Fruits, Taint, Inevitable Discovery
Category > Fruits, Taint, Inevitable Discovery
The inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply where police could have obtained a search warrant but chose not to and conducted a search based on invalid consent. The police searched defendant’s house illegally (warrantless search based on invalid consent). There was probable cause to obtain a warrant and police later obtained a warrant for a second search. The prosecution argued the trial court erred by granting the suppression motion because the illegally obtained evidence would inevitably have been discovered during the second search where police had a warrant. However, the inevitable discovery doctrine only applies where there is evidence that the police would have found the evidence pursuant to the initial investigation. The fact that the police could have performed a legal search but chose instead to proceed illegally does not support application of the doctrine.id: 25113
“Inventory search” exception to the warrant requirement did not apply where the record did not show the police complied with a standard procedure, and neither could it be argued that the weapon would inevitably have been discovered in an inventory search after the arrest.The trial court erred by ruling the illegal baton the police found in defendant’s car came within the “inventory search” exception to the search warrant requirement. The officer did not testify that he searched the car pursuant to standard police department policy for inventory searches - he simply said that after placing defendant in the police car, he searched defendant’s car. He didn’t know whether the car was later towed or whether the appropriate forms were prepared. The prosecution also argued that the police inevitably would have discovered the weapon during an inventory search after towing the car. However, the record did not show whether the car met the police department’s standardized criteria for towing, or whether it was, in fact, towed.id: 25351
The discovery after the fact of a probation search condition does not sanitize an unlawful detention.The unlawfulness of a suspicionless vehicle detention is not retroactively cured when one of the passengers turns out to be a probationer with a search condition.id: 23415
Search of car where cocaine was found in an airvent was not justified as an inventory search where the impound yard manager testified the policy was just to inventory items found in plain view. Defendant was stopped for erratic driving, tased and pepper sprayed after he refused to leave the car, and then arrested for interfering with a police investigation. The searches of his car at the scene or later at the impound yard (where cocaine was found in an air vent) were not justified as incident to arrest or under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The prosecution argued the search was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine because the drugs would inevitably have been discovered during an inventory search. However, the impound yard manager testified the policy was only to inventory items found in plain view and they don’t “search” cars. The search was not a valid inventory search.id: 22463
A child living with his family has standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. All family members who reside in a home have an expectation of privacy from government intrusion in all areas of the home, even if internal family rules restrict their access to certain areas. The trial court erred in finding the minor lacked standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. Contrary to the state's claim, the inevitable discovery doctrine did not save the illegal search since the prosecutor presented no evidence showing the police would have been able to obtain a search warrant had consent (which was coerced in this case) been denied.id: 17838
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the tarp structure that surrounded his truck, and the search of the truck was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. At a designated campsite, defendant pitched a tent–like structure that surrounded his Hummer, along with several smaller tents and an eating area. He then sold drugs from the area. The search of the Hummer was outside the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement because in order to access the interior of the vehicle the officers had to enter the tarp structure that enclosed the Hummer and defendant had a reasonable exception of privacy inside the tarp structure. The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule did not save the search because the prosecution provided no evidence showing that absent the search, defendant’s friends would have left the festival before it ended, abandoning the Hummer and its cargo to the police. id: 20674
Suppression was required if the search incident to a lawful arrest based on an outstanding warrant was obtained through an unlawful traffic stop.Evidence seized in a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest based upon an outstanding warrant must be suppressed if the police invented the ground for the traffic stop which led to the
discovery of the warrant. The trial court erred by finding it did not need to decide whether the police made up the claim regarding the faulty brake light since any taint arising from such an unlawful stop was dissipated by the discovery of the arrest warrant prior to the search.id: 19309
A university safety officer did not have the authority to give police consent to enter a dorm room but suppression was not required as the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. A university security officer did not have the actual authority to consent to the search of a student's dorm room. The subsequent entry of the room by the police was therefore unreasonable. The security guard may have had the apparent authority to consent, but that issue was not addressed since it was determined the evidence would have been inevitably
discovered by police. The school's safety officer had contacted police after gathering the evidence and it was likely the police would have been further involved in the investigation.id: 19310
Defendant's question regarding his extradition which he posed to officers leaving the room, did not open the door to interrogation after previously having invoked his Miranda rights.Defendant was arrested for murder and taken to the police station. He was advised of and invoked his <i>Miranda</i> rights. As the officers were preparing to leave defendant asked what was going to happen to him with reference to extradition. The officer then proceeded to describe the crime scene and stated defendant had occupied the motel room and the victim had delivered a pizza to the room before he was killed. Defendant responded I had to kill that boy and The boy would have identified me. The statements were the product of police-initiated interrogation following defendant's invocation of <i>Miranda</i> rights. However, the statements taken the next day following readvisement of <i>Miranda</i> rights were not the tainted product of the earlier confession as the defendant unilaterally initiated further communication specifically requesting to speak with the officers.id: 10920
Suppression was required where appellant discarded contraband moments after the illegal detention.Moments after the officer yelled Hold on, appellant discarded the heroin. Since appellant discarded the heroin after being detained the abandonment occurred while he was illegally seized and there could be no intervening circumstances. Finally, the officer had no objective reasons to detain appellant and it was clearly an expedition for evidence in the hope something might turn up. Accordingly, the heroin constituted the fruit of an illegal detention and the court erred in not ruling the evidence.id: 10926
Updated 3/4/2024Search of a parked vehicle was not illegal since it would have inevitably been subjected to an inventory search.Defendant argued the police conducted an improper investigative search under the guise of an inventory search after arresting him for not having a driver’s license and searching his car in a private parking lot. However, the search was justified by the inevitable discovery doctrine as the suspected stolen car would inevitably have undergone an inventory search.id: 28139
Updated 2/24/2024Evidence from an improper cell phone search was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.The warrantless search of defendant’s cell phone was improper. However, the data taken from the search, defendant’s cell phone number, would inevitably have been discovered from the lawful search of the victim’s cell phone and other sources.id: 26728
Updated 2/4/2024The discovery of defendant’s outstanding warrant attenuated the taint from the improper detention.Defendant was unreasonably detained when he was spotlighted by a marked police vehicle late at night without reasonable suspicion. However, the exclusionary rule did not apply where the officer discovered an outstanding warrant after the illegal stop but before the search.id: 27354
The trial court properly admitted DNA evidence collected in 2008 under the attenuation doctrine despite the unlawful DNA sample taken in 2006.Defendant was arrested for a drug offense in 2006, and police collected a DNA sample that was entered into a statewide database. No charges were filed in the case. In 2008, police retrieved DNA from a robbery that matched defendant’s profile in the database. Police contacted defendant and, with his consent, collected a second DNA sample that led to his conviction in the robbery cases. The 2006 collection of defendant’s DNA was unlawful under People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, since the prosecution failed to prove defendant was validly arrested or that his DNA was collected as part of a routine booking procedure. However, the court properly admitted the 2008 DNA sample under the attenuation doctrine since there was a substantial time break and intervening circumstances between the illegal collection in 2006 and the lawful procedure in 2008.id: 26047
The search of defendant’s center console was justified based on his passenger’s status as a probationer. In People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, the court upheld a search of personal items in the back seat of a car based on a front seat passenger’s status as a parolee. The same policy considerations justify the search of defendant’s center console based on his passenger’s status as a probationer. Also, the discovery of the drugs there would inevitably have led to the discovery of the drugs in the bags located in the back seat.id: 25255
Warrantless entry of an apartment was proper following a police report that several women were about to fight and officers reasonably believed people might be in need of aid.Someone called 911 and reported that several females were going to have a fight in an apartment. The police arrived late and women’s car was gone but two male defendants were walking out of the apartment. The codefendant acknowledged there had been a problem but that it had been resolved. The trial court properly found the officers had a reasonable basis for believing there were women in need of aid in the apartment and the warrantless entry was proper. Even if the warrantless entry was improper, the evidence police found could have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine as defendant was on parole and subject to a parole search of his home. id: 23354
The warrantless entry by the second wave responders following a valid protective sweep was proper where the police presence was uninterrupted and the recovery of a shell casing not found in plain view was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine.The trial court erred by suppressing forensic evidence seized from his home pursuant to a warrantless search conducted after he was arrested and the victim was declared dead. The first wave of responders entered the house lawfully in light of the exigent circumstances, and made certain plain view observations. The entry by the second wave responders was proper where there was an uninterrupted police presence in the house and a close-in-time successive search of areas already validly searched in order to begin processing evidence observed in plain view. Moreover, the evidence discovered that was not in plain view - a shell casing and a depression under it would inevitably have been discovered by the coroner.id: 22658
Any illegality in the traffic stop was attenuated by defendant’s probation search condition even though the police did not know about the condition at the time of the stop.During a traffic stop for failing to signal a turn, police discovered that defendant was carrying a loaded firearm despite his status as a convicted felon currently on probation. He argued the probation search condition could not be used to validate the patdown because the officer was unaware of the condition when he first initiated the stop. However, any illegality in the initial stop was attenuated by defendant’s probation search condition. Although the search and discovery of the gun occurred shortly after the detention, they did not occur until after the officer had recognized defendant as a person subject to a search condition. id: 22681
Testing the key in the front door lock did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the information gained from the testing could be considered in applying the independent source doctrine.Police officers made a warrantless entry into 321 Sanford using a key retrieved from the abandoned Volkswagen. Defendant argued that testing the key in the lock was a search that could only be performed pursuant to a warrant. Assuming that the key insertion was a search, it was based on reasonable suspicion and served a legitimate investigative purpose (confirming that defendant had access to 321 Sanford). The testing was therefore not an unreasonable search even though it was not authorized by a warrant and even if police did not have probable cause to believe there was evidence in the house before inserting the key in the lock. The information could be considered in determining whether the warrant issued after the illegal entry was supported by probable cause. id: 22470
The officer’s discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant attenuated the taint of the unlawful traffic stop. Defendant argued the vehicle in which he was a passenger was unlawfully stopped. However, the stop was justified by the officer’s testimony that the windows in the car were tinted. Assuming the stop was unlawful, following People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, the discovery that defendant was the subject of an arrest warrant removed the taint of the antecedent unlawful traffic stop.id: 21449
Evidence seized in a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon on outstanding warrant need not be suppressed because the discovery of the warrant occurred during an unlawful traffic stop.Defendant argued the evidence seized in a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon a valid outstanding warrant must nonetheless be suppressed because the discovery of the warrant occurred during an unlawful traffic stop. However, the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant prior to a search incident to arrest constitutes an intervening circumstance that may – and, absent purposeful police misconduct, will – attenuate the taint of the antecedent unlawful traffic stop.id: 20675
Suppression was not required where the initial detention was improper (local ordinance defendant violated was preempted by Vehicle Code) where defendant’s resistance to the arrest was an independent act that dissipated the taint.Defendant was improperly detained for walking down the middle of a street in a business district, because the Sacramento City Code provision that prohibits such conduct is preempted by the Vehicle Code which considers his action lawful. The police therefore lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply since the officers were reasonably expected to know the California Vehicle Code. However, defendant’s resistance to arrest was an independent act that dissipated the taint from the illegal detention and so the trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion.id: 20673
Witness testimony and physical evidence was not tainted fruit of police illegality, and was attenuated or would have been inevitably discovered.Defendant argued the testimony of two witnesses and other physical evidence was the tainted fruit of his illegal
detention and interrogation. However, the record shows the physical and testimonial evidence introduced against defendant would inevitably have been obtained, or was procured by means
sufficiently attenuated from the improper police conduct. The evidence was not suppressible as tainted fruit of the illegal police conduct.id: 19061
Admission of first statements made after an illegal detention was harmless because the second statements made voluntarily several days later were sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention.The first statements defendant made to police on April 30, while voluntary, nonetheless were the product of an illegal detention which was prolonged to enable the police to question him about the shootings without having probable cause to arrest him. The statements should have been suppressed because of the Fourth Amendment violation. The connection, however, between the illegal detention and defendant's second statements made voluntarily after being out of custody for three days, was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention. Defendant's confession was not obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention but as the result of the intervention of the person defendant initially implicated, who insisted that defendant tell the truth, and defendant's exercise of his own free will. Because defendant's second statements, in which he confessed to the crimes were admissible, the error regarding the admission of the first statements was not prejudicial.id: 18125
Statute addressing Shaken Baby Syndrome is not void for vagueness despite the medical disagreement as to whether shaking a baby can cause a severe brain injury.Defendant was convicted of assault on a child with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death - Penal Code section 273ab. She argued the provision is void for vagueness since there is a legitimate medical debate as to whether shaking an infant can cause a subdural hematoma and therefore a reasonable person could not believe it likely that great bodily injury would result from a brief but vigorous shaking of the child. However, section 273ab is not merely a shaken baby syndrome offense. While the existence of SBS might impact the issues of causation or sufficiency of the evidence, it does not affect the specificity of section 273ab.id: 16593
Defense counsel was not incompetent for failing to move to suppress the gun found in the motel room on the theory that police illegally seized the room by asking the manager not to allow anyone to enter without police authorization.Shortly after defendant's arrest for murder, a law enforcement investigator asked the manager of the motel not to let anyone enter defendant's room without police authorization. The police later seized the murder weapon from the room pursuant to a search warrant. At trial defense counsel argued the investigator's entry into the motel room was illegal, and the gun was therefore inadmissible. They did not challenge the propriety of the investigator's request that the motel manager bar entry into the room. The Court of Appeal set aside the murder conviction finding counsel was incompetent for not asserting that challenge. However, such a suppression motion would not have been successful both because the seizure was lawful, and because under the "independent source" doctrine, the subsequent seizure of the rifle by police was not a "fruit" of the investigator's initial seizure of the room.id: 15605
Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not require suppression of photo ID based on photo taken while defendant was in custody under an illegal arrest.A photograph of defendant originally taken as a result of (or while he was in custody for) a purported illegal arrest led to his connection with the crimes currently charged. The illegal arrest was in no way related to the crimes with which defendant was charged. He argued the photograph was a fruit of the poisonous tree and required suppression of the photo identifications in the present case. However, the photo was taken pursuant to standard police procedure and the illegal arrest was not a pretext to take the photo. The photo was an event during the arrest rather than a motive for the arrest. The officers properly used the photo in the later case. Moreover, assuming the photo was a fruit of the poisonous tree, the victim's in-court identification was not tainted by the illegality.id: 15606
The confession to a crime other than the one for which defendant was illegally arrested, to officers from another agency who were unaware of the illegality was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to dissipate its taint.Defendant was arrested without probable cause. Following his confession (for which trial counsel was determined incompetent for failing to seek suppression), and while still in custody, police officers from another jurisdiction obtained his confession to other crimes. The confession to crimes other than the one for which defendant was illegally arrested, to officers from a different police agency who were unaware of the circumstances of the arrest, was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to dissipate its taint.id: 15607
Voice identification obtained by accident when the victim's wife heard the tape was not a suppressible fruit following the Massiah violation during the taping.A tape recording was played at the preliminary hearing. The victim's widow was in the audience, heard the tape and recognized defendant's voice based upon the utterance of a profane word. The Supreme Court earlier determined the tape was inadmissible at trial due to a violation of defendant's right to counsel - a <i>Massiah</i> violation. However, accidental discovery of the voice identification was not an exploitation of the <i>Massiah</i> violation and could not have been contemplated by the violating officers. Moreover, the authorities had the right to record the conversations in the van and there was nothing illegal about using the sound of the voice as evidence. The identification came by the act of playing the tape, not exploitation of the illegality. It was therefore not a suppressible fruit of the <i>Massiah</i> violation. Finally, use of the tape was not prohibited by the law of the case doctrine absent a timely objection.id: 15608
Denial of motion to suppress accomplice testimony was not error when there was sufficient evidence of attenuation.Although accomplice testimony was the result of an illegal interrogation, there was sufficient evidence of attenuation to allow the admission of the testimony. Given the time difference between the testimony and the illegal confession, his initial hesitation to testify and his attorney's advice, there was a clear indication that the decision to testify at the preliminary hearing was freely and voluntarily made and was not the result of an illegal confession.id: 10921
Identity of witness which came to light after illegal questioning would inevitably have been discovered through proper procedure.Defendant argued the testimony of the prosecution witness who drove defendant to and from the murder scene should have been suppressed since the police lead to the witness was derived solely from the illegal questioning. However, the witness' identity would inevitably have been discovered since another prosecution witness knew of the other's relationship to the case and such knowledge would have been procured promptly and lawfully.id: 10923
Illegal seizure of burglary tools in 1982 did not give appellant immunity to use the same tools to commit new crimes.Appellants moved to quash the 1984 search warrants and suppress all evidence from those searches, on the ground that probable cause for issuance of those warrants was based in part upon inadmissible evidence tainted by a prior illegal search. However, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion on the ground that the 1984 warrants were not the product of exploitation of a prior illegality. Appellant's commission of new crimes and abandonment of tools were intervening independent acts attenuating any taint between the prior illegality and the evidence subsequently obtained.id: 10924
Statement made by defendant's father to police after a monitored conversation with defendant was not the tainted fruit of an illegal tape recording.Defendant argued the police conduct in electronically monitoring and tape recording his conversation with his father violated his right to privacy and therefore the subsequent statements by defendant's father to the officers regarding the shooting were tainted and should have been excluded. However, defendant failed to show his father's statement to the officers was linked to the alleged illegal police conduct -that his father would not have made the statement absent the illegal monitoring and tape recording.id: 10925
The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of statement made after warrantless arrest in home.Police officers entered defendant's home without a warrant and without his consent, in violation of <i>Peyton v. New York</i>, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). They took defendant to the station house, where he confessed to murder. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the state's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of <i>Payton</i>. Here, the police had a justification to question [defendant] prior to his arrest; therefore his subsequent statement wa not an exploitation of the illegal entry into [defendant's] home. The court explained that the statement, while the product of an illegal arrest and being in custody, was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than someplace else. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens vigorously dissented, stating that the majority's reasoning amounted to nothing more than analytical sleight-of-hand.id: 10927
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245