Jury, Right to/Waiver (for jury instruct. see 780)
Category > Jury, Right to/Waiver (for jury instruct. see 780)
Defense counsel’s concession of the hit and run while arguing against the murder charge required reversal of the former as it was tantamount to a guilty plea without a waiver of jury trial rights.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and felony hit and run after colliding with a motorcycle while driving drunk. During closing argument, defense counsel conceded the hit and run and focused on the murder count. The statements were tantamount to a guilty plea on the hit and run offense, and the record was silent as to whether defendant gave informed consent to waive his right to trial on that count. This was error under McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1500, and People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, and required reversal of the hit and run, but not the murder conviction.id: 25937
Defendant did not provide a knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to a jury trial.Defendant was convicted in a court trial of second degree murder and child abuse. However, the waiver of her right to a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court’s two-question inquiry as to whether she understood her right to a jury trial, and whether she agreed to waive that right and have a trial judge “sitting alone, decide the case,” did not affirmatively show that she understood that a jury is comprised of individuals from the community, instead of, for example, a collection of judges.id: 25840
The trial court must advise an MDO of his or her right to a jury trial and obtain a personal waiver from the defendant unless the court finds the defendant is incompetent.A trial court in mentally disordered offender proceedings under Penal Code section 2972, subd.(a), must advise the defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial, and before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.id: 24234
The trial court must advise an NGI defendant of the right to a jury trial at section 1026 proceedings and obtain a personal waiver unless the defendant lacks the capacity to give one. The trial court in not guilty by reason of insanity extension proceedings under Penal Code section 1026.5 must personally advise defendant of his or her right to a jury trial. Before holding a bench trial, the court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision. id: 24235
Juvenile was entitled to a jury trial on the Jessica’s Law residency restrictions because they were so overwhelmingly punitive. The lifetime residency restrictions the minor faces (under Jessica’s Law) as a result of his juvenile adjudication are punitive in nature. As a result the state must provide the minor a jury trial before imposing that consequence. The denial of the right to a jury trial violated due process and equal protection principles and the residency restriction was enjoined absent a jury trial on remand. id: 21943
The trial court improperly said it would consider defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial as a mitigating factor at sentencing but the promise did not actually induce the waiver. Defendant argued his waiver of the right to a jury trial was induced by the court's offer of a benefit, i.e., the waiver would be considered a mitigating factor at sentencing, and
therefore was involuntary. The court's statement that it would consider the waiver as a mitigating factor was an improper promise of a benefit for waiving a fundamental constitutional
right. However, the improper promise did not induce the waiver of the right to a jury trial.id: 19776
A defendant has a right to a jury trial in a Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500 proceeding to determine whether he was a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others.After a hearing without a jury, the superior court determined defendant was a mentally retarded person who was dangerous to himself or others. (Welfare and Institution's Code section 6500.) However, reversal of the finding was required where the court failed to advise defendant of is right to a jury or to secure his waiver of that right.id: 19331
Counsel cannot stipulate, over defendant's objection to a panel of less than 12 jurors in a trial on defendant's competency to stand trial. (536Defense counsel cannot stipulate, over a criminal defendant's objection, to a panel of only eleven jurors in a trial to determine defendant's competency to stand trial on criminal charges. The trial court's error in accepting the stipulation was prejudicial given the extensive evidence that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.id: 12526
The trial court prejudicially erred in excusing two jurors during deliberations without asking if they would continue even if their employers would not pay them.Twelve jurors deliberated for about three and one-half days, with two (or possibly three) holdouts. When two jurors were replaced without any inquiry about whether they would be willing to remain another day even if their employers would not pay them, the reconstituted jury reach a verdict in about three hours. The trial court prejudicially erred in excusing the two jurors.id: 12538
Defendant's waiver of a jury trial was not knowing and intelligent where it was based on the erroneous assumption that the waiver was necessary to perfect an appeal.Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the felony charges. However, the record showed the jury trial waiver was based on the mistaken belief that a waiver was necessary to perfect an appeal. It should have been apparent to the parties that defendant did not fully comprehend his right to a jury trial. Given the confusion, further inquiry should have been conducted to ensure the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.id: 15928
Court erred in denying defendant a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations but the error was harmless where identity was the only contested issue.The 1997 amendment to Penal Code section 1025, which added subdivision (c), did not eliminate the right to a jury trial on prior conviction allegations. However, it narrowed the issues that the jury must decide. Though subdivision (c) gives the question of identity to the court, the question of whether the alleged prior conviction ever occurred remains with the jury. The error in denying the jury trial was harmless under the <i>Watson</i> test where the defendant did not challenge that the prior convictions occurred, but rather challenged the issue of the identity of the perpetrator.id: 15013
Waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing and intelligent where the court offered an unspecified benefit in exchange for the waiver.Defendant's waiver of a jury trial was not valid when the trial court, before accepting the waiver, informed defendant that he would receive "some benefit" if he waived his right to a jury trial, although the court did not specify what the benefit would be.id: 16389
Court erred in failing to instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew following the substitution of an alternate juror.The trial court substituted in an alternate juror to replace a juror who was ill. However, the court failed to give the newly constituted jury the mandatory instruction that it disregard its previous deliberations and begin anew. This was error under the state constitution. Reversal was required under the Watson standard where evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and only a short time elapsed between substitution of the alternate and the verdict.id: 16548
Any error in instructing that defendant was the person in the 969b packet at the priors trial was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of identity.Defendant argued he had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the identity of the person in the Penal Code section 969b packet at the trial on the priors, and the court's instruction that he was the person in the packet violated due process and section 1025. While noting a possible problem, the court did not decide the issue since evidence of identity was overwhelming. Moreover, since the issue involved a fundamental constitutional right, the failure to raise it in the trial court did not waive the issue on appeal.id: 17203
Reversal was required where guilt was determined by a court trial without an express waiver by defendant of his right to a jury trial.In <i>People v. Howard</i>, (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, the court held that the defendant validly admitted having served an alleged prior prison term, despite the trial court's failure to advise him expressly of the privilege against self-incrimination because considering the totality of the circumstances, the admission to the prior conviction was voluntary and intelligent. The prosecution argued the totality of the circumstances test applied in <i>Howard</i> also should apply when a court trial is conducted in a criminal prosecution without an express waiver by the defendant of the right to a jury trial, and that the Court of Appeal in the instant case erred in reversing the conviction based on the absence of a waiver. However, <i>Howard</i> did not alter the long-established rule that, by virtue of the explicit language of the California Constitution, a criminal conviction resulting from a court trial must be reversed if the defendant did not expressly waive the right to a jury trial.id: 11570
Updated 2/4/2024SB 1437 was an act of lenity not subject to the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury.Defendant argued that he was entitled to a jury trial for his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. However, SB 1437 was an act of lenity by the Legislature, and is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis. id: 27296
Updated 2/4/2024Defendant’s jury trial waiver was valid where he understood a jury verdict had to be unanimous, and he discussed the pros and cons of a bench trial.Defendant entered a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial at the Sexually Violent Predator trial. It was conveyed to him that in a jury trial, a verdict had to be unanimous and the record showed he and counsel discussed the pros and cons of a jury trial versus a bench trial.id: 27656
Updated 2/3/2024Waiver of right to jury trial was valid where the judge adequately explained the process.Defendant who represented himself at a capital trial argued the record failed to show a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. Contrary to his claim, the judge adequately explained the right to a jury trial, and defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.id: 27547
Updated 2/3/2024Counsel could waive defendant’s right to a juvenile fitness hearing, and a personal waiver from defendant was not required.Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the charged offenses, but was tried and convicted in adult court. Following Prop 57, his case was transferred to juvenile court to determine whether he was fit for juvenile court treatment. His attorney stipulated in defendant’s presence, that the case should proceed to adult court in light of the probation officer’s recommendation. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, counsel could waive his right to a juvenile fitness hearing, and a personal waiver was not required.id: 26653
Jury trial advisement did not require language that 12 jurors would serve and had to be unanimous as to guilt.Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter following a court trial. He argued the court failed to properly advise him on his right to jury trial. However, the court was not required to inform him of his right to have 12 jurors serve on a jury and that those jurors would have to make a unanimous decision as to guilt.id: 24967
Jury waiver by the Laotian refugee before his capital trial was constitutional even though there was no specific discussion of the right to an impartial jury.The defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death following a court trial. He argued that his waiver of a jury trial was not knowing and intelligent because he was a Laotian refugee with limited English skills and he did not properly understand what the right to a jury trial entailed. However, defendant was represented by counsel and assisted by an interpreter. The circumstances demonstrated that he knew what he was waiving even though the court never fully explained the concept of an impartial jury. Moreover, there was no constitutional error based on the trial court’s failure to reaffirm defendant’s waiver at the outset of the penalty phase.id: 25282
The trial court committed statutory error at defendant’s capital trial by failing to take a separate jury trial waiver as to the special circumstance allegation.Defendant waived his right to a jury trial for the guilt and penalty phases of his capital case. The record showed his waiver was knowing and intelligent. However, Penal Code section 190.4, subd.(a) requires a separate personal waiver of the jury trial right for the special circumstance allegation. The failure to obtain that additional waiver was statutory error, but it was harmless absent evidence that the defendant would have chosen a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation absent the error.id: 25283
Counsel may waive jury trial for an NGI at commitment extension proceeding in his absence where it appears the NGI is incapable of deciding whether it is in his best interest to do so.The prosecution sought to extend defendant’s not guilty by reason of insanity commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. The trial court did not err by failing to advise defendant of his right to a jury trial, accepting counsel’s waiver and conducting a bench trial without a personal waiver. Defendant was in the hospital being treated at the time and the record shows he was aware of the right to a jury trial. A personal waiver was not required and NGI’s being treated for mental illness often choose not to appear. However, counsel does not have exclusive control over the decision and may make the decision only when it reasonably appears the NGI is incapable of doing so.id: 23164
Counsel may waive an NGI’s jury trial right at commitment extension proceeding at NGI’s direction, with his or her consent or where the NGI is incompetent.Penal Code section 1026.5 which governs extension of NGI commitment proceedings does not require a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial by an NGI. Counsel may waive a jury trial at an NGI’s direction, with his or her consent or on behalf of an NGI who is not competent to do so. The trial court did not err by not obtaining defendant’s personal waiver where he was being treated in the state hospital at the time.id: 23165
Capital defendant’s jury waiver was valid even though he was not specifically advised of his right to participate in jury selection. Defendant was convicted in a court trial of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. He argued his jury trial waiver was invalid because he was not advised of his right to participate in jury selection. However, there is no requirement that a defendant be advised of this “right” and the court gave proper and full warnings in the case. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, the record showed he was advised that the jury waiver included the special circumstance allegation, even though that warning was given orally. Any doubt was resolved when defendant agreed after the guilty verdict that he had waived a jury on the special circumstance allegations.id: 22679
The record did not show that the juror who was provided an interpreter was unqualified due to his lack of sufficient knowledge of the English language.The trial court provided a Spanish language interpreter for one of the jurors. The use of the interpreter did not indicate that the juror lacked sufficient knowledge of the English language and was therefore unqualified to be a juror.id: 22041
The trial court had jurisdiction to reconvene the jury to conduct the trial on the prior conviction even though it had just announced that the jury was excused.After the verdict on the substantive counts the trial court excused they jury. However, before the jury left the box, the prosecutor advised the court the jury was still needed for a trial on the prior convictions. Under the circumstances, the trial court maintained the jurisdiction to reconvene the jury since it had not been exposed to outside influences and there was no prejudice to defendant.id: 20684
A capital defendant facing a penalty phase retrial has the right to waive a jury trial.The trial court did not err by accepting defendant’s jury trial waiver for the penalty phase retrial.id: 20493
Appellant who had been found NGI had no right to a jury trial regarding his eligibility for placement as an outpatient in a local mental health program.Appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital, was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his eligibility for placement in a community mental health program as a supervised outpatient.id: 11726
Rule of automatic reversal does not apply to the denial of a fair cross-section of the community in selecting a grand jury.The systematic but nonpurposeful denial of a fair cross-section of the community in the selection of a grand jury does not require reversal absent prejudice relating to the conviction.id: 12534
New trial motion was properly denied on the basis that the juror was mentally incompetent at the guilt phase where the juror was discharged at the penalty phase after exhibiting signs of extreme stress.During the penalty phase a juror was discharged after demonstrating emotional problems which resulted in tardiness and, ultimately, a failure to appear for a morning session. Defendant later moved for a new trial on the theory that the juror was mentally incompetent at the guilt phase. However, the record showed the juror was experiencing stress resulting from family and financial problems which affected her ability to concentrate and retain information. The problem peaked during the penalty phase. However, there was no indication she had ever needed or received psychiatric care or counseling, or that she lacked the ability to receive, process, or exchange information. The trial court properly denied the new trial motion.id: 15932
Supreme Court says defendant prosecuted for multiple petty offenses has no right to jury trial.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. "The Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for petty offenses charged." Because of this holding, the majority found it unnecessary to decide whether the right to a jury trial could be eliminated by a judge's pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence would not exceed six months. Justices Kennedy and Bryer concurred in the judgment and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.id: 12537
The court did not err in telling the deliberating jurors they could read the instructions and think about the case at home.The trial court did not err by instructing the deliberating jurors that they could read the instructions and think about the case at home. Thinking about the case is not the same as deliberating.id: 19217
The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the impact of a juror's murder on the remaining jurors.A sitting juror was murdered prior to deliberations. The court selected an alternate to replace the murdered juror, released the jury for the day, and ordered the jury to return for work the following day. The trial court did not err by failing to conduct a more meaningful inquiry into the effect of the juror's death on the others or declare a mistrial.id: 19196
The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the impact of a juror's murder on the remaining jurors.A sitting juror was murdered prior to deliberations. The court selected an alternate to replace the murdered juror, released the jury for the day, and ordered the jury to return for work the following day. The trial court did not err by failing to conduct a more meaningful inquiry into the effect of the juror's death on the others or declare a mistrial.id: 19197
Counsel may waive defendant's right to a jury trial in an SVP proceeding.Defendant, at a sexually violent predator recommitment trial, argued the court erred by accepting counsel's representation that defendant wanted a court, rather than jury, trial. However, a personal waiver of jury trial from defendant was not necessary, as an SVP proceeding is civil not criminal, and the right to a jury is statutory, not constitutional.id: 18794
The trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial by retrying him without putting a second in-court waiver of his jury right on the record.Defendant argued the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial by failing to obtain a second, in-court waiver of his right to a jury before retrying him. However, defense counsel's comments in open court along with defendant's silence on the issue until he was tried and convicted show he reconsidered the jury trial waiver and decided not to withdraw it prior to the second trial. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the mistrial did not automatically cancel his consent to waive jury absent a new in-court waiver.id: 18772
That defendant was found incompetent two days after the start of trial did not show that he was incompetent when he waived jury trial and the court did not err in resuming trial after the restoration of his competency.After the start of the court trial, defendant was found to be mentally incompetent, causing the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which later resumed with the consent of defendant and his counsel when his competency was restored. Defendant argued his competency necessarily predated by at least a
few days the suspension of the criminal proceedings, and as such, his waiver of a jury trial was not competently made and he was not competent during a portion of the trial. However, there is
no evidence that defendant had any problems understanding the proceedings or participating at the early stages, and any claim that his incompetence began then was simply speculation. Since
there was no evidence of his incompetency earlier in the trial, the court did not err in resuming proceedings (rather than starting over) after the restoration of competency.id: 17444
Court did not err by failing to discharge a juror who expressed concerns about the safety of his family.Defendant argued the court should have removed a juror for cause after the juror informed the court he feared the defendant. In a note to the court, the juror asked if the defendant had access to the questionnaires, and he was concerned for his family and property. The court informed the jury the defendant had no access to the sealed questionnaires, and that any juror who questioned his or her ability to be fair should inform the court in writing. The court's handling of the situation was satisfactory.id: 17313
Trial court properly relied on the public defender's representation that it was in defendant's best interests to waive jury trial on the issue of competence.Defendant was represented by the public defender when his competence to stand trial was put in issue. The trial court appointed special counsel, in addition to the public defender to represent defendant's "wishes" on the issue of whether he wanted to waive jury trial on the competence issue. The public defender opined it was in defendant's best interest to waive jury trial. Special counsel informed the court defendant wanted a jury. The court correctly relied on the public defender's representation that it was in defendant's best interests to waive a jury. Moreover, in an ordinary case such as this one, the trial court should not appoint special counsel to represent defendant's "wishes" with respect to whether he or she wants a jury to try the issue of competence.id: 16600
Defendant was not entitled to a separate jury to decide the claim of insanity.The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a separate sanity phase jury. That the jury had just convicted him of murder at the guilt phase (in 42 minutes) did not establish that the jury was predisposed to find him sane. id: 16453
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging the only African-American male juror who needed a break to take his son to the doctor.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion when it discharged the only African-American male on the panel during trial because the juror needed to take his son to the doctor. However, there was no abuse of discretion since the court conducted an adequate inquiry into good cause and caring for a sick or injured family member constitutes good cause.id: 15933
Denial of statutory right to a jury trial on prior conviction allegations is subject to harmless error analysis.Denial of the statutory right to a jury trial on prior conviction allegations is subject to harmless error analysis. The error was harmless (under any harmless error analysis) in the present case where the evidence strongly supported the determination that defendant suffered the prior convictions.id: 15930
Jury trial waiver does not remain in effect for a subsequent retrial of the same case.Defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses in a court trial. On appeal, the court found certain evidence should have been suppressed and the matter was remanded for retrial. Defendant's original waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the subsequent retrial, and the trial court erred in finding to the contrary. The convictions resulting from the second trial were therefore reversed.id: 15931
Provision which allows for a single trial where crimes are committed against the same victim in multiple counties does not violate vicinage principles.Penal Code section 784.7 authorizes consolidation of the Santa Clara County charge against defendant with the Riverside County charge against him. The vicinage clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the right to a trial by a jury of the vicinage, as guaranteed by the California Constitution, is not violated by trial in a county having a reasonable relationship to the offense or to other crimes committed by the defendant against the same victim.id: 14977
Separate allegation of force did not violate defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.The jury was instructed on the meaning of force and further told that all facts essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish defendant's guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding the defendant guilty of simple escape and that he used force, the jury applied legal principles to the facts, leaving nothing for the court to do but implement the jury's verdict. Thus, there was no interference with defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.id: 12535
Supreme Court overrules Ninth circuit and finds no right to jury ruling on aggravating circumstances under Arizona death penalty statute.In Adamson v. Ricketts,865 F.2d 1011 (1988)(en banc), the Ninth Circuit held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because sentencing is conducted solely by a judge who determines whether certain aggravating circumstances are present, and imposes the death penalty if they are not offset by mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Defendant here made the same argument in the Supreme Court, contending that this provision violated his right to jury trial. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice White rejected the argument and overruled the Ninth Circuit, relying on earlier cases that had soundly rejected . . . [a]ny argument that the constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence. Nor were aggravating circumstances in Arizona elements of the offense, as they did not in themselves require imposition of the death penalty. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall dissented.id: 12536
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror in a capital case who called her new employer and then told the court anxiety over the new job would affect further deliberations.Deliberations in the capital case began on July 29, 1987. On that date a juror sent the court a note stating that she was beginning a new job in August. On July 31, she stated her anxiety over her new job would not affect her deliberations. On August 10, the court received a partial verdict and asked whether the new job anxiety would affect further deliberations. She replied in the negative. She then telephoned her new employer and thereafter told the court her anxiety would affect further deliberations. She was then excused. The trial court's failure to conduct a hearing before taking the verdicts was not error. Moreover, the court's finding of good cause to excuse the juror after the call to her employer was supported by substantial evidence.id: 12539
Waiver of the jury on the issue of guilt may extend to the trial on sanity.Appellant argued that he was not advised of, and did not waive, his right to jury on the issue of sanity. However, the court found that a defendant's waiver of jury on the issue of guilt extends to trial on both portions of a bifurcated trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1026 unless he specifically demands jury on the issue of sanity.id: 12540
A defendant charged with a felony can waive a 12-person jury and stipulate to trial by 6 jurors.The California Constitution mandates a 12-person jury trial for a felony defendant only when the defendant does not waive the right to such a jury. Under the Article 1, section 16 provision permitting criminal defendants to waive a jury, a defendant accused a felony can waive a portion of the 12-person jury provided the waiver conforms to that required for trial without any jury.id: 12524
Allowing the jury to select a new foreman did not pressure dissenting jurors.Defendant argued the trial court unduly pressured dissenting jurors to acquiesce in the verdict when it stated, in response to a juror's inquiry, that the jurors could change the jury foreman as long as the palace coup was bloodless Nothing coercive was reflected or intended by the statement.id: 12525
Court's general admonition was sufficient to advise defendant that he had the right to a jury trial to determine the truth or falsity of the special circumstance allegations.Defendant argued the trial court did not explicitly advise him that he had a right to a jury trial to determine the truth or falsity of the special circumstance allegations, and that he never explicitly waived this right. The court did advise him that the right to a jury trial applied to all aspects of his special circumstances case. The admonition was sufficient to advise defendant that his waiver, which included all aspects of guilt and penalty, included within it a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the truth or falsity of the special circumstance allegation.id: 12527
Death of a juror's mother constitutes good cause to discharge the juror and not merely to continue the trial when defendant so requests.Defendant argued the court erred by discharging a juror at the juror's request in the midst of the penalty phase. The juror was discharged because of the unexpected death of his mother the previous night. Defendant argued the more appropriate procedure would be to grant a one week continuance. However, death of a juror's mother constitutes good cause to discharge the juror<197>and not merely to continue the trial<197>when defendant so requests.id: 12528
Defendant failed to demonstrate that identifying the victim to prospective jurors as Jane Doe resulted in the denial of his right to a fair and impartial jury.Penal Code section 293.5 allows under certain circumstances the alleged victim of a sex offense to be identified as Jane Doe rather than by her true name. Defendant argued that because the victim's true name was not given to the jury, there was no way to determine whether the jurors may have known the victim. However, defendant failed to demonstrate that the identification of the victim as Jane Doe resulted in the denial of his right to a fair and impartial jury.id: 12529
Defendant's failure to object waived any error regarding post verdict juror substitution.Following the receipt of guilty verdicts for three of the five charged murder counts, the court excused a juror and replaced her with an alternate. Defendant argued it was error to substitute the alternate after the original jury had returned a partial verdict. However, defendant waived the issue by failing to object to the juror substitution, or to otherwise move for a mistrial on this ground.id: 12530
Failure to designate alternate jurors before the presentation of evidence was not prejudicial error.The court swore in 14 jurors and explained that it would not designate the alternates until the evidence had been presented. In this manner the court felt there would be no opportunity for two alternates not to pay attention. While the procedure technically violated Penal Code section 1089, the error was not prejudicial and there was no empirical evidence that alternate jurors do not pay attention to the trials in which they sit.id: 12531
Failure to request further polling constituted a waiver of the issue.The record showed that in polling the jury only 11 jurors gave their assent to the verdict. Failure to request further polling constituted a waiver of the issue.id: 12532
No right to jury trial for drunk driving with 6-month maximum sentence.The Nevada drunk driving law provides for a maximum 6 months in jail for first time offenders, or in the alternative, 48 hours of community work while identifiably dressed as a drunk driving offender. In addition, the offender must pay a fine of up to $1,000, attend an alcohol abuse education course, and lose his license for 90 days. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court held that these penalties were not sufficiently serious to require a jury trial. When an offense carries a maximum sentence of six months or less, it is presumed to be petty unless the defendant can show that any additional statutory penalties are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is a serious one.id: 12533
The denial of a trial by jury in juvenile cases does not require the minor's CYA confinement be limited to six months beyond the age of majority.17 year old minor was found to have committed a rape. He argued the state may not detain him in one of its CYA facilities past his majority unless he has been granted the right to a jury trial. However, neither the extension of juvenile court jurisdiction, nor the addition of punishment as an expressed purpose of the Juvenile Court Law changes the overriding purpose or design of the juvenile justice system warranting the imposition of a jury trial requirement.id: 11711
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245