Realignment Act of 2011
Category > Realignment Act of 2011
Updated 2/7/2024Denial of defendant’s petition to revoke parole due to the 60-day time limit of section 3008.08(l) violated procedural due process.Defendant was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed in post-release community supervision rather than parole when released from prison. The trial court denied his petition to revoke parole as untimely under Penal Code section 3000.08(l). However, the 60-day limitation violated defendant’s right to procedural due process. The trial court was directed to enter a new order granting the motion to dismiss and transferring defendant from parole supervision to PRCS.id: 27153
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court had the authority to transfer a defendant from parole supervision to PRCS.The trial court has the authority in a parole revocation proceeding to consider the issue of whether the defendant was improperly placed on parole supervision rather than postrelease community service (PRCS), and if inappropriate, to order that supervision be transferred from parole to PRCS under the provision allowing it to “modify... supervision of the person.” (Penal Code section 1203.2 (b)(1).) The 60 day period in section 3000.08, subd. (l) does not bar the transfer to PRCS.id: 26660
The length of defendant’s PRCS was not properly extended when it was revoked and then reinstated.The length of defendant’s postrelease community supervision was not properly extended when it was revoked and reinstated. The length of the supervisory period is not automatically extended when PRCS is reinstated after revocation, although a trial court may choose to extend the original expiration date for PRCS within the maximum statutory period.id: 25969
Mandatory supervision requiring defendant to report “any contacts with” police was vague.The mandatory supervision condition requiring defendant to report “any contact with” police officers was improperly vague. The matter was remanded with directions to modify the condition.id: 25042
After obtaining a reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor under Prop 47, the court had the authority to apply defendant’s excess custody credits to reduce the duration of his PRCS.Defendant serving a prison sentence for multiple felony convictions obtained Prop 47 relief reducing one of his convictions to a misdemeanor. Following resentencing, his custody credits exceeded the newly imposed term. The trial court had the authority to apply the credits to reduce the duration of postrelease community supervision.id: 25514
Requiring defendant to submit to searches of text messages, emails and photos on his cell phone as a condition of mandatory supervision was unlawful.Defendant was convicted of possessing a concealed firearm in a vehicle, and was ordered to serve a two year term, a portion of which was to be served under mandatory supervision. During that period he was required to submit to searches of his text messages, emails and photographs on his cell phone. However, the condition was invalid since it wasn’t reasonably related to preventing future criminality.id: 25191
The trial court erred by not ruling on defendant’s objections to the mandatory supervision conditions. Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense, and challenged certain mandatory supervision conditions relating to alcohol consumption and treatment. The trial court erred by not ruling on defendant’s objections, instead deferring any rulings to the mandatory supervision judge. However, defendant suffered no prejudice as the conditions were reasonable and valid.id: 25135
Defendant who was convicted of writing bad checks and sentenced to county jail followed by mandatory supervision was not required to pay restitution for losses not caused by the bad checks offense.Victim restitution ordered as part of a sentence to county jail followed by mandatory supervision pursuant to Penal Code section 1170 (h) is an order pursuant to section 1202.4 and its scope is limited to those losses arising out of criminal activity that formed the basis of the conviction. The trial court therefore erred by ordering restitution to two men whose losses were not caused by the defendant’s act of writing bad checks.id: 23909
Section 4573.5, which requires prison for bringing alcohol into a custodial facility violates equal protection since a similar provision addressing controlled substances allows for jail terms under section 1170, subd.(h).Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h) provides that those who violate section 4573 by knowingly bringing a controlled substance into a custodial facility are eligible for sentencing in the county jail whereas those who bring alcohol or a noncontrolled substance into a facility (in violation of section 4573.5) are to be sentenced to prison. The latter provision violates equal protection principles because it treats similarly situated individuals differently without a rational basis for doing so. The court “reformed” the statute to provide for a county jail term for violations of section 4573.5. id: 23924
The provision of the Realignment Act that permits incarceration for nonviolent drug offenders is invalid because it improperly amends Prop 36.In 2000, the voters passes Prop 36 for the purpose of placing nonviolent drug offenders into treatment programs rather than custody. Under its terms, Prop 36 could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature. In 2011, the Legislature enacted realignment legislation known as the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011, which allows for local supervision rather than parole for nonviolent offenders including drug users. But it permits incarceration not provided for in Prop 36. Because the Realignment Act amended Prop 36 relating to nonviolent drug offenders, without a two-thirds vote from the Legislature, that portion (Penal Code section 3455) is invalid.id: 23967
The no-contact with the victim order was unauthorized.After defendant was convicted of sexual assault and he was sentenced to prison, the trial court ordered that he have no contact with the victim. However, the no-contact order was not supported by any statutory authority and was not supported by any factual basis. It was ordered stricken.id: 22869
Prosecutor did not prove the Washington priors were strikes by merely saying the California and Washington statutes were similar. Defendant pled guilty to drug possession but was denied a local jail sentence under the Realignment Act because of strike priors in the State of Washington. However, the record was insufficient to show the Washington convictions constituted strikes in California where the prosecutor made no effort to prove the fact other than to say “The Washington felonies are similar enough to the California statute that they would be considered strikes.”id: 23036
Trial court erred in failing to consider the defendant’s ability to pay fees in a case where he was sentenced to county jail under the Realignment Act, but the presumption that he lacks the ability to pay does not apply.Defendant was convicted of felony and sentenced to five years in county jail pursuant to the Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h).) The trial court ordered him to pay $400 in attorney fees. However, it erred in doing so because it ordered the payment without making a determination of defendant’s ability to pay. Defendant further argued that he was entitled to the presumption that a defendant sentenced to state prison does not have the ability to pay costs, but the presumption does not apply to county jail sentences.id: 23093
Probation supervision fee does not apply to a defendant sentenced to mandatory supervision pursuant to section 1170, subd. (h). Penal Code section 1203.1B, does not authorize imposition of the probation supervision fee where defendant was not granted probation or given a conditional sentence, but was instead sentenced to serve a portion of his term on mandatory supervision under Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h).id: 23410
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was entitled to seek the retroactive benefit of an ameliorative statute on appeal from an order revoking supervision.The trial court imposed a split sentence on defendant who was convicted of various offenses. He violated the terms of his supervision, the court revoked supervision and ordered him to spend the rest of his term in jail. He was entitled to have the two one-year prison priors stricken from his sentence due to a change in the law (SB 136) that occurred after his sentencing.id: 27005
Updated 2/22/2024The trial court properly extended the termination date of defendant’s postrelease supervision by adding the days defendant absconded or his supervision was revoked.Defendant argued the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence because it lacked the authority to extend the termination of his postrelease supervision beyond three years from his release date by adding the days when his supervision was revoked. However, the probation officer properly relied on tolling for the number of days defendant absconded or his supervision was revoked.id: 27084
A split sentence under Penal Code section 1170(h)(5) becomes final for retroactivity purposes 60 days after it is imposed. An unappealed split sentence is final for purposes of retroactivity 60 days after it is imposed. Because defendant did not appeal from his 2013 or 2015 split sentences, they have been final for years. As a result, defendant was not entitled to relief under SB 180, which limited the reach of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 sentence enhancements that were attached to the earlier sentences.id: 25938
The trial court erred by ordering the 180-day period of confinement for the PRCS violation to run consecutively to a four year prison term in another case.A sentencing court lacks authority to run a period of confinement for a defendant’s postrelease commit supervision violation consecutively to a sentence in another criminal case.id: 25635
The trial court erred by revoking defendant’s PRCS for failing to register a residence change where he was homeless and the Act didn’t define “residence.” The trial court granted a petition to revoke defendant’s postrelease community supervision (PRCS) after finding that he violated the terms of his PRCS by failing to report a change of residence after he was released from a facility where he had been held in an involuntary commitment. However, the court erred by finding defendant failed to report the change of address. Defendant was homeless at the time and the PRCS act failed to define “residence.”id: 25048
The mandatory supervision condition requiring defendant to obtain written permission before leaving the state did not violate his right to travel.Defendant argued the condition of his mandatory supervision requiring written permission from his probation officer before leaving the state violated his constitutional right to travel, and thus his right to work. However, the condition was reasonable and it did not forbid travel. It was narrowly tailored to require written permission before leaving the state.id: 25041
Prop 47 provision does not apply to a person who is not currently incarcerated but is still serving a period of parole on PRCS for an offense that would otherwise qualify.A person who is on Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) is a person who is still “currently serving” (and has not “completed serving”) his or her sentence and therefore a petition for resentencing a person currently on PRCS is determined by Penal Code section 1170.18, subd.(a), rather than the Prop 47 provision, section 1170.18, subd.(f). id: 24947
Under the Realignment Act, an incarcerated defendant may not accrue section 4019 credits against a term of mandatory supervision unless the conduct resulting in the supervision was the sole basis for the incarceration. Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully taking a vehicle. He received a “split sentence” under the Realignment Act, where he served part of his sentence in local custody, and part under mandatory supervision by the probation department. He later violated the terms of his supervision and pled guilty to a drug offense that resulted in a three year jail term. He sought Penal Code section 4019credits but he was not in actual custody on the vehicle case from May 2015 to May 2016. Under Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(5)(B), he was not entitled to work and conduct credits against his term of mandatory supervision.id: 25601
The trial court erred by striking the white collar crime enhancement, and then imposing a split sentence.Defendants pled guilty to various offenses involving a scheme to defraud real estate investors. The trial court struck the Penal Code section 186.11 enhancement and imposed a split sentence where part of the term was to be served in custody and the remainder under community supervision. The sentence was unauthorized because a white collar enhancement is a disqualifying factor under the Realignment Act of 2011. The court lacked discretion to strike the enhancement under section 1385, and thus could not impose a split sentence.id: 25416
Report from the ankle bracelet monitoring company showing defendant had consumed alcohol was sufficient to support the revocation of his mandatory supervision.The trial court revoked defendant’s mandatory supervision after the probation department’s case manager testified based on the data from the monitoring ankle bracelet company showing he had consumed alcohol in violation of the terms of his mandatory supervision. While the company’s report was hearsay, the court could rely on it because it was trustworthy and not contradicted. Moreover, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the report on Kelly grounds because ankle monitoring bracelet technology is generally accepted as reliable, and the record did not show that had a Kelly objection been raised there was a reasonable probability of a different result.id: 25403
Requiring a supervising agency but not the district attorney to file a report when modifying or terminating parole or postrelease community supervision does not violate equal protection.When a supervising agency files a petition to modify or terminate parole or postrelease supervision, its petition must be accompanied by a written report. When a district attorney files such a petition, the petition need not be accompanied by a report. Assuming the two groups of supervised persons are similarly situated, the Legislature had a rational basis for doing so as supervising agencies have easier access to information included in a report, and petitions filed by supervising agencies often involve more technical violations that should be detailed in a report. The procedural difference does not violate equal protection.id: 25294
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a split sentence where he would be deported after release from custody and supervision was not possible.Defendant was a Mexican citizen who plead guilty to a drug offense. Under the agreement, he would be sentenced to five years in jail and could request a “split sentence” under Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(5). The trial court did not later err in denying defendant’s request for a split sentence because his possession for sale conviction required mandatory deportation. Mandatory supervision under a split sentence would not be possible once defendant was released from custody and deported.id: 25247
The trial court lacked the authority to modify a sentence under the Realignment Act once the execution of the sentence had begun. In 2013, defendant was sentenced to an 11 year term in county jail. In 2015, the trial court granted his motion to recall the sentence and modify it to a split sentence with the remaining unserved time to be spent on mandatory supervision. However, after the execution of defendant’s sentence for a term in county jail under the Realignment Act had begun, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence.id: 25169
The warrantless search of defendant’s home one day after his postrelease community service had expired was proper because the probation department still had 30 days to discharge him. Defendant argued the warrantless search of his home was unlawful because the county probation department’s postrelease community supervision of him had terminated the day before the search as a matter of law, pursuant to Penal Code section 3456. However, that provision requires that the agency discharge a defendant from supervision within 30 days after successfully completing one year of postrelease supervision. The defendant had not been discharged on the day after his year ended, and so the probation department maintained postrelease supervision.id: 24744
A full consecutive term for a misdemeanor was authorized for the sentence imposed under the Realignment Act.Defendant was convicted of both felony and misdemeanor resisting arrest. The punishment for the Penal Code section 148, subd.(a)(1) violation includes a jail term not to exceed one year. The court imposed a one year jail term to run consecutive to the felony term, but defendant argued that under section 1170.1, subd.(a) the authorized term was one-third of that term — four months. However, the one-third the mid term limitation applies only to consecutive felony terms. A different interpretation is not required where the sentence was imposed under section 1170, subd. (h).id: 24750
Felony evasion under section 2800.2 calls for a straight prison term rather than county jail under the Realignment Act of 2011.Defendant was lawfully sentenced to state prison (as opposed to county jail under the Realignment Act) following his conviction of felony evasion under Vehicle Code section 2800.2. That provision expressly provides that a felony violation shall be punished by a state prison sentence.id: 24696
There was no due process violation where the evidentiary hearing on the PRCS revocation took place 45 days after arrest, and 20 of those days were caused by defendant’s continuance request. Defendant appealed an order revoking her Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) and requiring her to serve 140 days in jail. She argued her due process rights were violated because she was not arraigned within 10 days of her arrest and provided a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing. The revocation hearing was conducted 45 days after her arrest, including 20 days for her requested continuance. There was no due process violation.id: 24664
The trial court erred by imposing mandatory supervision following local custody under the Realignment Act for a defendant convicted of possessing explosives. Defendant pled guilty to possessing explosive devices under Penal Code section 18715. He was eligible for local custody confinement under the Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)). However, the trial court erred by placing him on mandatory supervision because section 18780 expressly prohibits a sentencing court from suspending the execution of sentence for someone convicted of possessing destructive devices or explosives.id: 24206
The Realignment Act does not apply to defendants whose state prison sentences were imposed and suspended prior to October 1, 2011.The Realignment Act of 2011 which allows some defendants to serve their sentences in county jail, does not apply to defendants whose state prison sentences were imposed and suspended before October 1, 2011. Upon revocation and termination of such a defendant’s probation, the trial court ordering execution of the previously imposed sentence must order the sentence to be served in state prison according to the terms of the original sentence, even if the defendant otherwise qualifies for incarceration in county jail under the terms of the Realignment Act. id: 23598
The trial court did not err under the Realignment Act by imposing an additional 550 days in jail after defendant violated the terms of his mandatory supervision.Following a guilty plea, defendant was sentenced to county jail followed by a term of mandatory supervision. After he violated the terms of his mandatory supervision, the court reinstated his supervision but added 550 days in jail. The court did not abuse its discretion under the Realignment Act by imposing that term.id: 23680
“Flash incarcerations” during a year of community supervision were the equivalent of “custodial sanctions” and prevented defendant’s release after one year. Defendant was given a two year prison term for a firearm offense but after one year was placed on “community supervision” rather than parole. If the offender serves one year on postrelease supervision without a violation resulting in a “custodial sanction” then he can be released. During defendant’s year on supervision he received a couple of “flash incarcerations” following certain incidents. These flash incarcerations amounted to “custodial sanctions” such that defendant could not be released after one year on community supervision.id: 23911
Once the court learned the defendant did not qualify for local supervision due to an immigration hold, it properly terminated supervision and released defendant to an immigration enforcement agent.Defendant pled guilty to an offense and was given a split sentence of 28 months with half to be served in county jail and the other half under mandatory supervision. While preparing for his release from custody, the probation officer filed a report indicating defendant was not eligible for local supervision (under the Realignment Act) because he was subject to an immigration hold and would be deported upon his release from custody. The trial court thereafter properly terminated the mandatory supervision portion of the sentence and ordered defendant released to an immigration enforcement agent. id: 23966
Defendant was ineligible for a local commitment under the Realignment Act because of a prior conviction that required sex offender registration.The trial court erred by finding defendant eligible under the Realignment Act to serve his state prison sentence locally. Under Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(3)(a), he was ineligible because he was required to register as a sex offender. It did not matter whether he was required to register based on a current or prior sex crime. Because local time was a condition of the plea bargain, the case was remanded to allow defendant the chance to withdraw his plea.id: 23560
Prison sentence was necessary where it was required by sentence enhancement even though the underlying conviction could have allowed for a local jail term under the Realignment Act.Because the Health and Safety Code section 11379.7 sentencing enhancement expressly required an additional “two years in the state prison” defendant was not eligible for county jail placement. This is so even though the underlying conviction would have allowed for a local jail commitment under the Realignment Act.id: 23464
The sentencing changes made by the Realignment Act apply to persons sentenced after October 1, 2011, and prospective-only application does not violate equal protection. The sentencing changes made by the Realignment Act apply, by its express terms, “prospectively to any person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011.” (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(6).) A defendant who was sentenced before October 1, 2011, but whose conviction was not yet final on appeal, was not entitled to be resentenced under the Act’s provisions. Denying defendant the benefits of the Act did not violate equal protection under the rational relationship test. id: 22777
Denying retroactive application to the 2011 Realignment Act did not violate equal protection. The 2011 realignment legislation need not be applied retroactively to all defendants whose convictions are not yet final. The Legislature’s limiting the application of the act to felons sentenced on or after its operational date of October 1, 2011, does not violate equal protection.id: 22894
In executing a sentence for a probation violation after October 1, 2011, the trial court had no discretion to sentence defendant to prison. A trial court executing a suspended sentence for a probation violation on and after October 1, 2011, the effective date of the Realignment Act, has no discretion to send to prison a defendant who qualifies under the Act to serve the sentence in county jail.id: 22915
Defendant’s prior Washington convictions constituted sentencing factors that did not need to be pled or proven to render him ineligible for county jail under the Realignment Act.Defendant pled guilty to drug possession. He argued that he should have been sentenced to county jail rather than prison, under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, because his prior convictions in Washington were neither pled nor proven to a jury. However, the prior Washington convictions were sentencing factors that did not need to be pled and proven to a jury to render him ineligible for county jail.id: 23035
Defendant was not eligible for a local jail term under the Realignment Act of 2011 following his conviction for drunk driving with a prior drunk driving conviction.Defendant was sentenced to state prison following his plea of drunk driving with a prior, and providing false information to the police officer. He argued on appeal that he was eligible for sentencing to county jail pursuant to the realignment legislation. However, the law requires that a conviction for drunk driving with a prior (Vehicle Code section 23550.5) be punished with a prison sentence absent circumstances not presently applicable. He was therefore not eligible for local custody under the Act.id: 23037
Defendant who was sentenced to local custody under the Realignment Act was entitled to day-for-day conduct credits.The trial court concluded that because it committed defendant to jail under the Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)(1)) he as only eligible for conduct credits at the half-time rate applicable to jail sentences under former section 4019. However, section 4019 provides for presentence credits as required by “prior law.” Because applicable prior law provided for day-for-day presentence conduct credit, and the trial court determined defendant was entitled to credit for good conduct, he was entitled to credit at the full, day-for-day rate.id: 23052
Defendant must serve entire sentence in state prison where a sentence that qualified for county jail under realignment is ordered to run consecutively to a sentence being served in state prison.When a sentence that otherwise would have been served in county jail pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h) is ordered to run concurrently to a sentence already being served in state prison, the entire sentence must be served in state prison. This is so even though the sentence that was first imposed would have been served in county jail if it had been imposed on or after October 1, 2011. id: 23081
Felons whose prior records include juvenile adjudications that involve serious or violent felonies may not receive county jail terms under the Realignment Act. The Realignment Act (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)) provides that certain adult felons may serve their prison terms in county jail. It excludes felons with prior serious or violent felony convictions. It appears to exempt from the exclusion felonies stemming from a juvenile adjudication, and in this respect conflicts with the three strikes law. However, felons whose prior records include juvenile adjudications that involve serious or violent felonies may not receive county jail commitments under the Act.id: 23084
Prison sentence did not violate the Realignment Act where it was imposed but suspended before the act became effective.A defendant is sentenced on the date that sentence is first announced and imposed even if execution of the sentence does not happen until a later date. The defendant here was sentenced before October 1, 2011, even though the sentence was suspended and not executed until May of 2012. The court’s only option was to impose a prison sentence and that sentence did not violate the Realignment Act.id: 23094
A defendant with prior serious or violent juvenile adjudications does not qualify for county jail under the Realignment Act. Felons whose records include juvenile adjudications that involve serious or violent felonies may not receive county jail commitments under the Realignment Act. id: 23123
The Realignment Act of 2011 applies only to defendants whose sentences are imposed on or after October 1, 2011. Defendant pled guilty to a drug offense in February of 2011, received probation and then was found to have violated her probation on two later occasions. She was sentenced to prison in May of 2012, after the effective date of the Realignment Act of 2011. The trial court did not violate equal protection by not applying the act (which would have provided for local custody) afer finding it applies only to defendants whose sentences are imposed on or after October 1, 2011. It does not apply to the suspended execution of previously imposed sentences.id: 23135
A defendant whose sentence was imposed prior to October 1, 2011, but executed after that date (effective date of Realignment Act) must serve the sentence in prison.After the operative date of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h)), a defendant whose probation is revoked must serve his or her previously imposed and suspended sentence in state prison, according to the terms of the original sentence, even if the defendant otherwise qualifies for a county jail term under the act.id: 23151
The trial court properly sentenced defendant who committed a drug offense and was placed in probation before the Realignment Act to county jail where he violated probation and was sentenced after the effective date of the Act.Defendant pled no contest to a drug offense in 2009 and was placed on probation. He admitted a probation violation in 2011 and the trial court revoked his probation. The trial court did not err in then sentencing him to county jail under the Realignment Act because the act applied to those who committed an offense that would now qualify for county jail, were sentenced to probation after execution of sentence was suspended, violated probation and were then sentenced after the effective date of the act. id: 23197
Realignment Act did not apply to defendant who was sentenced to prison before the effective date even though the sentence was later executed after probation was revoked.The sentencing changes provided in the Realignment Act of 2011 apply to any person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011. The Act did not apply to the defendant whose sentence was imposed before October 1, 2011, and executed after that date when his probation was revoked.id: 23286
The trial court had discretion to impose the penal fine that was not part of the plea agreement or otherwise discussed while taking the plea. Defendant pled guilty to drunk driving charges and challenged the Vehicle Code section 23560 penal fine of $2,450. Because the amount of the fine was not made part of defendant’s plea bargain, and not discussed as part of the plea colloquy, it was left to the trial court’s discretion. The trial court did not err in imposing the fine. id: 23318
Applying the Realignment Act to defendant who was originally sentenced to probation before the effective date of the act would alter a material term of the plea bargain.Defendant argued that after his probation was revoked, the trial court should have sentenced him to county jail, not prison, because he was effectively sentenced after the Realignment Act of 2011 became operative when his probation was revoked, even though his sentence was imposed and its execution suspended before that date. However, applying the Realignment Act to send defendant to county jail would impermissibly alter a material term in the parties plea agreement.id: 23369
2011 Realignment Act does not apply to defendants whose sentences, were imposed but suspended before October 1, 2011, but executed after that date. Defendant was sentenced to state prison after his probation was revoked and argued he should have been committed to county jail pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h). However, the statute does not apply to defendants whose sentences, imposed but suspended prior to October 1, 2011, were executed after that date.id: 23373
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245