Consciousness of Guilt (Flight/Falsity, etc.)
Category > Consciousness of Guilt (Flight/Falsity, etc.)
Updated 2/4/2024Evidence of defendant’s suicide attempts did not support the giving of the flight instruction.The trial court erred by instructing with the flight instruction, CALCRIM No. 372, that it could consider evidence of defendant ‘s two suicide attempts, while in jail as consciousness of his guilt. The suicide attempts did not equate to flight and so the instruction was improper, although not violative of defendant’s due process right. The error was harmless given the lack of any evidence of flight.id: 27272
The trial court violated defendant’s due process rights by instructing the jurors that defendant’s refusal to come to court could be considered consciousness of guilt.Defendant refused to come to court, which resulted in a 38 minute delay. The trial court instructed the jurors that they could consider this evidence as tending to prove consciousness of guilt. The instruction violated defendant’s due process right since he made no attempt to elude prosecution or punishment. However, the error was not prejudicial given the strength of the prosecution’s case and the fact that the jurors rejected certain counts.id: 25962
The trial court erred in giving the consciousness of guilt instruction with an unmodified version of the voluntary intoxication instruction at defendant’s trial for orally copulating an unconscious person.Defendant was convicted of orally copulating an unconscious person. The trial court erred by giving both the consciousness of guilt instruction (CALCRIM 362) and the unmodified voluntary intoxication instruction (CALCRIM 3426). The latter allowed the jury to consider defendant’s intoxication only in deciding whether he knew the victim was unconscious during the oral copulation. The limitation erroneously prohibited the jury from considering evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication in determining whether he made false or misleading statements relating to the oral copulation knowing the statements were false or intending to mislead.id: 22513
The trial court erred in allowing defendant’s assertion of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. The trial court erred in admitting defendant’s assertion of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in ending his interview with the police, as evidence of consciousness of guilt. However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt.id: 20845
Defendant's changing residences did not justify the flight instruction.Defendant argued that by expressly refusing to limit CALJIC 2.52 (flight after the crime) to codefendant, the court erroneously permitted the jury to consider defendant's moving to a different residence as consciousness of guilt. The instruction was improper where the only evidence to support it was that he changed residences at a certain time while continuing to work at his normal place of employment.id: 13304
Court erred in failing to delete the word "immediately" from the standard flight instruction where the escape occurred after defendant was charged with the burglary.Defendant was convicted of burglary and escape. Because there was no evidence of flight at the time of the burglary (the escape was from custody after being charged), the court erred in failing to delete from the standard flight instruction the phrase immediately after the commission of a crime. However, inclusion of the irrelevant language was harmless where the error did not lower the prosecution's burden of proof on the escape charge or interfere with the defendant's ability to establish his necessity defense.id: 13194
Updated 2/26/2024The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in a lineup.The trial court did not err in admitting evidence that defendant refused to participate in a lineup as consciousness of guilt. While identity was not an issue at trial, it was at the time he
was asked to participate in the lineup. id: 27323
The trial court did not err by removing “immediately after” from the flight instruction where defendant left for Mexico when he realized he was being followed by police a while after the shootings.The trial court did not err by instructing on flight to show consciousness of guilt where defendant fled to Mexico after realizing the police were following him. The court did not err by omitting the “immediately after” language where the flight occurred later. id: 24728
CALCRIM No. 362 did not undermine any claim that defendant may have felt a consciousness of guilt of a lesser offense than first degree murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses. She argued that CALCRIM No. 362, the instruction on the use of willfully false prior statements, improperly undermined any claim that she may have felt a consciousness of guilt of a lesser form of homicide, and therefore created a presumption of guilt of the charged offense. However, when considering the instructions as a whole, the jury would understand that any consciousness of guilt evidenced by defendant’s lies to the officer would operate as to any degree of murder.id: 25958
Flight instruction was proper where defendant ran from the scene of the killings even though he returned home. The trial court properly instructed the jury on flight to show consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.52) given the evidence of defendant’s fleeing the scene even though he returned to his apartment after the killings.id: 24420
The trial court was not required to instruct that flight by the third parties could be considered as consciousness of guilt.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jurors that defendant’s flight from the scene could be seen as consciousness of guilt because the court didn’t give the same instruction regarding the flight of two third party suspects. However, third party flight is not a defense and there is no statutory requirement to give the instruction when the defendant relies on flight by third parties.id: 24646
Use of the term "aware of his guilt" in the CALCRIM flight instruction did not lower the prosecutor's burden.Defendant argued that language in CALCRIM 372 absent from analogous CALJIC 2.52 allowing the jury to infer from his crime that he was "aware of his guilt" impermissibly presumed the existence of guilt and lowered the prosecutor's burden of proof. However, use of the phrase in question did not lower the prosecutor's burden.id: 19657
The trial court properly instructed the jury it could infer consciousness of guilt from defendant’s refusal to be photographed.The trial court did not err by instructing the jury it could infer consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s refusal to be photographed. A reasonable trier of fact could infer defendant refused to be photographed in order to hide evidence.id: 23811
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of defendant’s offer to speak with the officer the show consciousness of innocence. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence of his offer to speak with the detective after the killing. However, evidence that defendant did not flee after the crime is not admissible to show consciousness of innocence. The court’s ruling did not violate defendant’s right to present a defense, and the disparate treatment afforded consciousness of guilt and consciousness of innocence evidence did not offend due process.id: 21745
Concealment of the victim’s body after the killing was relevant to defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing.Defendant argued that because the defense did not dispute that he killed the victim, the instruction that concealing evidence may show consciousness of guilt, created the constitutionally impermissible inference that because he hid the body to avoid apprehension, the killing was first degree murder. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the concealment of the victim’s body and possessions was relevant to the first degree murder charge and the special circumstance allegations.id: 22290
The trial court did not err by instructing that defendant’s effort to establish an alibi could show consciousness of guilt.The trial court did not err by giving the consciousness of guilt instruction where defendant made a false statement to police regarding his whereabouts at the time of the robbery.id: 22537
The flight instruction provided in CALCRIM No. 372 does not presume that a crime was committed and does not reduce the prosecution’s burden.Defendant argued that CALCRIM No. 372 which instructs the jurors to consider flight as consciousness of guilt deprives the defendant of due process and the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the instruction does not presume that a crime was committed. id: 20980
The campus officer’s search of the minor’s backpack was reasonable where minor had been passed out and admitted in the school nurse’s office that he had cigarettes. The campus police officer’s search of the student’s backpack did to violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer initially found the minor passed out with no odor of alcohol. He was then awakened and taken to the nurse’s office. The officer then asked the minor if he had anything he shouldn’t have in his backpack and the minor replied that he had cigarettes. The officer’s question was reasonable and the minor’s answer justified a further search.id: 20844
Consciousness of guilt evidence (comments made during arrest following a SWAT standoff) need not be excluded as unduly prejudicial where it shows defendant committed another crime about which the jury was unaware.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of his arrest following a SWAT standoff. Evidence of defendant’s resistance to arrest was admissible to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt, but the evidence also showed he was wanted in connection with two other shooting incidents. However, evidence of consciousness of guilt need not be excluded as unduly prejudicial where it shows defendant committed an offense about which the jury was unaware.id: 20695
Instruction on defendant’s false statements to show consciousness of guilt was not argumentative and did not establish defendant’s mental state.CALJIC 2.03, which says a defendant’s willfully false or misleading statements can be used to show consciousness of guilt, is not argumentative and does not assist in proving defendant’s mental state required for first degree murder in addition to guilt.id: 20554
The flight instruction was proper where defendant attempted to leave the crime scene before his arrest. Defendant argued the trial court erred in instructing on flight to show consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.52) because he was arrested at the scene and thereafter did not flee. However, the instruction was proper where defendant attempted to leave the house when the police arrived and was arrested after driving through a window.id: 20498
CALCRIM No. 362 regarding the use a jury can make of a defendant's false statement was not an improper pinpoint instruction.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 362 - defendant's false statement may show awareness of guilt. He claimed the instruction improperly pinpointed his changed statement to the officer about the victim not being in his house. However, CALCRIM 362 is not an impermissible instruction and the court properly left it to the jury to determine whether defendant's statement to police was false or misleading, and if so, what weight it should be given.id: 20205
The trial court was not required to instruct that the absence of flight tends to show innocence.The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the absence of flight is a circumstance tending to show innocence.id: 20204
Flight instruction was proper where there was substantial evidence of flight by defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator.A flight instruction is appropriate where there is substantial evidence of flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator, from which the jury could reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt. The instruction was justified in the instant case where defendant was seen running from the area of the fire back toward his own residence.id: 13320
Flight instruction in the sanity double phase was not improper.Flight instruction did not improperly permit the jury to find defendant sane based solely on an ability to discern that his conduct was unlawful rather than morally wrong. The instruction merely indicated that flight was a factor which the jury could consider in determining the defendant's sanity.id: 13306
The consciousness of guilt instruction was proper where defendant gave conflicting versions of why he went to the crime scene. The trial court did not err in giving a consciousness of guilt instruction where defendant's statement to police and the story he presented at trial, through witnesses, gave two entirely different accounts of why he went to the crime scene and what he found when he arrived. The jury could rationally infer that defendant made a false statement to deflect attention from himself.id: 19788
The jury could properly infer that defendant's refusal to remove his sunglasses so that a witness could better identify him demonstrated a consciousness of guilt.The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors that defendant's refusal to remove his sunglasses so that a witness could identify him could be used to show consciousness of guilt.id: 19194
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on flight as it related to a third party.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the principles of flight as it related to a third party, whom the defense argued could have committed two of the murders. While the defense may have been entitled to such an instruction if requested, none was offered and the court had no duty to craft an instruction for the defense. Moreover, given the weakness of the third party defense evidence, any error in failing to so instruct was harmless.id: 17466
Flight instruction was proper where defendant left for New Mexico immediately after the crime without prior specific plans to do so.Defendant left Oceanside for New Mexico within hours of the killing. Despite his claim that he had previously wanted to return to New Mexico he had made no plans to do so before the killing. He left suddenly and surprised his mother when he arrived. The court did not err in instructing the jurors that flight after the commission of a crime may be considered as a factor in deciding guilt or innocence.id: 16103
Flight instruction was supported by evidence where, after killing the victim, defendant drove to another town instead of summoning help by telephone or going to the nearby store.Although defendant admitted killing the victim and claimed he left to help her, defendant drove to another town instead of summoning help by telephone or going to the neighboring store. This evidence was sufficient to suggest that his purpose was to avoid being observed or arrested. The evidence therefore supported the modified instruction on flight after the crime as consciousness of guilt.id: 16104
Permitting the jury to infer that flight after a crime indicates a consciousness of guilt does not violate due process.Defendant argued the standard flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) violated his right to due process. He claimed the instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference because it cannot be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact on which it is made to depend. However, a permissive inference violates due process only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury. This test permits the jury to infer, if it so chooses, that the flight of a defendant immediately after the commission of a crime indicates a consciousness of guilt. Thus, the flight instruction does not deny due process.id: 16105
Court did not err in failing to modify flight instruction to suggest consciousness of guilt may not be considered in determining which charged offense was committed.The defense sought to modify the standard flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) by adding that consciousness of guilt may not be considered in determining which of the charged offenses may have been committed, or their degree. However, the standard instruction was sufficient as it is unlikely the jurors assumed evidence of flight only went to the most serious offense charged.id: 16101
Court did not err in giving CALJIC 2.15 where there was conflicting evidence about whether defendant had conscious possession of the stolen wallet.Police found the robbery victims wallet in the back of defendant's van. The defendant testified that the carjacker must have hid the wallet in the back of the van. He argued that because there was conflicting evidence about whether he had conscious possession of the wallet, the court erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.15 that jurors could infer guilt from the conscious possession of recently stolen property. However, the instruction was proper because it permitted an inference of guilt only if the jury first found he was in conscious possession of the wallet and there was additional corroborating evidence of guilt.id: 16102
Evidence of hidden clothing was properly admitted to show attempted jail escape.The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's uncharged escape attempt on the issue of consciousness of guilt. While defendant was not a trusty in the jail, he had secreted a trusty's tan outfit in the laundry area. Trusties had greater privileges including the ability to leave the jail on work assignments. While defendant's intent in possessing the clothing was not clear, the jurors were instructed it was an issue for them to decide.id: 16017
Court did not err in failing to instruct that the absence of flight tends to show innocence.The trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury might consider the absence of flight as a factor tending to show innocence. Such an instruction would invite speculation and there are plausible reasons why a guilty person might refrain from flight.id: 15047
Flight instruction was not improper where defendant fled but the primary disputed issue at trial was defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes.Defendant argued the trial court erred in giving the flight instruction, CALJIC 2.52, over his objection. He claimed that evidence of flight is irrelevant and prejudicial where, as here, the defendant does not vigorously dispute commission of the charged acts and where his mental state at the time of the crimes is the primary issue disputed at trial. However nothing in the instruction addresses the defendant's mental state or directs the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.id: 13310
Flight instruction was proper where appellant could not be found following the shooting of his son.Appellant was charged with the attempted murder of his son. He argued the evidence was insufficient to justify the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52). However, a reasonable juror could have inferred that appellant knew he had committed a serious crime and when he did not go to the hospital where his son had been taken following the shooting and was not at home when the officer knocked on his door, he might have fled. The inference, although not compelling, was reasonable.id: 13311
Flight instruction was proper where defendant returned to his home town after the homicide.Defendant argued the flight instruction was improper since the evidence showed only that he returned to his home town after the homicide, and thus, there was no basis for an inference of guilty flight. However, the departure from the homicide scene permitted an inference of guilty motive and the question was properly before the jury.id: 13312
Flight instruction was proper where defendant had his bags packed and was ready to leave for the airport when he was arrested.When police arrived at the apartment to arrest defendant, his packed suitcases were in his stepfather's car. He told his mother he was leaving California and arranged for his stepfather to take him to the airport. He initially denied killing the victims. The jury could properly infer consciousness of guilt from defendant's efforts to leave the state and the flight instruction was proper.id: 13313
Flight instruction was proper where defendant stated that he had been lying low.Defendant argued the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) should not have been given because his identity was in dispute. However, the court found the instruction was proper because a witness testified that after his (witness') arrest defendant stated that he had been lying low. The existence of alternative explanations for the conduct in question did not affect the propriety of the instruction, but merely went to the weight of the evidence.id: 13314
Flight instruction was proper where defendant left the victim's apartment after killing her, although he remained in the building, packed his bags and asked to be driven out of town.While defendant did not leave the apartment building in which the murder occurred he left the victim's apartment after killing her, told Stevens he had to get out of there, packed his belongings and pleaded with his roommate to drive him out of town. This was sufficient to warrant instructing the jury to determine whether flight occurred, and if so, what weight to accord such flight.id: 13315
Flight instruction was proper following defendant's escape from county jail.Defendant argued that the court erred in giving the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) because he denied participation in the crimes and proffered an alibi defense. However, the instruction was proper since it was not directed at flight after the crime, but at defendant's later escape from county jail, and as such, was admissible to establish consciousness of guilt.id: 13316
Flight instruction was proper despite defendant's claim that he fled the scene after nightmare visions which were the result of drug binges.Defendant argued the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) was improper because his departure from the crime scene was occasioned by his drug binges rather than guilty knowledge. However, while this suggests an alternative interpretation of the evidence there was sufficient evidence, nonetheless, from which the jury could infer he fled out of guilty knowledge. The instruction properly left it to the jury to determine which inference was more reasonable.id: 13317
Flight instruction was proper where identity was the issue and the evidence was relevant to identifying defendant as the perpetrator.Defendant was charged with assault. Evidence that the assaulter fled was irrelevant since it was identification neutral. However, the flight instruction was proper based upon other evidence that defendant was found hiding in a stranger's garage two and one-half blocks from the assault scene some twenty minutes after the assault and was drenched with perspiration. This activity demonstrated a consciousness of guilt and was relevant to identifying defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crimes.id: 13318
Flight instruction was proper notwithstanding that he ultimately admitted committing the homicide.Defendant argued the court erred in instructing on flight to establish consciousness of guilt because he ultimately admitted committing the homicide <197> leaving his state of mind at the time the crime was committed as the only remaining contested issue in the guilt phase. However, defendant having fled the state immediately after committing the murder, the prosecution was plainly entitled to rely on such evidence to support an inference of consciousness of guilt for the killings.id: 13319
Instruction regarding defendant's attempt to destroy evidence was not an improper pinpoint instruction.The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC 2.06 that if they found defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself or destroy evidence, they could consider such attempt as a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt. Defendant argued that since the only evidence this instruction related to was his attempt to get rid of the gun the instruction was an improper pinpoint instruction under <i>People v. Wright</i>, (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126. However, the court did not err in giving the instruction which was not cumulative and did state a principal of law.id: 13321
Instruction that if defendant lied about the crime it could be inferred that he thought himself responsible did not violate due process.The trial court instructed that if the jury found defendant made willfully false statements, they could consider such statements to show consciousness of guilt. The instruction defined a permissive inference to the effect that if the defendant lied about the crime, it may be inferred that he believed he was responsible. However, the permissive inference did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was altogether justified on proof of the predicate fact<197>that defendant lied about the crime.id: 13322
Instructions did not imply that if defendant lied about the crimes or failed to provide a handwriting sample, it could be inferred that he acted with the intent to kill.Defendant argued the court erred by giving two instructions that permitted the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from 1) defendant's deliberately misleading statements (CALJIC 2.03), and 2) defendant's refusal to provide a court-ordered handwriting exemplar (CALJIC 2.06). He argued the instructions implied that, if he lied about the crimes or failed to provide the handwriting exemplar, it could be inferred that he acted with intent to kill. However, a reasonable juror simply could not have taken the words of the instruction to mean that lies by defendant supported an inference of intent to kill. This reasoning is equally applicable to the permissive inference arising from defendant's refusal to provide the handwriting exemplar.id: 13323
Record did not support the contention that the court erred in instructing on consciousness of guilt based on defendant's failure to submit to a blood test.Defendant argued the court erred in instructing the jury it could infer consciousness of guilt from defendant's refusal to take a blood test. He claimed demand for the blood test violated both his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and his refusal to submit could not constitutionally be used against him. The Fifth Amendment claim was without merit because the evidence was testimonial and not physical. The Fourth Amendment claim would require closer scrutiny on a better record, but the instant record did not explain whether defendant refused to take the blood test for reasons within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.id: 13325
The trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on the absence of flight following a crime.Defendant did not flee when the arresting officer approached him. In fact, he opened the gate to let the officer in. Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the absence of flight.id: 13326
Willfully false testimony instruction was proper where witnesses gave sharply conflicting testimony.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.21 that the jury could reject in its entirety a witness' testimony found to be willfully false in one material part. However, two witnesses gave sharply conflicting testimony since one of them must have testified falsely, and the jury could have found the falsehood willful. The instruction was properly given.id: 13327
Adding the phrase by change of appearance did not cause the consciousness of guilt instruction to be an improper pinpoint instruction.Appellant argued the trial court erred in giving a modified version of CALJIC 2.06 regarding consciousness of guilt. He claimed that the court's insertion of the phrase by change of appearance caused 2.06 to be an improper pinpoint instruction. However, the instruction did not focus on specific evidence. The trial court merely tailored the instruction to the generic type of consciousness of guilt disclosed by the evidence.id: 13295
Consciousness of guilt instruction was not an improper pinpoint instruction.Defendant argued the court erred in giving the consciousness of guilt instruction based on defendant's statement to the police originally denying the crimes. According to defendant, the instruction was a pinpoint instruction favorable to the prosecution, and is no longer appropriate under <i>People v. Wright</i>, (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126. However, the instruction is not erroneous because it tells the jury they may consider the evidence, but that such evidence is not alone sufficient to convict.id: 13296
Consciousness of guilt instruction should not be given where false statement is made to protect someone else.Defendant made false statements to the police regarding Chilly B's involvement in the crime in order to protect Austin. The court erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.03 which tells the jury that if defendant makes a false statement concerning the crime before trial, such statement can be used to show consciousness of guilt. The statements to the officer, although admittedly false, did not show a consciousness of guilt but rather constituted the operative facts tending to prove the crime of being an accessory. A defendant cannot be conscious of his guilt until after the crime has been committed. Moreover CALJIC 2.03 should not be given unless it can be inferred that defendant made the statement for the purpose of deflecting attention from himself, as opposed to protecting someone else.id: 13297
Consciousness of guilt instruction was proper where defendant fled up two flights of prison stairs after stabbing an inmate.Defendant was convicted of the murder of a fellow prison inmate. The court did not err in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt based on evidence that defendant fled up the prison stairs from the first to the third floor after stabbing the victim.id: 13298
Court did not err in failing to limit the flight instruction to the burglary charge where the instruction did not contribute to the escape conviction.Defendant was convicted of burglary and escape. He argued the trial court erred in failing to modify the standard flight instruction to inform the jury that it could consider evidence of flight only in determining defendant's guilt for the burglary (because flight is an element of escape). However, defendant never requested a limiting instruction. Moreover, the claim was rejected on its merits because the prosecutor argued the flight was relevant to establish guilt for the burglary. Further, defendant asserted a necessity defense to the escape charge and thereby admitted the elements of the offense. It is highly unlikely the limiting flight instruction would have affected the jury's verdict on the escape count.id: 13299
Court did not err in giving consciousness of guilt instruction based on defendant's false and misleading statements.Defendant argued that the court erred in delivering the consciousness of guilt instruction (CALJIC 2.03) because his misleading statements had no probative value to any contested issue. However, the instruction properly directed the jury's attention to testimony tending to show that defendant attempted to divert suspicion from himself to Frank Hillhouse, and that his later inconsistent statements that he did not intend to kill the victim were false. The statements had a direct bearing on the credibility of his later testimony.id: 13300
Court had no sua sponte duty to modify the flight instruction.Defendant argued the court had sua sponte duty to modify the last sentence of CALJIC 2.52 - flight after a crime to establish consciousness of guilt to read: "Whether or not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance to be attached to such circumstance, are matters for your determination." The instruction had been so modified, upon defendant's request, in prior cases but the court had no sua sponte duty to modify the instruction in the instant case.id: 13302
Court properly instructed that pretrial false statements by a defendant may be admitted to support an inference of consciousness of guilt.Defendant argued that since his pretrial statements were not inconsistent with his testimony at trial the court erred in giving CALJIC 2.03 (false statement to show consciousness of guilt) because the instruction singled out his testimony as subject to more scrutiny than the prosecution witnesses. However, the giving of CALJIC 2.03 is justified when there exists evidence that the defendant prefabricated a story to explain his conduct. The falsity in defendant's pretrial statement was proved by testimony of other witnesses. The court properly instructed with CALJIC 2.03.id: 13303
Evidence of flight four weeks after the murders was not so remote as to lack probative value.The trial court admitted, to show consciousness of guilt, evidence of a high speed automobile chase involving defendant and two sheriff's deputies. The flight took place four weeks after, and in the same jurisdiction as the charged murder. Defendant argued the flight was so remote to the charged offenses that it was of no probative value. However, the evidence was admissible because a guilty person does not lose the desire to avoid apprehension for offenses as grave as multiple murder after only a few weeks.id: 13305
Flight instruction is appropriate where there is substantial evidence of flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator.Defendant argued that the instruction on flight after the crime was improperly given since the only contested issue was the identity of the assailant. However, a flight instruction is appropriate where there is substantial evidence of flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator. Such was the case here where, among other things, a witness identified defendant as the driver of the van that sped away from the scene of the crime despite efforts to stop him.id: 13307
Flight instruction is proper where the identity of the person fleeing is not disputed.Defendant argued the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) should not have been given because the identity of the perpetrator was contested. However, the evidence supporting the instruction was not the flight of an unidentified perpetrator, but defendant's flight from San Diego immediately after the killing.id: 13308
Flight instruction is proper if there is evidence identifying the person who fled as the defendant and if such evidence is relied upon as tending to show guilt.Defendant argued the flight instruction (CALJIC 2.52) should not have been given because identity was a contested issue. However, there was ample evidence that defendant fled from the crime scene and that he attempted to leave town unexpectedly within hours after the killings. The prosecution relied on this evidence as tending to show that defendant committed the crimes. The court therefore did not err in giving the flight instruction.id: 13309
Admitting evidence of defendant's refusal to stand in a lineup did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination.Defendant argued that admitting evidence of his refusal to stand in a lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. However, a defendant's appearance in a lineup is nontestimonial, physical evidence, and is not protected by the privilege. Moreover, since defendant's refusal to participate in the lineup supported an inference of consciousness of guilt the court did not err in instructing with CALJIC 2.06.id: 12734
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245