Out of State/Juvenile Priors
Category > Out of State/Juvenile Priors
Updated 3/6/2024The court properly applied Gallardo retroactively in finding defendant’s juvenile carjacking adjudication did not qualify as a strike. The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court properly applied People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, retroactively in finding defendant’s juvenile carjacking conviction did not qualify as a strike under 2006 law. id: 26679
Updated 2/26/2024Arizona robbery prior could not be used for purposes of the three strikes law or Penal Code section 667, subd.(a) where the Arizona law did not contain the same elements as the California robbery law.Because Arizona’s robbery statute does not require asportation of the stolen property (as California robbery statute does) the true finding regarding the Arizona prior was reversed for purposes of the three strikes law allegation and the five year serious felony prior.id: 26279
Updated 2/2/2024Washington state’s robbery statute is not a serious or violent felony under California law.Defendant’s prior convictions for robbery in Washington state did not qualify as violent or serious priors for purposes of the three strikes law or the five year enhancement under Penal Code section 667(a). Washington law does not require that a defendant intend to permanently deprive the victim of his or her property. The trial court could not supply the missing permanency element by construing facts recording in a document supplying the factual basis for defendant’s plea.id: 27867
Florida burglary was not a strike offense in California because it could be committed by remaining in a dwelling after forming the requisite intent. Substantial evidence did not support the fact that defendant’s prior Florida burglary conviction constituted a strike under the three strikes law. Unlike California law, a burglary may be committed in Florida by simply remaining in a residence after forming the requisite criminal intent. The record contained no facts regarding defendant’s intent when he entered the dwelling in Florida.id: 24425
The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment under Descamps by finding the New York third degree robbery qualified as a strike offense in California based on comments made while taking the plea.The trial court erred in finding defendant’s 1999 conviction for attempted third degree robbery qualified as a serious felony under California law for purposes of the three strikes law. The elements of the New York offense don’t correspond to robbery under California law. The court determined the plea colloquy in connection with the New York offense showed it would have constituted a robbery in California. However, this was improper judicial fact-finding under Descamps v. United States (2013) 133 S. Ct. 2276, and the court may not under the Sixth Amendment make a “disputed determination” about what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.id: 24811
Relying on Florida probable cause affidavit to determine the manslaughter constituted a strike violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue. Defendant’s Florida manslaughter prior did not constitute a strike under California law because it may constitute either voluntary or involuntary murder in California and the offense does not establish by itself that it was a serious felony under California law. Moreover, the Florida probable cause affidavit could not be used to prove the manslaughter qualified as a strike because it was not a “part of the record of conviction.” Finally, relying on the probable cause affidavit to prove the strike violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment under Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. ___.id: 24426
A trial court violates Apprendi by engaging in judicial fact-finding to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike.The evidence was insufficient to prove defendant’s prior vehicular manslaughter conviction was a strike because neither the elements nor the evidence showed that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. Because the elements of defendant’s prior plea do not show that he inflicted great bodily injury he is entitled to a jury trial on those facts unless he waived his right to a jury as to such facts and admitted them or they were found true by the court with his assent. Contrary to defendant’s claim, double jeopardy does not bar retrial on the issue.id: 24350
Prior Tennessee aggravated assault conviction did not constitute a strike prior where the record did not show defendant personally inflicted great bodily harm. The evidence was insufficient to show that defendant’s prior Tennessee aggravated assault conviction qualified as a serious prior conviction for purposes of the three strikes law where the record did not show defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. The court rejected the state’s additional concession that the strike prior was invalid where the offense can be committed by mere recklessness in Tennessee, because the record showed the requisite intent for aggravated assault under California law. id: 23453
Prosecutor did not prove the Washington priors were strikes by merely saying the California and Washington statutes were similar. Defendant pled guilty to drug possession but was denied a local jail sentence under the Realignment Act because of strike priors in the State of Washington. However, the record was insufficient to show the Washington convictions constituted strikes in California where the prosecutor made no effort to prove the fact other than to say “The Washington felonies are similar enough to the California statute that they would be considered strikes.”id: 23036
Under Texas law a robbery does not require asportation or taking from the person's immediate presence, and therefore does not constitute a serious felony in California for three strikes purposes.Under Texas law, the offense of robbery does not require either asportation or the taking of property from the person or his or her immediate presence. Both elements are necessary for robbery under California law. The evidence was therefore insufficient to prove defendant's prior Texas robbery conviction was a serious felony under California for purposes of the three strikes law. The matter was remanded for a retrial to determine whether the facts of defendant's prior conviction established a robbery under California law.id: 18095
Defendant's prior conviction of sexual assault in Nebraska was not a serious felony for three strikes purposes because it did not require a sexual intent.Defendant's prior conviction in Nebraska for child sexual assault lacked the same mens rea as California's Penal Code section 28, subd. (a) because it does not require an actual sexual intent. Therefore, defendant was not subject to a serious felony enhancement under section 667, subd.(a) nor eligible to be sentenced under the three strikes law.id: 19188
A prior juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike prior.A juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike to enhance an adult offender’s sentence notwithstanding the absence of the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.id: 20445
Documents used to prove the 1967 Louisiana prior conviction contained inadmissible hearsay and the conviction was not otherwise provable so the finding on the strike prior was reversed.Defendant was convicted of drug sales with two prior serious felony convictions under the three strikes law. The second strike finding was based on a 1967 Louisiana conviction for attempted aggravated escape. In support of that prior the prosecution presented a Louisiana charging document signed by a prosecutor and a letter signed by a district court judge referring to the conviction. However, that letter was not part of the record of conviction as required under the three strikes law because it was dated almost two months after the plea and sentencing. Moreover, information in both documents contained hearsay and there was no information establishing the facts were trustworthy or reliable. The factual statements contained in the documents did not fall within a certain hearsay exception. The documents were therefore inadmissible and the evidence was insufficient to prove the strike prior.id: 9411
Defendant's prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary did not qualify as a strike because the crime was not a section 707, subd.(b) offense as required in section 667, subd. (d)(3)(D).In the proceeding leading to the prior juvenile adjudication alleged and imposed against the defendant as a prior felony conviction, the only felony offense for which he was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court was burglary of an inhabited dwelling, which is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institution Code section 707, subd.(b). Although that offense is classified as serious and would, therefore, qualify as a strike under paragraph (B) of Penal Code section 667, subd.(d)(3), the separate requirement of paragraph (D), that the juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court because of a section 707, subd.(b) offense, was not satisfied. The court therefore erred in sentencing defendant under section 667, subd.(e)(1).id: 15213
A juvenile adjudication for a nonserious, nonviolent felony offense may not constitute a strike within the meaning of the three strikes law.Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (d)(3) provides that a prior juvenile adjudication may constitute a strike if the offense is contained within Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) or defined as a serious or violent felony by Penal Code sections 667.5 or 1192.7. Defendant's prior assault conviction was not proved to be either a serious or violent offense but it was an offense enumerated in section 707, subdivision (b). The use of a nonserious, nonviolent juvenile adjudication to impose a second strike sentence is contrary to the intent of the three strikes law and violates a defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.id: 15211
Defendant's prior juvenile adjudication for voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a strike since it was not listed in section 707(b), and the court could not go behind the adjudication to search the record for a strike offense.Defendant had a prior juvenile adjudication for voluntary manslaughter. At all pertinent times voluntary manslaughter was not an offense listed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(b). It therefore could not be used as a strike prior. The prosecution argued the court should go behind the bare adjudication to determine from the entire record whether a strike offense existed (in this case aggravated assault). However, the juvenile petition did not allege that offense and therefore it could not be used under the three strikes law.id: 16472
Although Florida complaint was part of the record of conviction, the factual statements used to prove personal weapon use were improperly admitted over defendant's hearsay objections.Defendant's strike allegations were based on Florida convictions for aggravated assault and attempted robbery, both of which involved the use of a deadly weapon. The convictions were the product of a guilty plea. In seeking to prove personal weapon use for the attempted robbery, the court allowed the facts set forth in the complaint, which was akin to California's preliminary hearing process. However, while the complaint was part of the record of conviction, its factual contents were improperly admitted as evidence over defendant's hearsay objections. The true finding was reversed where there was no other evidence in the record to show defendant personally used a weapon in the attempted robbery.id: 15164
Updated 3/6/2024Gallardo, which limited a court’s ability to make factual findings regarding out of state strike priors, does not apply retroactively to defendant’s case that was final on appeal.In 1999, defendant was convicted of robbery, and in a bifurcated proceeding the trial court determined he had two prior convictions in Illinois that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law. He recently filed a petition based on People v. Gallardo (20017) 4 Cal.5th 120, which held a court considering whether to impose a sentence enhancement based on a prior conviction may not make factual findings about the defendant’s conduct to impose the enhancement. However, Gallardo does not apply retroactively to defendant’s case since his appeal was final years ago.id: 26552
Updated 3/6/2024The trial court did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights by finding that his prior juvenile adjudication constituted a strike.Defendant argued the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it used his prior juvenile robbery adjudication as a strike to increase his sentence. He claimed juvenile adjudications can’t be used to increase a sentence because a juvenile does not have a right to a jury. However, that issue was resolved in People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, and that holding remains controlling law. id: 26620
There was no equal protection violation in finding defendant’s prior murder conviction in Jamaica qualified as a strike prior even though a conviction may be obtained by a guilty verdict from nine members of an 11 person jury.Defendant argued the trial court erred by finding his prior Jamaican murder conviction qualified as a strike prior and a serious felony prior because a defendant in Jamaica can be convicted of murder by nine members of an 11 person jury, and not a unanimous 12 person jury. However, the elements of murder in Jamaica aligned with those under Penal Code section 187. The recidivist laws look to the elements of the offense and not the process by which the conviction was obtained. The different process in Jamaica did not establish an equal protection violation. Defendant also provided no evidence from his prior trial showing that his conviction was obtained by anything less than 12 unanimous jurors.id: 25803
Defendant could not collaterally attack the voluntariness of an out-of-state plea without showing “Tahl like” requirements existed in the state at the time.Before entering a guilty plea in a three strikes case, defendant moved to set aside the out-of-state priors claiming the lack of valid Boykin-Tahl waivers. However, a defendant may not collaterally attack a prior out-of-state conviction without demonstrating that “Tahl-like” requirements existed in the jurisdiction at the time of the plea. In any event, the plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.id: 25184
Defendant’s prior Tennessee robbery conviction qualified as a strike prior even though Tennessee doesn’t’ recognize the claim of right defense. Defendant sentenced under the three strikes law argued the evidence was insufficient to prove his prior Tennessee robbery conviction qualified as a strike because the judgment did not state that he pled guilty to robbery “as charged in the indictment.” However, the trial court may draw reasonable references from the record. Defendant noted that Tennessee doesn’t recognize the claim of right defense, but that concept did not apply to defendant who was found to have “violently” stolen two pizzas.id: 23452
Felons whose prior records include juvenile adjudications that involve serious or violent felonies may not receive county jail terms under the Realignment Act. The Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)) provides that certain adult felons may serve their prison terms in county jail. It excludes felons with prior serious or violent felony convictions. It appears to exempt from the exclusion felonies stemming from a juvenile adjudication, and in this respect conflicts with the three strikes law. However, felons whose prior records include juvenile adjudications that involve serious or violent felonies may not receive county jail commitments under the Act.id: 23084
Faxed copies of certified court records may be admissible to establish that a prior conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony under the three strikes law.The prosecution presented certified copies of court records from Alabama to prove defendant had suffered an out-of-state prior serious felony conviction. It was determined the copies were incomplete. After a recess, the prosecutor presented a single page of an indictment faxed from the Alabama clerk’s office. The trial court admitted the faxed copy of the original certified document. The faxed copy was properly admitted because there was sufficient evidence to show it was an accurate copy of the authentic court record.id: 22251
The Florida prosecutor established a factual basis for the plea when he said the burglary involved a residence and defendant’s subsequent silence was considered an adoptive admission.The evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s prior Florida burglary conviction qualified as a strike. Evidence of his intent to steal was shown by the fact that he entered and took the victim’s wallet. Moreover, the Florida prosecutor’s statement in establishing the factual basis that defendant entered a residence, was not inadmissible hearsay but instead qualified as an adoptive admission as defendant said nothing after the prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis.id: 22487
Prosecutor’s statement regarding the facts of the crime at the out-of-state plea hearing were inadmissible to prove the strike prior and counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of other statements from the parties.The trial court erred in admitting, over defendant’s objection, the prosecutor’s statement reciting the alleged facts relating to the prior assault in Washington. This hearsay evidence was not admissible as an adoptive admission. Moreover, the unsworn statements of defendant, his attorney and the victim made to the Washington court after it had accepted the guilty plea were also inadmissible to prove the strike and the failure to properly object to the admission of those statements constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. The remaining admissible evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the Washington assault prior was a strike. id: 22192
No express finding of fitness is required for a juvenile adjudication to qualify as a strike.Defendant argued that for a prior juvenile adjudication to qualify as a strike, the juvenile court must have expressly found the juvenile to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. However, no express finding of fitness is required for a juvenile adjudication to qualify as a strike.id: 9414
Since burglary in Texas doesn't require the entry into an inhabited dwelling, the evidence did not support the 1974 Texas burglary as a strike.Under Texas law, a burglary can be committed of building other than a habitation, which does not satisfy the element of entry into an inhabited dwelling house required for first degree burglary under California law. Therefore, defendant's prior Texas burglary conviction did not constitute a strike under California law. The matter was remanded to determine whether the 1974 burglary involved entry into an inhabited dwelling.id: 18096
1992 Arizona guilty plea to domestic violence constituted a strike prior in California even though the Arizona conviction was later dismissed following a diversion program.In 1992, defendant pled guilty in Arizona to one count of aggravated assault against his wife. As a condition of probation, he successfully completed a domestic violence "diversion"' program in Arizona, which resulted in a judgment of dismissal. He argued the dismissal in Arizona negated the earlier guilty plea and precluded its use as a prior conviction in the current case. However, the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution did not bar the California courts from considering whether the dismissed conviction constituted a strike prior in California. Moreover, the guilty plea constituted a prior conviction under the three strikes law despite the subsequent history of the case in Arizona.id: 17817
Juvenile adjudications count as strikes even though there is no right to a jury trial.A prior juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike even though there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings.)id: 17642
A prior juvenile adjudication of robbery constitutes a strike where the current offense was committed after passage of Prop. 21.Defendant argued a prior juvenile adjudication of robbery does not constitute a strike offense under the three strikes law in cases where it occurred before robbery was added to the list of offenses in Welfare and Institution's Code section 707, subd.(b) by the passage of Proposition 21, but the current offense was committed after that date. However, a prior juvenile adjudication of robbery does constitute a strike in cases where the current offense was committed after the passage of Prop. 21. id: 17643
Prior juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike prior even though defendant did not have a right to a jury trial during the juvenile proceeding.Defendant argued his prior juvenile adjudication could not be considered a "strike" because he did not have the right to a jury trial during the prior juvenile proceeding. However, the procedural safeguards provided in juvenile adjudications are sufficient to satisfy the concerns set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.id: 17564
Defendant's prior Arizona robbery conviction qualified as a strike prior.Arizona's robbery statute satisfies the intent requirement of theft under California's robbery statute. Both statutes require an intent to deprive the owner of possession of his or her property either permanently or for an unreasonable length of time, or an intent to deal with the owner's property in such a way that there is a substantial risk of permanent loss. Because defendant had the intent to commit robbery as defined under California law, his prior Arizona robbery conviction was a serious felony and a strike for purposes of the three strikes law.id: 16807
Defendant waived the right to challenge her strike prior on the basis that it should have been treated as a juvenile adjudication by failing to raise the issue in the prior case.Defendant moved to strike a prior conviction on the grounds that she was 17 years old at the time of the offense, a fact that was not disclosed in that proceeding. However, any right to a juvenile court disposition of an action following an adult conviction must be asserted while the trial court in that action still had jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, the defendant waived any right to have her prior conviction treated as a juvenile adjudication for three strikes purposes. Moreover, defendant was estopped from challenging the court's jurisdiction to convict and sentence her as an adult in the prior action since the motion to strike procedure is only available to defendants who challenge the constitutionality of a prior conviction that is alleged for purposes of a sentence enhancement.id: 16766
Oregon statutory rape conviction was a lewd act under section 1192.7, subd.(c)(6), and therefore a strike.Defendant argued his Oregon conviction for second degree rape, which is defined as sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 14, does not constitute a strike under California law. Although defendant's prior conviction from Oregon does not contain a specific sexual intent (as required by Penal Code section 288) it is a lewd and lascivious act within the meaning of section 1192.7, subd.(c)(6).id: 16541
A defendant may not collaterally attack an out-of-state prior on Boykin-Tahl grounds unless the Tahl-like requirements existed in that state at the time of the plea.A defendant may not collaterally attack a prior out-of-state conviction on <i>Boykin-Tahl</i> grounds in the absence of evidence that the convicting jurisdiction required <i>Tahl</i>-like procedural formalities.id: 15208
A guilty plea to a prior Florida aggravated assault constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of the three strikes law.Since defendant admitted he pleaded guilty to a 1975 Florida crime, he suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. As such, his contention that he was not formally adjudicated guilty under Florida law was immaterial.id: 15209
A juvenile adjudication can be used as a strike even though there was no jury trial or waiver of a jury trial.Defendant argued that the transformation of his juvenile adjudication into a prior felony conviction means that the right to a jury trial attached to the juvenile adjudication hearing and because he did not have, or waive, a jury trial during the juvenile proceedings, his juvenile adjudication cannot be used as a strike. However, the fact that defendant was neither afforded nor waived a jury trial at the prior juvenile adjudication does not prevent the use of that adjudication as a strike for purposes of sentencing in his current adult proceeding.id: 15210
A juvenile adjudication for residential burglary constitutes a strike prior even though the offense is not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).Defendant argued his guilty plea should be set aside because he entered it on the erroneous belief that his juvenile adjudication for residential burglary was a strike prior. He argued it was not a strike prior because it was not accompanied by an express finding of fitness, and that the offense was not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). As to the former contention, the Courts have recently held an express finding of fitness is not required. As to the latter claim, the failure to include residential burglary in section 707, subdivision (b) was a drafting oversight. The juvenile adjudication met the requirements of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), and may properly be considered a strike prior.id: 15212
Trial court may review Oregon probation report to determine the truth of the out-of-state prior conviction.Defendant argued his prior Oregon conviction for attempted sodomy could not be used for three strikes purposes because, in Oregon, an attempt requires a "substantial step" toward commission of the crime, while California requires a "direct act." He claimed the only way the court could have determined the Oregon conviction was a serious felony was by reviewing his statements in the presentence report in that case. However, the probation report containing defendant's admission to the probation officer qualifies both as part of the record of conviction and as admissible hearsay.id: 15214
Trier of fact may consider the appellate court record in determining whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction.In determining where an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under the California law, the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction but no further. The record of conviction is not limited to the trial court record but extends to the appellate court record, including the appellate opinion. The jury was therefore entitled to consider the appellate opinion to help determine whether the assault conviction was based upon personal use of a deadly weapon.id: 15215
Oregon burglary prior qualified as a California strike since the intent to deprive the owner of the main value of his property is equivalent to the intent to permanently deprive.Defendant argued the evidence of his prior Oregon burglary conviction did not establish all of the elements of a California offense and therefore did not constitute a strike for resentencing purposes. The intent to deprive an owner of the main value of his property under Oregon law is equivalent to the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property under California law. Moreover, while theft in Oregon does not require that the stolen property be carried away (as it does in California) the evidence showed defendant carried the property away in the Oregon offense. Substantial evidence therefore supported the court's conclusion that the Oregon burglary was properly alleged and proven as a strike under California law.id: 14814
1982 Texas attempted murder conviction constituted a valid qualifying prior and a strike where it shared the specific intent requirement with the California statute.The trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that the 1982 Texas conviction for attempted murder constituted a valid qualifying prior and a strike. Defendant argued that since the Texas murder statute includes a knowingly element, and since that element has been equated with implied malice in California case law, his Texas conviction could have been reached on a theory of implied malice so that the essential elements of that offense do not comport with the same California elements. However, the focus should be on the specific intent required in the attempt statutes and their intent requirements control over any possible generalities in the murder statutes. Moreover, it makes no sense to suggest there was a specific intent to act with implied malice.id: 9409
Court erred in failing to impose the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement in addition to the three strikes punishment.The trial court declined to impose a five year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) after finding the prior qualified as a strike prior. However, imposition of the five year prior was not an improper dual use of the prior and the court was required to impose the enhancement in addition to the three strikes punishment.id: 9410
Expungement of a prior serious or violent felony under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772 does not preclude treatment of the offense as a strike in subsequent criminal proceedings.Defendant's two prior felony convictions were expunged pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772. Under that provision a defendant who is honorably discharged from the Youth Authority may petition the court to set aside the guilty verdict and dismiss the information. He or she is then released from all penalties or disabilities resulting from the offense. However, expungement under section 1772 does not preclude treatment of the offense as a strike in subsequent criminal proceedings.id: 9412
Juvenile prior constitutes a strike if it was a serious or violent felony or is included in section 707, subdivision (b).Defendant argued the prosecution failed to prove his juvenile adjudication for attempted robbery involving use of a knife, was for an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) and was therefore not a strike under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(1)). However, the three strikes law demonstrates an intent to include as strike priors not only the crimes listed in section 707, subdivision (b), but also those listed as violent felonies in section 667.5, subdivision (c) and as serious felonies in section 1192.7, subdivision (c).id: 9413
Out-of-state priors qualify as strikes under the Proposition 184 three strikes provision.An out-of-state conviction qualifies as a strike under the three strikes provision of Proposition 184 (Penal Code section 1170.12.) Unlike its legislative predecessor, section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), this portion of section 1170.12 is ambiguous regarding whether it includes out-of-state convictions. However, in light of the unequivocal evidence of voters' intent the statute is properly construed to include such convictions.id: 9415
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245