Severance/Joinder
Category > Severance/Joinder
Updated 2/3/2024The trial court erred in denying defendant’s mistrial motion where the jurors heard evidence of a murder that had been severed from the charge for which he was on trial. Defendant was charged with unrelated murders in Hayward and Oakland. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to sever the counts since the evidence of the Oakland murder was weak. During trial of the Hayward murder where the defense presented a case of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation or imperfect self-defense, a witness testified about the Oakland murder, which weakened his defense. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.id: 27751
The trial court committed reversible error by denying defendant's motion to sever the misdemeanor indecent exposure charge for which the evidence was strong from the weak felony sexual assault charge.Defendant was charged in separate cases with misdemeanor indecent exposure, and sexual assault, a felony. The charges arose from dissimilar incidents with no historical connection. Proof of the misdemeanor count was strong as it occurred in broad daylight, the victim recorded defendant's license plate number and positively identified defendant from a photo lineup. The assault case was weaker. The incident occurred in a dimly lit parking lot and the victim's description of the perpetrator and his car did not match defendant or his vehicle. The trial court admitted reversible error in denying defendant's motion to sever the charges and the resulting trial was so unfair as to deny defendant's right to due process of law. id: 20919
Joinder of burglary and possession of stolen computer equipment counts was prejudicial in light of the arguments, instructions and lack of cross-admissibility of the evidence.The evidence on counts one and two was not cross-admissible. Moreover, the prosecutor urged the jury to draw the impermissible inference that, because defendant possessed stolen computer equipment (count two), he burgled the school for the computer equipment (count one). The trial court also refused defendant's request for an instruction on the noncross-admissibility of the evidence on counts one and two, and the instructions given did not ameliorate these errors. Finally, the evidence on counts one and two was similar although not strong as to count one. It is therefore likely that the jury used the evidence that defendant received and was concealing computer equipment stolen from a school to infer he burgled the school for computer equipment. The joinder of the charges substantially prejudiced defendant and denied him a fair trial.id: 17633
Silence during a joint custodial interrogation is not admissible to prove an adoptive admission, and admitting the codefendant's statements violated the Aranda/Bruton rule.Defendant was convicted of the murder of her young son under circumstances showing abuse and neglect. She was tried jointly with the victim's father. Defendant argued her trial should have been severed from the father's trial primarily because of an alleged Aranda/Bruton violation arising from the use of the father's statements implicating her during the joint interrogation. The father had said they were both "overzealous" in disciplining the victim, that defendant was involved like he was, etc. However, defendant's silence during a joint custodial interrogation is not admissible to prove an adoptive admission. The statements should not have been admitted. Furthermore, the admission of a separate statement by defendant after excising the portion where she blamed the father for some of the abuse also violated Aranda and Bruton. However, the errors were harmless when placed in the context of the entire interrogation.id: 17583
Denial of severance motion even where defenses were antagonistic was harmless and the trial court could not have anticipated the holding in Gray v. Maryland.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his severance motion because the joint trial resulted in statements of codefendants implicating him in violation of Aranda/Bruton principles, and resulted in the introduction of his own statements edited to exclude reference to the codefendants which inaccurately portrayed him as the sole perpetrator. As to the first issue, assuming there was an Aranda/Bruton violation it was because of the holding in Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 US. 185, where the word “deleted” was substituted for defendant’s name throughout the transcript and the jury likely linked that redaction to defendant’s name. However, Gray was published six years after defendant’s trial and the court cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate the holding. Moreover, the introduction of defendant’s redacted statements, even if erroneous was harmless. Finally, the fact that the defenses of the various codefendants were antagonistic did not require severance since the acceptance of one party’s defense did not preclude acquittal of the others.id: 20393
The trial court erred in failing to individualize its analysis as to each of the murders when denying the severance motion.Following a reversal of his murder conviction on appeal, defendant's case was returned to the superior court for a retrial. The prosecution sought to consolidate the case with four other murder charges under Penal Code Section 790(b), which
allowed the consolidation of charges where murders were committed in different counties. The trial court erred in failing to review the facts of each murder carefully and individually before denying severance, instead treating the issue of severing all four Los Angeles cases from the
Orange County cases, or severing none of them.id: 19473
Denying the motion to sever trials was improper where the court allowed a redacted version of appellant's post-arrest statement to be read to the jury without allowing appellant to present exculpatory portions of the statement.Appellant and his brother were charged jointly of murder and were convicted. Portions of appellant's post-arrest statement pertaining to his brother were excised pursuant to <i>People v. Aranda</i> (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and related to the jury. The trial court erred in denying appellant's severance motion and allowing use of the redacted version of his statement without permitting appellant to present portions of the statement which tended to exculpate him from responsibility for the murder.id: 11967
Trial court erred in consolidating defendant's case with a codefendant who was also charged with a premeditated murder in an entirely separate episode.Defendant and a codefendant were charged with two counts of premeditated attempted murder. In a separate criminal proceeding arising out of a different episode, the codefendant and another person were charged with execution-style murder. (Charges against the other person in the second episode were severed.) The consolidation of the cases presented a serious prospect of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to consolidate.id: 14978
Updated 2/3/2024When related offenses are properly joined, the court may consider more than one preliminary hearing record in ruling on a 995 motion.Penal Code section 954’s joinder clause permits a district attorney to file a single information, and when related offenses are properly joined by the district attorney, a trial court is permitted to consider more than one preliminary hearing record in ruling on a 995 motion.id: 27539
The trial court did not err by refusing to sever the child pornography charge from the capital murder and kidnap counts.The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s requests to sever the child pornography charge from the charges of capital murder and kidnap where the offenses were connected in their commission and each showed a motive for the other.id: 26070
Where joinder of charges is proper under Penal Code section 954, the prosecution can file a unitary information covering charges that were the subject of complaints and preliminary hearings in separate cases.When a defendant is held to answer on charges brought in separate cases following separate preliminary hearings, the prosecution does not need the court’s permission to file a unitary information covering the charges in both cases. The decision is left to the prosecutor’s discretion. If the defendant believes the inclusion of all charges in a unitary information prejudices him or her, he or she may move for a severance of counts.id: 25929
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the capital defendant’s motions for severance that were based on the existence of antagonistic defenses or a request for dual juries. Defendant filed many motions to sever his case from a codefendant’s both before and during the capital trial. His requests were based largely on the existence of conflicting or antagonistic defenses. However, the trial court has discretion to deny severance despite the existence of antagonistic defenses and did not abuse its discretion in doing so here. The trial court was otherwise within its discretion in denying the request for dual juries after the denial of the severance motions.id: 25013
Recorded statements of codefendants were not testimonial and their admission did not violate Aranda/Bruton or due process principles.The U.S. Supreme Court’s narrowing of the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation to protect against only “testimonial” statements (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36) also narrowed the Aranda/Bruton doctrine. Because the jailhouse conversation between the codefendants was nontestimonial under Crawford, there was no Aranda/Bruton violation in admitting it along with the instruction that the recording should not be admitted against defendant. The fact that it would be difficult for the jury to disregard the statement when considering defendant’s guilt did not amount to a due process violation.id: 25349
The trial court did not err by denying the severance motion despite the antagonistic defenses given the independent overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his severance motion in light of the antagonistic defenses presented by the defendants. However, denying severance was not improper given the overwhelming evidence of guilt that came directly from the defendant’s own mouth.id: 25094
A defendant cannot create a due process violation from a trial court’s refusal to sever charges before trial based on testimony he gives during trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever the inmate assault counts from the gassing the guards count. Even though there was no cross-admissibility, the other factors supported consolidation. Defendant further argued the failure to sever resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a due process violation. That analysis looks to events that occurred at trial. Defendant claimed unfairness due to testimony he gave at trial. However, a defendant cannot create a due process violation from a trial court’s refusal to sever before trial based on testimony he gives during the trial. id: 24607
Defendant could not move for severance on Aranda-Bruton grounds where his codefendants would have been prejudiced by the statements of the uncharged accomplices.Defendant was charged in a capital murder case with the other inmates. He moved to sever his case on Aranda-Bruton grounds claiming he intended to introduce testimony from other witnesses who implicated the codefendants. Assuming that an uncharged accomplice’s statements may be subject to Aranda-Bruton, in this case it would be the codefendants who would have been prejudiced, not defendant who was the proponent of the proferred statements.id: 24552
Severance is not required despite the claim that the other defense attorneys would be serving as second prosecutors. Defendant moved to sever his case from that of codefendant due in part to conflicting defenses and the fact that counsel for the codefendants acted as second prosecutors. However, because there was substantial independent evidence of each defendant’s guilt, the denial of severance was not improper. id: 23753
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s severance motion where the codefendant’s actions showed his influence over defendant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to sever his case from that of his codefendant. Defendant argued the evidence of codefendant’s misconduct not involving him tainted him by association. However, the evidence was admissible to show the codefendant’s potential influence over defendant to explain defendant’s motives for the murders. And separate trials are not required just because of evidence of bad acts by a codefendant.id: 23958
Antagonistic defenses did not require severance where there was strong independent evidence of guilt against the moving defendant.The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to sever the cases. Even though the defendants presented antagonistic defenses, there was sufficient independent evidence against defendant that it could not be said that was the conflict between the defenses that demonstrated his guilt.id: 23337
Denial of severance was not improper as defendant was convicted because of the evidence against him and not because of his association with defendant.The capital defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his severance request in part because his codefendant bad character (interest in Satanism) and prior record tainted defendant by association. However, substantial evidence implicated defendant in the charged crimes and there was little chance that he was convicted because of his association with codefendant.id: 23579
Antagonistic defenses did not require severance due to the strength of the independent evidence of defendant’s guilt.The trial court did not err at the capital trial in refusing to sever defendant’s case from that of his brother even though they had conflicting defenses. However, when there is independent evidence against the defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not require severance. Here, defendant claimed alibi and his brother claimed to be dominated by defendant. Whatever the degree of conflict, the strength of the independent evidence belied the claim that the conflict alone required reversal.id: 23018
The trial court did not err by refusing to sever the Adkins murder charge from the cop killing charges.The trial court did not err in refusing to sever the Adkins murder charge, from the two police officer murder charges. While the cop killing charges may have been inflammatory, the Adkins killing was also callous and it was not a case where the evidence was weak. Severance was not required where defendant indicated he might not testify on the Adkins count. Finally, when looking at the evidence introduced at trial, the joinder did not result in gross unfairness.id: 22638
The trial court properly continued defendant’s trial to a date within the 10-day grace period afforded by section 1382 in order to preserve joinder with the codefendant.Under Penal Code section 1382, when one codefendant’s trial is continued to a date within section 1382's 10-day grace period, the state’s strong interests in joinder provide good cause to continue the trial for properly joined codefendants to the same date within the 10-day period. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the defendant’s trial to a date within the 10-day period in order to permit the two defendants to be tried in a single trial.id: 22779
Defendant was not denied due process when the trial court failed to sever the cases once codefendant decided to testify.The failure to sever defendant’s trial from that of his codefendant did not result in a denial of due process once the codefendant decided to testify. While the codefendant’s recorded phone conversations had been previously excluded, their admission now did not violate Aranda/Bruton principles because defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (codefendant). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jurors not to consider the codefendant’s statements in the recorded calls when assessing defendant’s guilt.id: 21578
Sex crimes committed in different counties need not be identical to qualify for joinder under section 784.7.Penal Code section 784.7, subd.(a) permits the joinder of any combination of its listed sex crimes, but requires the court to hold a section 954 joinder hearing at which the court may exercise its discretion to deny joinder in the interest of justice. The trial court did not err by permitting the San Bernardino offense to be joined with the Orange County offense for trial in Orange County, and defendant failed to show any prejudice.id: 21573
Section 790, subd.(b) allowed charged murders from different counties to be tried together even where the defendant was not a “serial killer.”Defendant was charged with the murder of her two infant sons, one in 2004 in Alameda County, and the other in 2006, in Contra Costa County. Penal Code section 790, subd.(b) allows for counts of murder committed in different counties to be tried together as long as the charged murders were “connected together in their commission.” The trial court erred by ruling that section 790, subd.(b) is intended to allow a single trial only for serial killers.id: 21545
The trial court did not err in denying the severance motion where codefendant’s offer to testify on defendant’s behalf was conditioned on his case being tried first.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from that of his codefendant, Palms. He claimed that Palms would have testified in his favor had the motion been granted, assuming Palms was tried first. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the package deal plea form was not improper as it did not transform Palms from a willing witness to an unwilling one. Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the severance motion where Palms offer to testify was conditioned upon his being tried first as that arrangement could lead to a manipulation of the system.id: 21184
Denial of severance motion was not improper despite the claim of antagonistic defenses where the defenses were not so irreconcilable that only one could be guilty.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his severance motion because the defenses presented by his two codefendants were antagonistic to his defenses. However, aside from defendant’s self-serving statements, there was no evidence showing the other two defendants were more culpable and defendant’s defense and those of his codefendants were not so irreconcilable that only one could be guilty. The prosecutor presented independent evidence supporting the guilt of each and the joint trial was no unfair.id: 21183
There was no error in failing to sever the male and female defendants at the penalty trial.Defendant and female codefendant faced the death penalty. He argued the joint penalty trial is inherently skewed against the male in such a case. In fact, he was sentenced to die and the codefendant received a life sentence. However, defendant’s claim was speculative and there was no evidence showing the jury failed to properly perform its sentencing function.id: 20579
The trial did not err in denying defendant’s request for severance based on antagonistic defenses where any blame codefendant placed on defendant was subtle and independent evidence of guilt was strong.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his severance request in the capital trial because he and the codefendant had conflicting defenses -- he blamed unknown third parties and codefendant blamed him. However, codefendant never expressly blamed defendant even though counsel may have implied that as an alternate theory in closing argument. Moreover, antagonistic defenses do not compel severance where, as here, there is strong independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt.id: 20578
The trial court properly denied defendant’s severance motion based on the cross-admissibility of the gang evidence and drug evidence.Defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to sever the gang count and gang enhancement from the drug charges. However, the evidence regarding the offenses was cross-admissible as the gang evidence established defendant’s motive in possessing and transporting saleable drug quantities, i.e., as a business enterprise for his gang, and in turn, the drug offenses on behalf of his gang demonstrated his active participation in the gang. id: 20918
The trial court did not err in joining two cases of murdering homeless men in their sleep where the evidence would have been cross-admissible on the issues of intent and identity.Within four months, two homeless men who camped about three miles apart were killed as they slept on their backs. Evidence tied defendant to both crime scenes and both victims. Although initially charged separately, the cases were later joined for a single trial. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s severance motion since the evidence of the two killings would have been cross-admissible on the issues of intent and identity even if the cases were tried separately.id: 20852
There was no prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error in admitting incriminating letters written by codefendant which redacted defendant’s name or admitting codefendant’s statement that he and defendant “went looking” for the victim.Defendant argued the trial court committed Aranda-Bruton error by failing to sever his trial from that of codefendant Garcia. The letters written by Garcia and admitted at trial never incriminated defendant , references to his name were redacted and the jury never learned that he was the recipient of the letter. The only statement that incriminated him was codefendant’s statement to a third party that he and defendant “went looking” for the victim after a fight. However, this evidence was not powerfully incriminating and showed only that defendant went looking for the victim – not that he intended to assault or kill him if they found him.id: 20682
The trial court did not err in denying severance of counts as to murders occurring in 1973 and 2004 where the evidence as to each count would be cross-admissible in separate trials.Defendant was charged with the murder of his first wife in 1973, along with the murder of his third wife in 2004. He argued the counts should have been severed. However, the trial court did not err in denying the severance motion since the evidence as to each count would have been cross-admissible, and neither count was particularly weak.id: 20394
Joinder of four Los Angeles murder charges with a fifth charge in Orange County was proper under section 790, subd.(b) due to the common elements. The prosecutor moved under Penal Code section 791, subd.(b), to join five murder charges (one originating in Orange County and the other four in Los Angeles) in order to proceed with a single trial in Orange County. Each charge alleged a separate special circumstance allegation. Joinder was proper under section 790 because the offenses involved common elements as all victims were young Caucasian females who suffered blunt force facial trauma following a sexual assault. The trial court erred in finding that two of the Los Angeles cases had to be tried separately as the evidence at the trials would be cross-admissible, some of the charges would not usually inflame the jurors as to the others, and exceptionally weak charges were not being unfairly joined with strong charges.id: 20392
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing joinder of the murder and assault charges. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to join the murder and assault charges due to the similarity of motive, the presence of planning in each case, and the fact that each case was supported by similarly strong evidence.id: 19550
The trial court did not err in denying the midtrial severance motion based on antagonistic defenses where the evidence of defendant's guilt was strong.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's midtrial severance motion. Evidence of
defendant's association with Richard did not require severance given that the evidence showed defendant, rather than Richard, shot the victims and was therefore more culpable. Moreover, the
fact that defendant and Richard had antagonistic defenses, did not require severance.id: 19069
Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to request severance of the street terrorism charge and bifurcation of the gang enhancements.Defendant argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request severance of the street terrorism count and bifurcation of the gang enhancements. However, its unlikely a severance would have been granted. The strong cases here were the robbery and attempted murder, and the gang evidence was relatively benign in comparison. Defendant would not benefitted from the severance. Moreover, bifurcation of the gang enhancements was even more unlikely as virtually all of the gang evidence supporting the enhancements would have been admissible on the street terrorism charge.id: 18776
The trial court did not err in failing to consolidate charges where defendant's successful severance motion resulted in two capital jury trials.The trial court did not err in failing to reconsolidate charges arising from crimes committed in different counties after granting defendant's motion to sever the charges. Although the severance resulted in two separate capital trials, defendant failed to show he was prejudiced in either trial by the failure to consolidate the charges.id: 18740
Once the court granted defendant's motion to sever the murder charges, it was no longer a capital case and defendant was not entitled to second counsel.The prosecution originally charged defendant with two murders and alleged the multiple murder special circumstance. The court then appointed Skyers as second counsel under Penal Code section 987, subd. (d). After defendant successfully moved to sever the murder charges the court removed Skyers from the initial trial. Defendant argued error because Skyers, who later became lead counsel in the second case, was deprived of the opportunity to observe the witnesses and prepare for the penalty phase. However, the court's ruling was not erroneous because once it granted the severance motion, it was no longer a capital case, and defendant was no longer entitled to second counsel under section 987.id: 18633
The court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever the capital murder count from the rape involving another victim.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the special circumstance murder of Carol from the forcible rape of Valery. Joinder was allowed because the offenses belonged to the same assaultive class. Despite the lack of cross-admissibility, the evidence of murder was strong and the evidence of the rape was not especially inflammatory. Defendant failed to show a substantial danger of prejudice that would compel severance.id: 18452
Denial of severance for capital defendants was not prejudicial error despite antagonistic defenses where the evidence of guilt as to each was overwhelming.Defendants were convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to death. They argued the denial of the severance motion required a reversal of the judgment. However, the fact that they had antagonistic defenses did not, by itself, require severance. Moreover, any error in denying severance was harmless where the evidence against each defendant was overwhelming, each defendant testified (which negated any Aranda-Bruton concern) and this was not a case where one defendant was more involved than the other.id: 18053
There was no spillover prejudice where evidence of defendant's drug possession was relevant to the assault on a police officer charge.Defendant argued there was "spillover prejudice" from a joint trial of the possession of cocaine charge (which was reversed in a post-trial habeas proceeding) and the assault on a peace officer charge which required reversal of the assault conviction. However, the circumstances of the arrest would have been admissible even if defendant had not been charged with drug possession. The cocaine possession explained why he might nearly run over the officer and to impeach his testimony that he did not know Boyd was an officer. There was no misjoinder.id: 17839
The trial court did not err in denying a motion to sever the murder and escape charges where the motive of the escape was to avoid prosecution for the murder.The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever the murder and escape charges. Although the escape took place almost two years later, the apparent motive was to avoid prosecution for the murder. The offenses were therefore connected in their commission, and the evidence as to each offense was cross-admissible.id: 17703
The trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes. Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to provide sua sponte an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the Stark and Berryhill crimes in deciding his guilt of the Weeden murder. However, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes.id: 17303
Joinder may be proper even where the charge to be consolidated is of the same class as a "secondary" charge.Defendant argued the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion to consolidate the charge of petty theft from Woolworth with those of murder, robbery and vehicle taking, at the Volunteers of America apartments. Petty theft (from Woolworth) falls within the same class of offenses as robbery and vehicle taking. Even though the robbery was only "secondary" to the murder charge, there is no support for the proposition that joinder is proper only when the charge to be consolidated is of the same class as the "principal" charge, here the murder.id: 16789
Court did not err in failing to sever penalty trials where the codefendant's mitigating evidence was more compelling than defendant's.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to sever his penalty phase trial from that of his condefendants. He claimed the mitigating evidence elicited in support of the codefendants tended to eclipse the evidence favorable to him. However, nothing in the record suggested the jury assigned undue culpability to defendant after hearing his codefendant's mitigating evidence.id: 15820
Trial court did not err in precluding defense counsel from commenting on a codefendant's decision not to testify.The trial court denied defendant's motion to sever her trial from that of the other codefendants. Defendant later argued the refusal to permit her to refer in closing argument to a codefendant's decision not to testify benefitted the codefendant at her expense and denied her due process. However, the defendant would not have benefitted by counsel's comment on codefendant's failure to testify. Moreover, the prospect of a severance whenever a defendant elects to offer such a comment would provide an unacceptable mechanism for defeating the statutory preference for joint trials.id: 15821
Court maintains discretion to sever trials in the interest of justice despite Proposition 115's limitation on the impact of the absence of cross-admissibility as a factor precluding joinder.While the constitutional and statutory law adopted pursuant to Proposition 115 (California Constitution, article 1, section 30; Penal Code section 954) limit the impact of the absence of cross-admissibility as a factor precluding joinder, other factors set forth in California case law remain relevant to the trial court's exercise of discretion as to whether it would be in the interest of justice to order separate trials. However, there was no abuse of discretion in ordering the instant joinder. Both cases were drive-by shootings with gang implications. That the evidence in the cases was not cross-admissible did not preclude joinder. The cases appeared to be of relatively equal strength as eyewitnesses identified defendants in both cases. The benefit in trying the cases together outweighed any prejudice to defendant and did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant.id: 11964
Cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials.The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's finding that evidence of the joined charges would have been admissible in separate trials, and on that basis found potential prejudice in failing to sever the counts. However, the Supreme Court held that cross-admissibility is only one of the factors to be considered in determining whether potential prejudice requires severance, and the defendant failed to carry his burden of showing potential prejudice where evidence of the two offenses was of relatively equal strength.id: 11965
Denial of severance was not improper notwithstanding evidence of codefendant's association with a prison gang.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. He stated that evidence of codefendant's association with the Aryan Brotherhood <197> a prison gang <197> would be prejudicial to him. However, the theory that the jury would be convinced of defendant's guilt because of tangential evidence that his codefendant was associated with the Aryan Brotherhood is untenable.id: 11966
Failure to sever defendant's trial from codefendant's based on conflicting and antagonistic defenses was not erroneous.Defendant argued he was entitled to a separate trial because he and codefendant had conflicting and antagonistic defenses. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the codefendant presented no evidence which implicated defendant in any way. Even if the court erred in denying severance the error was harmless where it was not reasonably probable defendant would not have received a favorable verdict at a separate trial.id: 11968
Given the cross-admissibility of the evidence the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon from the armed robbery charge.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon from the armed robbery charge. However, in light of the cross-admissibility of the evidence about whether a gun was used and by whom in the robbery charge, the personal gun-use enhancement and the charge of ex-felon in possession of a gun, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling.id: 11969
Joinder of counts was not prejudicial where a single conspiracy linked all of the charged offenses.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his pretrial motion to sever the conspiracy and Barnes murder counts from the Hickey murder and burglary charges. The offenses charged satisfied the joinder requirements, bur defendant argued joinder would be prejudicial. However, the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that a single conspiracy linked all the charged offenses. The evidence was therefore cross-admissible and joinder did not prejudice defendant.id: 11970
No exceptional circumstances warranted severance of trials after codefendant's statement was redacted to omit any reference implicating defendant.Defendant and codefendant moved to sever their trials; codefendant on the basis that he, unlike defendant, did not face the death penalty and defendant on the basis that the dismissal of the special circumstance against codefendant would be prejudicial to him. Since defendant did not join in the codefendant's motion, he could not argue error in the denial of that motion. As to the denial of his own motion, there were no exceptional circumstances warranting severance after the codefendant's statement to police was redacted to omit any direct or indirect reference implicating defendant.id: 11971
Propriety of a ruling on a motion to sever counts is judged by information available to the court at the time the motion is heard.The trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to sever the murder count from the robbery counts. The court ruled the evidence of the robberies would be admissible on trial of the murder charge to establish the motive for the killing. Defendant argued the court erred because some of the robbery victims did not identify him at trial. However, the propriety of a ruling on a motion to sever counts is judged by the information available to the court at the time the motion is heard. At that time it appeared that the evidence he participated in the charged robberies was quite strong since it would be introduced through accomplice testimony.id: 11972
Rape is of the same class as robbery and murder and the offenses were properly joined.For purposes of a motion to sever counts, rape is an assaultive crime against the person and as such, is of the same class of offenses as robbery and murder. Moreover, the instant rape was connected in its commission with the vehicle theft where the two crimes occurred very close in time and place. Finally, contrary to defendant's claim the evidence was not relatively weak as to the rape and strong as to the robbery and murder, nor was the rape inflammatory as to the robbery and murder.id: 11973
Severance motion based on claimed Bruton/Aranda problem was properly denied where the court redacted the reference to defendant in codefendant's statement and replaced it with a neutral term that did not implicate defendant.Defendant moved to sever his trial from that of codefendant based upon codefendant's statement to the police that implicated defendant. The trial court denied the motion but redacted the statement to delete reference to defendant's name. The statement was admitted noting that codefendant told two guys to go out and kill the victim. Contrary to defendant's claim, the use of the neutral term ("two guys") did not incriminate him directly or indirectly as there were a number of other people who had contact with codefendant so the statement could not have been directed at defendant. However, an incriminating link was provided by witnesses placing defendant with or near codefendant at the time of the crime. Any error was harmless given the ample eye witness testimony positively identifying defendant and the substantial evidence supporting the first degree murder finding.id: 11974
Severance was not required where defendant wished to call a codefendant to testify on his behalf and impeach her if she failed to exonerate him.Defendant's request for a separate trial was made solely to permit him to call one of his codefendants to testify on his behalf and if she failed to exonerate him, to impeach her by use of the tape recording. Denial of the severance motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion where use of the tape was wholly speculative and absent a showing that the separate trial would have been less prejudicial than the joint trial.id: 11975
The fact of conflicting defenses without more, did not mandate separate trials.Defendants were charged with murder following a drive-by shooting at a nightclub. No one saw which of the two did the shooting and each blamed the other. Defendant argued the trial court should have severed the trials as the inconsistent defenses mandated separate trials. However, the fact of conflicting defenses, without more, does not require separate trials.id: 11976
Trial court had no sua sponte duty to sever charges or furnish a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes.The trial court had no sua sponte obligation to sever his trial on one count of murder from the other charges. Moreover, counsel was not ineffective in failing to move for severance as it was not reasonably probable the motion would be granted because much of the incriminating evidence from the other counts would have been admissible in a separate trial on the murder count to prove the identity of the murderer. Finally, the court did not err in failing to furnish a limiting instruction sua sponte on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes.id: 11977
Use of two juries instead of separate trials did not prejudice defendant despite the antagonistic defenses where it was not a case in which only one defendant could be guilty.Before trial both defendants moved to sever the trial. Instead the trial court ordered the use of two juries. Defendant argued that given the inconsistent defenses the trial court erred in refusing to sever the trials. However, this was not a case in which only one defendant could be found guilty, and it was undisputed that each defendant was involved in the incident. Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's decision to use two juries rather than sever the trial.id: 11978
Other crimes evidence was admissible to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator where all the victims were gay and the attacks occurred outside of gay bars.The court did not err in denying defendant's severance motion where the evidence of the murder charges would have been admissible at a trial on the attempted murder charges. Defendant's identity was in issue and the crimes shared many common marks including the victim's homosexuality and the fact that the victims were attacked shortly after leaving gay bars.id: 11979
Chiropractor was not prejudiced by a joint trial with defendants who staged the automobile accidents.Defendant chiropractor was charged with multiple counts of insurance fraud for his part in treating people who had staged multiple auto accidents. He argued he was prejudiced by a joint trial with those involved with the accident and defense counsel should have moved for severance. He claimed that because he was not charged with participating in the staging of the accidents and because there was no evidence the passengers in the cars were not injured, he was unduly prejudiced by the joint trial. However, the evidence of codefendants' acts would have been admissible against defendant in a separate trial and a severance motion would likely have been denied.id: 11958
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to sever counts where crimes were all of same class - murder - and evidence was cross-admissible.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever two murder counts from a third count. Both incidents involved the same class of crimes - murder. Since the requirements for joinder were met error can be predicated only on a showing of prejudice. Since evidence supported the court's finding the evidence in the two sets of crimes was cross-admissible, severance was not required. An exception might apply if joinder was grossly unfair. However, there was no such unfairness and if one of the murders was inflammatory, they all were.id: 11959
Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering dual juries rather than complete severance of defendants where defenses were inconsistent and attempts would be made to shift responsibility.The trial court ordered that each defendant be tried by a separate jury instead of ordering a complete severance of defendants. Only the inconsistent defenses and the anticipated introduction of extrajudicial statements in which defendants implicated each other suggested that severance might be necessary. The court elected the dual jury procedure in recognition that some of the evidence would not be admissible against the nonspeaking defendant. The inconsistent defenses and attempts to shift the blame did not mandate complete severance. Defendant argued that dual jury procedure was improper as it would cause each jury to convict for fear the other would acquit thereby ensuring someone would be punished. However, there was no abuse of discretion in denying complete severance and no prejudice as a result of the dual jury procedure.id: 11960
Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever defendant's penalty trial from his codefendant's.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever his penalty trial from that of his codefendant. According to defendant, the lack of cross-admissible evidence mandated a severed trial, given the heightened scrutiny accorded severance motions in capital cases. However, the verdict showed the jury carefully weighed the culpability of each defendant and found defendant more blameworthy, but took care to discriminate among the charges on which he had been convicted deciding that he should be executed for one murder but should receive life without possibility of parole for the other murder.id: 11961
Court did not err in denying motion to sever Taco Bell crimes where robbery victim was shot and killed from the other crimes where defendant shot at but did not kill the robbery victim.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the Taco Bell crimes from the others. However, neither incident was more inflammatory than the other as both cases involved a robbery where the victim was shot. Moreover, neither case was so weak in evidentiary support that the aggregate evidence was likely to have affected the jury's verdict. Finally, although the Taco Bell case was charged as a special circumstance murder for which the prosecution sought the death penalty, this was not a case in which the joinder itself gave rise to the special circumstance allegation. Defendant failed to demonstrate undue prejudice resulting from the joinder of the charges.id: 11962
Court did not error in concluding that the pretrial severance ruling did not determine the admissibility of evidence of the other offenses at the capital trial.The court granted a pretrial motion to sever the charges of crimes committed against victim Cross. Defendant argued that the pretrial ruling granting the severance conclusively determined that evidence of the Cross offenses was inadmissible in the trial of the capital charges. However, pretrial rulings on the admissibility of evidence are generally not binding on a trial court. Moreover, when it granted the severance motions, the court expressly stated that it was not determining the admissibility of the evidence at the capital trial.id: 11963
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245