Vicinage

Category > Vicinage

An accomplice who delivered drugs following a negotiation with two others on a phone call (one in LA County and one in Ventura) was properly prosecuted in Ventura County. A police informant in Ventura County negotiated by phone with a drug dealer in Los Angeles County for the purchase of heroin. The drugs were delivered in Los Angeles County by an accomplice who did not take part in the phone negotiations. Under Penal Code section 781 the accomplice could have been prosecuted in either county and the trial court did not err in ruling that Ventura County was a proper venue for the trial. id: 23086
Prosecuting the Los Angeles offenses in Riverside did not violate defendant’s vicinage right. Defendant was charged with sex offenses against two minors, one in Los Angeles and one in Riverside. He argued that standing trial in Riverside County for offenses committed against a victim in Los Angeles under the amended version of Penal Code section 784.7 violated his Sixth Amendment vicinage right. The California Supreme Court had held, before the 2003 amendment to section 784.7 that the vicinage clause was not applicable in a state trial, and that holding was binding on the appeals court.id: 21383
Sex crimes committed in different counties need not be identical to qualify for joinder under section 784.7.Penal Code section 784.7, subd.(a) permits the joinder of any combination of its listed sex crimes, but requires the court to hold a section 954 joinder hearing at which the court may exercise its discretion to deny joinder in the interest of justice. The trial court did not err by permitting the San Bernardino offense to be joined with the Orange County offense for trial in Orange County, and defendant failed to show any prejudice.id: 21573
Trying defendant charged with receiving stolen property in the county where the property was first stolen did not violate venue provision of vicinage rights.Defendant argued that in receiving stolen property cases, venue should only be allowed in the county from where the property is stolen if the defendant knew the property was stolen in that county. However, Penal Code section 786 does not say defendant must know where the property was stolen and the court refused to read that requirement into the law. Moreover, trying the case in Orange County where the original theft occurred did not violate defendant's vicinage rights.id: 19345
Crimes were "committed" in San Bernardino for vicinage purposes where the body was found there in one case, and the sequence of events in another case began in that county.Defendant argued his right to a jury drawn from the vicinage of the crimes requires that each crime be tried before a jury drawn from the county in which the crime occurred. However, defendant extended his commission of the murder into San Bernardino where the body was found and his attempted murder of an officer in Riverside arose from a kidnapping which commenced in San Bernardino - at least under the broad concept of "commission" courts have applied for purposes of determining proper vicinage. id: 16981
Transfer of a capital case to a different judicial district in the same county did not violate the right to vicinage or to a fair cross-section.Defendant argued the transfer of his case from the Central Judicial District of the Los Angeles Superior Court to the Northwest Judicial District denied his rights both to vicinage and a jury chosen from a fair cross-section. However, there is no violation of the vicinage requirement when a defendant is tried in a county by a jury drawn from that county. Moreover, there was no evidence that the state selected the jury pool in a constitutionally impermissible manner. The county used voter registration lists and DMV records to compile its jury pool. The failure to supplement these lists with other available lists did not demonstrate systematic exclusion.id: 16377
No vicinage right violation where property was taken in San Bernardino but concealed and used in Los Angeles, where the case was tried.Defendant objected to being tried in Los Angeles arguing such a trial violated his vicinage right to be tried by a jury in the judicial district where the alleged crime occurred - in this case in San Bernardino. However, by bringing the stolen telephone into Los Angeles, defendant was concealing evidence in that county. By making calls without authorization of the subscriber, defendant stole services in both counties. Trial of the charges in Los Angeles did not violate defendant's vicinage rights.id: 15817
Where the county had a single judicial district there was no violation of the right of vicinage where the venue was drawn from the entire county rather than a smaller area in the county.Defendant argued the judicial district in which the offenses were committed was the supervisorial district from which the jury venue was drawn for the South Lake Tahoe session of the superior court, rather than the entire county of El Dorado which has but one judicial district. However, defendant was accorded a jury drawn from the vicinage in which the crime was committed, and the countywide draw violated no constitutional or statutory provisions.id: 15819
Provision which allows for a single trial where crimes are committed against the same victim in multiple counties does not violate vicinage principles.Penal Code section 784.7 authorizes consolidation of the Santa Clara County charge against defendant with the Riverside County charge against him. The vicinage clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the right to a trial by a jury of the vicinage, as guaranteed by the California Constitution, is not violated by trial in a county having a reasonable relationship to the offense or to other crimes committed by the defendant against the same victim.id: 14977
Right to a jury drawn from the vicinage only requires that the jurors reside in the county wherein the murders were committed.Defendant argued his constitutional rights to a jury drawn from the vicinage were violated by the trial court's policy of excusing all prospective jurors claiming hardship caused by residing more than an hour and one half from the county courthouse. Defendant claimed he was entitled to jurors from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene. However, under both state and federal constitutions the boundaries of the vicinage are coterminous with the boundaries of the county. There can be no vicinage argument where defendant did not claim the jurors in his case were drawn from outside the county wherein the murders were committed.id: 12571
The 1990 amendment of section 786 does not require a defendant's waiver of the right of vicinage for prosecution in a jurisdictional territory in which a waiver was not required prior to the amendment.The Legislature did not intend to alter the well-settled vicinage provisions of Penal Code section 786 when, by its amendment of the statute in 1990, it expanded the trial court's venue for certain property crimes into contiguous jurisdictions on condition the defendant waive her vicinage right in such prosecutions.id: 12574
The boundaries of the vicinage are coterminous with the boundaries of the county.The Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District practice of transferring cases from the Traffic Court Building to a branch courthouse within the same district does not violate the Sixth Amendment vicinage right. Vicinage is based on the county and not the judicial district in which the crime took place.id: 12576
Vicinage principles were not offended where jurors were picked from San Diego and robberies took place in Riverside because the preliminary acts occurred in San Diego.Penal Code sections 781 and 786 state that trial is appropriate in more than one county when certain facts apply; i.e., section 781 allows jurisdiction in any county where acts preliminary or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur and section 786 permits jurisdiction in either the county where property is taken in a theft related offense or in the county where the property is brought into after the offense. Neither section violates the Sixth Amendment concept of vicinage. The vicinage principles were not offended in this case by drawing jurors only from San Diego County where the preliminary, overt acts occurred and where defendants returned after the Riverside County robbery.id: 12583
Counsel's failure to object to venue and vicinage issues did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se.Defendant argued the Stanislaus Superior Court lacked proper venue and vicinage over count V, theft from Union Bank, because the prosecution failed in its burden to show that material portions of the crime were committed within Stanislaus County. However, due to the failure to object, the vicinage and venue issues were not preserved for appeal. Moreover, the failure to object was not ineffective assistance of counsel per se and defendant made no claim the trial in Stanislaus County of Count V was unfair or that if he had been tried in Tulare County on that count it was not reasonably likely he would have been convicted.id: 12333
Vicinage requirements are satisfied if the murder trial takes place in the county where the body was found.Penal Code section 790 is a venue statute. It provides that jurisdiction of a criminal action for murder may be in one of three counties: where the fatal injury was inflicted, where the injured party dies, or where the body was found. The constitutional right of vicinage is satisfied if the trial is held in any of the three counties specified in section 790.id: 11957

About Pat Ford

Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.

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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245