Insanity/Diminished Capacity/Intoxication
Category > Insanity/Diminished Capacity/Intoxication
Updated 2/4/2024AB 103, providing relief for NGI committees is not an unconstitutional amendment of Prop 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act.Following the passage of Assembly Bill 103, a defendant filed a petition for a reduction of his commitment under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.127. That provision allows people who are found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital to obtain relief that parallels Three Strikes relief for those found guilty of a crime. Because AB 103 did not amend Prop 36, the trial court erred in finding it was unconstitutional. id: 27305
The trial court violated defendant’s right to present a defense by prohibiting expert testimony regarding defendant’s PTSD at the time of the killing.Defendant was convicted of murder. However, the trial court prejudicially erred by prohibiting defense expert testimony regarding defendant’s psychiatric impairment (PTSD) at the time of the killing. Penal Code sections 28 and 29 do not preclude offering as a defense the absence of a mental state that is an element of a charged offense or presenting evidence in support of that defense. They preclude only expert opinion that the element was not present.id: 24701
The trial court erred by precluding the jury from considering the evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication with respect to his claim of imperfect self-defense. Penal Code section 29.4 expressly allows for consideration of voluntary intoxication with respect to express malice. Because an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates express malice, section 29.4 makes evidence of voluntary intoxication relevant to the state of mind required for imperfect self-defense.id: 24781
Defendant was legally insane when he killed the victims, if as a result of his delusions, the facts he perceived would have entitled him to claim self-defense. Defendant was charged with murder and pled not guilty by reason of insanity. He argued his delusional state caused him to believe that he was acting in self-defense. An instruction on self-defense in the sanity phase must inform the jury that if the defendant’s delusion caused him to believe he was in danger that required his use of deadly force that he would be legally justified in doing so. The jury was required to apply defendant’s perception of reality in order to determine his sanity and the instructions given prevented it from doing so.id: 24331
Unconsciousness defense applies to a defendant suffering from mental illness.The defense of unconsciousness under Penal Code section 26 applies whether the defendant’s mental state of unconsciousness is caused by mental illness or physical or organic conditions. The trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct on unconsciousness given that the defendant was unaware of his actions. In this situation defendant was not limited to an insanity defense. If the jury were to find defendant’s condition was substance-induced, the defense may not apply to a general intent offense.id: 24191
The insane defendant’s use of a hammer was incidental to the carjacking for purposes of section 654, and he could not be punished for both in the state hospital committment order. Defendant was legally insane at the time he committed the present offenses. Whether or not he was capable of forming criminal intent, his actions showed that his use of the hammer was “incidental” to the carjacking and he could not be punished for both. His committment order was therefore modified to reduce the maximum period of confinement to 15 years.id: 22939
The insane defendant’s use of a hammer was incidental to the carjacking for purposes of section 654, and he could not be punished for both in the state hospital committment order. Defendant was legally insane at the time he committed the present offenses. Whether or not he was capable of forming criminal intent, his actions showed that his use of the hammer was “incidental” to the carjacking and he could not be punished for both. His committment order was therefore modified to reduce the maximum period of confinement to 15 years.id: 22940
The trial court erred by instructing the guilt phase jury that defendant was presumed to be sane at the time of the offense.Defendant was charged with murder, pled not guilty and raised an insanity defense. At the guilt phase trial, the court instructed (at the prosecutor's request) that defendant was presumed to have been sane at the time of the offense. The instruction was improper because the question of a defendant's sanity is irrelevant at the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial under Penal Code section 1026. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably probable the defendant would have received a better result absent the instruction.id: 22929
The trial court committed harmless error by failing to give a pinpoint instruction directing the jury’s attention to the expert testimony regarding defendant’s Asperger’s Syndrome.The expert testimony of defendant’s mental disorder of Asperger’s Syndrome, along with other evidence, was sufficient on the issue of whether he formed the mental state required for the charged solicitation and conspiracy offenses. The trial court therefore erred by refusing to give CALCRIM No. 3428 - the mental disorder instruction. However, the error was reviewed for prejudice under the Watson standard and was harmless given the strength of the evidence. id: 22695
The trial court erred in giving the consciousness of guilt instruction with an unmodified version of the voluntary intoxication instruction at defendant’s trial for orally copulating an unconscious person.Defendant was convicted of orally copulating an unconscious person. The trial court erred by giving both the consciousness of guilt instruction (CALCRIM 362) and the unmodified voluntary intoxication instruction (CALCRIM 3426). The latter allowed the jury to consider defendant’s intoxication only in deciding whether he knew the victim was unconscious during the oral copulation. The limitation erroneously prohibited the jury from considering evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication in determining whether he made false or misleading statements relating to the oral copulation knowing the statements were false or intending to mislead.id: 22513
The trial court erred by precluding defendant’s psychiatric expert from testifying about defendant’s dissociation and the impact of that condition.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The trial court prejudicially erred by unduly restricting the testimony of his psychiatric expert. The court refused to permit the expert to testify about defendant’s diagnoses and mental condition at the time of the offense, and limited his testimony to diagnoses or mental conditions in the abstract and their effects on the general person in the population at large. He should have been permitted to testify that in his opinion defendant entered a dissociated state and the impact of dissociation. The testimony would have given the jury a basis to infer that defendant did not harbor malice, deliberate of premeditate.id: 22062
The trial court erred by failing to instruct that voluntary intoxication could be considered when assessing specific intent to torture.The trial court erred by omitting torture from the list of specific intent offenses in which his voluntary intoxication could be considered. However, the error was harmless where the jury necessarily determined that defendant’s intoxication did not prevent him from forming the specific intent necessary to convict him of the other crimes.id: 22556
The trial court erred by preventing defendant from entering an NGI plea over the objection of defense counsel.Defendant charged with burglary and assault with a firearm should have been allowed to plead not guilty by reason of insanity because he committed his crimes while believing he was merely following the goals of the video game he had been playing. A defendant has the right to personally enter the plea of his choice regardless of what his counsel thinks of the merits of the plea. However, the court’s error in failing to allow the plea was harmless where the record demonstrates the lack of credible evidence for an insanity defense. id: 21143
Evidence of defendant's mental disorders and intoxication was admissible to refute an essential element of the crime - that he knew the property was stolen.The trial court precluded evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication and mental disorders because the charged crime of receiving stolen property is a general intent crime. However, with regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is a specific intent crime, as that term is used in Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b), and section 28, subdivision (a). The preclusion of evidence of mental disorders and their exacerbation by drug abuse, unfairly denied him the opportunity to prove he lacked the requisite knowledge. The error required reversal of the conviction.id: 10433
Statements to Penal Code section 1368 evaluators were inadmissible at the sanity phase.Permitting the doctors to testify at the sanity trial about statements defendant made during competency evaluations and during his involuntary hospitalization violated the judicially declared rule of immunity announced in Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465 and adopted in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.id: 19292
The jury should have been instructed to determine whether a person who voluntarily ingested a prescription medication was involuntarily intoxicated from lack of knowledge of the effects of the medication. After voluntarily ingesting prescription medication, defendant drove into oncoming traffic causing two accidents, and leaving one person with serious injuries. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct on involuntary intoxication due to prescription medication. Defendant could have been involuntarily intoxicated if he knowingly ingested a prescription medication but did not know or have reason to anticipate its intoxicating effects. id: 20551
A trial court may not order a criminal defendant to grant access for purposes of a mental examination, not to a court appointed mental health expert, but to an expert retained by the prosecution.The trial court’s order granting the prosecution access to defendant for purposes of having a prosecution expert conduct a mental examination is a form of discovery that is not authorized by the criminal discovery statutes or any other statute, nor is it mandated by the federal constitution.id: 20413
Jury may consider voluntary intoxication in determining knowledge and intent of aider and abettor.Penal Code section 22 permits defendants tried as aiders and abettors to present and the jury to consider, evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question whether they had the requisite mental states of knowledge and intent.id: 15314
Insanity instruction was misleading by directing jurors to assume sanity if defendant had sane moments, but the instruction further said defendant could present evidence to the contrary.During the sanity phase of defendant's trial, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3450. The instruction states in part that if the jury finds the defendant was sane at times and insane at other times, it must assume he was sane at the time of the crime. The instruction was misleading because most mentally ill people have lucid moments and it created a risk that the jurors would find the assumption was irrebuttable. However, the instruction when read in its entirety was not likely to mislead the jurors as it said that even if the jury was to assume defendant was sane, the assumption was subject to defendant presenting evidence to prove otherwise.id: 19907
Court erred in ruling psychiatric experts could not testify as to mental illness or defect unless they believed defendant did not premeditate or deliberate the murders.The trial court erred in ruling the defense experts could not testify at the guilt phase as to defendant's mental illness unless they believed he did not premeditate and deliberate the murders. However, the error was not prejudicial where the record did not confirm defendant's claim that his failure to offer expert testimony regarding mental illness or defect was attributable to the court's restriction of expert testimony. Moreover, none of the experts, either court appointed or defense obtained, all of whom testified defendant was mentally ill, believed his illness affected his ability to premeditate or deliberate.id: 15419
Rule that defendant pleading NGI must be told commitment may exceed the maximum term is retroactive.The rule that a criminal defendant must be advised that commitment following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity may exceed the maximum possible term of imprisonment for the underlying crime is retroactive. If, at the end of the maximum term, an unadvised defendant remains a danger to others, the proper procedure is to seek civil commitment pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code. A defendant's failure to raise the issue of lack of advisement when previous extension petitions were filed does not constitute a waiver, since it provided him no advantage, but rather increased the length of his commitment.id: 9837
Court erred in failing to instruct on diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication with regard to burglary and robbery.The trial court erred in failing to instruct on the availability of the defenses of voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity with regard to burglary and robbery. However, the error was harmless. Defendant relied on voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity as a result of voluntary intoxication. A reasonable juror would have effectively given consideration of these defenses through the instructions dealing with the requisite specific intent to commit burglary and robbery.id: 13134
Giving special instruction based on section 25.5 during sanity phase was erroneous where defendant did not rely on long term substance abuse as the sole cause of his insanity.Defendant was convicted of murder and other serious offenses. The trial court erred in giving a special instruction based on Penal Code section 25.5 during the sanity phase of the trial. In relevant part, section 25.5 references findings of insanity based solely on the abuse of intoxicating substances. Defendant did not rely on his long term substance abuse and possible resulting mental damage or disorder as the sole cause of his insanity. Therefore, section 25.5 did not apply and the special instruction should have been refused. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably probable the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had the instruction been refused.id: 16066
The trial court erroneously instructed in the sanity phase that an insanity finding required proof that defendant could not distinguish legal right from legal wrong.Defendant offered evidence at the sanity phase of his trial that he was suffering under the delusion that doctors were injecting him with lethal substances and that he felt morally justified in killing the doctors to protect himself and others. The trial court's instruction on insanity required defendant to prove that he could not distinguish legal right from wrong, in addition to moral right from wrong. However, this is not the law and the finding of sanity was reversed.id: 18468
Because the two state hospital commitments following insanity findings arose from a single act, the court lacked the authority to impose concurrent terms.The trial court found defendant was not sane at the time of the aggravated assault and committed him to a state hospital for the maximum term of seven years. After the victim died, defendant was charged with voluntary manslaughter. He was again found to have been insane at the time of the beating. He was committed to the state hospital for a maximum term of 11 years to be served concurrently with his previous term. However, because the two commitments arose out of a single act of violence directed at one victim, the trial court did not have the authority to impose concurrent periods of confinement in the state hospital. The seven year term was stayed.id: 18855
Prosecutor erred in eliciting testimony that a defendant pleading insanity could not be examined by the prosecution absent the defendant's consent.The prosecution committed misconduct at the sanity phase by intentionally eliciting testimony on cross-examination of a defense psychiatrist to the effect that the prosection did not have a right to have a defendant pleading insanity examined by a psychiatrist without his consent, and the court erred in admitting evidence in the form of such testimony. However, the error was harmless where there was no basis for assuming the jury believed additional evidence about defendant's mental condition would have been more effective in impeaching the defense experts than was the testimony of the experts called as prosecution witnesses who were appointed by the court.id: 15918
Supreme Court holds that defendants acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be confined indefinitely without medical basis.In a 5-4 decision written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute violated due process by requiring an insanity acquitee, who was no longer mentally ill, to prove that he was no longer a danger to himself or others. Two court-appointed doctors reported that the defendant was in remission from the drug-induced temporary psychosis he suffered from at the time of the crime. The doctors, however, could not certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. The Supreme Court held that this was not a sufficient medical reason to confine the acquitee indefinitely. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia dissented, arguing that due process is a variable concept and that civil committees and insanity acquitees are sufficiently different to warrant different treatment.id: 11771
Court erred in appointing the same experts for both the competency and sanity hearings.The appointment of the same two psychiatrists to examine the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial, and at the same time, to determine his sanity, violated his right against compelled self-incrimination. However, the error was harmless where numerous experts opined that defendant was sane, neither of the doctors in question learned information during the competency exam that was not available to the other doctors, and the testimony of these two doctors was not uniformly negative. id: 16450
The court erred in denying the petition for placement in a conditional release program under section 1026.2 without holding an evidentiary hearing.The trial court erred in denying defendant's petition for placement in a conditional release program pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2 without holding an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing the defendant is entitled to full due process rights to call persons to testify and cross-examine adverse witnesses, but he is not entitled to a jury trial.id: 17233
Voluntary intoxication may negate the malice aforethought required for murder in drunk driving cases.Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol when his car crossed the center divider of a highway and collided head-on with another vehicle killing the driver. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant's intoxication may have rendered him incapable of harboring the malice aforethought required for murder.id: 10263
Updated 6/1/2024The superior court lacked jurisdiction to recall defendant's 2016 NGI judgment to modify the maximum term of confinement.The trial court lacked jurisdiction to recall (under SB 483 or SB 136) the maximum term of confinement for a person found to be no guilty by reason of insanity.id: 28291
Updated 2/26/2024Evidence of drug use was not sufficient to require an instruction on voluntary intoxication that it affected the defendant’s thought processDefendant was convicted of murder. He argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct on voluntary intoxication to negate express malice. However, while there was evidence of defendant’s use of methamphetamine, there was no evidence that the drug use affected his thought process in any way. id: 27520
Updated 2/23/2024The trial court did not err by failing to properly instruct on unconsciousness where defendant did not request the instruction or rely on that defense.Defendant argued the trial court failed to properly instruct on the defense of unconsciousness - that is by instructing on the defense as it related to the evading police charge - without defining the term “unconscious.” However, defendant did not request an instruction on unconsciousness, he did not rely on the defense and it was inconsistent with his necessity defense.id: 26788
Updated 1/29/2024Neither voluntary intoxication nor unconsciousness was an available defense to leaving the scene of an accident.The knowledge requirement of Vehicle Code section 20001(c) (leaving the scene of an accident) is not a specific intent that may be negated by voluntary intoxication or unconsciousness.id: 28083
The amended section 12022.53 (h) does not apply to an insanity acquittee.The recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53,, subd. (h), giving trial courts discretion to dismiss a firearm enhancement does not apply retroactively to a person whose case is not yet final because he was committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity.id: 25987
Voluntary intoxication instruction did not restrict the jury’s consideration of the aiding and abetting theory of liability for attempted burglary.The prosecution advanced two theories of liability on the burglary count - aider and abettor or direct perpetrator. Defendant argued that the court’s instruction under CALCRIM No. 3426 improperly restricted the jury’s consideration of intoxication only to a single mental state for attempted burglary. However, in light of the other instructions given, it is unlikely the jury would have misconstrued CALCRIM No. 3426 in the manner suggested.id: 25932
Evidence supported the sanity verdict even though the defense experts considered the factors not reviewed by the prosecution experts. Evidence supported the jury’s finding that defendant was sane at the time of the murder. While the state’s mental health experts may not have considered all of the facts raised by the defense experts, their opinions were of sufficient quality that the jurors could rely on them to rearch a sanity verdict.id: 25831
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of defendant’s intoxication at the time he entered the jail which he argued was relevant as to whether he knowingly possessed drugs in the jail.Defendant was convicted of the knowing possession of methamphetamine in jail in violation of Penal Code section 4753.6, subd.(a). He argued the court erred by excluding evidence of his voluntary intoxication at the time of his arrest almost two days before the drugs were discovered. However, voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to negate the presence of general criminal intent, so the court’s ruling was proper.id: 25671
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible on the question of whether the defendant believed he needed to act in self-defense. Penal Code section 294 permits evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether the defendant harbored express malice (whether he intended to kill), but not on the question of whether he believed he needed to act in self-defense for purposes of voluntary manslaughter.id: 25629
New developments don’t require resurrection of the irresistible impulse test for determining the sanity of a juvenile.Defendant argued that in light of the research on the development of brain function in adolescents that underlay the decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, the standard for the sanity of a juvenile should be based on irresistible impulse. However, the law does not require resurrection of the irresistible impulse test.id: 25525
Evidence that defendant occasionally blacked out due to drug and alcohol abuse did not support an unconsciousness instruction where there was no claim that he blacked out at the time of the incident.The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct on unconsciousness based on a statement that defendant occasionally blacked out due to his drug and alcohol abuse. This was not substantial evidence that he blacked out at any time during this incident. In fact, he had substantial recall of the incident 17 years later.id: 25272
Evidence supported the sanity finding even though all of the experts concluded defendant was insane at the time of the killing. Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to show that she was sane at the time of the killings. However, the fact that the experts unanimously found she didn’t understand her actions were morally wrong was not dispositive. The record contains other evidence showing defendant understood the nature and quality of her acts, and that her acts were legally and morally wrong.id: 24999
Sanity instruction requiring defendant’s understanding that her acts were legally “or” morally wrong was proper. Defendant argued the sanity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3450, was flawed because it referred to the defendant’s understanding that her acts were legally “or” morally wrong, when the instruction should have required a finding that she was legally “and” morally wrong. However, it’s speculative to suggest the jurors took such a strained interpretation of the instruction . Moreover, the instruction did not fail to inform the jury that defendant had to be incapable of understanding that the charged act was wrong.id: 25000
Voluntary intoxication instruction was not incomplete in light of other instructions.Defendant argued the court’s instruction on CALCRIM No. 404 was incomplete because it failed to instruct that the jury could consider whether voluntary intoxication affected defendant’s knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit a robbery, and his intent to aid the perpetrator. However, in light of other instructions, it was unlikely the jury believed it was precluded from considering intoxication evidence. And a word processing error in the last sentence of the instruction was harmless.id: 24170
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on unconsciousness where defendant's actions showed he did not lack awareness. Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on unconsciousness as a complete defense to the charges where he was bipolar, intoxicated professed unawareness as to his actions and forgot certain facts. However, defendant did not lack awareness during the offenses. His complicated actions showed he knew what he was doing before shooting the victims in vital areas of their bodies. For the same reason the evidence did not require an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on
unconsciousness.id: 19834
The trial court properly directed a verdict of sanity where defendant failed to show he was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion for a directed verdict at the sanity phase of defendant’s trial. Defendant argued the ruling was erroneous because he presented sufficient evidence that he was insane at the time of the crimes. However, defendant presented no evidence to support the second element of the M’Naughten test that he was incapable of distinguishing between the moral rightness or wrongness at the time he attacked and robbed the victim.id: 23838
The trial court did not err by refusing to modify the standard NGI implementation to delete any reference to outpatient treatment placement.Defendant argued that the trial court erred at his sanity phase trial by failing to properly modify CALJIC No. 4.01, which explained the consequences of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. However, deleting the reference to outpatient treatment could have rendered the instruction inaccurate. Moreover, the modification the court did make provided additional assurance that the seriousness of the defendant’s crimes would impact any outpatient treatment placement.id: 23245
The trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness.Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer and argued that because he testified he was “knocked out” after sustaining a head wound, the trial court should have instructed sua sponte on the defense of unconsciousness. However, the trial court was not required to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness absent a request from the defendant.id: 23344
The trial court did not err by failing to appoint a second mental health professional under section 1027 to examine defendant with respect to his insanity defense. Defendant was charged with several counts relating to a robbery and kidnapping incident, and pled not guilty by reason of insanity. He argued the trial court erred by not appointing a second mental health professional under Penal Code section 1027 to examine him with respect to his insanity defense. However, defendant agreed to the appointment of a single psychologist when another examiner was later appointed defendant agreed to the cancellation of that appointment.id: 22601
The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct that unconsciousness could reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. She argued the trial court erred by refusing to give CALCRIM No. 626 which provides that voluntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness can reduce a charge of murder to involuntary manslaughter. However, the evidence did not support the instruction given the evidence of defendant’s driving and her later interactions with people. That she later had no recollection of the events and may have suffered an alcohol-related blackout did not require the instruction. Moreover, the 1995 amendments to Penal Code section 22 precluded her from relying on unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication as a defense to a charge of implied malice murder or gross vehicular manslaughter.id: 22472
The irresistible impulse instruction was proper at the sanity trial even though the defense expert concluded the act was a product of rage that prevented defendant from distinguishing between right and wrong.The trial court did not err by instructing on “irresistible impulse” at defendant’s sanity trial where the defense expert did not find defendant acted under an irresistible impulse, but found instead he suffered an uncontrollable rage reaction that rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. By its terms, the irresistible impulse instruction did not apply if defendant met the definition of insanity.id: 22429
A defendant has a right to plead NGI if there is evidence to support the plea.The trial court did not err by allowing defendant to plead not guilty by reason of insanity over defense counsel’s objection. The plea was free, voluntary, made with knowledge of its consequences, and there was some evidence to support it. id: 22428
The prosecution may compel a mental examination by its own expert in a case where defendant pleads NGI.A 2010 amendment to the California discovery law (Penal Code section 1054.3, subd.(b)(1)) allows the prosecution to compel a mental examination by a retained prosecution expert of a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. Because the subject matter of section 1054.3, subd.(b) concerns procedures to be followed in preparation for trial and at trial, its application is prospectiveid: 21998
Evidence was insufficient to support an instruction on unconsciousness from voluntary intoxication to reduce the murder to involuntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder (implied malice) in a drunk driving incident. He argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness as a result of voluntary intoxication. He argued this as a partial defense seeking to reduce the offense to involuntary manslaughter. However, there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction. Defendant was intoxicated, attempting to sober up, and focused on getting himself home. The facts did not show that he was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication when the accident occurred.id: 22156
The withdrawal of the NGI plea was knowing and intelligent where the experts agreed defendant was sane even though another expert would disagree one month later.Defendant argued the withdrawal of his not guilty by reason of insanity plea was not knowing and intelligent. The plea withdrawal followed the findings of three appointed experts that defendant was sane with no defense evidence to the contrary. That a fourth expert later found defendant was legally insane did not change the result.id: 21465
No sua sponte instruction on voluntary intoxication was required based upon the testimony of a witness that defendant looked like a staggering drunk as he crossed the street.There was no evidence showing defendant had been drinking or that he was incapable of forming the intent required for attempted murder. The testimony of a witness that defendant “looked like a staggering drunk” as he ran across the street did not require the trial court to instruct sua sponte on voluntary intoxication. id: 21098
The court’s instruction and response to a juror question did not impermissibly allow the jury to reject the insanity defense if it found his intoxication at the time of the stabbing was merely the primary cause of his mental disease or defect. A jury convicted defendant of several offenses and rejected his defense of insanity. He argued that the trial court erred in responding to a question from jurors during deliberations, that the jury could reject the insanity defense if it found his intoxication at the time of the stabbing was merely the primary cause of his mental disease or defect. However, the court’s response and CALJIC No. 4.02 properly explained that, where addiction or abuse of intoxicating substances was only a partial cause of the mental disease or defect, the insanity defense would apply if, at the time of the offense, the effects of any recent alcohol use have worn off and the defendant was still incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.id: 20749
A defendant found NGI on some counts and guilty on others must remain in the state hospital until his sanity is restored and his prison sentence must be stayed until his sanity is restored.A defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity as to some crimes and convicted of others and who has not fully regained his sanity at the time of sentencing must be confined in a state mental hospital until his sanity is restored. If a defendant has not fully regained his sanity and is committed to a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, his state prison sentence must be stayed until his sanity is restored.id: 20200
One expert's conclusion that defendant was sane supported the jury's sanity finding.The expert's conclusion that defendant was sane at the time of the crime was sufficient to support the jury's sanity finding notwithstanding the contradictory conclusion of a second doctor.id: 20121
The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the defendants's blood alcohol level and not instructing on voluntary intoxication where there was no evidence that he was intoxicated during the incident.Defendants were convicted of first degree murder. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of one defendant's blood alcohol and refusing to instruct on voluntary intoxication. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible on the issue of whether the defendant formed the required specific intent. However, there was little evidence the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the incident and the defendant's high blood alcohol level at the hospital may have been a result of his drinking after the incident.id: 20214
The trial court has the inherent authority to remove the NGI issue from the jury where there is no evidence to support it.Defendant argued the trial court erred by directing a verdict on the issue of defendant's sanity in favor of the prosecution. Neither Penal Code section 1385 nor section 1118.1 authorize such a result. Each section contemplates a dismissal only in favor of the defendant. However, the trial court retains the inherent power to remove an affirmative defense from the jury where there is no evidence to support it. In the present case, the only expert to testify concluded defendant appreciated the nature and quality of his actions, and was able to distinguish between right and wrong. The defense relied upon evidence that the defendant ingested drugs which caused blackouts. Such evidence was insufficient to establish an NGI defense under section 25.5. The trial court did not err in taking the issue of sanity from the jury.id: 17230
The prosecutor did not err at the sanity phase in using defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent as evidence of his lucidity.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting from defense witnesses on cross-examination testimony indicating that defendant had stated to jail personnel that he would not speak to them on advice of his attorney. However, evidence that defendant consciously chose to remain silent to attempt to rebut defendant's assertion that his mental illness rendered him incapable of communicating was proper. Because he had introduced evidence of his uncommunicativeness as alleged proof that he suffered from a mental illness, the prosecution was entitled to rebut such an inference by presenting evidence that established a different explanation for his lack of communication.id: 11246
Findings of two experts that defendant was sane supported the sanity finding notwithstanding the two conclusions to the contrary.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he was sane at the time of the murder where two psychologists testified he was not sane and trial was delayed for ten years because of the repeated findings that defendant was not competent to stand trial. However, the sanity finding was supported by the presumption of sanity, and the findings of the two other experts.id: 18105
Flight instruction in the sanity double phase was not improper.Flight instruction did not improperly permit the jury to find defendant sane based solely on an ability to discern that his conduct was unlawful rather than morally wrong. The instruction merely indicated that flight was a factor which the jury could consider in determining the defendant's sanity.id: 13306
Supreme Court says states may eliminate intoxication defense.In this murder case, the jury was told that under Montana law the defendant's intoxicated condition could not be considered in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. In a 4-1-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Montana statute did not violate due process. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the due process clause does not give a defendant the right to introduce all relevant evidence. The intoxication defense cannot be ranked as fundamental. On the contrary, at common law voluntary intoxication provided neither an excuse nor a justification for crime. The plurality said the due process clause does not bar states from making changes to their criminal law that make it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions. Justice Ginsburg concurred separately, arguing that the Montana statute is not simply an evidentiary rule. Rather it validly describes the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible for their actions. Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented.id: 9527
Supreme Court says claim that insanity bars execution may be raised in second habeas petition. Defendant was convicted of capital murder. Although defendant had a long history of mental health problems, his first habeas petition did not claim that he was mentally incompetent to be executed. When that petition was denied, defendant filed a second petition arguing that he was insane and, therefore, under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), could not be executed. In response, the State argued that defendant's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. id: 20197
Supreme Court says state procedures inadequate to determine competency to be executed.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prior to his execution, he filed a motion in state court asserting that he was mentally incompetent to be executed. The state court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed a habeas petition, and the district court stayed defendant's execution to allow the state courts to consider defendant's competence. Defendant submitted evidence that he did not understand the reason he was to be executed. The state court appointed two experts to evaluate defendant, and the experts concluded that defendant had the ability to understand the reason he was to be executed. Based on the expert reports and without holding a hearing, the state court denied defendant's motion for funds to hire his own expert and found defendant competent to be executed. The Supreme Court held that once defendant made a substantial showing of incompetency, the state court was required to allow him an adequate opportunity to submit psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence solicited by the state court and a fair competency hearing. The Court also noted that the state court's denial of defendant's request to transcribe the proceedings contributed to the inadequacy of its procedures.id: 20198
Supreme Court says prisoner may not be executed if he lacks rational understanding of reasons for execution.Defendant, who had been sentenced to death for murder, argued that he was incompetent to be executed. Defendant's expert evidence tended to show that he understood that the State intended to execute him for the murder, but that he actually believed that the State's reason was a "sham" and that he was to be executed "to stop him from preaching" about his religious beliefs. In habeas proceedings, the Fifth Circuit held that petitioner was not incompetent to be executed because he was aware that he was going to be executed and the reasons why he was going to be executed. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit imposed too restrictive a stand and that a prisoner's awareness of the reasons for his execution is insufficient to show that he is competent. Instead, the Court held, a prisoner is incompetent to be executed if a "psychotic disorder" prevents him from having a "rational understanding" of the reasons for his execution.id: 20199
Supreme Court holds that insanity defense may be limited to capacity to tell if act was right or wrong.Arizona does not allow admission of evidence of a mental disorder to negate the specific intent to commit a crime; instead, under Arizona law, a defendant may introduce evidence of his mental health only to show that he lacked the capacity to tell whether the criminal act he committed was right or wrong. The Supreme Court held that due process does not prohibit Arizona from using an insanity defense stated solely in terms of whether the defendant had the capacity to tell whether an act charged as a crime was right or wrong or from barring expert mental health testimony on the issue whether the defendant had the intent to commit the charged offense.id: 20177
The trial court did not err by failing to instruct on voluntary intoxication in deciding whether defendant acted with a conscious disregard for human life.Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. He argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury could consider his voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he acted with conscious disregard for human life. However, voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to proof of the mental state of implied malice or conscious disregard. Moreover, Penal Code section 22, which addresses the issue does not violate equal protection by applying different rules to defendants charged with first degree express malice murder than to those charged with implied malice killings since an offender's culpability is only determined by the conviction, not the charging papers.id: 19684
The trial court did not prejudicially err in failing to extend "unconsciousness" instructions to situations where it is induced by chronic drug abuse and head injuries rather than voluntary intoxication.The trial court instructed that voluntary intoxication, even where it results in unconsciousness, cannot excuse homicide. Defendant argued there was evidence supporting unconsciousness based on chronic drug abuse and head injuries which required further instruction on unconsciousness. Any error in failing to give more complete instructions was harmless where there was strong evidence showing defendant was conscious during the robbery. Moreover, any error in failing to define "unconsciousness" was harmless as the instruction given adequately conveyed the concepts defendant stressed. Finally,
the court did not err by instructing on involuntary manslaughter as a general intent crime where the theory of involuntary manslaughter was unconsciousness by voluntary intoxication.id: 19057
Exclusion of voluntary intoxication evidence on the issue of implied malice did not violate due process, equal protection or the terms of section 22.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder (based on implied malice) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Contrary to defendant's claim, the exclusion of defense evidence of voluntary intoxication under Penal Code section 22 did not violate due process. Moreover, neither due process nor the terms of section 22, subd.(b) prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication to establish implied malice. Finally, section 22 does not violate equal protection principles by permitting a voluntary intoxication defense to second degree murder based upon express malice, but not as to the same crime based upon implied malice.id: 19015
The trial court has the power to direct a verdict of guilty.Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court has the inherent power to remove an insanity defense from the jury where there is no evidence to support it. The trial court erred by appointing itself trier of fact rather than adhering to its proper role of determining whether the evidence was sufficient to send it to the trier of fact. However, because the evidence was not sufficient to find defendant was insane, the verdict was affirmed.id: 18989
Prop 115 discovery provisions do not prohibit compelled prosecution mental examinations.A criminal defendant may be required to submit to an
examination by a prosecution expert upon request when he places his mental condition at issue. This compelled examination is not a form of discovery prohibited by the criminal discovery
statutes.id: 18969
The trial court did not err in denying the requested mistrial when the psychiatrist at the sanity phase testified that defendant was a serial killer.Defendant argued the trial court erred at the sanity phase of his capital trial in denying his mistrial motion after a court-appointed psychiatrist testified that he was a "serial killer." However, the law does not confine expert testimony on the issue of sanity to DSM manual disorders, and the phenomenon of serial killers has been a topic of interest in the psychiatric community. Moreover, the testimony was not more prejudicial than probative and was relatively innocuous in relation to the testimony regarding the shocking circumstances of the crimes.id: 18893
The prosecution does not have the burden of proving the question of insanity after Apprendi.Defendant argued that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 has altered the burden of proof on the question of insanity, now requiring the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the burden remains with the defense, and the trial court did not err in instructing that defendant had the burden of proving legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.id: 18617
Informing the prospective jurors about defendant's NGI plea did not violate the spirit of section 1026.Where a defendant pleads guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity Penal Code section 1026 provides for a bifurcated proceeding. The trial court did not err by informing the prospective jurors in defendant's capital case about his NGI plea.id: 18433
Absent medical testimony establishing that defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect there was no basis for giving CALJIC 3.32.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32 regarding evidence of mental disease or defect. However, without medical testimony establishing that defendant was suffering from a mental disease, defect, or disorder at the time of the crime, there was no evidentiary or legal basis for the instruction.id: 16730
Defendant was not entitled to a separate jury to decide the claim of insanity.The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a separate sanity phase jury. That the jury had just convicted him of murder at the guilt phase (in 42 minutes) did not establish that the jury was predisposed to find him sane. id: 16453
Test for determining idiocy under section 26 is the same as the test for insanity.Defendant argued that because of mental retardation he was incapable of committing the charged robbery. He relied on Penal Code section 26 which provides "All persons are capable of committing crimes except ...idiots..." However, the test for determining idiocy pursuant to section 26 is the same as the test for insanity under section 25, subd.(b). Because defendant knew what he was doing was wrong, there was no basis for concluding he lacked the capacity to commit the crime.id: 16062
Court did not prejudicially err in omitting the first paragraph of the intoxication instruction.Defendant argued the court erred in omitting the introductory paragraph of the intoxication-related instruction CALJIC No. 4.21 - namely that for each of the crimes of which defendant was accused a necessary element was the existence of the intent to do some act or a particular mental state. However, in looking at the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors believed they were foreclosed from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication in connection with the felony-murder charges or special circumstance allegations.id: 16064
Court may not dismiss sanity proceedings in furtherance of justice.The superior court erred in dismissing the remaining insanity proceedings after the second deadlocked jury in order to avoid a proceeding that would be too time-consuming and thus unduly burden judicial resources. Sanity proceedings may not be dismissed in furtherance of justice under Penal Code section 1385. Moreover, the court lacked the power to direct a verdict on the issue.id: 16065
Instruction did not suggest that defendant's insanity defense - that he was acting on God's commands - was an irresistible impulse defense.Defendant argued the court's irresistible impulse instruction led the jurors to believe his defense that he acted on a command from God involved an irresistible impulse. However, while the instruction limited the purpose for which the psychiatric evidence that he believed he was acting under commands from God could be used, it did not suggest that defendant's insanity defense was an irresistible impulse defense.id: 16067
Voluntary intoxication is no defense to the charge of cross-burning.Defendant was convicted of burning a cross on another person's property under Penal Code section 11411, subd.(c). He sought to defend the charge on the grounds of voluntary intoxication. However, voluntary intoxication is no defense to the crime of cross-burning, and the trial court properly excluded defendant's proposed evidence on the effects of his drinking.id: 16068
Diminished capacity instructions were not required where the record failed to show the quantity of drugs and alcohol consumed prior to the murder.The record indicated defendant consumed an unspecified quantity of alcohol, marijuana and cocaine at a party shortly before the murder. He argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. However, the record contained no evidence that defendant consumed an inordinate quantity of drugs or alcohol or that his behavior actually demonstrated diminished capacity.id: 13137
Erroneous diminished capacity instruction was harmless where the jury was otherwise properly instructed.The court instructed the jury to give defendant the benefit of the doubt regarding intent if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was capable of forming the specific intent. The defense of diminished capacity was abolished in 1982. However, the error was harmless where the jury was instructed the prosecution had the burden of proving all the elements of the crime and the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the necessary mental states required in the crime of murder.id: 13138
Failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication was not improper where defendant ingested methamphetamine and saw God and where the court instructed on mental disease.Defendant was charged with attempted burglary. He testified that he injected methamphetamine before the incident and entered the apartment because he thought God was inside. The court instructed with CALJIC 3.36 regarding mental disease, defect or disorder. There was no evidence of intoxication or that the drug use would have produced an intoxicated condition. The trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication.id: 13139
Instruction to assume defendant was of sound mind when his mental state was at issue was harmless error.The trial court erred in giving an instruction on the assumption of a defendant's sound mind when the defenses of intoxication and unconsciousness due to epilepsy were raised. The error was harmless where other instructions and closing arguments informed the jury that it had a duty to acquit defendant if it had a reasonable doubt that he was conscious at the time of the crime.id: 13140
Intoxication was not necessarily involuntary where defendant's intent was not to become intoxicated or unconscious, but to commit suicide.A person takes an overdose of a prescription medicine for the purpose of committing suicide. The label warns that the medicine can cause drowsiness. The overdose does not cause death. It renders the person unconscious so that she has no awareness of what she is doing. While in this unconscious state she drives a car and is arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicating drug. Under the circumstances a trier of fact could conclude the intoxication was voluntary. Although the trier of fact could also have found the intoxication involuntary such finding was not compelled and the conviction was affirmed.id: 13141
No involuntary intoxication instruction was necessary where defendant was secretly given PCP while he was taking other illegal drugs.Defendant testified that he voluntarily consumed alcohol and drugs in the early morning hours prior to the killings. The court did not err in failing to instruct on involuntary intoxication notwithstanding defendant's assertion that he was secretly given PCP while he was taking the other illegal drugs.id: 13142
No sua sponte duty to give voluntary intoxication instruction where there was no evidence that drug use affected defendant's mental state.Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder. He argued the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALJIC 4.21, regarding the effect of voluntary intoxication on the person's ability to form criminal intent. Witnesses testified that defendant was a regular user of speed and that he may have been high on speed the morning of the killings. However, defendant gave detailed testimony about the events of the morning including meeting Masterson, getting a gun from a friend, going to the truck and getting into an argument with the victim. The evidence was insufficient to show that drug use affected his mental state and there was no sua sponte duty to instruct with CALJIC 4.21.id: 13143
Phrase mental disease or defect in insanity instruction did not prevent the jury from considering the effects of both in combination.Defendant argued the reference to a mental disease or defect in CALJIC 4.00 prevented the jury from considering the effects of both in combination. However, this was an unreasonable interpretation of the instruction although the court did not expressly state the jury could consider both a disease and a defect, it did not prohibit such consideration.id: 13144
Phrases distinguishing right from wrong and morally wrong are not impermissibly vague.Defendant argued that the phrase distinguishing right from wrong in the legal definition of insanity and the phrase morally wrong as developed in the case law, were impermissibly vague. However, jurors do not have to apply their personal moral views to determine sanity. The relevant inquiry regarding sanity is whether the defendant was <U>incapable</U> of distinguishing right from wrong, that is, of realizing his crimes were morally wrong. There is nothing impermissibly vague in this inquiry.id: 13145
Prosecutor did not misstate the law in arguing that mental illness and insanity are two different things.The prosecutor's statement during sanity phase argument that mental illness and insanity are two different things did not misstate the law. Mental illness is a medical diagnosis and it alone does not establish legal insanity. The prosecutor was entitled to argue that even if the jury found that the defendant suffered from a mental illness, he was still sane.id: 13146
Requested instructions on unconsciousness as a complete defense were properly refused due to defendant's voluntary intoxication.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He argued the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with CALJIC 4.30 and 4.31. These instructions state the fundamental principle expressed in Penal Code section 26, subd. 4, that a defendant cannot be adjudged guilty of any crime with which he is charged if he committed the act while unconscious. However, unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication is governed by section 22, not section 26. Although voluntary intoxication may at times amount to unconsciousness, it cannot give a complete defense under section 26, subd. 4, it can only negate specific intent under section 22.id: 13147
Admonition before withdrawal of insanity plea is not required where there is no doubt as to defendant's sanity.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to expressly advise him regarding the various constitutional rights he would be foregoing by withdrawing his plea, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to jury trial and confrontation. However, such advisements are not required where there is no doubt regarding defendant's sanity.id: 13130
Court did not err in giving the jury information regarding the consequences of an insanity verdict and then instructing it not to consider such consequences.Defendant argued that it was contradictory, and thus erroneous, to instruct the jury regarding the consequences of an insanity verdict (CALJIC 4.01), and then tell it not to consider such consequences (CALJIC 17.41). However, given CALJIC 4.01's intent to protect the defense, it is not an error of which the defendant can complain under the circumstances.id: 13131
Court did not err in refusing to give legal insanity instruction where there was no evidence to support it apart from present drug use.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to give CALJIC 4.02 regarding legal insanity. However, the record was devoid of substantial evidence to support a finding that his July 22, 1989 overdose caused a continuing state of psychosis, temporary or permanent, which persisted after the immediate effects of the overdose wore off. The record was equally devoid of evidence to support a finding that defendant's past overdoses resulted in a psychosis from which he was suffering at the time he committed the offense. There was no evidence of legal insanity which existed apart from any present drug use.id: 13132
Court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor's objections to question of defense expert regarding the ALI test for insanity.During direct examination of the defense expert, the court properly sustained prosecution objections on relevancy grounds to the questions: (1) would it be accurate to say that defendant is often times not able to conform his behavior to what is legally and morally right?; and (2) would it be accurate to say he cannot always conform his behavior to the requirements of the law? The questions were phrased in terms of the ALI test for insanity which has been overturned by the electorate.id: 13133
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on diminished capacity where the evidence of drinking did not show lack of capacity to form the intent.Defendant's crime was committed in 1981, before the effective date of the legislation abolishing the diminished capacity defense. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte regarding diminished capacity. The record made clear the court thought the abolition of the defense applied to this case. However, the evidence did not warrant a finding that defendant lacked the requisite mental state where he consumed several beers and a couple of shots of hard liquor over a six hour period.id: 13135
Court was not required to instruct on the effect of intoxication based upon evidence that defendant was a frequent user of cocaine.Defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to a special instruction which would have directed the jury to consider the effect of intoxication on defendant's mental state. He claimed the collective testimony of three witnesses established an inference that due to his prolonged cocaine use he must have been using cocaine at or shortly before the time of the killings. However, the witnesses each testified defendant often went several days without using cocaine. Evidence that a defendant has ingested a drug at some point in time does not equate to usage at the time of the killings.id: 13136
Expert cannot conclude defendant acted impulsively where the expert is otherwise prohibited by section 29 from giving an opinion as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime.Defendant argued the trial court misinterpreted the limitations on opinion testimony embodied in Penal Code section 28, subdivision (a) and section 29, and erred in excluding the opinion of the defense expert that based on defendant's inebriation and tendency to overreact to stress, he fired his rifle impulsively. Section 29 forbids an expert conclusion as to whether a defendant had the requisite state of mind at the time of the crime. By testifying that defendant acted impulsively the expert was suggesting defendant acted without malice aforethought. Contrary to defendant's claim an expert may not testify to defendant's state of mind at the time he acted using words other than the legal name of the state of mind in question.id: 13021
Waiver of the jury on the issue of guilt may extend to the trial on sanity.Appellant argued that he was not advised of, and did not waive, his right to jury on the issue of sanity. However, the court found that a defendant's waiver of jury on the issue of guilt extends to trial on both portions of a bifurcated trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1026 unless he specifically demands jury on the issue of sanity.id: 12540
Defendant bears burden to show incompetence to stand trial.Due proces prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause permits a state to require that a defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial bears the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that the fact that the burden of proof has been allocated to the state on a variety of other issues implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights did not mean that the burden must be placed on the state here. Nor does the presumption of competence violate due process. Thus the court found no reason to disturb the state Supreme Court's conclusion that in essence the presumption is simply a restatement of the defendant's burden to show competence by a preponderance of the evidence. Justices O'Connor and Souter concurred in the judgment, and Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 11747
Waiver of a bifurcated sanity trial - without Boykin-Tahl advisement was not tantamount to a guilty plea.Upon conclusion of the guilt-phase evidence, defendant agreed to continue immediately with presentation of sanity-phase evidence, without a prior determination of guilt. He had a right to such a prior determination under Penal Code section 1026, subdivision (a). Defendant argued the waiver, taken without <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements, was tantamount to a guilty plea because it allowed the court to consider incriminating sanity phase evidence in reaching its guilty verdict. However, the record did not show the court considered sanity phase evidence in reaching its verdict. Moreover, defendant did not identify any incriminating testimony given by sanity phase experts. Finally, even accepting defendant's premise, the procedure was still not tantamount to a guilty plea.id: 11578
Court had no duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication in a prosecution for possession of narcotics.Appellant was convicted of possession of narcotics. He argued the trial court had a duty to instruct, sua sponte, on the defense of intoxication. The clear effect of the 1982 amendment to Penal Code section 22, was to limit evidence of voluntary intoxication to the issue of whether the defendant (a) actually formed a required specified intent . . . when a specific intent crime is charged. While possession of narcotics requires knowledge it is not a specific intent crime. Hence, under section 22, evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible to refute the mental state of knowledge.id: 10708
Court did not err in failing to instruct that voluntary intoxication could negate express malice so as to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter.The trial court gave CALJIC 4.21 stating that voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether defendant had the specific intent to kill. Defendant argued the instructions were inadequate because they did not tell the jury that voluntary intoxication, like heat of passion upon adequate provocation, could negate express malice and reduce what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. He also argued the court was required to instruct that intoxication could be considered in determining whether the killing was deliberate. However, the 1981 changes to the Penal Code abolished the diminished capacity defense and provided that evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental illness was limited to establishing whether an accused actually formed a specific intent required to commit a crime.id: 10197
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct that the jury could consider defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether he had premeditated and deliberated the murder.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury should consider his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he had premeditated and deliberated the murder. However, where defendant is attempting to relate his evidence of intoxication to an element of the crime he is entitled to seek a pinpoint instruction, but the court has no duty to give the instruction sua sponte.id: 10211
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible under Penal Code section 22 to negate the required mental state for arson.Evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible under Penal Code section 22, on the issue of whether defendant formed the required mental state for arson because arson is a general intent crime.id: 9898
Sanity phase jurors may not be swayed by sentiment, conjecture, or sympathy.The court instructed the sanity phase jury that they may not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, or sympathy. Defendant argued that in deciding the question on sanity, the jury may be swayed by those factors. However, for purposes of this issue, the sanity phase is similar to the guilt phase, not the penalty phase, and the decision must be rendered without regard to the consequences.id: 9838
Trial court did not err in granting defendant's free and voluntary decision to reinstate his previously withdrawn insanity plea.Defendant originally entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. He then moved to withdraw the insanity plea. Two days later, defendant announced that he wished to reinstate the insanity plea. The trial court had no discretion to deny defendant's motion to reinstate his insanity plea solely because his counsel opposed that choice on tactical grounds.id: 9839
Voluntary intoxication instruction did not tell jurors intoxication is a complete defense and did not require defendant to prove his innocence.The trial court instructed with CALJIC 4.21.1 on the legal significance of voluntary intoxication. The instruction states that no act is less criminal because of the condition and the exception to the general rule lies where defendant did not possess the required specific intent because of the voluntary intoxication. Defendant argued the instruction erroneously told the jury there was an exception to the rule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense. However, the exception is not that intoxication may be a complete defense, but rather, that the jury may consider intoxication in determining whether defendant possessed the required specific intent. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the instruction was not confusing. Finally, the instruction did not shift the burden to defendant unless defendant proved sufficient intoxication to invoke the exception. It did not even remotely suggest the jurors were obligated to find defendant acted with specific intent.id: 9840
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245