Brady v. Maryland material
Category > Brady v. Maryland material
Updated 3/5/2024The prosecution committed Brady error by failing to inform the defense that the police report it referred to in discovery contained impeachment material regarding a key witness.The prosecutor committed a Brady violation by withholding impeachment information relating to a key prosecution witness. The prosecution had a police report that contained impeachment material regarding Jane Doe 2. They disclosed in discovery that they had the report but neglected to say that it contained information that could have impeached Jane Doe 2's account of the alleged molestation. While the police may have been prohibited by law from providing the report to the defense, they should have provided it to the juvenile court, and properly notified the defense of the potential impeachment value. The trial court erred in denying the new trial motion that was based on the Brady violation. id: 27042
Updated 2/3/2024Dismissal of charges not required for prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecution did not coerce testimony, but there were Brady and other errors requiring reversal of the charges.The prosecution violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by placing an undercover officer in his cell for questioning, and violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by ignoring his invocation of counsel during questioning. The prosecution also failed to inform the defendant that his codefendants had entered into a package deal plea bargain and would have to testify as to specific facts. The prosecution also failed to record interviews with the codefendants and provide defendant with material it intended to use during trial. Dismissal of the charges was not appropriate because the prosecution did not coerce testimony from the codefendants. However, the conviction was reversed so the court could assess the impact of the other errors. id: 27514
Updated 2/3/2024The Attorney General has a constitutional, ethical and procedural duty to disclose evidence in response to a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady claims. The Attorney General responding to a habeas corpus petition alleging a Brady v. Maryland violation must disclose Brady evidence when filing an informal return if the evidence is not subject to Brady, but is subject to rule 3.8 of professional Rules of Conduct, the Attorney General has an ethical duty of disclosure that exists at the time the petition is filed. Where the evidence is not subject to Brady or rule 3.8, the Attorney General has a duty to disclose the existence of the evidence under People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, that arises after the issuance of the order to show cause.id: 27708
The prosecution committed Brady error by failing to provide the defense with a video showing that defendant invoked his Miranda rights in a case where the detective testified that he waived his rights.The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for new trial after the prosecution failed to disclose a video recording of the defendant invoking his Miranda rights in a case where the arresting officer testified that defendant admitted threatening the victim with a gun.id: 25404
Defendant was not required to allege specific misconduct committed by the deputy in the case in order to trigger in camera review of the existing Pitchess/Brady material.Defendant charged with drug offenses moved for in camera review and pretrial disclosure of potential impeachment material the district attorney informed him was contained in the personnel file of the arresting deputy who was expected to testify at defendant’s trial. Nothing more was required to trigger the trial court’s in camera review, and defendant was not required to allege specific misconduct committed by the deputy in that case.id: 25408
Juvenile court must conduct an in camera review when a minor files a section 827 petition seeking review of a confidential file that may contain exculpatory Brady material.A minor facing delinquency proceedings requested that the juvenile court conduct an in camera review of a prosecution witness’s file for Brady v. Maryland exculpatory or impeachment evidence. The court refused to examine the file, ruling the Brady review should be conducted by the prosecutor, not the court. However, when a minor files a Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 petition requesting the court review a confidential juvenile file and provides a reasonable basis to support a claim that the file contains Brady material, the juvenile court must conduct an in camera review.id: 23492
The prosecutor’s Brady obligation applies at preliminary hearings. The prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, applies to preliminary hearings. Neither Proposition 15 (passed in 1990) nor the cases that have construed it support a contrary position.id: 23112
Failure to provide photos of the victim’s truck before the preliminary hearing did not violate Brady where the evidence was not favorable to the defense. Defendant has a due process right to disclosure before the preliminary hearing of evidence that is both favorable and material, in that its disclosure creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome at the preliminary hearing. However, there was no Brady violation where the photographs of the victim’s truck were not favorable to the defense or material to the probable cause determination.id: 23131
The prosecutor committed reversible Brady error by failing to disclose mitigating evidence (threats to defendant) at the penalty phase.Evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing showed that the prosecutor committed Brady v. Maryland error at defendant’s 1987 capital trial. The prosecutor failed to disclose mitigating evidence at the penalty phase - specifically, evidence that defendant committed the charged murders because he and his family had been threatened and ordered to do so by members of a Columbian drug cartel. The error required reversal of the death judgment.id: 22871
If the prosecution introduces excerpts of a diary into evidence, the defense is entitled to examine the entire diary, subject to appropriate protective orders.The prosecution introduced into evidence the portion of the victim’s diary where she disclosed the molestation. Although a diary may be afforded privacy protection, the prosecution’s use of any portion of the diary reflects a waiver of that privacy interest sufficient to permit review by the defense. The defense had the right to inspect the entire diary subject to appropriate protective orders, and to present argument to the trial court on the issue of relevancy.id: 21446
Defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding, made a sufficient showing under Brady to require an inspection of a detective’s personnel file to look for incidents where payments to informants were not disclosed.The trial court denied defendant’s request for discovery of information in preparation for an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding. However, defendant made a sufficient showing under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, to require the court to examine a detective’s personnel file and disclose any materials relating to the detective’s previous failure to report payments or other incentives given to informants, to his supervisors, the prosecution or the defense.id: 21394
Dismissal was not required by the prosecutor's intentional Brady violation after the conviction was vacated following federal habeas corpus proceedings.Defendant sought to prevent a retrial after his federal habeas petition succeeded in vacating his conviction. He argued that because of the prosecutor's intentional Brady violation, retrial was barred by the double jeopardy provision as well as due process. However, a retrial is not prohibited where the prosecutorial misconduct was intended to secure a conviction (rather than prevent an acquittal). Moreover, due process did not require a dismissal at this stage of the proceedings.id: 18283
The prosecution committed prejudicial Brady error by suppressing a videotape of the victim’s medical exam -- the SART video.Defendant was convicted of several sex crimes committed against his granddaughter. The prosecution’s nondisclosure of a videotape of a SART exam constituted prejudicial Brady error. The video was favorable to the defense. The Sexual Assault Response Team at the hospital was part of the prosecution team. Moreover, the video was material under Brady where the prosecution’s nonmedical evidence was weak, and it was unfair to defendant to require him to respond to the state’s medical evidence with limited and inferior photos when the SART video was available. id: 20389
The prosecution committed prejudicial Brady error at the penalty phase by not disclosing evidence that would have substantially impeached the primary witness.At the penalty phase of defendant’s capital case, the prosecution introduced evidence of another murder (of victim Hosey) defendant committed two weeks before the capital crime. The evidence was presented through the testimony of Joe Saucedo, who was also involved in the killing but received a reduced charge and a grant of probation in exchange for his testimony. However, at the time of defendant’s capital trial, the prosecution possessed a letter from Saucedo that he had killed Hosey, and other evidence supporting that point. The failure to provide this impeachment evidence to the defense constituted a violation of the prosecution’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. Defendant’s death sentence was vacated.id: 20304
Prosecution's failure to provide defense discovery of recorded statements that would have impeached key witnesses required reversal of judgment twenty years after the conviction and defendant's death did not render the proceedings moot in light of the circumstances. More than 20 years ago, defendant was convicted of special
circumstance murder and received a sentence of life in prison without parole. However, it was determined years later that the prosecution failed to provide the defense at trial with several tape-recorded statements by key witnesses. The statements did not establish defendant's innocence but would have damaged the credibility of the state's key witnesses. There was therefore a
reasonable probability of a better result had the prosecution complied with its discovery obligations and the habeas corpus petition was granted. Moreover, the death of the defendant
pending the proceedings did not render the action moot in light of the extraordinary circumstances.id: 19418
The prosecutor committed prejudicial Brady error by failing to disclose police reports showing his key witness was involved in a shooting before trial. The prosecutor failed to provide defense counsel with police reports containing information about the involvement of the sole eyewitness in a shooting before trial. There was a reasonable probability that the present result would have been different had the prosecutor not withheld the reports. The Brady error required reversal of the murder conviction.id: 19264
Trial court abused its discretion in failing to find materiality and good cause under the hybrid Pitchess/Brady motion where counsel alleged on "information and belief" that the witness had previously fabricated facts as a police officer.Defendant was accused of aggravated assault using his car. His defense was that he was not present, but the prosecution intended to present the testimony of a former Calexico City Police Officer who claimed defendant admitted to being there. The defense filed a hybrid Pitchess/Brady motion seeking evidence of the witness' previous misconduct and material fabrications while on the Calexico Police Department. The request was based on counsel's "information and belief" following information he received from the witness's prior colleagues on the police department. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion without conducting an in camera hearing to examine the "counseling memos" which would have discredited the witness. The declaration based on counsel's information and belief met the good cause showing under the Pitchess and Brady materiality standards.id: 17574
The prosecutor should have informed the defendants that a potential witness denied her earlier statements.The prosecutor asked the defendant about a certain event which had been described to an investigator by a third party. The third party later denied having made the statement. She was never called as a witness. The prosecutor erred in failing to inform the defendants that the third party denied her earlier statement. The error was harmless and if the denial had been introduced it would only have served to remind the jury of damaging evidence.id: 11888
Statement of an alleged eyewitness to the shooting who knew defendant and Tolbert and who identified Tolbert as the shooter triggered the prosecution's duty to disclose.Defendant was accused of shooting the victim. The defense theory was that Tolbert, not defendant, was the shooter. During deliberations, a person contacted the authorities and stated that he witnessed Tolbert shoot the victim. He explained that he had not come forward earlier because he feared retaliation from Tolbert. The statement was disclosed to the defense two weeks after the guilty verdict. The People had a duty to disclose the statement notwithstanding that its reliability had not been investigated. The evidence was reasonably favorable to the accused and this triggered the duty to disclose. Moreover, the statement was material evidence as there was a reasonable probability that if disclosed, it would have affected the verdict.id: 11883
Drunk driving conviction was reversed where the D.A. and A.G. failed to disclose information that came to them after trial regarding the improper calculating methods used by the accident reconstruction expert.Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury. He was sentenced to three years in state prison but the sentence was subsequently reversed pursuant to a stipulation of counsel. Following the conviction it was brought to the District Attorney's and Attorney General's attention that the accident reconstruction expert used in the case to calculate defendant's driving speed was no longer being used because of faulty calculations in other cases. This knowledge regarding the credibility of the expert witness constituted exculpatory evidence. The failure by the two prosecuting agencies to disclose problems known about the expert witness to the defense at the time the stipulated partial reversal was being negotiated was a violation of due process. Moreover, the error was prejudicial where the prosecution's main theory was that defendant was driving at an unsafe speed.id: 11857
Prosecutor withheld Brady material where he did not disclose the existence of witnesses interviewed by the arson investigator.Witnesses were interviewed by the arson investigator following the crime. During the trial testimony of one witness a reference was made to an interview summary which had never been furnished to the defense. The investigator had also interviewed another witness who could not be located at the time of trial and the defense had no knowledge of this. Withholding of the exculpatory evidence required a reversal of the conviction where there was a distinct possibility that had the absent witness been called to testify he would have stated that someone other than defendant caused the fire.id: 11879
Supreme Court orders habeas relief for failure to disclose Brady material at state capital trial.Writing for a five justice majority, Justice Souter ruled that the government withheld material trial evidence in violation of <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) at petitioner's state capital trial. The evidence withheld included: (1) contemporaneous, impeaching, eyewitness statements; (2) statements by a suspicious, non-testifying, informant; and (3) a printout of license numbers of cars parked at the crime scene which did not list the license number of petitioner's car. Since disclosure of this suppressed evidence would have made a different result reasonably probable, federal habeas relief was required. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, filing a separate concurring opinion. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.id: 11885
Capital conviction which had been affirmed on appeal was vacated where results of investigation in habeas corpus proceeding showed prosecutor committed Brady error in failing to describe tests showing defendant had PCP in his blood sample.Defendant asserted a diminished capacity defense at his capital trial claiming he had been under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the killing. The prosecutor committed <i>Brady v. Maryland</i> error in failing to disclose to the defense the result of a radioactive immunoassay (RIA) of his blood sample was positive for PCP. The negative results introduced at trial were based on a different test. The factual conflicts resolved in the habeas proceeding showed that while crime lab officials claimed the blood test results were sent to defense lawyers, the evidence showed they were never received. Moreover, the prosecution did not fulfill its obligation to check the lab files for exculpatory evidence which must be disclosed to the defense. The judgment of conviction which had been affirmed on appeal was vacated.id: 15795
Evidence supported trial court's findings that the prosecution suppressed favorable impeachment evidence regarding the state's key witness, and the writ petition was properly granted.Following an evidentiary hearing the trial court granted the writ of habeas corpus. The court found pursuant to <i>Brady v. Maryland</i> (1963) 373 US 83, defendant had been deprived of evidence at his 1972 murder trial that would have substantially undermined the credibility of a key prosecution witness, Julius Butler. The trial court's findings were supported legally and factually. Butler had an extensive history as an LAPD informant for which he received favorable treatment on pending cases. This information was not fully disclosed to the defense. Finally, the evidence was material. Without Julius Butler, the state's case was questionable. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was properly granted.id: 15797
Prosecution committed Brady error by failing to disclose impeachment evidence in the form of expunged felony convictions.Defendant was employed to perform general office work in a law office. He was convicted of embezzlement. The office manager, Esquivel, was a key prosecution witness. However, the prosecution failed to disclose that Esquivel had a criminal history including three felony convictions - subsequently expunged- and a pending charge of spousal abuse. The failure to disclose the impeachment evidence was a violation of the discovery laws as well as Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The conviction was reversed where it was reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable verdict had the evidence been divulged and admitted.id: 17066
Updated 2/23/2024The federal government’s failure to produce evidence in the possession of the DEA did not violate due process and the trial court erred in dismissing the charges.Defendants were charged with multiple felonies, including robbery, that arose from an aborted drug deal. The trial court dismissed the charges because the federal government refused defendant’s request to produce potentially exculpatory evidence in the possession of the DEA informant. The government’s refusal to produce the evidence did not violate due process. The DEA was not part of the prosecution’s team for Brady v. Maryland purposes. The absence of the evidence did not prevent the defendants from asserting their primary claim that the alleged victim was not credible. The government’s actions likewise did not violate the defendant’s rights of confrontation and compulsory process. Finally, the defendants failed to show the evidence in the DEA’s possession was material.id: 26890
Updated 2/22/2024The prosecution did not suppress evidence for Brady purposes where it offered to provide photos to defense counsel who declined to review them. Defendant argued the prosecution committed a Brady violation by failing to provide the defense with certain photos before trial. However, the prosecution had offered the photos to defense counsel who declined to review them. Assuming the prosecution had a duty to produce the photos despite counsel’s disinterest, the photos in question were not material as they involved a minor issue regarding the earlier sequencing of photo shoots that was not central to the prosecution’s case.id: 27070
The prosecution did not commit Brady error by failing to provide the defense with a police report showing that one of the responding officers had responded to a different incident where defendant was also present.Defendant argued the prosecution committed a Brady v. Maryland violation by failing to disclose a purportedly exculpatory police report to the defense before trial. The report detailed a shooting incident that occurred weeks before the charged incident. The court questioned whether it was favorable since it was collateral and didn’t really show a bias on the officer’s part. Moreover, defendant failed to show materiality as evidence that a deputy in the second police car to arrive on the scene previously investigated another incident where defendant was present did not amount to evidence of police bias.id: 26081
The prosecution was not required to provide discovery regarding the STRmix DNA program that was in the possession of a third party who was not a member of the prosecution team.The San Diego Police Department Crime Lab tested swabs from bloody gloves using the STRmix program that it purchased from a distributor of a research institute owned by the government of New Zealand and a private company - ESR. The trial court granted the defense request to provide discovery regarding the STRmix program. However, ESR, which possesses the requested source codes and other information, is not a member of the prosecution’s team, and the prosecution was not required to produce the material in its possession.id: 25926
Delayed disclosure of police reports did not violate Brady or discovery rules where there was no prejudice to the defense, and the court did not err by finding it to be negligent and instructing the jurors it was caused by the police.Delayed disclosure of reports in the detective’s trial notebook did not constitute Brady error where the delay didn’t result in prejudice to the defense. The court allowed a five-day recess to allow investigation, and the defense could not show how their choices would have been different had the discovery been made available earlier. For that reason there was also no statutory violation. Moreover, the trial court did not err when instructing on the late disclosure that the police and not the prosecution was at fault. Finally, the court did not err by prohibiting the defense from later arguing that the delayed disclosure was intentional where the evidence supported the court’s finding that the delay was a product of police negligence.id: 25772
There was no Brady error by failing to disclose the prior convictions of a witness who was not central to the prosecution’s case.Defendants argued the prosecutor committed Brady error by failing to disclose several prior convictions suffered by the victim’s mother who testified for the prosecution. However, the evidence was not material because Patricia was not a key witness and her prior conduct had little probative value.id: 25394
Victim’s law firm is not part of the prosecution’s team for Brady purposes.The law firm representing the victim of the defendant’s alleged financial crimes is not part of the prosecution’s team for purposes of the duty under Brady v. Maryland to disclose any material, exculpatory evidence in its possession.id: 25263
The failure to provide the specifics of the prosecution’s deal with a witness did not amount to a Brady violation where the jurors learned the witness was testifying in exchange for his safety.Defendant was a San Quentin inmate accused of the murder of a guard. Evans was an inmate who testified against defendant. Defendant argued the prosecutor failed to disclose benefits Evans received in exchange for his testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A parole agent had agreed to help keep Evans safe by keeping him out of the prison if he testified. There was also an agreement that if Evans pled guilty to a pending offense he would receive no more than 16 months. Evans sentencing was postponed twice until after he testified. The jury never heard about his early release. Nevertheless, the failure to provide the defense with specifics did not violate Brady because the evidence was not material. The jury did learn generally that Evans was testifying in exchange for safety.id: 24557
The prosecution did not commit Brady error by failing to disclose that the arresting officer was a drug addict who committed burglaries to support his habit. Defendant argued the prosecution committed Brady error by withholding evidence favorable to his defense and material to his innocence because it showed the arresting police officer was addicted to a heavy opiate and supported his habit through burglaries, using his police officer status to gain access. While the prosecution may not have satisfied its discovery obligations, there was no Brady error because it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have acquitted defendant if it had been presented with the evidence regarding the officer.id: 24280
A prosecutor who is informed by police that peace officer records may contain exculpatory evidence meets the Brady obligation by delivering that information to the defense.The police department notified the district attorney that it had confidential records of two police officers who were potential witnesses that might contain exculpatory information. In that case, the prosecution may not simply examine the records to determine whether there is exculpatory evidence, but must follow the procedures established for Pitchess motions. Moreover, the prosecution fulfills its Brady obligation if it informs the defense that the specified records might contain exculpatory information.id: 24176
The trial court did not err by refusing to order the prosecution to run the rap sheet of a police officer witness.The prosecutor has a duty under Brady v. Maryland to learn of and disclose material impeachment information about police officer witnesses within the prosecution’s constructive possession, but the prosecution cannot be forced to comply with its Brady duty to investigate in a particular manner. The trial court did not err by refusing to order the prosecution to run an officer’s rap sheet pursuant to Brady. And the court didn’t err by denying the Pitchess motion seeking the officer’s rap sheet and birth date where the rap sheet was not in the officer’s personnel file. Neither was the prosecution required to run the rap sheet under the general discovery provisions.id: 23853
Prosecutors seeking to comply with Brady obligation may have direct access to peace officer personnel files.In fulfilling its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, the prosecution is entitled to direct access to peace officer personnel files. Penal Code section 832.7 does not bar direct prosecutorial access to the files.id: 23718
The trial court’s refusal to compel the prosecution to run rap sheets of the officer witnesses did not violate due process.The prosecution cannot be forced to comply with its Brady v. Maryland duty to investigate in a particular manner. The trial court’s refusal to compel the prosecution to run rap sheets of the officer witnesses did not violate due process.id: 23610
The prosecutor did not commit Brady error by failing to inform the capital defendant that the victim’s family did not want a death sentence imposed. Defendant argued the prosecutor committed Brady v. Maryland error at the penalty phase by not providing him with information that the victim’s family opposed the death penalty in his case. However, the evidence was not material for Brady purposes because a crime-victim’s views on punishment are not relevant to any disputed issue at the penalty phase. id: 23646
The witness’s misdemeanor welfare fraud conviction was not material for Brady purposes.The prosecutor erred by failing to disclose that a witness had a prior misdemeanor welfare fraud conviction, but the error did not amount to a Brady v. Maryland violation because the information was not material even though favorable to defendant. id: 22430
There was no prejudicial Brady error where the prosecutor in the capital case failed to reveal that a witness had pending criminal matters. The prosecutor was obligated to disclose to the defense information that a witness was facing pending criminal matters some of which were being prosecuted by his office. However, the evidence was not material as the information would not have significantly undermined her credibility. None of the charges were serious and it is unlikely that the witness would perjure herself in a capital trial to obtain a minor benefit in her own pending matters.id: 21758
Supreme Court finds no constitutional right to post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing.At defendant’s 1993 trial for rape and other offenses, the State introduced the results of DQ Alpha DNA testing of semen found at the rape scene. The DNA showed that a person with a genotype shared by 16 percent of African-American males, including defendant, had committed the crime. Years later, defendant filed a lawsuit under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking access to the evidence so that he could have it subjected to a form of DNA testing that was not available during his trial and that yields extremely precise results. Without deciding whether §1983 was a proper vehicle to seek access to the evidence, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, held that defendant had no procedural or substantive due process right to obtain post-conviction access to the evidence to subject it to DNA testing. The Court explained that Brady was inapplicable to defendant’s post-conviction claim and that the proper inquiry was whether the State’s rejection of defendant’s request for the evidence offended some fundamental principle of justice or denied defendant fundamental fairness. Here, the Court found, the state’s post-conviction relief procedures were adequate to allow defendant to litigate his request to have the evidence. Justices Stevens and Souter wrote dissenting opinions.id: 21424
The sheriff’s department’s act of releasing the subpoenaed witness to immigration authorities for deportation did not constitute a compulsory process clause violation because there was no state action absent knowledge that he was a material witness.A defense witness, incarcerated in county jail, was served with a subpoena requiring his presence at trial. The prosecution did not know the witness had been subpoenaed and the sheriff’s office did not know he was a “material” witness. The witness was immediately deported after serving his sentence. The trial court erred in dismissing the case because the sheriff’s department’s act of releasing the witness to federal authorities did not constitute state action necessary to support a violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence.id: 20305
Wende review is not required in an appeal from the denial of outpatient status pursuant to a petition for restoration of competency. Anders/Wende review is not required in an appeal from the denial of outpatient status pursuant to a petition for restoration of competency (Penal Code section 1026.2) if appointed appellate counsel represents he or she has found no arguable issue.id: 20303
Supreme Court sends case back to State court for Brady determination.After defendant was convicted of abducting three women and sexually assaulting one of them, he obtained a note in which the alleged victims mocked defendant for having been "played" for a fool and suggested that no sexual assault occurred. Defendant alleged that the note had been shown to a police officer investigating the alleged crimes, but that the officer declined to take possession of it and told the person who produced it to destroy it. The state courts denied defendant a new trial without discussing defendant's claim that the officer's refusal to take possession of the note and turn it over to defense counsel constituted a Brady violation. In light of the evidence that a Brady violation had occurred, the Supreme Court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded to the State courts for consideration of defendant's Brady claim.id: 20183
There was no Brady violation where a letter written to the jailer by defendant's sister was not provided to the defense.During trial, defense counsel learned of letters written by defendant's sister to a deputy sheriff asking to be notified if defendant was to be released and stating that he was a danger to the family. Defendant argued there was a Brady v. Maryland violation since he had not been provided this letter by the prosecutor. However, the sheriff's department was not involved in the prosecution and was not an agency subject to the duty of disclosure. Moreover, the letters did not contain anything that was remotely material or favorable to defendant.id: 19803
Defendant failed to show the late disclosure of a report impeaching the credibility of a witness against his codefendant prevented defendant from testifying.Defendant argued the Brady violation that led the court to grant his codefendant's motion for a new trial had a spillover effect as to him because the two codefendants had an understanding that
if one testified the other would also have to testify. Defendant was entitled to assert the Brady claim even though the evidence was not admissible against him, where they agreed on a both-or-neither approach to testifying. However, defendant showed only the possibility that he would have testified had the evidence been timely produced. Because the claim was based upon
speculation it failed to establish materiality for Brady purposes. Finally, the Brady violation was unintentional and therefore did not constitute reprehensible conduct for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.id: 19771
The trial court erred in dismissing charges as a result of a discovery violation that did not implicate the U.S. Constitution. The trial court dismissed numerous charges against the defendants based on its finding that the prosecutor had violated discovery statutes by failing to provide defendants with reports of various witness statements regarding defendants' supposed affiliation with the Taliban. Dismissal is a proper sanction only when there is a federal constitutional violation, and absent Brady v. Maryland error there is no federal
constitutional violation. There was no Brady violation here where the evidence not disclosed was not favorable to the defendants.id: 19655
Evidence that the forensic pathologist had changed his opinion and testimony in another case was not "material" for Brady purposes. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and assault on a child resulting in death. He argued the District Attorney's office withheld exculpatory information in the form of evidence to impeach the forensic pathologist who testified at his trial. The evidence consisted of changes of opinion and testimony by the witness in another case. However, while the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and may have been suppressed by the prosecutor, it was not "material" within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, since the witness's testimony was corroborated by other doctors, and defendant's version of the facts was inconsistent and contradicted by the evidence. It was not reasonably probable the result would have been different if the defense had been able to use the other case to impeach the witness.id: 18586
There was no Brady violation where the evidence the prosecutor failed to disclose regarding a key witness' claim regarding the conditions of his OR release on another case was favorable to the defense but not material.The prosecutor knew before trial, but did not disclose to the defense, that a key witness had told him (the trial prosecutor) that the witness had an OR release from another case because of his participation as a prime witness in this case. The prosecutor rejected the claim knowing he would have had to authorize such an arrangement and did not do so. The witness's OR arrangement was really a product of evidentiary problems in that case. The prosecutor did not reveal this fact to the defense until shortly before the hearing on the new trial motion. Defendant claimed the failure to disclose the information was a Brady violation. However, while the information was favorable to the defense in that it tended to impeach the witness, it was not material since it would have added little to the cumulative impact of the other impeachment evidence.id: 18562
Pitchess procedures do not run afoul of the principles expressed in Brady v. Maryland.Defendant argued the statutory Pitchess framework, as applied in criminal cases, conflicts with the principles expressed in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, in violation of his due process rights. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the Pitchess procedures do not impermissibly interfere with the prosecutor's duty to ascertain and disclose material, exculpatory evidence to the defense, and do not improperly place upon defendant the burden of establishing good cause for Brady disclosure.id: 17612
Prosecutor had no constitutional obligation to disclose complaints about police officer misconduct where the only evidence of such misconduct was defense testimony at an unrelated trial. Defendant argued the prosecution had a constitutional duty to discover and disclose to the defense two citizen complaints against a detective that could have been used to impeach his rebuttal testimony that defendant admitted gang membership before being booked. Both complaints consisted of defense testimony, given at other criminal trials, alleging the detective had fabricated evidence of cocaine possession. However, the prosecutor had no constitutional obligation to disclose complaints about police officer misconduct where the only evidence of such misconduct was defense testimony at an unrelated criminal trial.id: 17324
Defendant's threat against a witness was not favorable to him and the prosecutor had no duty to disclose it.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed a Brady violation at the penalty phase retrial by failing to notify the defense it intended to introduce evidence of defendant's threat against a prosecution witness. However, the threat was not favorable to the defendant so the prosecutor had no duty to disclose it.id: 17177
Trial court erred by ordering disclosure to the defense of a 10 year-old citizen complaint against one of the arresting officers.The arresting officer's veracity was called into question by a 1990 finding that he failed to report a fellow officer's use of mace, after denying the incident had occurred. Because the 10 year-old complaint was not material evidence under the Brady standard, and is not discoverable under California's Pitchess discovery scheme as it is more than 5 years old (Evidence Code section 1045, subd.(b)(1)), the trial court's order directing the police to disclose to the defense information about the macing incident was improper.id: 16997
The record did not support the claimed Brady violation in failing to disclose the practice of placing informants near high profile suspects in the hopes of securing incriminating statements.Defendant argued the prosecution violated his right to due process by failing to disclose information regarding an alleged informant system in the Los Angeles County jail that assertedly encouraged attorneys to seek or fabricate confessions from defendants in notorious cases such as his. However, the record did not demonstrate that detectives investigating the crime purposely placed inmate informants near defendant in an effort to secure incriminating statements. The Court refused to take judicial notice of a grand jury report on the topic and suggested the evidence would be more appropriately presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.id: 15804
Any discovery violation in failing to reveal information that a prosecution witness helped defendant commit the murder was harmless.Defendant moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence premised upon the statements of jailhouse informants that a key prosecution witness confessed that he participated in the killing along with defendant. Defendant argued the prosecutor erred in withholding this information. Contrary to defendant's claim, this was a discovery rather than a due process violation. The error did not undermine confidence in the result of the case where the state's witness' credibility would have been difficult to impeach and, at most, the jury would have heard evidence that the witness helped defendant carry out the murder.id: 15794
Supreme Court finds cause for failing to raise Brady claim, but no prejudice.Under <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecution must disclose all evidence favorable to an accused, even absent a request.<i> U.S. v. Agurs</i>, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, <i>U.S. v. Bagley</i>, 473 U.S. 667-, 676 (1985), and includes evidence "known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor." <i>Kyle v. Whitley</i>, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995). Here, the Supreme Court held that petitioner established cause for failing to raise a <i>Brady</i> claim earlier because (1) the prosecution withheld the exculpatory evidence; (2) petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution's open file policy; and (3) the Commonwealth asserted during state habeas proceedings that petitioner had received "everything known to the government." Nevertheless, petitioner failed to satisfy the "prejudice" or "materiality" prong because there was no reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different if the withheld materials had been disclosed. Justices Souter and Kennedy dissented on the prejudice issue.id: 15144
Trial court did not err in refusing to order discovery of the prosecution witness' correctional records where defendant received disclosure of the witness' felony record and inducements to testify.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request for discovery of Department of Corrections records pertaining to a prosecution witness. Defendant did receive full disclosure of the witness' felony record and inducements to testify. However, regarding the Department of Corrections file defendant failed to suggest how information containing the witness' mental state following his 1977 commitment to a state hospital for PCP use, might be relevant to his state of mind in 1982 when defendant allegedly confessed his crimes to the witness.id: 11893
Failure to disclose prosecutor's files regarding the credibility of a jailhouse informant was harmless in light of appellant's tape-recorded confession.Appellant argued that the prosecution suppressed material evidence relevant to the credibility of the jailhouse informant. However, in light of the strong prosecution case based on appellant's own tape-recorded confession, the cumulative nature of the informant's testimony and the thorough cross-examination as to the informant's character and motives, the failure to disclose district attorney files to the defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.id: 11859
Prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence did not necessitate a new preliminary hearing where the reviewing court weighed the incriminating evidence against the exculpatory effect of the denied evidence.Prior to defendant's preliminary hearing prosecutors failed to inform defense counsel that a witness to the robbery emphatically denied defendant was one of the two perpetrators. This constituted substantial material evidence on the issue of guilt and the failure to disclose the evidence constituted a violation of <i>Brady v. Maryland</i> (1963) 373 U.S. 83. Because the error was not visible within the four corners of the preliminary hearing transcript it could not be addressed by a Penal Code section 995 motion. Rather, the nonstatutory motion to dismiss was the appropriate vehicle to address the error. The nonstatutory motion to dismiss, unlike the 995 motion, requires a show of prejudice from the denial of a substantial right before a new preliminary hearing is warranted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the information where it was clear the lower court scrutinized each piece of incriminating evidence from the preliminary hearing and carefully weighed it against the exculpatory effect of the witness' refusal to identify defendant.id: 11624
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245