Stipulations
Category > Stipulations
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires the enforcement of the stipulation by the parties that defendant’s SVP commitment would be for two years. The Court of Appeal erred by modifying the term of defendant’s SVP commitment from two years - the term agreed to by the district attorney, the public defender and the presiding judge, pursuant to a signed stipulation - to an indeterminate term, as provided by Prop 83's amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6604. The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies to enforce the stipulation by the parties to the two year term.id: 21576
Court erred in accepting a stipulation to a misdemeanor count during trial without providing Boykin/Tahl advisements.Defendant was charged with child endangerment, possessing methamphetamine for sale, and being under the influence. Before testimony began, defendant stipulated that he was under the influence of a controlled substance "in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550(a)." The stipulation included all elements and facts necessary for a conviction and therefore triggered a duty to provide the Boykin/Tahl advisements. The failure to properly advise defendant was not harmless where the record did not show the stipulation was knowing and voluntary.id: 17742
Supreme Court says government may not prove prior felony when defendant offers to stipulate.In U.S. v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1993) the Ninth Circuit held that the government had the right to refuse an offer to stipulate to the prior conviction in a felon in possession of a firearm case under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g). Relying on that rule, the district court in the present case allowed the government to show the name and nature of the prior felony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, in a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Souter. The majority rejected the argument that government was entitled to prove all of the elements of the crime. The majority recognized that a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. But the majority nonetheless held that Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. requires the district court to balance the probative value of this evidence against its prejudicial effect. Because the purpose of the evidence in the present case was solely to prove the element of prior conviction, the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the offer to stipulate. Justice O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas dissented.id: 10673
A defendant charged with petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction may stipulate to a prior felony conviction allegation.A defendant charged under Penal Code section 666 (petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction) may stipulate to a prior felony conviction allegation and thus preclude the jury from learning of that conviction. The prior conviction requirement of section 666 is a sentencing matter for the court and not an element of a section 666 offense that must be determined by a jury.id: 11582
Defendant was essentially coerced into entering into a disadvantageous stipulation by an erroneous evidentiary ruling that would have allowed testimony regarding the victim's nonviolent character.The prosecutor proposed to call the victim's mother to testify as to her son's nonviolent and religious nature. The trial court ruled the evidence would be admissible, so the defense offered to stipulate to certain facts in this regard. However, because defendant did not offer any evidence that the victim acted aggressively, the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 1103 in ruling the prosecutor could present evidence of his peaceful and nonviolent nature. This ruling essentially coerced the disadvantageous stipulation by defendant. However, the error was harmless where it was not reasonably probable that defendant would have achieved a better result had the evidence been excluded.id: 16937
Despite an express advisal of defendant’ trial rights, the record shows the stipulation was voluntary and intelligent.Defendant argued that his driving with a suspended license had to be reversed because the stipulation that he entered into, which admitted the elements of the offense was invalid because he was not advised of, and did not waive, his trial rights before entering into the stipulation. However, a review of the entire record not just a record of the stipulation colloquy, shows the stipulation was voluntary and intelligent.id: 24383
The prosecution was not required to accept a guilty plea on a charged offense or a stipulation that defendant obtained the murder weapon in another robbery.Evidence of the Riteway robbery was admissible on the issues of intent and identity on the liquor store shooting charges. The prosecutor was not required to accept the guilty plea to the robbery charge and stipulation that he obtained the gun used in the shooting during the robbery. The prosecution cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation or a plea offer.id: 23596
A stipulation without reference to a document describing the facts may establish a factual basis for a plea, and the issue is cognizable on appeal despite the stipulation.Where defendant acknowledged in the plea colloquy that he had discussed the elements of the crime and any defenses with his counsel and was satisfied with her advice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a factual basis for defendant’s no contest plea based on counsel’s stipulation. The claim was cognizable on appeal despite defense counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis. id: 23402
A stipulation to a prior conviction for domestic violence for purposes of Penal Code section 273.5 does not require the court to engage in the advisement and waiver process.The stipulation to the existence of a prior domestic violence conviction was not tantamount to admitting all elements of an enhancement. Rather, the existence of the prior (for purposes of the domestic violence with a prior provision) was a sentencing factor authorizing the trial court to impose a more severe alternative sentencing scheme. As a result, the court was not required to advise defendant of his fundamental trial rights and solicit waivers of them before giving effect to the stipulation. id: 23212
The prosecutor was not required to stipulate to facts to which the victim’s wife might emotionally testify at the guilt phase. Defendant offered to stipulate to any facts to which the victim’s wife might testify because the witness had been extremely emotional at the preliminary hearing. Defendant argues that allowing such emotional testimony would be akin to allowing victim – impact evidence at the guilt phase. However, the prosecution is not required to accept such a stipulation. Moreover, the testimony did not deal with the effect of the loss to defendant’s family members, but addressed the circumstances under which the victim disappeared.id: 20529
The prosecutor was not required to accept defendant's offer to stipulate that he had suffered a conviction that subjected him to the section 290 requirements.Defendant was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. He sought to exclude evidence of the nature of his prior conviction by offering to stipulate that he had a conviction which subjected him to the registration requirement. He argued his status as a sex offender was thereafter irrelevant. However, the prosecutor was not required to accept the stipulation. While the jury need not be informed of defendant's specific sex offense conviction, it was entitled to know defendant's duty to register derived from his status as a sex offender.id: 18455
The trial court did not err in failing to force the prosecutor to stipulate to the fact that defendant's felony status was a product of a receiving stolen property conviction.Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argued the court erred in failing to force the prosecutor to accept his stipulation that defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property, thereby obviating the need for proof of the prior felony element of the charged offense. Defendant had refused to stipulate generally to his client's felon status out of concern the jury might assume the unspecified felony was more serious. However, the court did not err in failing to require the prosecutor to accept the proposed stipulation. Neither did not court err in refusing to limit the prosecutor's proof of defendant's felony status to the abstracts of judgment, and instead allowing introduction of defendant's mug shot, fingerprint card, and chronological history contained in his state prison file.id: 17982
Court had no sua sponte duty to instruct that the jurors not consider the priors, to which defendant stipulated, to show his criminal propensity.During trial, defendant and his codefendant stipulated that they had prior felony convictions for the purpose of establishing their ex-felon status as an element of the felon-in-possession charges. Contrary to defendant's claim, the court had no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction to ensure the jury did not consider his prior felony convictions as showing that he had a propensity to commit crimes.id: 17457
Failure to advise defendant of the consequences of stipulation to easily verifiable facts was harmless.Failure to advise defendant of the consequences of the stipulation concerning the victim's age and his own parolee status was harmless where these facts were easily verifiable.id: 11583
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245