Trial Judge/generally
Category > Trial Judge/generally
The commissioner lacked the authority to revoke defendant’s parole absent a stipulation.Revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be performed by a commissioner absent a stipulation by the parties. Because defendant did not stipulate to the commissioner revoking his parole and committing him to jail, the judgment was reversed. id: 25960
The trial court committed harmless error by initiating contact with a juror who announced a scheduling conflict. The trial court had an improper ex parte communication with a juror when it initiated contact with a juror who had left a message about a scheduling conflict. However, the error was harmless.id: 22431
Juvenile court judge violated the minor's procedural due process rights by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status.A referee who takes on the role of both judge and advocate in a contested juvenile court proceeding, by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status, acts in violation of the minor's constitutional right to procedural due process.id: 18485
Absent a stipulation that the commissioner could serve as a temporary judge, the commissioner lacked the authority to rule on the contested issue of continuing the preliminary hearing.Absent a stipulation, which defendant refused, the commissioner had no authority to continue the preliminary hearing. While the commissioner could hear uncontested matters, the question as to whether the preliminary hearing should be continued was contested.id: 20737
Ordering defendant jailed without bail, and scheduling a hearing a month later for "contempt" of the court's assistant was a de facto revocation of probation without satisfying any of the due process requirements.Defendant appeared in court regarding a possible probation violation, and a judicial assistant angrily notified the judge that defendant refused to make the $1,000 donation to "Laura's House," a battered woman's shelter. The payment had been a condition of his probation. The trial court then ordered defendant to be taken into custody for lack of cooperation with the judicial assistant. However, placing defendant in jail, denying him bail, and scheduling a hearing a month later constituted a de facto revocation of his probation without satisfying any of the due process requirements demanded upon such revocation. Moreover, the trial court should not have personally selected the charity to which defendant was ordered to contribute. Because of the judge's personal embroilment in the case, defendant could request the case be transferred to another judge.id: 18393
The sentencing judge abused his discretion in refusing to continue sentencing for three days until the trial judge was available.Defendant did not have a right to be sentenced by the judge who presided over the trial. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge abused his discretion in refusing to continue the sentencing hearing for three days until the trial judge was available.id: 19914
Superior Court's policy statement which was contrary to the court's interpretation of the law regarding peremptory challenge of a judge, violated Government Code section 68070.In <i>Mackey v. Superior Court</i>, (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1124, the court held that the 10-day/5-day rule set forth in Penal Code section 170.6 subdivision (2) applied to criminal cases assigned from municipal court to a particular superior court department under a direct calendaring system. In response to <i>Mackey</i>, the Superior Court issued a policy statement which declared that in order to be timely, a challenge must be filed within 10 days of the defendant's first appearance in the direct calendar court. The policy statement was contrary to the court's interpretation of section 170.6 in <i>Mackey</i>, and therefore violated Government Code section 68070.id: 12160
Court's ex parte communication with the probation officer and county ranch superintendent regarding continued placement at the ranch required a remand.Appellant's CYA commitment was reversed because there were unrecorded ex parte communications between the juvenile court on one hand and the minor's probation officer and the county ranch superintendent on the other hand concerning the minor's continued placement at the ranch. The CYA commitment was fully supported and would have been proper even before the latest escape. However, without a record of the ex parte communications there was no way of knowing the precise grounds on which the CYA commitment was based.id: 12147
170.6 challenge to disqualify a judge was timely under the all purpose assignment rule or the 10-day/5-day rule where the assignment identified the judge who would preside over the case.The case was transferred from the criminal master calendar department to Department 104" Judge Trammell's department for trial setting". This was not an assignment of a trial-ready case to a trial-ready courtroom, and thus the master calendar rule (requiring disqualification motions no later than the time the case is assigned for trial by a master calendar) did not apply. Rather, it was more like an all purpose assignment because Judge Trammell was instantly identified as the judge who would process the complex litigation in its entirety from that point forward. If the all purpose assignment rule did not apply, however, then the 10-day/5-day rule would control. Since petitioner knew Judge Trammell presided over Department 104 this was an assignment to a judge known at least 10 days before the date set for trial. Petitioner exercised the challenge on the day of the assignment. There was no possibility the case would go to trial within five days of the challenge. Therefore, under either of the latter rules the challenge was timely.id: 12141
The trial court erred in relieving counsel where there was no showing of impaired representation, in denying the subsequent motion to reinstate counsel, and in filing an opposition to the petition to reinstate counsel.The trial court abused its discretion in relieving appointed counsel pursuant to a Marsden motion where there was no factual showing defendant's right to counsel would be impaired by the continued representation. Therefore, the court erred in denying defendant's subsequent motion, made within one week after the erroneous grant of the Marsden motion, to reverse the earlier order. The trial court also lacked standing to oppose the petition for extraordinary relief on the matter since there was no issue affecting the court's operating procedures or budget. Given the trial judge's personal interest in keeping the originally appointed counsel off the case, he should be disqualified in the interest of justice.id: 12162
A second judge was without authority to reverse the original judge's bail order even if the latter failed to comply with the bail statute. After a judge sets bail for a criminal defendant awaiting trial, another judge may not increase the bail solely because that judge believes the first judge's bail determination was erroneous.id: 17019
A party may challenge a judge upon the refiling of an action following the dismissal of a grand jury indictment pursuant to a section 995, subd.(a)(1)(A).The dismissal of a grand jury indictment pursuant to Penal Code section 995, subd.(a)(1)(A) terminates the action. Therefore, if the action is refiled and assigned to the same judge to whom the case was originally assigned, a party may disqualify the judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.id: 17256
Commissioner erred by ruling defendant impliedly stipulated to her serving as the magistrate for the preliminary hearing by failing to object.The commissioner erred by ruling that defendant had impliedly stipulated to her conduct of the preliminary hearing by failing to object at the first hearing. A subordinate judicial officer may serve as a temporary judge only upon the stipulation of the parties. The issue was not moot in that the commissioner became a judge shortly after the preliminary hearing since the issue does not turn on a specific individual, but on the rule by which the stipulation is implied.id: 18613
Resentencing by a new judge constituted Arbuckle error after the Court of Appeal reversed the original judge's ruling in dismissing the strike priors and the prosecutor challenged the original judge at the resentencing.Defendant pled guilty to certain drug offenses and admitted three prior strike allegations. At sentencing the judge dismissed two of the three strike priors and sentenced defendant to a term of 32 months. The Court of Appeal subsequently found the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the strike priors. On remand, the prosecutor issued a Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.6 challenge against the original judge. The new judge reinstated the strikes and imposed a term of 25 years-to-life. However, because the defendant was not allowed to withdraw his plea after the prosecutor removed the original judge, the subsequent sentencing violated defendant's plea bargain. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749). The matter was remanded for a full sentencing hearing which included the defendant's right to present relevant evidence as to all available sentencing options.id: 17071
Judge was disqualified from deciding the hearing on the priors in the three strikes case where it was discovered after trial on the substantive charges that she was the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing for one of the priors.Defendant was charged with committing drug offenses and two prior strikes were alleged. The hearing on the priors was bifurcated from the underlying charges. Prior to trial on the drug offenses, defendant learned that the trial judge had been the calendar deputy district attorney at the time of a plea to a charged prior. The judge refused to recuse herself since, as calendar deputy, she was not active in the prosecution and she could be impartial. Prior to the sentencing and hearing on the motion to strike the prior it was discovered that the judge had actually been the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing in one of the prior cases. The judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(c) from the sentencing and hearing on the priors but her disqualification did not invalidate the judgment of conviction on the current offense.id: 9339
Updated 3/5/2024The juvenile court did not improperly delegate its sentencing authority by having probation decide whether the minor successfully completed the various stages of a program.The juvenile court imposed probation, and one condition required the minor to complete the “Girls in Motion” program at the juvenile hall. She argued the requirement improperly delegated the juvenile court’s authority to determine the length of the commitment because the probation department decides whether the minor successfully completes each stage of the program. However, the court determined the maximum term of confinement, and having probation supervise the program was not an unconstitutional delegation of authority.id: 26987
Updated 2/26/2024The original sentencing judge must rule on a section 1170.95 petition, if available.Penal Code section 1170.95 requires that the original judge (if available) rule on the SB 1437 petition. The court erred in finding the original tribunal that sentenced defendant, rather than the actual sentencing judge, could hear the petition.id: 26965
Referring to defendant’s relinquishment of his pro se status as a “final change” was not a preemptive denial of his Faretta right.Defendant invoked his right of self-representation, but two weeks later relinquished his pro se status. During the dialogue that followed, the court told him “This is the final change.” This was meant to discourage continued disruption and was inadvisable, but it did not unequivocally foreclose any chance of self-representation later. id: 25961
There was no error in failing to recuse the trial judge where defendant did not seek recusal.The trial judge suffered a mild heart attack during the first penalty phase proceedings of defendant’s capital case and he disclosed that to the jurors to explain scheduling irregularities. Defendant argued this disclosure was improper as it aroused juror sympathy making him reluctant to zealously advocate for the defendant for fear of alienating the jury. However, the issue was moot at the first penalty phase trial since Judge Platt was replaced, and defendant failed to seek recusal of the judge at the penalty retrial.id: 24524
The trial court’s unfavorable rulings and stern comments at sentencing did not show bias against defendant.Defendant argued judicial misconduct based on the trial court’s unfavorable rulings and stern comments to defendant at sentencing. However, nothing in the court’s ruling or comments suggested the court evinced a bias against defendant.id: 24372
Defendant was not denied a fair capital trial by the fact that the trial and appellate judges must stand for election. Defendant argued his capital trial was unfair because the trial judge and the justices deciding his appeal were subject to judicial elections that prevented them from being impartial. However, any interest stemming from judicial elections was indirect and nonpecuniary and affects all California judges equally.id: 24247
The trial judge did not err in failing to disqualify himself where he had a personal and professional relationship with the prosecutor that he disclosed before trial. The prosecutor in defendant’s capital case had been elected to the superior court at the time he tried the case. Defendant argued the trial judge should have disqualified himself because of his personal and professional relationship with the prosecutor. However, the parties discussed the issue before trial and defense counsel agreed to proceed with the judge. The record did not show the judge’s relationship with the prosecutor affected his rulings, and trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to file a peremptory challenge against the judge.id: 24014
The substitution of judges during penalty phase did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, and defendant forfeited the right to argue the substitution violated section 1053. Judge Fagan presided over the guilt and penalty phase trial but was absent for two days of penalty phase deliberations. Judge Long substituted in, and on the second day, declared a mistrial due to a hung jury. Contrary to defendant's claim, Penal Code section 1053 which permits the midtrial substitution of judges did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial. Moreover, the claim that section 1053 was violated since the record did not show Judge Fagan was unable to proceed, was forfeited for lack of a defense objection. This is a perfect example of the need for forfeiture doctrine, as an objection would have led to a record showing why Judge Fagan was unable to proceed.id: 19836
Trial court’s comments that it was skeptical of paid experts did not establish judicial bias at the new trial motion.Defendant argued the trial court’s comment admitting a bias against the eyewitness experts rendered it incapable of ruling on her new trial motion. However, the court’s comments about being skeptical of paid experts was an assessment of witness credibility, a permissible task for the court sitting as the 13th juror. id: 24046
A court commissioner has the authority to summarily deny a writ petition seeking to enforce a prisoner’s rights while in confinement.Code of Civil Procedure section 259, subd. (a) authorizes a court commissioner to summarily deny a writ petition seeking to enforce a prisoner’s rights while in confinement, but not a petition that seeks to collaterally attack the criminal conviction that provides the basis for the confinement.id: 22750
The trial court did not err by admitting a videotape from the first trial where the judge was active in clarifying the ambiguous testimony of a prosecution witness.Defendant was convicted, at a retrial, of second degree murder. He argued the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the videotape of a witness’s testimony from the first trial where the judge acted like a witness for the prosecution. However, the videotape merely shows the trial judge seeking to clarify a prosecution criminalist’s ambiguous testimony. The trial court has the power to clarify testimony and there was no confrontation clause or due process error.id: 22168
The appearance of bias by a judge does not require recusal under due process principles.While actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under the due process clause neither is the appearance of bias sufficient. Instead, there must exist a probability of actual bias which did not exist in the case where the trial judge who originally recused himself because of his friendship with a dependency court judge defendant was allegedly stalking, later tried the case. Defendant had a statutory remedy to challenge the judge, but forfeited that remedy by failing to seek writ review of the denial of her Code of Civil Procedure section 1701.1 challenges.id: 21357
There was no prejudicial error in having a substitute judge preside over guilt phase deliberations for an afternoon where she made no substantive rulings.The trial judge was absent from trial one afternoon due to “business in Sacramento.” During his absence, the jury returned guilt phase verdict forms that were confusing and discussed between a substitute judge and the parties, and then resolved. Assuming the trial judge’s business trip did not amount to an “inability to proceed” within the meaning of Penal Code section 1053, any error was harmless where the substitute judge made no evidentiary or instructional rulings that would have required familiarity with the case.id: 21062
The trial court did not abandon its neutrality by asking clarifying questions of the witnesses.Defendant argued the trial court abandoned its role as neutral arbiter by asking clarifying questions of the witnesses. However, the court's questions of three witnesses were very few and neutrally phrased. The court did not step outside its proper role of attempting to clarify witness testimony and trying to help the jury understand the evidence.id: 19203
Disqualification of the judge was not required due to the judge's brief encounter with the victim's father shortly after the penalty verdict.The denial of defendant's motion to disqualify the trial court did not violate defendant's due process right to an impartial
judge because no reasonable person would doubt that a judge could remain impartial merely because of a brief encounter that the murder victim's father initiated after the penalty phase
verdict. Similarly, that the judge's daughter had been robbed at knife point several years earlier, and the judge accompanied her to the lineup and preliminary hearing, did not show a bias
requiring disqualification.id: 19048
The trial court did not abdicate its control over the readback process.The jurors requested a readback of certain testimony during guilt phase deliberations. The record did not support defendant's claim that the trial court allowed the court reporter to decide which testimony was responsive to the jurors' questions. Even if the court failed to monitor the readback of testimony as closely as it should have, any resulting error was harmless.id: 18860
The trial judge's friendship with the prosecutor which originated while the two worked in the DA's office did not require her disqualification from defendant's capital trial.Defense counsel moved to disqualify the trial court judge from the capital trial based upon the judge's friendship with the prosecutor. The two had worked together in the DA's office, their families had camped together, and the judged presided over the wedding of the prosecutor's daughter. However, defendant's failure to comply with the writ review requirement of Penal Code section 170.3, subd.(d) precluded him from challenging the denial a of the motion to disqualify the judge. Moreover, under the facts presented, a reasonable person would not have entertained a doubt as the judge's impartiality.id: 18735
The court did not err in denying defendant's motion to disqualify the entire Van Nuys courthouse where the victim's parents worked at the courthouse.The trial court did not err in denying the capital defendant's motion to disqualify the court and all judges at the Van Nuys courthouse where the victim's mother and her fiance both worked at the courthouse. Defendant showed no institutional bias, and seemed to be attempting to relitigate his unsuccessful change of venue motion.id: 18434
Disqualification of the trial judge was not required where the judge supported the reelection of a sitting judge who was being opposed by defense counsel.A capital defendant argued the trial court erred in denying a motion to disqualify the trial judge (Turner) where defense counsel indicated he was running for judge in opposition to a sitting judge (Lloyd) who was being publicly supported for reelection by Judge Turner. However, after reading Judge Turner's declaration stating he would be fair, the court found (by minute order) that Judge Turner would not be biased. The allegations presented in support of defendant's disqualification motion did not support the allegation of bias.id: 18054
Due process did not require that the trial judge preside over the motion for new trial.Defendant argued that due process requires the motion for new trial under Penal Code section 1181 be heard by a judge who presided over the trial. However, defendant had no right to demand or expect that the trial judge preside at the new trial motion, and another judge may competently perform the supervisory function to review the evidence and determine whether it supported the verdicts.id: 17868
Original sentencing judge who ordered probation had exclusive jurisdiction over sentencing and presiding judge had no jurisdiction to impose a prison term.Defendant was placed on probation following a guilty plea. He thereafter violated probation. Sentencing was suspended pending a psychiatric evaluation. The judge presiding over the matter said he would be unavailable for the sentencing so defendant signed an Arbuckle waiver agreeing to a new judge for sentencing. The new judge (Neville) referred him "back to probation" with recommendations for a medication program. Sentencing was again continued and he was ordered "discharged." The original judge later placed a hold on defendant's release. He later sentenced defendant to prison. However, because defendant never executed a second Arbuckle waiver Judge Neville obtained exclusive jurisdiction over sentencing. The original judge's action in taking over the sentencing was in excess of his jurisdiction and the prison sentence was vacated.id: 17567
The court's comments following closing arguments sought to clear up jury confusion by describing which acts applied to the different counts, and the temperate comments did not improperly emphasize the prosecution's case.Defendant was charged with one count of forcible rape, one count of rape of an intoxicated person and two counts of attempting the same offense against the victim. During the discussion on jury instructions, the trial judge told the prosecutor she was confused as to which evidence supported the individual charged counts. After closing arguments, the court addressed the jury and attempted to clarify which acts were applicable to the various charged counts. Defendant thereafter argued the court's comments unfairly emphasized the prosecution's case. However, the court merely discussed and analyzed the evidence in an impartial and instructive manner. The comments sought to clear up possible jury confusion, which is a judicial function.id: 17147
That certain justices were removed from office after reversing death judgments did not show a disabling conflict of interest in defendant's appeal.Defendant argued the death penalty appellate review process was unconstitutional in that three justices that voted to reverse death judgments were removed from office, thereby creating a conflict of interest in that the justices must affirm death judgments to retain their office. However, defendant made no showing of a disabling conflict of interest in his appeal.id: 16555
Provision which allows judge's absence during a readback of testimony does not violate due process or the right to an impartial jury.Defendant challenged the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1138.5, which provides that the judge need not be present while testimony is reread to jurors during deliberations. Defendant argued the judge's absence during a readback results in a fundamental breakdown in the proper handling of a jury trial. However, the claim of error was waived because the defense counsel agreed to the readback without the presence of defendant, counsel or the trial court. Morever, the readback of testimony is not a critical stage of the trial. Where the judge controls the process, and is available for questions, nothing compels his presence during the readback.id: 16569
The presiding judge's sequential designation of judges to authorize a wiretap was permissible under the statute.Penal Code section 629.50 permits a law enforcement agency to obtain an order authorizing a wiretap under certain circumstances. The application for the wiretap order must be made in writing to the presiding judge of the superior court. The presiding judge designated a judge to review wiretap applications. In addition, the presiding judge designated a second judge to review the applications if the first judge was unavailable. This sequential designation was permitted under the statute and there was no error in having the wiretap authorized by the second judge where the first designated judge was unavailable.id: 16499
Reversal of the minor's extended commitment was not required on the ground the referee heard the matter without obtaining the minor's stipulation to hearing the matter.The minor appealed an order extending his commitment to the California Youth Authority for an additional two years on the basis he had a mental deficiency that would make him dangerous to the public if released. (Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800.) He claimed the order must be reversed because the initial hearing on the section 1800 petition was heard by a referee over his objection. He argued that since a referee's section 1800 determination may constitute a final order, the order is a determination to which jeopardy attaches. However, a section 1800 hearing is not the type of hearing to which jeopardy attaches. Therefore, a stipulation of the parties is not required in order to have the matter heard before a referee.id: 15774
Judge at the murder trial had no sua sponte duty to disqualify herself simply because she presided over the earlier related prosecution where defendant plead guilty to the charges.The prosecution charged defendant with noncapital crimes arising from her assault. He plead guilty to those charges. When the victim died several months later, defendant was charged with her murder. The judge presiding over the murder prosecution had no sua sponte duty to disqualify herself simply because she presided over the earlier proceedings.id: 12153
Renewing the municipal court judge's assignment to the superior court twice did not render the assignment permanent.Defendant argued his conviction was void because the municipal court judge who presided over his trial had no authority to sit as a permanent member of the superior court bench. However, the fact that the judge's assignment was renewed twice to cover a total duration of three years did not transform the temporary assignment to permanent.id: 12157
Substitution of judge to read the concluding instructions was not improper.The judge who had presided throughout the trial became ill on the day guilt phase deliberations were to begin. Another judge read the prepared concluding instructions and submitted the case to the jury. It was not improper to substitute another trial judge without the defendant's affirmative consent. Moreover, the substitution did not violate his due process right to a judge familiar with the proceedings or his right to the same judge and jury throughout the trial. Finally, in response to a question on malice, the substitute judge properly advised the jury to reread the malice and homicide instructions in context.id: 12158
Supreme Court finds extrajudicial source doctrine applies to recusal of judge.Petitioners filed two motions to recuse the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 455(a) which requires a federal judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The first motion was based on rulings and statements made by the judge at an earlier trial and the second one was based on the judge's admonishment of counsel and co-defendants in front of the jury. All nine Justices agreed that disqualification was not required in this case. But they split 5-4 on the application of the extrajudicial source doctrine to 455(a) motions. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that opinions arising during judicial proceedings require disqualification under 455(a) only if they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus while the extrajudicial source doctrine applies, it is more of a <i>factor</i> rather than <i>doctrine</i>. Four justices disagreed with the adoption of a standard that places all but dispositive weight upon the source of the alleged disqualification.id: 12161
Trial had commenced for purposes of statute allowing transfer of judges after two days of voir dire.After mistrial, defendant's second trial commenced and defendant filed a peremptory challenge against the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 As a result, the supervising judge of the court took over the case. After ruling on a defense motion for bifurcation and presiding over voir dire for two days, the supervising judge transferred the case to another trial judge who had become available. Penal Code section 1053 allows for a substitution of judges in the event the first judge is unable to proceed. Appellant argued this case did not involve inability to proceed. The People argued the statute was inapplicable because the trial had not yet commenced within the meaning of section 1053. However, trial had commenced and it was error to transfer the case to another judge over defendant's objection.id: 12163
Trial judge properly acted as a de facto judge despite his automatic resignation after being elected as a school board trustee.The judge who presided over defendant's trial, pursuant to California Constitution Article 6, section 17, did resign the office of superior court judge when he took the oath and accepted the office of a school board trustee after being elected to such position. However, he was acting as a de facto judge of the Plumas County Superior Court subsequent to his automatic resignation as judge and during the trial proceedings in the instant case. Defendant was therefore precluded from collaterally attacking either the judge's authority to preside over the trial or the rulings made by the judge during that proceeding.id: 12164
Appellant's failure to timely object to the court's cross-examination constituted a waiver of the issue.Appellant argued the trial court's questions were prejudicial cross-examination and plainly based on the assumption that appellant's testimony was false. However, the trial judge has a right to question witnesses. Moreover, appellant, by waiting until the court had concluded its questioning and after the prosecutor had concluded his re-cross-examination, failed to timely object to trial court cross-examination. In any event, the court's questions were not adversarial nor designed to establish reasons to disbelieve appellant.id: 12143
Blanket assignment of municipal court judges to sit as superior court judges for a limited period did not violate the state constitution.Defendant argued the blanket assignment by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court appointing 23 municipal court judges to sit as superior court judges for a period of one year violated the state constitution and the separation of powers doctrine. However, the blanket assignment accomplishes the purpose of expediting judicial business and equalizing the work of judges. It does not violate the state constitution.id: 12144
Claim that defendant was illegally tried by a superior court judge who did not reside in the county in which he sat must be brought by a quo warranto proceeding.Defendant argued he was illegally tried by a superior court judge who did not live in the county in which he sat, in violation of Government Code section 69502. However, the proper method of challenging the right of a judge to hold office is by a quo warranto proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 803.id: 12145
Court commissioner may conduct a trial in a capital case where defense counsel knows the judge is a commissioner and fails to object.A court commissioner may conduct a trial in a capital case when no oral or written stipulation of the parties authorized him to sit as a temporary judge but when defense counsel proceeded to trial without objection, knowing that the judge was a court commissioner. The right to be tried by a regularly appointed or elected superior court judge is not a fundamental personal one requiring an admonition and express waiver, and the stipulation necessary to vest the commissioner with authority to try the case can be inferred from the conduct of counsel.id: 12146
Defendant impliedly consented, by failing to object, to the court commissioner's authority to try the capital case.Defendant argued he never stipulated to the appointment of a court commissioner to preside over his capital trial, and accordingly the commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction over the trial violated several rights under the state and federal constitutions. However, when defense counsel proceeded to trial without objection, knowing the judge was a court commissioner, the stipulation necessary to vest the commissioner with authority to try the case was inferred by the conduct of counsel.id: 12148
Having the preliminary hearing magistrate act as the trial judge was not inherently prejudicial.There is no inherent prejudice resulting from the fact a judge has presided over a preliminary hearing which would automatically disqualify that judge from presiding over the subsequent trial. If, in a particular case, an allegation of actual prejudice is made, that may be handled on its merits. Inasmuch as the defendant conceded, both at trial and on appeal, that there was no basis to disqualify the judge other than the fact he had conducted the preliminary hearing, there was no error in assigning him the case for trial.id: 12152
Oral stipulation to have referee sit as judge did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.A petition was filed alleging that the minor came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by having committed a robbery and personally used a firearm. Minor argued the referee was without jurisdiction to act because there was no written stipulation that she serve as judge. However, the requirement of a written stipulation is directory and the absence of a writing does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.id: 11693
According to the tantamount stipulation doctrine the commissioner did not exceed her authority in committing the minor to the CYA.A superior court commissioner is not a juvenile court referee and absent a stipulation of the parties the commissioner would not have the authority to commit a minor to the California Youth Authority. However, according to the doctrine of tantamount stipulation the parties impliedly stipulated the commissioner could act as a temporary judge in the proceeding.id: 11639
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245