Competency/Voluntar./Advice (Boykin-Tahl)
Category > Competency/Voluntar./Advice (Boykin-Tahl)
Stipulation admitting to the elements of the crime was invalid where defendant had not been advised of his constitutional trial rights before counsel entered the stipulation.Defendant entered into a stipulation through his counsel that admitted all of the elements of the charged crime, making it tantamount to a guilty plea. However, no advisements of constitutional rights were given before the stipulation, and the record failed to show defendant understood his counsel’s stipulation had the effect of waiving his rights to a jury trial and confrontation as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. The stipulation was the only basis for the jury’s misdemeanor verdict, and so his conviction was reversed.id: 25756
Because the unwarned stipulation to the prior conviction subjected defendant to a longer term, the stipulation was invalid under Yurko. Defendant was charged with felony infliction of corporal injury under Penal Code section 273.5(a) along with a prior conviction under section 273.5. Defendant stipulated to the prior conviction and the court accepted the stipulation without advising defendant of his trial rights. However, because the unwarned stipulation to the prior conviction had the direct consequences of subjecting defendant to a longer term, the stipulation was invalid under In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857.id: 24097
The trial court committed prejudicial Yurko error by failing to advise the defendant about his rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses before accepting his admission on the prior conviction allegations.Before accepting defendant’s admission on the prior conviction allegations, the trial court advised him of his right to a trial but did not mention his right to silence or to confront or cross-examine witnesses. The last time he had been advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights was 15 months earlier when he was arraigned on the complaint.id: 24062
The failure to obtain on-the-record advisement and waiver of constitutional rights required that the prior conviction findings be vacated.The record does not show that defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights before he admitted the prior conviction allegations. While the parties referred to defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial at one point, there is no indication on the record that he was ever advised of his rights. The prior prison term and strike allegations were vacated.id: 22877
Defendant was not adequately advised of his rights before entering his plea and the record did not show whether it was knowing and voluntary.Defendant argued his guilty plea and admission were invalid because the trial court failed to advise him of his rights to confront witnesses and against self-incrimination, both with regard to the substantive offense and the prior convictions. The prosecutor noted he was advised of his right to trial, and that he fully comprehended his rights and his plea. However, the judgment was reversed where the record was inadequate to determine whether defendant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.id: 18302
Court erred in accepting a stipulation to a misdemeanor count during trial without providing Boykin/Tahl advisements.Defendant was charged with child endangerment, possessing methamphetamine for sale, and being under the influence. Before testimony began, defendant stipulated that he was under the influence of a controlled substance "in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550(a)." The stipulation included all elements and facts necessary for a conviction and therefore triggered a duty to provide the Boykin/Tahl advisements. The failure to properly advise defendant was not harmless where the record did not show the stipulation was knowing and voluntary.id: 17742
Error in accepting a stipulation as to defendant's ex-felon status without full Boykin-Tahl advisements and waivers was not prejudicialDefendant was charge with possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. Prior to his stipulation to the ex-felon status the court advised him of his right to a jury trial on that element. However, the court erred in neglecting to also advise defendant and obtain personal waivers of the right to confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination. The error was not reversible as the stipulation was a routine tactical choice and it was not reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if proper advisements were given.id: 10427
Defendant's due process rights were violated where the prosecutor and the trial court misinformed him about his eligibility for conduct credits when presenting the plea offer.Defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor and trial court misinformed him regarding his eligibility for good conduct credits, causing him to reject the plea offer. The matter was remanded to resume the plea negotiation process or submit the previously offered plea bargain to the court.id: 19439
Guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary where defendant was ignorant of exculpatory evidence in a supplemental police report.The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea which was not knowing and
voluntary since the prosecutor failed to provide him a supplemental police report containing exculpatory information.id: 19198
Defendant must be specifically advised of his privilege against self-incrimination before admitting an allegation of a prior conviction.Defendant was not advised of and did not waive his right against self-incrimination and therefore the guilty plea admission of the prior serious felony allegation was invalid. That defendant was advised that he had a right to a jury trial and that witnesses would be testifying against him did not cure the failure to advise regarding the privilege against self-incrimination.id: 11541
Failure to advise appellant that an insanity plea could result in confinement for life was prejudicial error.Appellant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in return for a concession from the district attorney that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court held that <i>People v. Lomboy</i>, (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 67 is to be applied retroactively and found that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to advise the appellant that being found not guilty by reason of insanity of manslaughter subjected her to a possible confinement for life (six years plus repeated two year extensions).id: 11552
Court erred in failing to advise appellant that a nolo contendere plea was considered the same as a guilty plea.Appellant argued the trial court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw the nolo contendere plea because he was never advised a nolo contendere plea was considered the same as a guilty plea. The court's omission did constitute a failure to advise appellant of the consequences of his plea. However, the error was harmless where nothing in the record showed any civil action had been filed by any of the victims where his plea could be used as an admission and therefore, it was not reasonably probable that a different result would have been reached with a proper advisement.id: 11534
Failure to advise regarding the extension of commitment rendered the NGI plea invalid notwithstanding petitioner's failure to raise the issue at the first extension.Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity but was not advised of the consequences <197> that his term could be extended indefinitely. His failure to challenge the first extension to his commitment did not constitute a waiver to his challenge the second time based on his claim that the plea was defective for inadequate advisements since, at the time of the first extension, he was unaware of his right to challenge the plea. The proper remedy was to allow withdrawal of the original NGI plea.id: 11557
Mention of the possibility of a restitution fine in the probation report did not satisfy the court's requirement of so advising defendant prior to accepting his plea.The trial court did not advise appellant of the possibility of a restitution fine when it accepted his plea and nowhere did it appear that the point was discussed with appellant in plea negotiations. He was theoretically put on notice when the probation officer expressly recommended the restitution fine in the written probation report. However, the mere appearance of a recommendation in a probation report, which appellant may or may not have seen and of which he may or may not have been aware, is an insufficient basis for upholding the restitution fine.id: 11564
Restitution fine was stricken where defendant was not advised of the possibility of such fine before entering into the plea.Appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine. She argued imposition of restitution fines was improper because she was not advised of the possibility of such fines when she entered her plea. Both California Constitution Article I, section 28(b) and Penal Code section 1202.4 provide that imposition of the fine may be waived for compelling and extraordinary reasons. One example of a valid reason is the failure of the court and prosecution to advise the defendant entering a plea of the full measure of direct punishment which could be imposed, including a restitution fine.id: 11568
Ineffective assistance by way of misadvice concerning a plea offer may result in a reinstated plea offer.When it is determined counsel was ineffective in conveying an offered plea bargain or misadvised a defendant concerning matters important to the decision to accept or reject the offer, and when it is determined such ineffectiveness was prejudicial, the defendant is entitled to accept or reject the offer lost because of the ineffectiveness subject to approval of the bargain by the trial court. However, the People may withdraw the offer if they are able to articulate to the trial court's satisfaction a reasonable basis for such withdrawal given the People's discretion in such matters, the basis for appropriate rejection is wide and may involve either matters relating to the defendant or the crime charged or the internal policies of the prosecuting office.id: 11561
Bunnell requirements are applicable where a defendant submits to court trial on the degree of a homicide pursuant to a stipulation precluding a first-degree murder conviction.In exchange for eliminating defendant's exposure to special circumstances and first degree murder, he waived preliminary examination and submitted to a court trial to determine, based on police reports, taped statements by defendant, and defendant's testimony, whether he was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The trial court erred by failing to obtain his waiver of the right against self-incrimination upon submission to court trial even though he reserved the right to testify and later testified. However, the error was not reversible. The submission in this case was not tantamount to a plea of guilty to second degree murder. It is extremely unlikely a judicial admonition about this right would have altered the defense strategy.id: 11529
Failure to advise appellant of the mandatory parole period was harmless.Appellant pled guilty to petty theft with priors. The trial court erred in failing to inform him that a period of parole would follow his 16-month term in prison. He argued that the proper remedy was specific enforcement of the implied no-parole term. However, specific enforcement by striking parole was not required. Appellant did not claim the lack of advise was prejudicial nor that he would have pled differently if he had been so advised. He therefore suffered no prejudice and the failure to advise him of this penal consequence of his plea was harmless.id: 11553
Where the court misadvised defendant regarding the maximum term of his parole, the sole remedy was to permit him to withdraw the plea.In taking defendant's plea the court misadvised him regarding the maximum length of his parole term. The usual remedy for violation of a plea bargain is either to allow defendant to withdraw his plea and go to trial on the original charges or to specifically enforce the plea bargain. However, neither the prosecutor nor the court has authority to determine a defendant's parole period. Consequently, the court was unable to order specific performance of the court's misstatement. Therefore, the sole remedy was to permit defendant to withdraw his plea.id: 11580
Boykin-Tahl applies when a defendant pleads not guilty, waives a jury trial, does not submit on the preliminary hearing transcript and has a court trial which is tantamount to a guilty plea.<U>Boykin-Tahl</U> admonitions regarding a defendant's constitutional rights given prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea, must be given when a defendant pleads not guilty, waives a jury trial, does not submit on the preliminary hearing transcript, and has a court trial which is tantamount to a plea of guilty.id: 11528
Reversal was required in the absence of an express jury trial waiver.Appellants were tried without a jury and the record did not reflect an express waiver of the right to a jury trial. The People argued the record, under the totality of the circumstances, showed a voluntary and intelligent jury waiver. However, the law does not authorize an appellate court to find "voluntary and intelligent" a non-existent jury trial waiver. The error was prejudicial and required reversal of the conviction.id: 11569
Court's erroneous advisement regarding the appealability of denial of section 995 motion was an improper inducement which voided the plea.Following denial of a Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss the information, defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere. Both pre-plea and post-plea statements by the trial court erroneously led the defendant to believe that appellate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss was preserved. The plea precluded defendant from seeking review of the denial of the 995 motion. The court's promise was illusory and therefore was an improper inducement which voided the plea. Defendant should be given an opportunity to reevaluate his guilty plea and withdraw that plea and proceed to trial if he desires.id: 11539
Court committed harmless error in failing to inform defendant prior to the making of the plea that its approval was not binding.Penal Code section 1192.5 provides among other things that if the court approves the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding. The court failed to so inform defendant. Defendant argued the court must have been unaware it could disapprove the plea bargain, and being thus unaware, failed to exercise discretion to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the court fully implemented the indicated sentence and there was nothing in the record to suggest the court was unaware of its discretion and authority under section 1192.5. Any error in the court's notification omission was harmless.id: 11531
Reversal was required where guilt was determined by a court trial without an express waiver by defendant of his right to a jury trial.In <i>People v. Howard</i>, (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, the court held that the defendant validly admitted having served an alleged prior prison term, despite the trial court's failure to advise him expressly of the privilege against self-incrimination because considering the totality of the circumstances, the admission to the prior conviction was voluntary and intelligent. The prosecution argued the totality of the circumstances test applied in <i>Howard</i> also should apply when a court trial is conducted in a criminal prosecution without an express waiver by the defendant of the right to a jury trial, and that the Court of Appeal in the instant case erred in reversing the conviction based on the absence of a waiver. However, <i>Howard</i> did not alter the long-established rule that, by virtue of the explicit language of the California Constitution, a criminal conviction resulting from a court trial must be reversed if the defendant did not expressly waive the right to a jury trial.id: 11570
Failure to obtain express waivers of right to confrontation and against self-incrimination invalidated the admission of the prior prison term allegation.The failure to obtain express, on-the-record waivers of appellant's right to confrontation and against self-incrimination invalidated appellant's admission of the prior prison term enhancement. The matter was remanded for a redetermination of the truth of the prior prison term allegation.id: 11558
Waiver of appellate rights was invalid where there was no advisement of those rights before the purported waiver.The People argued defendant waived his appellate rights as part of the plea bargain. However, there was neither a written form including an advisement nor an oral advisement of defendant's appellate rights. While there was a purported waiver there was no advisement and therefore the waiver was not knowing and intelligent.id: 11579
Defendant must expressly waive a jury trial and such waiver may not be implied from the trial court's interpretation of a gesture.The trial court granted defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial on the enhancements from the issue of guilt in the substantive count. The court then inquired about the waiver of a jury for the enhancement trial. Defense counsel stated defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The court then asked defendant personally. While there was no audible response, the court said all right, thank you. Defendant most likely indicated to the court he wished to waive a jury trial, but such a waiver must be expressed in words and cannot be implied from a defendant's conduct. The judgment imposed for the enhancements was reversed and the issue was remanded for a new jury trial.id: 11542
Trial court prejudicially erred in taking the prior conviction allegation waiver and admissions in a summary manner.Following the trial on the substantive charges the trial court asked whether defendant waived his right to a trial on the prior conviction allegations. The record did not reflect he was ever advised fully or even in a summary fashion as to the nature of the rights he was giving up by his decision to waive trial and admit the priors. The error was prejudicial given the grave consequences of the serious/violent felony prior alleged in the case.id: 11575
Parties may not enter into a negotiated disposition, either by negligence or design, which specifies a sentence not authorized by law.Defendant pled guilty to annoying or molesting a child with a prior conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 647.6, subdivision (c)(2). He was placed on felony probation and advised by the prosecutor that a probation violation could result in a three year prison term. However, the punishment range for this offense is two, four or six years. After his probation was revoked the court imposed the four year midterm with one year being stayed, to comply with the negotiated disposition. However, the court's creative sentence was not authorized by law. The parties may not enter into a negotiated disposition, either by negligence or design, which specifies a sentence not authorized by law. The sentence was reduced to the two-year lower term.id: 15713
Trial court erred in accepting defendant's spontaneous admission of the prior convictions without obtaining an intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.After the guilty verdict on the underlying offense, defense counsel said defendant was willing "waive jury" on the issue of the prior conviction. Defendant blurted out that he was guilty of the prior which was charged as a strike and a five year prior. The court responded "That plea is accepted." However, the court erred in accepting an admission of the prior without obtaining an intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. There was no mention of the right of confrontation or the privilege against self-incrimination. While the right to a jury trial was earlier mentioned it was never waived. Finally, defendant did not explicitly admit the prior (he was stopped by the court in mid-sentence) and he was not told of the consequences of an admission. The matter was remanded to determine the truth of the allegation.id: 16564
Defendant may bring a pretrial motion challenging the constitutional validity of a prior conviction on Boykin/Tahl grounds.A defendant in a noncapital case may move to strike a prior conviction on <i>Boykin/Tahl</i> grounds notwithstanding the decision in <i>Custis v. United States</i> (1994) ___ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1732, abolishing this remedy in federal courts. However, the instant defendant failed to allege and prove he was unaware of the meaning of a jury trial at the time of his prior conviction and would not have pleaded no contest had he understood what a jury trial was. The order striking the allegation was therefore reversed and the case was remanded.id: 9385
Court prejudicially erred in failing to obtain waivers on the right to confront witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination before accepting admissions on the prior strikes.Defendant's admissions of his prior felony convictions were invalid because he was not advised of his right to confront witnesses and his privilege against self-incrimination. Because all of the court's sentencing decisions were based on the premise this was a third strike case, the failure to obtain a proper admission of the first two strikes required a reversal of the sentence and a remand for a trial on the priors.id: 9383
Findings on the allegations of the strike priors were reversed where defendant was not advised of the right to remain silent or confront his accusers.Defendant admitted two prior convictions for use as strikes and serious felony allegations. He was advised of and expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the allegation of the priors. However, there was no advisement of the right to confront his accusers or the right to remain silent. The true findings as to the priors were reversed.id: 9388
A defendant may move to strike a prior conviction on the ground he was denied his Boykin-Tahl rights in the prior proceeding.A noncapital criminal defendant, after <i>Custis v. United States</i> (1994) 511 U.S. 485, and <i>Garcia v. Superior Court</i> (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, can use the motion to strike procedure to challenge a prior felony conviction on the ground he was denied <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> rights in the prior proceedings. However, the motion to strike procedure is available to challenge only those prior felony convictions suffered after the 1969 decision in <i>Tahl</i>.id: 15202
Jury trial advisement did not require language that 12 jurors would serve and had to be unanimous as to guilt.Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter following a court trial. He argued the court failed to properly advise him on his right to jury trial. However, the court was not required to inform him of his right to have 12 jurors serve on a jury and that those jurors would have to make a unanimous decision as to guilt.id: 24967
Defendant could collaterally challenge his Oregon pleas because Oregon has Boykin-Tahl like requirements but the record showed his pleas were voluntary and intelligent. Defendant could collaterally attack his Oregon prior convictions that were based on guilty pleas because Oregon had a Boykin-Tahl like rule requiring on-the-record admonitions and waiver of rights. However, the record in this case showed that the Oregon pleas were voluntary and intelligent, and therefore the prior convictions were constitutionally valid.id: 25319
Sex offender management program as a probation condition was not a direct consequence of the plea so no pre-plea advisement was required.The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw a no contest plea to human trafficking after finding the probation conditions described in Penal Code section 1203.067 (primarily a sex offender management program) were not direct consequences of the plea, and a pre-plea advisement was not required. The probation condition was not an automatic requirement of the plea. Moreover, defendant failed to show prejudice - that the program in question would have caused him to forego his plea.id: 25116
Despite an express advisal of defendant’ trial rights, the record shows the stipulation was voluntary and intelligent.Defendant argued that his driving with a suspended license had to be reversed because the stipulation that he entered into, which admitted the elements of the offense was invalid because he was not advised of, and did not waive, his trial rights before entering into the stipulation. However, a review of the entire record not just a record of the stipulation colloquy, shows the stipulation was voluntary and intelligent.id: 24383
The trial court did not miscalculate the maximum term before the plea by failing to consider that section 654 might apply to some counts. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea because the court informed him the maximum term he faced was 34 years-to-life, but because Penal Code section 654 applied to some of the charges, the true maximum term was only 23 years-to-life. However, when advising the defendant as to his potential maximum sentence, the court did not have to determine what effect section 654 might have on the sentence. id: 23834
A stipulation to a prior conviction for domestic violence for purposes of Penal Code section 273.5 does not require the court to engage in the advisement and waiver process.The stipulation to the existence of a prior domestic violence conviction was not tantamount to admitting all elements of an enhancement. Rather, the existence of the prior (for purposes of the domestic violence with a prior provision) was a sentencing factor authorizing the trial court to impose a more severe alternative sentencing scheme. As a result, the court was not required to advise defendant of his fundamental trial rights and solicit waivers of them before giving effect to the stipulation. id: 23212
That defendant’s plea bargain did not anticipate a possible federal prosecution did not make it unintelligent. Defendant argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was unaware of a looming federal indictment at the time of the plea, and the indictment was a direct consequence of the plea. However, the trial court was not obligated to inform defendant that federal prosecutors might use his plea against him in federal court. id: 22394
Defendant was required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment following a plea.Defendant argued that because he was inadequately advised of the immigration consequences of his plea, the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. However, the motion to vacate was an attack on the validity of the plea, and an appeal from the denial of the motion required him to obtain a certificate of probable cause. The appeal was dismissed. id: 22145
Misadvisement regarding the sentencing consequences of going to trial did not require reversal where defendant did not show he would have accepted the plea if properly advised.The trial court and prosecutor misadvised defendant regarding the consequences of going to trial by telling him his maximum exposure at trial was 68 years to life when it was in fact 120 years to life. However, the misadvisement did not require reversal where defendant did not show it was reasonably probable he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised.id: 20632
There was no Boykin-Tahl violation notwithstanding the absence of the word waiver on the change of plea form.Defendant argued that his 1976 prior conviction,which was based on a guilty plea, was obtained in violation of his Boykin-Tahl rights. He argued the change of plea form was insufficient to establish a waiver of his constitutional rights because defendant never explicitly waived his rights. However, he expressly stated that in pleading guilty he knew he was giving up the rights his attorney had previously explained to him. He need not have specifically stated that he waived those rights. The record established that defendant was aware of his constitutional rights and that he waived those rights before pleading guilty.id: 11573
Coram nobis was not available to challenge a prior conviction where petitioner had not been informed the conviction would subject him to deportation.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis claiming that a prior conviction was based on a mistake of
fact - the lack of knowledge that the guilty plea would subject him to deportation. However, coram nobis relief was unavailable since there was no showing of a previously unknown fact and,
to the extent that it involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claim is not cognizable via coram nobis or the equivalent nonstatutory motion to vacate the judgment. Moreover, there was no legitimate claim of a violation of Penal Code section 1016.5 because that provision applies to the warnings the trial court is required to make and the present claim involved trial counsel's failure to adequately warn the client.id: 19626
Defendant challenging a guilty plea due to a Vienna Convention violation may not do so by petition for a postjudgment writ. Defendant sought to vacate a judgment resulting from a 1989 guilty plea. He argued the plea was entered in violation of a treaty (The Vienna Convention) requiring a foreign national to be advised of the right to contact his or her consulate upon arrest. However, the advice regarding the right is to be provided by the arresting officer and there was no evidence in the record that the officer failed to give the proper advice.
Moreover, the issue must be raised on direct appeal following the conviction rather than by a petition for a postjudgment writ.id: 19491
The record showed defendant's guilty plea was a product of his free will and his later claim that he was medicated at the time of the plea did not require that the plea be withdrawn. Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea based upon evidence of his mental impairment at the time of the plea.
However, the sole evidence that defendant was intoxicated or confused at the time of the plea came from his own assertions at the time of the motion to withdraw the plea. There was no other
evidence showing impairment at the time of the plea.id: 19270
Imposition of fines and assessments that were not made part of the agreement, and about which defendant was generally advised, did not violate the agreement.Defendant entered into a plea bargain that would result in a two year prison term. He did not object when the court orally imposed, in addition to the agreed prison term, a $1,000 state restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, and a concurrent $500 fine "with the appropriate penalty assessments." The penalty assessments were later calculated to be $1,125, along with a suspended restitution fine of $1,000. Defendant was adequately advised of the potential fines and assessments, and since they were not made part of the plea bargain, their imposition did not violate the agreement.id: 18299
Capital defendant's stated "death wish," violent propensity, and history of psychiatric treatment did not indicate he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea.Defendant pled guilty to the capital charges and told the court he wanted to receive the death penalty. On appeal, he argued that his "death wish," together with his past violent behavior, attempt to hoard drugs for a suicide attempt, and history of psychiatric treatment, indicated he was incompetent and required the court to order a psychiatric evaluation before finding him competent to plead guilty. However, these factors did not indicate defendant was incompetent at the time of his guilty plea.id: 18208
The $1200 restitution fine did not violate the plea bargain since defendant was advised there would be a fine but the amount was not specified.Following a no contest plea, the court ordered defendant to pay a $1200 restitution fine. Defendant argued the fine was not part of the plea bargain, and asked that the amount be reduced to the statutory minimum. However, there was no violation of the plea bargain where, as here, the court properly advised defendant of the restitution fine prior to accepting his plea. The fine was within defendant's "contemplation and knowledge" when he entered the plea even though the precise amount of the fine was never specified.id: 18188
Defendant can voluntarily and intelligently admit a prior conviction under certain circumstances despite being advised and having waived only his right to a jury trial.When, immediately after a jury verdict of guilty, a defendant admits a prior conviction after being advised and waiving only the right to trial, that admission can be voluntary and intelligent even though the defendant was not told of, and thus did not waive, the concomitant rights to remain silent and confront adverse witness if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the admission supports the conclusion.id: 17967
The failure to advise defendant about the direct restitution which was not part of the plea agreement was harmless where he had been advised of the possibility of a restitution fine. Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in ordering direct victim restitution where it was not part of the plea agreement and he was not advised it would be a consequence of his plea. Initially, defendant did not waive the issue by failing to raise it at sentencing where the court immediately imposed the sentence without providing the necessary advisement. However, defendant suffered no prejudice by the insignificant deviation from the plea bargain where he had been advised of the possibility of a restitution fine, rather than direct restitution, and it could not have mattered to him whether he paid restitution to the victim or the state.id: 17552
Confederate's plea bargain was not coerced where it required him to testify truthfully even though his limited immunity was conditioned on there being no new evidence showing that he was the killer.Defendant argued that his confederate, Garrison, was the shooter. He argued Garrison was an inherently unreliable witness at trial since his plea bargain was conditioned upon his promise to testify in conformity with the state's theory that defendant was the actual killer. However, Garrison did not agree to testify in conformity with a prior statement. He merely agreed to testify truthfully although his immunity agreement was conditional on there being no new evidence showing he was the actual killer.id: 16936
When defendant pled guilty to a murder in 1986 his future eligibility for the death penalty was only a possible collateral consequence of the plea not requiring an advisement.Defendant argued the prior-murder special circumstance must be reversed because he was not advised before the 1986 guilty plea that the murder conviction would make him eligible for the death penalty. However, the future possibility of the death penalty in the event of a second murder prosecution is not a direct consequence of the guilty plea that requires an advisement.id: 16939
Defendant could not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea on appeal where he did not file the motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court at a time when he had knowledge of the problem.Defendant argued his guilty plea should be set aside since it was involuntary in that he was not made aware of the falsehood in the parole agent's report until after he entered the plea. However, he learned of the alleged falsehood well before sentencing and moved for a continuance on that basis to withdraw the plea. Since he never filed the motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court, he waived the claim on appeal.id: 16740
Defendant forfeited the claim on appeal that his guilty plea was involuntary where he never moved to withdraw his plea in the trial court.Defendant argued his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary in that he was not made aware of the alleged falsehood in the parole agent's report until after he entered his plea. However, defendant was aware of the alleged falsehood two days after entry of the plea and well before the judgment. He thereafter obtained a continuance to allow him to file a motion to withdraw the plea. By failing to move to withdraw the plea in the trial court, defendant forfeited the claim on appeal that his plea was entered involuntarily.id: 16670
There was no improper "sentence entrapment" where federal agents presented an opportunity to commit credit card fraud between the sentencing in state court after a plea, and the date set for surrender.Defendant argued that he was entrapped by government authorities during the period between his sentencing in state court following a guilty plea and the date set for his surrender. He claimed he was not advised at the time of the plea that the district attorney and federal agents planned to set him up for a probation violation and then ask for more time in prison. However, the record did not support his argument. It was the defendant who requested a delay in his surrender date because he did not want to go to county jail using crutches. The prosecutor did not know of a period after the plea during which defendant could be set up for a probation violation. Moreover, California courts do not recognize the concept of sentencing entrapment, and if they did, it would not apply since the defendant was predisposed to commit the credit card fraud and was not pressured into doing so.id: 16570
Boykin-Tahl protections do not extend to extrajudicial confessions.Defendant argued that because his statements to the police constituted a full confession of guilt, those statements should be deemed inadmissible because police failed to obtain specific waivers for each constitutional right he was forfeiting by confessing. However, no authority exists for extending Boykin/Tahl protections to extrajudicial confessions.id: 16447
Failure to advise defendant of possibility of deportation did not render the plea invalid where he made no showing regarding the likelihood of deportation.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea since, at the time of the plea, the court failed to advise him pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5, that his plea could result in deportation. However, defendant's proof of noncitizenship, without more, was insufficient to satisfy his burden under section 1016.5, subdivision (b). He must also make a showing of possible adverse immigration consequence.id: 15710
Court need not advise a defendant about the possibility of future SVP proceedings before accepting a plea.The trial court was not required to advise defendant, before accepting his no contest plea, that he might eventually be subject to additional confinement under the Sexually Violent Predator Act - Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600.id: 15708
In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by felon, a defendant need not be advised of the Boykin-Tahl rights before stipulating to his or her status as a felon.The trial court was not required to provide <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements before permitting defendant, through his counsel, to stipulate during his trial for possession of a firearm by a felon that he had previously been convicted of a felony.id: 15540
Trial court need not advise three strike defendant, prior to guilty plea, that he was ineligible for parole until he served four-fifths of his sentence.A defendant's parole eligibility date is not a direct consequence of which a defendant must be apprized before pleading guilty. Therefore, in sentencing under the three strikes law, the trial court was not required to advise defendant, prior to his guilty plea, that he was ineligible for parole until he had served four-fifths of his sentence.id: 15191
A defendant may not collaterally attack an out-of-state prior on Boykin-Tahl grounds unless the Tahl-like requirements existed in that state at the time of the plea.A defendant may not collaterally attack a prior out-of-state conviction on <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> grounds in the absence of evidence that the convicting jurisdiction required <i>Tahl</i>-like procedural formalities.id: 15208
Court may not invalidate a prior conviction on Boykin-Tahl grounds without complying with the Sumstine/Allen procedures.The trial court determined the alleged federal prior conviction for bank robbery was not true because the prosecution failed to prove the validity of the <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> waiver at the time of the guilty plea. However, the prosecution is not required to prove, as an element of the "truth of a prior conviction" the validity of the underlying change of plea because such a challenge can only be made pursuant to the procedures set forth in <i>People v. Sumstine</i> (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, and <i>People v. Allen</i> (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424.id: 14942
Defendant was not entitled to specific performance of an indicated sentence where the sentencing court subsequently learned of two prior prison terms.Defendant was sentenced to a ten year prison term following a plea of guilty to attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon and several enhancements. He argued he should have received no more than seven years which was the indicated sentence originally offered by the trial court over the objection of the prosecution. At the time the court indicated the sentence it had no knowledge of defendant's two prior prison terms. Defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the indicated sentence. He was informed the seven year sentence was not a promise. He then pleaded guilty a second time knowing he would receive nothing less than ten years and he was given an opportunity to withdraw his plea, which he refused. He was entitled to nothing more.id: 11545
Defendant's stipulation that she was legally married when she married the parolee was not tantamount to a guilty plea without advisements and waivers given her vigorous defense of the other charges.Defendant, a parole officer, married one of her parolees. She was convicted of several offenses including bigamy under Penal Code section 281. She argued that her stipulation that at the time she married the parolee she was legally married to her prior husband was tantamount to a guilty plea without <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> waivers. However, because defendant advanced a substantial defense to the other counts charged, her stipulation regarding the validity of the prior marriage did not mandate <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements. Counsel made a tactical decision to offer the jury a chance to compromise its verdict by convicting defendant of only one charge. Under the circumstances the proceedings were not the equivalent of a guilty plea.id: 11546
Defendants' silence at sentencing constituted a waiver of any error in failing to advise him at the time of the plea of the mandatory restitution fine.Defendants argued the trial court erred in failing to advise them, at the time they pleaded guilty, that such a plea would subject them to a virtually mandatory restitution fine. However, defendants' silence in the face of both the probation report recommending the fines and the trial court's subsequent order constituted a waiver of any error.id: 11547
Docket sheet,supported by testimony was substantial evidence of a valid waiver of rights before pleading guilty.Appellant argued the trial court should have stricken his 1987 prior because the record failed to demonstrate that he expressly and explicitly waived his rights before pleading guilty. However, the docket sheet on its face reflected an express and explicit waiver: defendant was specifically advised of each of his rights, he understood them, and he personally, knowingly and voluntarily waived each one. Moreover, there was no credible evidence to support a reasonable doubt to the contrary.id: 11548
Failing to advise on the lesser prison terms was harmless error.Before accepting her plea the court advised defendant that she could be imprisoned for up to three years. The court erred in failing to advise her on the lesser prison options of two years or sixteen months. The error was harmless since the advice regarding the lesser terms could only have made the plea more attractive.id: 11550
Failure to advise a defendant who submits on the preliminary hearing transcript regarding the right against self-incrimination is not reversible per se.Defendant's submission of his case on the preliminary hearing transcript was tantamount to a guilty plea. He was never advised he would be waiving his right against self-incrimination by submitting the case upon the transcript. The failure to render such advice was not reversible per se. Viewed cumulatively with the advisements properly given, it was clear that defendant knew he would be incriminating himself by submitting the case on the preliminary hearing transcript. His choice to do so, with the advice of counsel, was voluntary and intelligent.id: 11551
Failure to advise defendant of restitution as a consequence of the plea was not prejudicial where the plea bargain was favorable and his claims of victim fraud were speculative.Defendant was resentenced after the original sentence failed to include a restitution award. At the time of the plea he was not advised that one of the consequences of the plea would be the requirement to pay victim restitution. Advisement as to the consequences of the plea is not constitutionally mandated and the plea will be set aside only upon a showing of prejudice. There was no prejudice in the instant case where the plea bargain was very favorable to defendant, and his lawsuits and claims of fraud by the victims were purely speculative.id: 11554
Failure to advise of the consequences of the enhancement allegations was harmless where defendant was aware of the consequences and failed to object.The trial court erred in failing to advise defendant of the penal consequences of admitting the enhancement allegations. However, the record disclosed that defendant was not only aware of the increased penalties, but argued for leniency with that awareness. Moreover, defendant waived the error by failing to object when the court sentenced him.id: 11555
Failure to advise of the probability that the slow plea would result in conviction was harmless error.The trial court erred in failing to advise defendant of the probability that his slow plea <197> submitting the case on the stipulated facts from the preliminary hearing evidence <197> would result in a conviction. The error did not require reversal. Once the motion to suppress evidence was denied any reasonable person would have realized the likely outcome of the proceeding would be a guilty verdict, at least as to the lesser charge of narcotics possession. Moreover, the record reveals that defense counsel and the prosecutor had an understanding and both attorneys requested the court to consider the lesser offense of simple possession when it took the matter under submission after the prosecutor asked the court to dismiss the two Vehicle Code violations. The court complied with the requests.id: 11556
In accepting defendant's guilty plea to a felony, the court has no duty to advise him that this conviction may be used to enhance future felony convictions.In accepting a guilty plea to a felony, the trial court is not required to advise the defendant that his conviction may result n an enhanced sentence for a future felony conviction.id: 11559
Indiana court effectively apprised defendant at the time of his prior plea of his privilege against self-incrimination.Defendant argued his two prior convictions for burglary committed in Indiana were improperly admitted at the penalty phase for lack of adequate <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements. Specifically, he referred to the lack of an express admonition and waiver concerning the privilege against self-incrimination. However, the trial judge clearly advised defendant of his right to a jury trial and to confront the evidence against him, that the state had the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that <U>he could remain silent</U> and the burden would not shift to him. Thus, he was effectively apprised of the privilege against self-incrimination.id: 11560
Lack of an express waiver of jury trial did not invalidate the guilty plea where circumstances demonstrated defendant was aware of the right.Defendant argued his guilty plea was invalid and must be set aside because he never personally waived his right to a jury trial. However, the absence of an express waiver of the right to a jury trial did not require reversal where the circumstances of the case demonstrate that appellant was well aware of his right to a jury trial as defense counsel stated that defendant waived that right. An express waiver of jury is still required for a trial by court, but not for a guilty plea.id: 11562
Plea condition that witness pass a polygraph test stating she was not involved in several murders was not impermissively coercive.A prosecution witness pled guilty as an accessory to murder and received a three year sentence. The basic condition of the plea was that she testify truthfully and pass a polygraph examination stating she had no involvement in the other murders. This plea condition was not impermissibly coercive. Although there was pressure on her to adhere to her statements that she had not killed any of the victims she was nonetheless required to testify truthfully in order to avoid breaching the plea agreement. She was not improperly coerced to testify in a particular fashion.id: 11565
Plea on the prior was not invalid for failure to advise on the right to testify.The trial court struck the prior conviction on the ground that the transcript of the prior plea did not show defendant was advised of his right to testify. The record did establish that defendant was properly advised of his rights regarding self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury trial. The law does not require that he be advised of his right to testify.id: 11566
Prior conviction was valid despite the absence of the transcript from the hearing as it was the custom of the judge who accepted the plea to give Boykin-Tahl advisements and extract a personal waiver on each cause.Before the penalty trial, defendant moved to declare his 1972 conviction for forcible rape invalid on the grounds he did not knowingly waive his <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> rights before pleading guilty to the offense. No reporter's transcript of the hearing was available, the trial judge who took the plea was deceased, and neither attorney remembered the circumstances under which the plea was taken. However, substantial evidence supported the court's decision to uphold the constitutional validity of the prior where the prosecutor and defense counsel testified that all defendants who pled guilty before the deceased judge were fully advised of all constitutional rights and potential sentencing consequences, and that the judge extracted a personal waiver on each issue from every accused.id: 11567
Single advisement of constitutional rights was proper before accepting a guilty plea and admissions of prior convictions.Defendant's plea to the substantive offenses and admission of the prior convictions occurred in a single proceeding and were not separated in time. Nor did the magistrate separate the substantive offenses from the prior conviction allegations by the manner in which the advisement was given and the plea was taken. The single express advisement was sufficient to inform the defendant of each of his constitutional rights with respect to the guilty pleas to the substantive offenses and the admissions of prior convictions.id: 11571
The participation in a fair trial that results in conviction makes moot and harmless defense counsel's misadvise during plea bargaining negotiations.Appellant argued that had he received adequate counsel during the plea bargaining stage he would have accepted the bargain, entered a guilty plea, and suffered a much lighter penalty than that received after the jury verdict of guilty. However, the participation in a fair jury trial preserves all of the defendant's basic constitutional trial rights, thereby rendering any error of counsel at the plea bargaining stage legally harmless.id: 11572
Trial court was not required to investigate the possibility that a defendant might be willing to make an alford plea.In <i>North Carolina v. Alford</i>, (1970) 400 U.S. 25, the court held that a guilty plea is not per se involuntary because it is based on the defendant's desire to avoid a harsher sentence even though it is accompanied with protestations of innocence. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the trial court was not required to investigate the possibility that a defendant might be willing to make an Alford plea.id: 11576
Trial court's erroneous advice regarding the parole term did not violate a term of the plea agreement.Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and was advised that he would receive a sentence of 15 years to life. The court also erroneously told defendant that when he completed his prison term he would be on parole for up to three years. Prior to sentencing he moved to withdraw his plea arguing that he was misadvised as to the parole period and the law would subject him to parole for the rest of this life. However, the trial court's erroneous advisement regarding the parole period did not violate a term of the plea bargain. Therefore, reversal was not required. Moreover, defendant did not establish prejudice as his negotiated sentence was favorable and enabled him to avoid a possible 30 years to life sentence and it was reasonably probable he would have pled guilty even if he had been correctly advised regarding the parole term.id: 11577
Waiver of a bifurcated sanity trial - without Boykin-Tahl advisement was not tantamount to a guilty plea.Upon conclusion of the guilt-phase evidence, defendant agreed to continue immediately with presentation of sanity-phase evidence, without a prior determination of guilt. He had a right to such a prior determination under Penal Code section 1026, subdivision (a). Defendant argued the waiver, taken without <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advisements, was tantamount to a guilty plea because it allowed the court to consider incriminating sanity phase evidence in reaching its guilty verdict. However, the record did not show the court considered sanity phase evidence in reaching its verdict. Moreover, defendant did not identify any incriminating testimony given by sanity phase experts. Finally, even accepting defendant's premise, the procedure was still not tantamount to a guilty plea.id: 11578
A defendant need not be advised of the possible future use of a conviction in the event the defendant commits a later crime.When entering a guilty plea a defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of a conviction. However, possible future use of a current conviction is not a direct consequence of the conviction.id: 11521
Advisements before slow plea were not inadequate where the court had just given full advisement on self-incrimination while taking a guilty plea to a separate charge.Appellant argued his convictions, except conspiracy to possess methamphetamine for sale, must be reversed because the court failed to advise him of his right against self-incrimination before accepting his submission of the remaining counts on the grand jury transcript. However, the record demonstrates appellant was aware he had a right not to incriminate himself since shortly before he entered his slow plea the court had fully outlined his right against self-incrimination while taking his guilty plea to the conspiracy to possess methamphetamine charge. The court had explained the right not incriminate himself as it pertained to a jury trial and when accepting appellant's slow plea reminded appellant it had explained his jury trial right.id: 11522
After submission of the case on the preliminary hearing transcript, the court's error in failing to advise defendant of the minimum term of imprisonment was not erroneous.Defendant submitted his case on the preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court advised him of the maximum term of imprisonment but erred in failing to advise him regarding the minimum term. Having consented to the transcript submission knowing he faced a possible four year term, it is improbable that defendant would have rejected the submission had he been advised that the disposition might be more favorable to him. The defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to advise him of the minimum term of imprisonment.id: 11523
Any error in failing to advise defendant that his admission to theGBI enhancement rendered him ineligible for probation was harmless where he agreed to a 12 year prison sentence.Appellant argued he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because he was not advised that his admission to a great bodily injury enhancement would render him ineligible for probation. However, counsel and the defendant expressly agreed to a 12 year prison sentence and waived application for probation because they expected to receive that sentence. Therefore, even assuming the court had an obligation to give the advisement in question any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different absent the error.id: 11524
Any error in failing to give the Boykin-Tahl advisements at the penalty phase was harmless.Without determining whether the Boykin-Tahl rule applies at the penalty phase of a capital case, the court held that any error in failing to give the required advisements was harmless. If defendant had chosen not to make a waiver, all or at least most of the 18 witnesses whose prior testimony was admitted by stipulation and who did not testify would have given live testimony to the same or substantially the same effect.id: 11525
Any error on advising of right to cross-examine but not on the right to confrontation was harmless.Defendant challenged the validity of his grand theft prior on the ground that the guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. While he acknowledges being advised that he was giving up his right to cross-examine witnesses, he argued he was never told that by pleading guilty he was giving up his right of confrontation. The court found that advisement on the right to cross-examine may serve as an adequate advisement on the right of confrontation. Moreover, any error was harmless where defendant made no showing that when the plea was entered he lacked knowledge of his constitutional rights.id: 11526
Boykin-Tahl advisements were not necessary before accepting a stipulation that the secondary offense was committed while on bail or OR release for purposes of the section 12022.1 enhancement.The Court of Appeal concluded that a defendant's stipulation that the secondary offense was committed while on bail or own recognizance release for the primary offense is analogous to the admission of a prior conviction when charged for the purpose of enhancing a term. (Penal Code section 12022.1). Therefore, the court held the stipulation had to be accompanied by advice regarding the personal waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights to silence, confrontation and cross-examination, and jury trial, i.e., <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> advice and waivers. However, because the stipulation was a stipulation to evidentiary facts, not an admission that the enhancement allegation itself was true or an admission of every element necessary to imposition of punishment on the section 12022.1 charge, the <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> and <i>Yurko</i> requirements were inapplicable.id: 11527
Coram nobis is appropriate vehicle to challenge a guilty plea allegedly induced by fraud, mistake or coercion.The writ of error coram nobis is an appropriate procedure for a postjudgment challenge to a guilty plea allegedly induced by mistake, fraud or coercion.id: 11530
Court did not err in failing to advise defendant he might be required to pay restitution before accepting his plea.Defendant argued that because the trial judge did not inform him he could be required to pay restitution to San Diego Gas & Electric as a condition of probation, the restitution order went beyond the scope of his <i>Harvey</i> waiver where the court must advise the defendant of the penal consequences of his plea. However, the restitution order was not a penal consequence, it was a condition of probation. Moreover, the record showed defendant always expected to pay restitution, it was only the amount to which he objected when facing sentence.id: 11532
Court did not err in failing to advise defendant prior to his plea that he had the right to testify on his own behalf.Defendant argued the evidence failed to establish adequate waivers of his constitutional rights were taken at the time of his 1980 plea <197> specifically that he was not advised of his right to testify. Failure to elaborate upon defendant's right against self-incrimination did not invalidate the earlier plea.id: 11533
Court erred in striking the prior conviction for failure to advise on the potential deportation consequences of the plea.The trial court granted defendant's motion to strike a 1989 prior conviction for residential burglary on the ground that before accepting the plea, the trial court in that case failed to give a statutorily required advisement concerning the potential deportation consequences of his plea. However, striking the prior was an inappropriate remedy. Defendant should have been permitted to withdraw the guilty plea and enter a not guilty plea.id: 11535
Court taking murder plea did not err in failing to explain that defendant might be convicted of manslaughter if he went to trial.Defendant argued that his prior murder conviction had to be set aside because the trial judge in that proceeding did not explain that he could be convicted of manslaughter if he went to trial. There is no need for a trial court taking a plea to engage in an in-depth discussion with a defendant regarding the possible outcomes should the accused proceed to trial.id: 11536
Court was under no obligation to hold a second competency hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to plead guilty.Defendant was found competent to stand trial following a contested hearing two weeks before his plea. While a higher degree of competence is required to plead guilty than stand trial, the court did not err in failing to order, sua sponte, a hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to plead guilty. The court was aware of the defendant's alleged mental problems and, after the earlier hearing, was not convinced defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. Moreover, defendant failed to point to evidence to show the court should have entertained a doubt as to defendant's competence. Finally, defendant did not request a second competency hearing before pleading guilty.id: 11537
Court's comment that it would not rule out the possibility of probation did not improperly induce the plea.Defendant was not informed at the time he entered his plea that probation would be statutorily disfavored. However, the record did show a climate of real anticipation that probation was likely. The court indicated it was ruling out none of its sentencing options. There was no indication at the time of sentencing that defendant was surprised by the statutory limitation on probation or that he felt the plea bargain was being breached. Given the circumstances, the plea was not improperly induced by the trial court's comments regarding sentencing.id: 11538
Defendant, alleging Boykin-Tahl error failed to produce evidence, available to him in the form of a transcript.Defendant argued he was not given the proper advisements prior to his 1986 guilty plea. The prosecution produced an abstract of judgment, reflecting the conviction, and thereby made a prima facie showing. Defendant, however, did not meet his burden of producing evidence of a violation of his constitutional right, although a transcript of the plea was available to him for that purpose.id: 11540
Defendant need not specifically waive the right to testify before pleading guilty.The right to testify is not grounded in the 5th Amendment, but rather, the 6th Amendment right to present evidence. Defendant, while not specifically advised of her right to testify was advised of her right to present evidence and waived that right before pleading guilty. There is no requirement that before entering a plea defendant must specifically waive the right to testify.id: 11543
Defendant was not entitled to Boykin-Tahl advisements before admitting a probation violation.Defendant argued his admission to the probation violation was improper because the trial court failed to properly admonish him before receiving the admission. Upon being informed that defendant wanted to admit the violation the court did inform him he had the right to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. However, defendant argued he should have been admonished as though he were entering a guilty plea. However, there is no need for the court to enumerate specific rights to the defendant and have those rights waived prior to receiving an admission of a probation violation.id: 11544
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245