likely to recur.id: 27030
When a defendant seeking restoration of sanity petitions for a conditional release under section 1026, the trial court must obtain a recommendation by the state hospital director.Defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital sought to be released and applied for restoration of sanity under Penal Code section 1026. The trial court denied defendant’s petition for release based on the defendant’s failure to include a recommendation from the state hospital director. However, this was improper because the court, and not the defendant has to obtain the medical director’s recommendation once the defendant initiates a petition. Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his petition for conditional release.id: 24755
The trial court must advise an NGI defendant of the right to a jury trial at section 1026 proceedings and obtain a personal waiver unless the defendant lacks the capacity to give one. The trial court in not guilty by reason of insanity extension proceedings under Penal Code section 1026.5 must personally advise defendant of his or her right to a jury trial. Before holding a bench trial, the court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision. id: 24235
NGI committees facing a commitment extension hearing enjoy the constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants, including the right to refuse to testify. A defendant in a hearing to extend a commitment after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity (Penal Code section 1026.5) has a right to refuse to testify, the right guaranteed to criminal defendants under the Fifth Amendment. id: 23929
The prosecutor could not compel the defendant’s testimony at a trial to extend his NGI commitment.The trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to compel the defendant to testify in a trial to extend his not guilty by reason of insanity hospital commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. The statute provides that the rights afforded in criminal proceedings “shall” be afforded to those facing a civil commitment trial. Therefore the defendant had the right not to incriminate himself.id: 23280
An NGI defendant’s right to outpatient treatment after demonstrating that she was no longer mentally ill cannot be negated by the government’s failure to provide specific details of the outpatient program.Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 2000. In 2008, the experts agreed she should be placed in outpatient treatment. The trial court did not find defendant was not insane. It erred by denying outpatient status not because defendant would not benefit from it, but because it was not satisfied with the day-to-day details of the proposed outpatient program. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.id: 22258
Statements to Penal Code section 1368 evaluators were inadmissible at the sanity phase.Permitting the doctors to testify at the sanity trial about statements defendant made during competency evaluations and during his involuntary hospitalization violated the judicially declared rule of immunity announced in Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465 and adopted in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.id: 19292
Privilege against self-incrimination applies at a hearing to extend the commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.Penal Code section 1026.5 authorizes an extended commitment for treatment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity. The privilege against self-incrimination bars the prosecution from questioning defendant about his mental state at the commitment extension hearing.id: 17780
The court erred in denying the untimely section 1026.5 petition to extend defendant's commitment in a psychiatric hospital.The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the two year extension of his psychiatric commitment under Penal
Code Section 1026.5, subd. (b). The 79 day delay in filing the commitment petition was prejudicial as counsel for the state would not have been adequately prepared to proceed if the
petition had been timely filed, and the only justification for the delay was "clerical error." id: 19453
The trial court erred in denying defendant's request to remove his shackles at the trial to extend his commitment under section 1026.5.In a trial to determine whether defendant's commitment in a state hospital should be extended, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to determine the need for shackling. The jurors saw defendant in shackles and one juror commented on the shackles during voir dire. The question whether defendant represented a danger to others was before the jury as fact finders under Penal Code section 1026.5 and the physical restraints spoke to that issue. The error was prejudicial under any standard.id: 19169
The jury should have been instructed at defendant's section 1026.5 recommitment trial that his disorder affected his volitional and cognitive capacity such that he was a danger to others.Defendant who was earlier found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital argued the procedures for extending his commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5 denied him due process because the provision did not require proof that he was unable to control his behavior, and the court erred in failing to instruct on the volitional element. While the jury should have been instructed that the disorder needed to affect defendant's volitional or cognitive capacity such that he was a physical danger to others, the error was harmless in light of the evidence which established the necessary linkage between defendant's mental disorder and his dangerousness.id: 18890
The court's failure to consider defendant's ability to control his dangerous behavior for purposes of an extended commitment under section 1026.5 was prejudicial error.Extension of a defendant's commitment to a state hospital under Penal Code section 1026.5 requires proof that he or she has serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. The trial court's failure to consider the "control" issue before granting the petition to extend the commitment was prejudicial. While there was abundant evidence showing defendant did not control his behavior there was insufficient evidence showing that he was unable to do so.id: 19259
Court erred in determining that as a matter of law, an antisocial disorder is not a mental disorder within the meaning of Penal Code Section 1026.5.A diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder may be substantial evidence of a mental disorder under Penal Code Section 1026.5 where the diagnosis is based on criteria in addition to repeated criminal or antisocial behavior. Moreover, the trial court erred in granting the motion for nonsuit on the ground that antisocial personality disorder was not a mental disorder as a matter of law.id: 11740
Supreme Court holds that defendants acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be confined indefinitely without medical basis.In a 5-4 decision written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute violated due process by requiring an insanity acquitee, who was no longer mentally ill, to prove that he was no longer a danger to himself or others. Two court-appointed doctors reported that the defendant was in remission from the drug-induced temporary psychosis he suffered from at the time of the crime. The doctors, however, could not certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. The Supreme Court held that this was not a sufficient medical reason to confine the acquitee indefinitely. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia dissented, arguing that due process is a variable concept and that civil committees and insanity acquitees are sufficiently different to warrant different treatment.id: 11771
Court erred in appointing the same experts for both the competency and sanity hearings.The appointment of the same two psychiatrists to examine the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial, and at the same time, to determine his sanity, violated his right against compelled self-incrimination. However, the error was harmless where numerous experts opined that defendant was sane, neither of the doctors in question learned information during the competency exam that was not available to the other doctors, and the testimony of these two doctors was not uniformly negative. id: 16450
The court erred in denying the petition for placement in a conditional release program under section 1026.2 without holding an evidentiary hearing.The trial court erred in denying defendant's petition for placement in a conditional release program pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2 without holding an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing the defendant is entitled to full due process rights to call persons to testify and cross-examine adverse witnesses, but he is not entitled to a jury trial.id: 17233
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court erred by accepting defense counsel’s waiver of defendant’s right to a jury trial at his restoration of sanity proceedings. The prosecution moved to extend defendant’s involuntary commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. The state hospital failed to produce the defendant for a pretrial hearing and appointed counsel provided a psychiatrist’s letter opining that he lacked the capacity to decide whether to waive his right to a jury trial. His commitment was then extended following a court trial. However, the court erred by deciding in defendant’s absence that he was incompetent to waive his jury trial, and by accepting his counsel’s waiver. id: 27067
Updated 2/3/2024Wende review is not available following the extension of NGI commitments. The trial court extended defendant’s not guilty by reason of insanity commitment by two years under Penal Code section 1026.5(b). Defendant sought to appeal, but counsel found no arguable issues. Counsel sought independent review by the court under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. However, Wende review is not available in appeals following the extension of NGI commitments. id: 27770
Updated 2/1/2024The trial court did not err in weighing the evidence when acting as trier of fact at the motion for a directed verdict at defendant’s trial for outpatient treatment under section 1026.2.Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and sought outpatient treatment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion for a “directed verdict” finding among other things that defendant could be dangerous if under outpatient treatment. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by weighing the evidence on the motion for a directed verdict. However, the court was the fact finder, and entitled to weigh the evidence.id: 27996
Updated 1/31/2024The trial court properly found defendant was a danger in denying his restoration of sanity petition given his current diagnoses of ASPD and substance abuse disorder.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition for release on the ground of restoration of sanity under Penal Code section 1026.2 given his current diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder.id: 28029
Updated 1/29/2024The appellate court need not conduct an independent review following a Wende brief in an appeal from an extension of an NGI’s civil commitment.An appellate court is not required to review the record for the existence of meritorious issues in a matter where the superior court extended the civil commitment of an individual previously found not guilty by reason of insanity, when the individual’s appointed counsel informs the court he or she has found no arguable issues on appeal. The client has been notified of the fact and was given a chance to file a brief, but did not raise any issues on appeal.id: 24676
The trial court erred at defendant’s restoration of sanity hearing by denying his request for an appointed expert, and refusing to allow him to testify by telephone. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 1997, and petitioned for conditional release from a state hospital under Penal Code section 1026.2. The trial court erred by denying his request for an independent expert to assist him in demonstrating he was ready for outpatient treatment. The court also erred by denying his request to testify remotely by phone to avoid being transported to jail before the hearing.id: 25888
Defendant’s personality disorder was a mental defect supporting the extension of his NGI commitment in a state hospital under section 1026.5.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his extended commitment to a state hospital under Penal Code section 1026.5. Contrary to defendant’s claim, his diagnosis of a personality disorder NOS (not otherwise specified) constitutes a mental disease, defect or disorder section 1026.5. Moreover, there was no credible evidence that defendant learned to control the manifestations of his personality disorder outside the hospital setting. Finally, the experts agreed there was a strong chance he would fail to control his behavior if released even though he showed no violence in the hospital.id: 24415
Defendant, an NGI who was granted outpatient status but not accepted in any programs, was properly kept in Patton in the inpatient program.Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 2000 and was granted outpatient status in 2011. The outpatient agencies refuse to admit him so he remained in Patton State Hospital in the inpatient program. The Department of Mental Health and the outpatient agencies did not act unlawfully by failing to admit defendant. Keeping him at Patton did not amount to an improper revocation of outpatient status. Collateral estoppel did not require that defendant’s outpatient status remain in place.id: 23891
Penal Code section 1026.5 does not require an NGI’s personal jury trial waiver.Penal Code section 1026.5 (extension of commitment of an NGI defendant) does not require an NGI’s personal jury trial waiver. Counsel may waive a jury at the NGI’s direction or with his or her knowledge and consent, and counsel may also do so over a defendant’s objection when the defendant is not sufficiently competent to determine what is in his or her best interests. When the court conducts a bench trial the record must affirmatively establish the circumstances and validity of the waiver.id: 23175
Counsel may waive jury trial for an NGI at commitment extension proceeding in his absence where it appears the NGI is incapable of deciding whether it is in his best interest to do so.The prosecution sought to extend defendant’s not guilty by reason of insanity commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. The trial court did not err by failing to advise defendant of his right to a jury trial, accepting counsel’s waiver and conducting a bench trial without a personal waiver. Defendant was in the hospital being treated at the time and the record shows he was aware of the right to a jury trial. A personal waiver was not required and NGI’s being treated for mental illness often choose not to appear. However, counsel does not have exclusive control over the decision and may make the decision only when it reasonably appears the NGI is incapable of doing so.id: 23164
Counsel may waive an NGI’s jury trial right at commitment extension proceeding at NGI’s direction, with his or her consent or where the NGI is incompetent.Penal Code section 1026.5 which governs extension of NGI commitment proceedings does not require a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial by an NGI. Counsel may waive a jury trial at an NGI’s direction, with his or her consent or on behalf of an NGI who is not competent to do so. The trial court did not err by not obtaining defendant’s personal waiver where he was being treated in the state hospital at the time.id: 23165
The District Attorney could properly file a petition to extend the NGI commitment of a defendant even though the medical director recommended against it.The medical director’s recommendation against extending the commitment of the not guilty by reason of insanity patient pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, did not preclude the district attorney from filing a petition under section 1026.5, subd.(b). Moreover, substantial evidence supported the order extending defendant’s commitment where the doctor concluded defendant might be able to control his dangerous behavior in an unsupervised setting. id: 22710
The trial court did not err at defendant’s Penal Code section 1026.5 proceedings by refusing to instruct the jurors to draw no negative inference from defendant’s failure to testify. Defendant argued that the trial court erred at his Penal Code section 1026.5 trial to extend his commitment after a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, by failing to instruct that he had a right not to testify and a negative inference should not be drawn from his failure to testify. However, section 1026.5 proceedings do not have the same constitutional protections available in criminal proceedings and the trial court did not err in refusing the requested instruction.id: 22087
Statutory deadline for petition to extend a not guilty by reason of insanity commitment is directory, not mandatory.Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital. A petition to extend his commitment was filed late and he moved to dismiss on due process grounds. However, the statutory deadline for filing an extension petition is directory, not mandatory, so long as the petition is filed before the end of the current commitment. Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the petition although he would have been entitled to release pending trial following a proper motion. Defendant is not now entitled to release because the court retained jurisdiction to try him and he received a fair trial.id: 21903
The trial court properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 224, the general instruction on circumstantial evidence, at defendant’s mentally disordered offender trial.A jury found defendant to be a mentally disordered offender within the meaning of Penal Code section 2970. He argued the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 224, the general instruction on circumstantial evidence, rather than CALCRIM No. 225, the instruction given when a defendant’s mental state is at issue. However, because the jury was not required to determine a defendant’s “mental state” in order to determine whether a defendant suffered from a “severe mental disorder”, the court properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 224. id: 21558
Defendant’s past history of increasing violence in the community showed she was dangerous to others for purposes of the section 1026.5 extended commitment.In 2001, defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of two counts of battery on correctional officers. She argued the evidence was insufficient to support the extended commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5 because the facts did not show she was a danger to others. However, even though she did not engage in dangerous acts while in outpatient status, her past history of increasing violence in the community showed she presented a danger to other if released into the community.id: 20733
Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing his sanity was restored where his treating clinicians testified he has a disorder and is not ready to be safely released to outpatient.The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s petition for restoration of sanity pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. At the time of his commitment his primary diagnosis was amphetamine induced psychotic disorder. All of the clinicians who testified at his hearing described his substance abuse disorders as being a remission, not recovery. He failed to meet his burden of showing he would not be a danger to others if released.id: 20636
Appellant who had been found NGI had no right to a jury trial regarding his eligibility for placement as an outpatient in a local mental health program.Appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital, was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his eligibility for placement in a community mental health program as a supervised outpatient.id: 11726
Findings of two experts that defendant was sane supported the sanity finding notwithstanding the two conclusions to the contrary.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he was sane at the time of the murder where two psychologists testified he was not sane and trial was delayed for ten years because of the repeated findings that defendant was not competent to stand trial. However, the sanity finding was supported by the presumption of sanity, and the findings of the two other experts.id: 18105
Counsel may waive jury over the client's objection at a section 1026.5 commitment extension trial.Counsel may waive jury trial over objection of his or her client in a Penal Code section 1026.5 "not guilty by reason of insanity" commitment extension trial.id: 17707
Section 1026.5 does not require a personal appearance to waive one's rights.Defendant waived a hearing on the prosecutor's request for a two year extension of his state hospital commitment following the not guilty by reason of insanity finding. (Penal Code section 1026.5, subd.(b).) Contrary to defendant's claim, the court did not err by not requiring a personal appearance for the waiver. Moreover, the record showed an implicit waiver of the right to a trial by jury.id: 19912
The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury at the section 1026.5 hearing to extend defendant's state hospital commitment that he had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.Defendant's commitment to a state hospital (following a not guilty by reason of insanity finding) was extended under Penal Code section 1026.5. The trial court erred at the hearing by refusing to instruct the jury that the prosecutor had to prove that he could not control his dangerous behavior. However, the instructional error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence showing defendant had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.id: 20028
Extension of defendant's commitment for two more years under section 1026.5 was proper where evidence showed at the time of the hearing he suffered from a mental illness and could not control his dangerous behavior. There was substantial evidence that at the time of the hearing defendant suffered from mental illness that caused him to engage in potentially dangerous behavior over which he had little, if any, control, and that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. The trial court did not err in extending his commitment for two more years under Penal Code Section 1026.5, subd.(b).id: 19464
NGI defendant is not entitled to a hearing to determine his competence to refuse psychotropic medication.Defendant was convicted of a criminal offense, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to Atascadero State Hospital. While confined at Atascadero, he was not entitled to a hearing to determine his competence to refuse to take antipsychotic medication.id: 15780
The court did not err in starting the extension trial after the 30-day deadline where defendant was afforded procedural due process.Defendant's state hospital commitment was extended pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1). He argued his extension trial did not begin 30 days before his commitment period ended as mandated by section 1026.5. However, there was no dispute that defendant was afforded procedural due process for the July 26 extension trial. It was therefore presumed the court acted properly in starting the extension trial after the 30-day deadline.id: 11775
The People are entitled to a jury trial in a restoration of sanity proceeding regardless of whether it is the NGI defendant or the outpatient treatment program requesting release.The People have the right to a jury trial when a not guilty by reason of insanity defendant petitions for restoration of sanity under Penal Code section 1026.2. The People's right to jury trial also attaches when it is the outpatient treatment program making the request for release.id: 11776
The trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution to commence the sanity retrial.Defendant argued that because he had the burden of proof at the sanity retrial, the court erred in permitting the prosecution to go first. However, the trial court has discretion to control the order of a trial and the court properly believed it would be helpful to the jury to first hear evidence of the crimes.id: 11777
Trial court did not err in using hearsay - hospital records - at the restoration of sanity hearing to consider outpatient status.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting his entire hospital record into evidence at the restoration of sanity proceeding to consider outpatient status. He argued the records were inadmissible hearsay not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. However, even if such records were not technically within the business records exception or state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, they are useable at the outpatient status hearing if the court finds they are reliable. The court's use of the notes to evaluate the recommendation given to it is necessary and proper, just as it is in a probation or parole revocation hearing.id: 11779
Court in restoration of sanity proceeding may not consider outright release until the person has spent time in a local outpatient program.Penal Code section 1026.2, subdivision (e) provides that no person shall be released for restoration of sanity until after he or she spends a year in a local outpatient program. Respondent court sought to conduct a hearing on the real party's outright release even though he had not undergone outpatient treatment as part of his commitment. However, the superior court was specifically barred by statute from proceeding directly to the issue of outpatient release.id: 11742
Defendant's state hospital commitment was properly extended for a mental disorder different from the one for which he was originally committed.Defendant's state hospital commitment was extended pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1). He argued that his commitment could not be extended for a mental disorder different from the one for which he was originally committed. However, the court did not err in applying the section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) language of a mental disease, defect, or disorder to defendant's post-admission diagnosis of Axis I pedophilia.id: 11750
Dismissing petition to extend commitment was improper where defendant waived the defect in the plea by his unexcused delay.Defendant's 1983 not guilty by reason of insanity plea was infirm because he had not been advised before entering the plea that such a plea could result in lifetime commitment in a mental health facility. However, defendant waived the defect in the plea by his unexcused delay in challenging that plea until he appeared the full benefit of preferable hospital confinement and avoided the possibility of prison and attendant parole period.id: 11754
Extension of insanity commitment procedures do not violate equal protection because civilly committed individuals and insanity acquittals are not similarly situated.Defendant argued the extension of insanity commitment procedures under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b), deprived him of his right to equal protection because at a recommitment hearing under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), evidence may be considered from any time in the individual's life, while at civil commitment hearings, evidence of events which occurred only during the past six years may be introduced. However, civilly committed individuals and insanity acquittees are not similarly situated. The rational basis for the different treatment of insanity acquittees is that such a person initiates the process himself by pleading and proving that mental illness has led him to commit a crime.id: 11757
Extension of insanity commitment provision is not violative of due process for using a standard other than M'Naghten.Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b) sets out the procedures for extending the commitment to the Department of Mental Health of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity. Section 1026.5, subdivision (b) is not violative of due process in that it is not based on a finding of continued legal insanity under the <i>M'Naghten</i> test. By requiring the prosecution to prove dangerousness because of mental disease, defect, or disorder, section 1026.5, subdivision (b) assured that the extended commitment bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the commitment. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim the phrase mental disease, defect or disorder does not encompass the mental conditions of recidivists or sociopaths that would render the phrase over-inclusive and vague.id: 11758
NGI defendant's outpatient status can be revoked upon a showing of preponderance of the evidence.Defendant was found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. After fifteen years he was granted outpatient status. The trial court then revoked his status as an outpatient and returned him to Patton State Hospital. He argued the court erred in requiring the prosecution to show only by clear and convincing evidence that his outpatient status should be revoked. He claimed the proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, all that is required to revoke a defendant's outpatient status is a showing of a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the trial court did not err in considering public safety concerns in determining defendant's outpatient status should be revoked.id: 11764
Proceedings to determine present sanity do not apply to a hearing to extend a commitment under section 1026.5Appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of felonious assault and committed to a state hospital in 1981. In 1990, during a hearing on the third extension of his commitment (Penal Code section 1026.5) he moved to institute proceedings to determine his competence to stand trial under section 1368. His motion was denied and his commitment extended. He argued that a person subject to a commitment extension hearing has the right, under due process principles and express statutory authority, to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist counsel in preparation of his defense. However, proceedings to determine present sanity do not apply to a hearing to extend a commitment under section 1026.5id: 11768
"Non-violent" child molestation supported a finding of danger of physical harm for purposes of extension of state hospital commitment.Defendant's state hospital commitment was extended pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1). He argued that since he simply fondles children, his non-violent sexual molestation behavior does not provide a basis for showing a substantial danger of <U>physical</U> harm as required by section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1). However, there is an inherent danger of physical harm in any act of child molest.id: 11721
At a proceeding to extend a state hospital commitment the jury may consider appellant's medicated condition in determining his future dangerousness as a defense to the action.Appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of aggravated assault and attempted murder. Ten years later the People sought to extend his commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5(b)(1). Although the trial court's instructions did not expressly advise the jury it could consider appellant's medicated condition in assessing his future dangerousness, it was apparent the People and appellant not only each introduced substantial evidence on the issue, but each argued as if the requested instruction had been given. Under the circumstances, the jurors must have understood they should take into account the effect of appellant's use of psychotropic medication and the likelihood of his continued self-medication.id: 11727
At an outpatient status hearing to determine as part of the restoration of sanity procedure the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the release conditions were met.The outpatient release procedure is an integral part of the restoration of sanity procedure stated in Penal Code section 1026.2, and in such procedure the defendant has the burden of proving that he or she met the conditions for release by a preponderance of the evidence. Placing the burden of proof on the defendant was not a due process violation.id: 11729
At the extension of insanity commitment trial the court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on the meaning of mental disease, defect or disorder.At the trial to determine whether to extend the commitment of the defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity (Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)) defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the meaning of mental disease, defect or disorder. However, the meaning of the phrase was sufficiently explained in testimony and argument to allow adequate understanding by the jury. No further explanation was necessary in the absence of a request.id: 11730
Court did not abridge defendant's religious freedom by inquiring into his religious beliefs in considering outpatient status at the restoration of sanity proceeding.At the restoration of sanity proceeding to consider outpatient status defendant argued the trial court improperly infringed on his freedom of religion by considering his religious beliefs as a basis for denying outpatient status. However, the court found defendant's religion was relevant because religion, in the form of psychotic delusions, had played an important role in the crime. The court thought the experts should have inquired into defendant's religious beliefs to determine if they were still indicative of present dangerousness. Therefore, given the compelling state interest in assuring a dangerous person was not released into the community, defendant's religious freedom was not abridged.id: 11732
Court did not err at sanity retrial in admitting evidence that when psychiatrists interviewed appellant he had been sentenced to death.Appellant argued the trial court erred in his sanity retrial in admitting evidence that when a defense psychologist interviewed appellant he had been sentenced to death. He claimed the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. However, the prejudicial effect of the question was limited as the jury had already been informed that appellant had committed five murders, and before the subject question was asked, evidence had been admitted that appellant was "facing the prospect of execution."id: 11736
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245