Voluntariness of confession
Category > Voluntariness of confession
Updated 2/3/2024Police coerced defendant’s confession by telling him they would charge his two sons with murder if did not confess. While interrogating the defendant, police said they knew his sons were innocent of murder but he intended to charge them anyway unless he confessed. Defendant’s subsequent confession was involuntary and inadmissible for all purposes. Trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statement did not forfeit claim on appeal because it involved a constitutional issue the entire incident had been video recorded and was available for review. id: 27737
The detective’s aggressive questioning and the minor’s inexperience and distraught state rendered the statement involuntary. The 15 year-old minor’s confession was involuntary given his inexperience and emotional state as well as the detective’s aggressive questioning that overbore his will. The aggressive detective used maximization tactics including accusative questioning, reference to a lie detector, and then the detective switched to minimization, which led to the statement. The detective’s overbearing tactics combined with the minor’s youth made him susceptible to pressures that rendered his statement involuntary. The court exercised its discretion to decide this issue on appeal despite the lack of an objection in the trial court. id: 25386
The officer’s representation that defendant would not be charged if he told the truth was an implied promise of leniency and rendered the statement involuntary.The interrogating officer told defendant that if he told the truth he would not be charged, and that he was either a suspect who would be charged, or a witness. The officer told defendant he witnessed something terrible and if he told the truth, he’d have a possible career in the Marines and “a life.” Defendant then said he had some information, and confessed to his involvement in the shooting shortly after that. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the statements because they were obtained pursuant to a promise of leniency, and were therefore involuntary. id: 24466
The 13 year-old’s statement that he touched the three year-old’s vagina was involuntary where it followed repeated claims of guilt by the detective and involved other coercive techniques. The juvenile court erred by ruling the 13 year-old’s statement was voluntary. The minor was not sophisticated, had no prior interactions with police and the statement was given in a small room at school in front of two officers and the principal. The statement acknowledging that he touched the three year-old’s vaginal area followed relentless questions from the detective as to why he did it, and he selected curiosity over sexual intent. There was no interview before the interrogation and the detective used false evidence and other deceptive techniques. The inculpatory statements cannot be deemed a product of the minor’s free will.id: 24121
Fear of physical violence in prison, absent protection from government informant, rendered confession coerced.Ruling that the question was a close one, the Supreme Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion that defendant's confession was coerced. The government informant was aware that defendant had been receiving rough treatment from the guys in prison. Using his knowledge of these threats, the informant offered to protect defendant in exchange for a confession to the murder. The Arizona Supreme Court declared that the confession was obtained as a direct result of extreme coercion and was tendered in the belief that the defendant's life was in jeopardy if he did not confess. This is a true coerced confession in every sense of the word. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter dissented.id: 11284
Trial court erred in admitting an involuntary statement defendant made to police officers to impeach his testimony.Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights during interrogation. He stated that he would not say another word without his attorney. Officers continued to question defendant who then made incriminating statements that did not constitute a confession. The officer testified at trial that he had continued to question defendant after the invocation of Miranda so that if defendant testified at trial, the statements could be used for impeachment. The officer testified that this tactic was taught at a seminar. Defendant's statements were coerced and involuntary and should not have been introduced to impeach his trial testimony. However, the erroneous admission of the involuntary statement was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.id: 11248
Police made implied promises of leniency to suspect suggesting a statement from her would make a difference in her sentence.Defendant argued her statement to police was coerced by the officer’s implied promises of leniency. The officers’ repeated comments regarding “what’s on the table” in reference to her exposure and that her statements would “matter,” constituted implied promises and were improper. However, the record did not show that the improper comments caused defendant to make her statement and so the statement was not involuntary. Even if it was, the error in admitting it was harmless in light of the strength of the remaining evidence.id: 23670
Police coerced defendant’s confession with false promise of leniency where the officer told appellant he could not receive a life sentence if he admitted killing the victim during a robbery.Defendant was convicted of felony murder and robbery. However, promises of leniency rendered his confession involuntary. The interrogating officer told defendant several times that admitting to killing the victim during a robbery would not result in a life sentence and that he could avoid a life term if he provided an explanation for the murder that did not show premeditation. The record showed that defendant confessed because of these false promises of leniency. The error required reversal of the convictions.id: 23067
Defendant’s statement was involuntary after he had invoked his Miranda rights and only changed his mind when the parole agent impliedly promised a reduced term.The trial court erred by admitting defendant’s coerced confession into evidence. After defendant was Mirandized and invoked his right to remain silent, his parole agent (working with police) suggested that if defendant failed to cooperate with police, he would have to write a report recommending maximum in-custody time. Implied in this comment was that he would do less time if he cooperated. He then changed his mind and gave a statement. The statement was involuntary given the implied promise of leniency. However, the error was harmless in light of the weight of the other evidence establishing guilt.id: 22947
Defendant's confession was involuntary, even though he reinitiated contact with police, since the police had previously engaged in a series of coercive actions, and held defendant overnight without food, water, or access to counsel.An officer, in his initial custodial interrogation of defendant, intentionally continued the interrogation in deliberate violation of Miranda in spite of defendant's repeated invocation of his right to remain silent and right to counsel. Defendant asked to speak with his attorney nine times. Moreover, the officer not only continued the questioning but badgered defendant, accusing him of lying and informing him this was his only chance to cooperate. Despite the badgering, defendant did not admit guilt. After spending the night without access to counsel, and without food, water or toilet facilities, defendant asked to speak with the officer and ultimately confessed. The confession was involuntary and inadmissible at trial for any purpose, despite the fact that defendant initiated the further contact. Admission of the evidence required reversal of the murder conviction.id: 17445
Defendant's statement was involuntary where it followed an implied promise of leniency suggesting the consequences would not be harsh for a 16 year-old who was not the actual shooter.Defendant's statement that he was in the Honda was not coerced since the officer's statement that the claim would make the difference between life in prison versus a much shorter time was not a false promise of leniency. However, the second statement about firing a gun was involuntary where the officer told him that gun was not the murder weapon and suggested the consequences would not be harsh for a 16 year-old who had not killed anyone. The officer's comments amounted to an improper implied promise of leniency.id: 19857
Juvenile's confession was involuntary where the interrogating officer repeatedly lied and made implied promises of leniency.The officer repeatedly lied to appellant during the interrogation. He stated that his friend had implicated him, that witnesses identified him and that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of burglary and vandalism. He also repeatedly misled the naive 16 year old by telling him he could be tried as an adult, and sent to San Quentin. The officer also suggested that appellant's girlfriend would be in trouble if appellant did not confess. Finally, the interrogation was replete with implied promises of leniency. Under the circumstances, the confession was involuntary and inadmissible. The error in admitting the confession was reversible since there was no evidence to connect appellant to the burglary other than the confession.id: 11289
Notwithstanding the Miranda waiver, statements taken following officers' lies, accusations, exhaustion, isolation and threats to overcome defendant's resistance were involuntary.Trial court erred in determining defendant's taped interview statements following the shooting of his wife, were voluntary. Several times the defendant expressed his desire not to talk. Police detectives used lies, accusations, exhaustion, isolation and threats to overcome defendant's will. One detective screamed at him for his involvement of the children in the affair. Other officers appealed to his manhood, his religion, and his Hispanic heritage, and when all else failed, clearly advised him his refusal to talk would be interpreted as evidence of premeditation and support a charge of first degree murder. They repeatedly told him that if the shooting was an accident, he would be better off, and clearly suggested to him that he would avoid the more serious charge by that admission. The message was clear. Failure to tell them what they wanted to hear would result in greater charges. The error required reversal of the murder conviction.id: 11293
Defendant's confession was involuntary because it was the product of promises of leniency and false representations regarding the law of murder but the error was harmless.The interrogating officer persuaded defendant he should tell what had occurred to dispel the implication that the murder was premeditated. The officer's account of the law of murder was misleading in omitting any reference to the felony murder doctrine. The deceptive omission made more plausible the implicit promise that a first degree murder charge might be avoided if there was a confession showing no premeditation. Moreover, the promissory character of the representations was enhanced by the officer's repeated assertions that he was present to help defendant. The confession was therefore involuntary and inadmissible. However, the error was not prejudicial where independent evidence established defendant was in the victim's bedroom and raped her on the night of the murder and the chance of someone else killing her the same night was too remote.id: 11276
Interrogator's promises of an OR release and no federal prosecution rendered the statements involuntary even though the promises were kept.Officers made promises of leniency to defendant during the interrogation. They promised him that if he gave statements they would not institute federal prosecution and that he would be released on his own recognizance. The prosecution argued the officers kept their promises and that only false promises of leniency are coercive. However, whether the coercion is based on a promise kept or repudiated can only truly be tested in hindsight, but it constitutes coercion under either scenario. Moreover, the promises were a motivating factor in defendant's decision to talk as he was told he would be released from custody if he talked and that otherwise he could be held for 12 to 24 hours without the opportunity to make phone calls or post bail.id: 11288
Minor's statement was involuntary where he refused to waive Miranda rights and made the statement only after the officer offered to turn off the tape recorder.Appellant, a minor, was arrested and transported to an interview room. He unequivocally refused to waive his Miranda rights. The officer subsequently noticed appellant was looking at the tape recorder and asked appellant if he would feel more comfortable if the tape recorder was turned off. Appellant then gave an incriminating statement. However, the inculpatory statement was inadmissible because the officer deliberately continued the interrogation after appellant invoked his Miranda rights. While a statement may be voluntary if, after invoking Miranda, appellant initiates communication, simply looking at a tape recorder is not conduct which is tantamount to the initiation of further communication and it was the officer who initiated further communication by offering to turn off the recorder.id: 11291
The juvenile court erred by finding the minor unfit for juvenile court treatment based on statements made to police without a hearing on the voluntariness of the statements.A minor challenged the order of the juvenile court finding him unfit for juvenile court treatment and transferring the case to adult court. He argued the juvenile court erroneously failed to determine whether his admissions to the police were involuntary and coerced. Where, as here, incriminatory statements are offered to establish a prima facie case that a minor committed an offense triggering the presumption of unfitness (under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subds. (b) and (c)), the minor may move to exclude them. Thereafter, the juvenile court must hold a hearing and rule on the admissibility of the statements. The minor in the present case did not waive a finding on voluntariness by failing to reassert his objection when the court announced its ruling.id: 16776
Third party's statement identifying defendant as the killer was the product of police coercion and it was prejudicial error to admit it.Police coerced a statement from a witness by an improper threat to try the witness for the murder unless he named defendant as the killer. The Court of Appeal found that a defendant seeking to exclude third party evidence of guilt on the ground the evidence was produced by coercion need not separately show the coerced evidence was "unreliable." The rule is different, however, where the defendant claims the evidence at trial was the end product or a "fruit" of unlawful coercion of a third party.id: 16658
Updated 3/7/2024The detective’s statement that defendant should set a good example for his son did render the statement involuntary.Defendant argued that his statement was involuntary because after deferring to his invocation of Miranda rights, the detective impermissibly attempted to soften him up by suggesting he might make a deal and by playing on his responsibility as a father. Suggesting that he set a good example for his son was not strong enough to overcome his will. The detective’s delay in giving the Miranda warnings until after the two began talking was problematic but any error in admitting the statement was harmless.id: 26292
Updated 3/4/2024Compelled use of defendant's finger to unlock his cell phone was not an illegal search and if so the good faith exception applied, and did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.Police obtained a search warrant that allowed them to use defendant's finger to unlock his cell phone. Assuming the compelled use of defendant's finger constituted a search, suppression of the evidence was not required because the good faith exception applied. Also, compelled use of the finger to unlock the phone did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because it did not constitute a testimonial act. Finally, the act did not render his later testimony involuntary for due process purposes.id: 28178
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant’s Miranda waiver was not coerced where the detective disparaged the victim and encouraged defendant to repair his relationship with his children.Defendant argued the detective coerced his Miranda waiver by improperly “softening him up,” specifically by disparaging the victim and appealing to defendant’s desire to mend his relationship with his children. However, the waiver was voluntary where defendant was not hostile or reluctant to speak, the detectives did not exploit a longstanding relationship, and defendant was forewarned about his Miranda rights.id: 26259
Updated 2/26/2024The detective did not coerce a statement by suggesting defendant might face retaliation or mentioning defendant’s exposure to the death penalty.The interrogating officer suggested there might be retaliation by others in prison if he saw statements of others cooperating with police, but he didn’t threaten to exacerbate that risk if defendant didn’t talk. The officer also asked if he knew the punishment defendant faced, and defendant acknowledged, “the death penalty,” but that was not an unlawful threat. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the statement was not involuntary.id: 26263
Updated 2/26/2024Police were not required to Mirandize defendant before his conversation with an undercover informant. Defendant argued that statements made to an informant placed in his cell were inadmissible absent Miranda advisements. However, Miranda warnings were not required where defendant didn’t know he was talking with a police informant. Defendant also argued the statements were involuntary because of the pressure he felt to show respect to and gain protection from the gang member cellmate, but there was no evidence in the record showing defendant was pressured to make the statements.id: 26423
Updated 2/4/2024Prejudice for lack of consular notification must be resolved in a habeas proceeding.Defendant argued his statements to police were involuntary given the failure to inform him of his right to the assistance of the Mexican Consulate. However, prejudice would only be established by matters outside the record which would need to be raised by way of habeas corpus.id: 27597
Officer’s ruse in telling defendant he wanted to interview him about his future sex offender registration status, and to keep him out of the “red file” did not render the Miranda waiver involuntary.Defendant argued his Miranda waiver was involuntary because he agreed to speak to the officer who said he was a sex crime investigator conducting a routine pre-release interview connected to the sex offender registration process. The officer said he had many files of sex registrants and the objective was for the defendant to stay out of the “red file” of people the officer was going after. However, despite the officer’s failure to disclose that he was investigating a murder, defendant knew the officer was investigating “past crimes.” The officer’s ruse was not coercive and the waiver was voluntary.id: 26257
There was no due process violation by allowing defendant to be impeached with his prior testimony from the first SVP trial where that testimony was compelled but not involuntary.The trial court ruled that if defendant testified at his SVP trial, he would be impeached with the content of his compelled testimony from the first trial. The fact that his earlier testimony was compelled did not mean that it was involuntary, and therefore there was no due process violation by allowing his impeachment with the prior testimony.id: 25981
The detective did not coerce a statement by describing the facts, giving defendant one chance to respond or risk being “fried.” The detective described the narrative as he understood it, told defendant this was his only chance to provide his side of the story (as his confederates were blaming him) and said he had enough to “fry” defendant. Contrary to defendant’s claim, defendant’s subsequent statement was not coerced as the officer did not engage in any impermissible strong-arm or brainwashing tactics, and defendant acknowledged there had been no improper threats or promises. The reference to the death penalty (that defendant would “fry”) was isolated and did not appear to make an impression on defendant.id: 25783
Defendant’s statements were not coerced and the police are not required to reread Miranda rights, after defendant invoked but later asked what the police intended to do.Defendant was given his Miranda rights, spoke to the detectives for a while, but then invoked his right to remain silent and the detectives left. Another officer later gave defendant water and defendant asked for his medicine. He also asked if the officer knew what the police were going to do with him and the officer asked if defendant wanted to bring the detectives back. This interaction did not involve any improper psychological coercion designed to get the defendant to talk, and the officers were not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before they resumed questioning.id: 24873
There was no implied promise of leniency where the detective told defendant before the statement that it would be in his best interest if he cooperated.Defendant argued that the promises of leniency from the police rendered his statement involuntary. Before the statement, the detective told defendant that he had been identified in a crime and that, in the detective’s experience, it would be best if he cooperated. There were no implicit threats or promises of leniency in the officer’s exhortation for honesty and cooperation.id: 24840
Defendant’s confession was not involuntary where he started talking before the alleged promise of leniency.Defendant argued his confession was coerced due to the interrogating officer’s statement that defendant was at a crossroads and if he took the path of telling the truth, he could go on with his life and be with his family. However, defendant had already starting giving his statement before that comment and so it was not an improper inducement to get him talking.id: 25423
Police did not coerce a confession given the trial court’s finding that the officers didn’t mention the death penalty during the interrogation.Defendant argued the officers improperly coerced his confession by mentioning the death penalty and either directly or indirectly mentioned he would receive a lighter sentence if he confessed. However, the trial court expressly found the officers were credible when they denied ever mentioning the death penalty.id: 25093
The minor’s statement was not involuntary where the detective’s reference to a light sentence was brief and mentioning the father’s liability was not the same as threatening to charge the father. The 16 year-old suspect validly waived his Miranda rights when he answered questions after being advised of his rights. The statement he gave was voluntary. The detective’s brief reference to the minor doing “a little time in a juvenile camp” during a lengthy interrogation was not an express promise of leniency. Moreover, while the detective suggested the minor’s father had criminal liability as the gun owner, he never threatened that the father would be charged. The record does not show the detective’s statements had the effect of coercing the minor into an involuntary and unreliable confession.id: 25075
The witness’s trial testimony was not coerced where he was held in contempt for refusing to take the oath at the preliminary hearing.Defendant argued the witness’s trial testimony was coerced and unreliable where he had been held in contempt for refusing to take the oath at the preliminary hearing. Whether the witness properly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination at the preliminary hearing by refusing to even be sworn, he took the oath at trial and testified willingly. His testimony did not violate defendant’s due process rights. id: 24796
The detective’s continued questioning after defendant invoked his Miranda rights did not render the statements involuntary.During his interrogation, the young defendant repeatedly asked to be taken home or to have his parents called to pick him up. The interrogating detective violated the defendant’s Miranda rights, but the continued questioning did not amount to coercion for due process purposes.id: 24388
The initial coercion of a witness did not infect her trial testimony three years later where she testified under a grant of immunity. Police may have coerced statements from a witness arrested in connection with the present killing by suggesting she would be kept in custody and separated from her children until she told the truth. However, the initial coercion did not affect her trial testimony because she testified under a grant of immunity that was conditioned only on her giving truthful testimony, and that condition did not coerce her into offering trial testimony identical to her earlier statements to police. id: 21667
Neither mention of the death penalty nor the deception overcame defendant’s will and so the statements he gave were not involuntary.Defendant argued the police coerced a statement by threatening him with the death penalty if he refused to cooperate with them and by lying about the evidence the police had implicating him. However, neither the mention of the death penalty nor the deception overcame defendant’s will as he was experienced in the system, exhibited no sign of distress and remained able to parry the officer’s questions. id: 21671
The trial court did not err by allowing the interrogating detective to impeach defendant’s testimony with Miranda-violative statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the interrogating detective to impeach his testimony with statements he obtained after the arrest. The detective purposely interrogated defendant without providing the Miranda warnings knowing that the statements would be admissible for impeachment. The law is unsettled on the question of whether Miranda-violative statements can be used for impeachment if there is evidence of widespread, systematic police misconduct. Contrary to defendant’s claim, there was no showing of such widespread misconduct even though the detective employed the tactic he learned from another member of the Westminster Police Department. The statements were not involuntary as the detective did not mislead defendant into thinking the statements could not be used in court.id: 24246
Defendant’s statement was voluntary where the record showed he was prepared to talk even before the alleged softening up. Defendant argued the interrogating detectives improperly “softened him up” before questioning by claiming his companion was in custody and he could exonerate her by giving a statement. However, the detectives’ comments did not render his statement involuntary where the record showed he would speak to the police even absent the “softening up.” id: 24180
Defendant forfeited the claim that his confession was involuntary by failing to include the trial court’s crucial factual findings in his analysis.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the involuntary confession. However, defendant forfeited the appellate issue by omitting from his analysis several crucial findings concerning the facts. Moreover, the confession was not involuntary where defendant was not in custody at the time of the interview at the police station as the doors were unlocked and he was repeatedly told he was free to leave. Finally, because this was not a close case on the issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on false confessions.id: 23535
Defendant’s statement was not involuntary as there were no promises of leniency, his mental state was not compromised by drugs or sleep loss and the questioning was not relentless. The detective’s statement to defendant that “there are two sides to every story” did not constitute a promise of benefit or leniency. Moreover, the record did not show defendant was so drug impaired or sleep deprived as to render his statements involuntary. While his forehead had been scraped when he attempted to avoid arrest, he refused medical treatment. The failure to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before his afternoon statement was not a factor suggesting coercion. Finally, interrogating defendant for almost five hours, separated by breaks, even after leaving him alone for three hours initially did not show a relentless interrogation rendering the statement involuntary. id: 23706
The police did not coerce the statement of a third party by mentioning that this was a death penalty case. Defendant argued the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting the coerced statement of a third party. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the police did not threaten the third party with the death penalty if she failed to implicate defendant. The statement that this was a death penalty case, and that the jury might view her more favorably if she indicated she did not intend to kill the victim, did not constitute an improper threat and did not render her statement involuntary.id: 23068
The trial court did not err in excluding expert testimony on coerced confessions.The trial court did not err by excluding defendant’s proffered expert testimony on the issue of whether his confession was coerced. There was little evidence showing coercion and there was a good deal of corroborating evidence suggesting the confession and admissions were true. Under these facts, the evidence was highly speculative and properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Moreover, its exclusion did not violate defendant’s right to present a defense. id: 23275
Statements made after defendant reported threats to correctional officers during the intake interview were not involuntary and did not violate Miranda or Massiah.During a routine prison intake interview, defendant reported threats to his safety. When the officers questioned him about the source of the threats, he made incriminating statements. The statements were not coerced. Moreover, they were analogous to statements admitted under the "booking exception" to the Miranda requirements. Finally, they were not deliberately elicited by the officers and did not violate Massiah.id: 23075
The minor’s statements were not involuntary even though the officers lied about facts, and questioned him well into the early morning hours exceeding the six hour statutory limit. The 17 year-old’s statements to the police were not involuntary where they exceeded the statutory six hour time limit, and the discussion lasted into the early morning hours when the minor was tired. The officers gave him food and water, did not threaten him or promise leniency. While the officers lied about certain facts, the lies were insufficient to render the statement involuntary.id: 22993
Defendant impliedly waived her Miranda rights by continuing to talk after the advisements and the detective’s deception did not render the statements involuntary.Defendant impliedly waived her Miranda rights by continuing to participate in the interrogation after being advised of her Miranda rights which she understood. That an officer referred to the advisements as “clearing a technicality” did not change the result. Moreover, that the interrogating officer lied by telling her that she was captured on a surveillance video and encouraging her to tell the truth did not render the statements involuntary.id: 21897
An investigator who participated in defendant’s compelled statement could testify to matters independent of the statement.Defendant was a police officer charged with assault and filing a false report. He gave a compelled statement to the department investigators after being advised it would not be used against him in a criminal trial. At trial, the prosecutor called the person who took the statement to opine as to whether defendant had control of the arrestee during the arrest. That testimony did not violate Kastigar v. U.S. (1972) 406 U.S. 441, regarding the treatment of witnesses exposed to compelled statements, as the record showed the investigator relied on sources independent of defendant’s compelled statement.id: 21437
The witness’s statement was not coerced where the interviewing officer said he could be charged as an accessory if he withheld information.Defendant argued the police coerced the testimony of a witness. However, contrary to defendant’s claim that the witness was drunk at the time of the interview, he told police he did not believe he was still drunk. Moreover, the fact that the officer advised the witness that he could be considered an accessory after the fact if he withheld information did not render the later statement involuntary. The witness was not threatened with an accusation of the charged crime.id: 21099
Defendant’s confession was not involuntary where police informed defendant that his wife had exposure as an accessory.Defendant argued his confession was involuntary since the officers threatened to hold his wife in custody and charge her as an accessory if he did not confess. However, defendant’s wife was being questioned as a possible accessory based on evidence the police had already gathered. This was different than cases where police threatened action against an innocent wife. Moreover, the record showed defendant’s statements were not made in response to these “threats”.id: 21168
Officer’s statement that he would help explain the “whole thing” to Palo Alto police was not an implied promise of leniency rendering the confession involuntary.Defendant’s confessions were not prompted by promises of leniency where the officer said he would help defendant explain the “whole thing” to Palo Alto police. The statement was a response to defendant’s prior questions as to why she was arrested and the officer’s disclaimer of any control over another investigation. Moreover, the confession was not prompted by the officer’s comments which were made an hour before the confession. Finally, the deceptive comments relating to the nature of the charges and potential punishment did not render the statements involuntary.id: 21169
Defendant’s incriminating statements were not coerced where police pretended to conduct a polygraph test (at defendant’s request) and fabricated fake documentary graph results.While defendant was being questioned by police about his involvement in a homicide, he asked to take a polygraph test during which he denied any involvement in the crime. The police then showed him a fake graph from the fake polygraph machine and told defendant he had not been truthful. He then admitted he had been present at the scene. His admission was not involuntary where he requested the polygraph and he continued to steadfastly deny participation in the murder.id: 20961
The trial court did not err in refusing the special instruction suggesting coercive interrogations are unreliable.The trial court did not err by refusing to give defendant’s requested special instructions suggesting that if the jury found defendant’s confession was coerced it could consider that fact in determining the weight to give the evidence. Defendant presented evidence showing how the interview was conducted and why the confession was not reliable. The jury was also instructed to determine the reliability of statement made by the defendants.id: 20377
While the detectives suggested they could help defendant with his mental problems, his decision to confess was based on his belief that one should tell police what he knows.While the interrogating officers made certain inducements to the defendant, the evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant's decision to confess was based upon his free will and preexisting belief that when questioned by authorities, a person should tell what he knows. The confession was voluntary.id: 20266
Defendants failed to prove the third party's testimony was coerced by the prosecution team and therefore there was no error in denying the motion to exclude the witness' testimony.Defendants argued the trial court erred in denying the motion to exclude the assertedly coerced testimony of the prime prosecution witness. Defendants had standing to bring the motion where they alleged the violation of their own right to a fair trial by claiming the witness' trial testimony would be affected by the earlier coercion. In order to prevail on such a claim the defense must show the coercion applied to the witness producing an involuntary pretrial statement and the coercion actually affected the reliability of the evidence presented at trial. In reviewing the entire record and making an independent determination the court found defendants did not prove coercion. That the witness was arrested in Santa Cruz for a crime committed in Santa Clara County had no effect upon her extrajudicial statement or trial testimony. Regarding the claim of promises of leniency defendants failed to connect the pressures brought to bear on the witness before trial with her ultimate trial testimony. Further, the prosecution team did not coerce the witness' trial testimony by talking to her without counsel present because after she was granted immunity and no charges were pending her attorney withdrew from the case as defendants proposed to call him as a trial witness. A person not charged with a crime but who is simply to be called as an immunized witness need not be provided appointed counsel. Finally, the witness did not testify at trial under an agreement conditioning her immunity on testimony consistent with earlier statements to the police.id: 11279
Confession was not induced by a threat of prosecution for a capital crime.Defendant argued that he was impelled to confess by the threat that, if he did not, he would be subject to the death penalty. However, the death penalty was never mentioned by the interrogators who said only that there were two alternative theories,an accidental killing, or an intentional killing. The fact that defendant may have feared the intentional killing would be punished more severely did not render improper the officer's accurate statement of the circumstances.id: 11270
Making appeals to defendant's Christian upbringing did not amount to improper psychological coercion where he subsequently denied wrongdoing and confessed at a later session.Defendant argued the police improperly attempted to exploit his vulnerabilities during an interrogation when they asked whether his acts would upset his christian parents and whether his wife would stick around and wait while he served a prison sentence. Such statements did not amount to improper psychological coercion where defendant denied any wrongdoing after the statements.id: 11290
Officer's comment that "There is no death penalty here" did not render defendant's confession involuntary.Defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights. During the course of the interrogation, the officer stated There is no death penalty here. Defendant subsequently confessed. Given the length of the interrogation, the officer's brief, but incorrect statement did not render the confession involuntary. The police activity was not coercive and the officer's comment about the death penalty did not constitute a promise of benefit or an inducement.id: 11295
Misleading statement that defendant's Miranda-violative statement could not be used in the state's case-in-chief did not render the statement involuntary.Defendant's statement to the police was not involuntary where it was made in response to the accurate police claim that the statement could not be used in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
Defendant was experienced in the justice system, invoked his right to counsel, and the misleading nature of the police claim (suggesting that the statement could not be used for any
purpose) was not so egregious as to render the statement involuntary.id: 19791
Absent physical or psychological pressure, statements of a heavily sedated defendant in intensive care at the hospital were voluntary. Defendant argued statements he made to the police were involuntary since he was interrogated in the intensive care
unit of the hospital while he was recovering from surgery and heavily sedated with narcotic pain medications. However, the interview lasted only 20 minutes, the officers questions were calm and deliberate and the defendant did not indicate any distress or unwillingness to speak with the police. The statement was voluntary absent any suggestion that the officers resorted to physical or psychological pressure.id: 19434
Defendant's statement was not involuntary where police did not exploit his claimed
psychological vulnerabilities and the sham test the police described did not result in an admission that he was the shooter. Defendant's statement to the police was voluntary where the record does not show the officers knew of or exploited his claimed psychological vulnerabilities, the officers failed to correct his statement that it would take a week to get counsel
and the second interrogation 12 hours after the first was not preceded by a readvisement of Miranda rights. While the officers' reference to the "neutron proton negligence intelligence test" designed to gain a statement that he fired a gun, was deceptive and a sham, it was not so coercive as to produce an involuntary statement - in fact defendant never confessed to being the shooter.id: 19440
The police did not improperly coerce the testimony of a witness by offering immunity in exchange for her testimony. Defendant argued the police coerced the testimony of a witness by threatening to take away her children, and tossing her infant daughter off a bed. However, the trial court credited the officer's denial of these incidents. Instead, the primary reason for the witness's cooperation was the prosecution's offer of immunity from prosecution as an accessory. There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime and offering immunity in exchange for truthful testimony.id: 19059
Officer's false statements and defendant's understanding of the interrogation based on his experiences in Guatemala did not render the statement involuntary.The officer informed defendant he would be arrested for murder if he did not speak, and defendant thereafter gave a statement in an effort to clear himself of suspicion. Moreover, the officer informed defendant falsely that he had sufficient cause to arrest him without a statement. The subsequent statement was voluntary, and the officer's false statement while relevant to the analysis, did not render it involuntary. Moreover, defendant's experiences in Guatemala affecting his understanding of the interrogation did not render the statement involuntary because there was no state coercion.
id: 18955
Defendant forfeited his claim regarding the admission of coerced testimony where his only objection at trial was based on hearsay.Defendant argued the admission of coerced testimony violated his right to due process. However, at trial, defendant objected to the admission of the testimony on grounds of hearsay rather than coercion. The issue of coerced testimony was therefore not reviewable. Moreover, even though the witness was granted transactional immunity to testify against the defendant, the agreement did not require that her trial testimony conform to the statements she gave police.id: 18681
Admission of first statements made after an illegal detention was harmless because the second statements made voluntarily several days later were sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention.The first statements defendant made to police on April 30, while voluntary, nonetheless were the product of an illegal detention which was prolonged to enable the police to question him about the shootings without having probable cause to arrest him. The statements should have been suppressed because of the Fourth Amendment violation. The connection, however, between the illegal detention and defendant's second statements made voluntarily after being out of custody for three days, was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention. Defendant's confession was not obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention but as the result of the intervention of the person defendant initially implicated, who insisted that defendant tell the truth, and defendant's exercise of his own free will. Because defendant's second statements, in which he confessed to the crimes were admissible, the error regarding the admission of the first statements was not prejudicial.id: 18125
Defendant's statements to police were not involuntary despite the officer's ignoring of the request for counsel, and statements that the admissions could not be used in court.Defendant argued his statements to the police were involuntary and inadmissible to impeach his testimony. He cited police offers of better jail conditions but could not show any such promise. That the police repeatedly ignored his request for counsel was problematic but did not establish coercion in light of his age and experience, his continued denials, and the fact that his later admissions were a product of being confronted by the evidence. The officer's assurances that defendant's statements could not be used in court were also problematic but not prejudicial where the prosecutor presented abundant other evidence. Assuming the court erred in ruling the statements to be voluntary, the error was harmless where the evidence of defendant's intent to kill, apart from his statements, was overwhelming.id: 18055
The officer's offer to inform the DA that defendant was cooperative was not an implied promise of leniency rendering the confession involuntary.Defendant argued his confession was the product of promises of leniency in that his cooperation would help him in the judicial process, and was therefore involuntary. However, the officer simply informed the defendant he would advise the DA regarding defendant's cooperation. Because the officer only pointed out the benefit that might naturally flow from a truthful and honest course of conduct, the officer's remarks did not constitute a promise of leniency.id: 18072
The officer's mention of the possibility of a death sentence did not render the confession involuntary.In questioning the defendant the officer said "We're talking about the death penalty here." The mention of the death penalty did not render the confession involuntary since it did not result from the threat of such punishment. The officers' further comments that the killings may have been accidental following a blackout, did not amount to a promise of lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation.id: 17933
Failure to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before initiating a second interrogation was not improper where the first interrogation was one hour earlier and defendant was sophisticated.Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the police. Questioning ceased when he said "I don't want to say anything else right now." The second interrogation was conducted by the same officer at the jail after the talk an hour earlier was conducted on a college campus. Defendant suggested they go somewhere more private to talk. Defendant was sophisticated and had prior experience with the police. Statements taken from the second interrogation were voluntary even though the officer failed to re-Mirandize the defendant.id: 17595
Defendant's statements to a CDC psychologist were not involuntary where he offered to talk with the doctor, and even though she tried to trick him into an admission, the record showed he was not influenced by her techniques.Defendant argued statements he made to a Department of Corrections psychologist were involuntary. Initially, the statements were made during noncustodial interviews. They were prompted by defendant's request for police to find him a psychologist who could talk to him and then tell police defendant was not capable of committing the charged crimes. He knew he was not required to talk with the psychologist and could end the interviews at any time. Contrary to defendant's claim, he did not appear to be under the influence of marijuana during the interviews, and if he was, it was self-induced intoxication which does not establish involuntariness. While the doctor attempted to trick defendant into admitting guilt, the evidence showed he did not believe her and was not influenced by her techniques. Finally, mentioning the possibility of a split personality - "good Bob/bad Bob" was not official coercion.id: 17304
Miranda waiver and confession were not involuntary even though the defendant was young and not informed by police that he was a suspect.Defendant argued his Miranda waiver and subsequent statements were involuntary due to deceptive practices where the detective failed to inform him upon taking him into custody that he was a suspect. However, the failure to inform defendant of all useful information did not render the waiver or subsequent statements involuntary. Moreover, defendant's youth and lack of academic achievement did not render the confession involuntary as defendant had prior felony convictions which showed a familiarity with the legal system and he did not seem mentally slow.id: 17077
There was no Edwards violation where defendant was released from custody following an earlier Edwards violation (and confession) and reinterviewed, though not rearrested, at his home two days later.Police violated Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, by reinitiating conversation with a defendant who had first waived and then invoked his right to counsel at a police station interrogation. Defendant confessed to the murder of his wife. Thereafter, they released defendant but visited his home two days later. They assured him he would not be arrested and did not re-Mirandized him. He then provided a more detailed version of the assisted suicide story. The police then left as promised. He was later charged with murder. Edwards was not violated by the interrogation at defendant's home where he was recontacted by the police after a break in custody which gave him reasonable time, while free from coercive custodial pressures, to consult counsel. Moreover, since defendant was not rearrested before requestioning at home, but was reinterviewed in a noncustodial setting, new Miranda advisements were not required. Further, by releasing and then reapproaching defendant the police were not involved in an improper ruse or pretext. Finally, the home interview was not the tainted product of the earlier Edwards violation since the earlier statement was not coerced, and the two day interval between interviews further attenuated any taint.id: 16976
Miranda-violative statement may be used to impeach a defendant if it is voluntary even though the statement is untrue. Defendant made a statement at the hospital after invoking his Miranda rights. Although he was taking pain medication he was coherent. The statement was ruled Miranda-violative but admissible for impeachment since it was voluntary. Defendant argued it was not admissible to impeach his testimony since the statement was untrue, not inculpatory and inconsistent with the prosecution's and defense theories of the case. However, Miranda-violative statements need not be truthful to be admissible for impeachment. Moreover, the statement was not involuntary even though the officer said it would not be used for any purpose at trial.id: 16983
Trial court did not err in admitting fruits of third party's coerced statements on the theory that exclusion would deter police misconduct.Defendant argued the trial court violated his due process rights by presenting evidence which was a product of statements taken from an accomplice that the court determined were involuntary. While a third party's coerced statements may be excluded if unreliable, the court properly refused to exclude evidence discovered as a product of the coercion on the theory that such exclusion would deter police misconduct.id: 15662
Defendant's claim of police trickery in inducing a Miranda waiver failed where there was no evidence the officers lied in telling him they knew little about the case.Defendant argued his <i>Miranda</i> waiver was invalid where the officers led him to believe he was not a suspect in the murder. However, there was no evidence to suggest the officers were lying when they told defendant they did not know very much about the case yet. Without that missing factual predicate, defendant's claim of policy trickery in inducing a <i>Miranda</i> waiver fails.id: 15667
Defendant's request to see his wife was not a request to stop the questioning.Defendant's request during the interrogation to see his wife did not amount to an indication he wanted the questioning to cease. Neither did the request present a factual basis for a finding that the detectives either threatened defendant or his wife, or otherwise rendered his waiver of rights under <i>Miranda</i> involuntary.id: 15668
Defendant's statements to police were voluntary despite the officer's promise to tell the DA defendant had been honest and the officer's statement that the truth would set defendant free.Defendant argued his statements to interrogatories were involuntary in that he was promised leniency. He claimed the detective falsely implied that in telling the district attorney defendant had been honest, such intercession would generate leniency. However, defendant acknowledged that he understood the terms of the questioning and stated on the record that no promises were made in exchange for his testimony. Moreover, the officer's statement during interrogation that the truth would set him free, while arguably inappropriate was not a promise of leniency.id: 15669
Defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol did not render his statement to police involuntary.Defendant argued defense counsel was ineffective in failing to seek exclusion of defendant's videotaped statement to police on the ground the statement was involuntary. However, defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol does not establish an impaired capacity to make a voluntary statement.id: 15670
Inmate's confession was not involuntary where it was motivated by fear of prison guards rather than the interrogating officer.Defendant argued he confessed not because of any impropriety by the interrogating officer but in an effort to escape the acts of violence instigated against him by guards at Corcoran State Prison and his fear based on general conditions at the prison that if he remained at the institution he would be killed. However, if the confession was the unexpected and unsought result of misconduct not undertaken as part of an investigation or interrogation, it is not coercive in the sense that term is used in the due process context.id: 15671
Officer's statement that he would try and have defendant placed in a separate cell did not render subsequent confession involuntary.Before defendant confessed, he asked the officer to promise that he would be placed in a separate cell. The officer did not promise although he did say he would try to have him placed in a separate cell. Moreover, the officer never told defendant any effort to secure him a separate cell would be contingent on defendant's decision to give a statement. The subsequent confession was not involuntary as it was not induced by promises of leniency.id: 15672
Officers did not misrepresent the Miranda rights as a "technicality."Officers told defendant they did not know what knowledge of the crime he might have so they were going to just deliver the <i>Miranda</i> advisal. The officer's statement was not an improper representation that the <i>Miranda</i> rights were merely a "technicality."id: 15673
The officer's failure to advise defendant about the criminal nature of the investigation did not render his confession involuntary.Defendant argued his confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary. The officer's failure to reveal he was conducting a criminal investigation rather than asking questions regarding the placement of defendant's children did not render the statements involuntary. So long as a police officer's misrepresentations or omissions are not of a kind likely to produce a false confession, confessions prompted by deception are admissible in evidence. Moreover, <i>Miranda</i> warnings were not required since defendant was expressly told he was not under arrest, and following his statement, he was returned home as promised.id: 15674
Miranda advisements and waivers need not be tape recorded to be considered voluntary.Defendant argued that federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process require that all advisements and waivers of Miranda rights made in a place of detention must be tape-recorded before the resulting confession can be considered voluntary. However, the court found that such tape recording was not necessary.id: 11292
Offering defendant a chance to tell his side of the story did not amount to improper coercion.After giving defendant the Miranda advisements the officer told defendant that a waiver of those rights would give defendant a chance to tell his side of the story. The officer's statement did not improperly coerce the defendant into giving up his right to remain silent.id: 11294
Officer's statement during interrogation that someone inside defendant may have committed the crime did not amount to improper psychological coercion.During an interrogation the defendant denied wrongdoing and the officer then stated that it must have been someone inside of you. Defendant then said yes, I have these terrible headaches, and subsequently confessed. The officer's single, oblique reference to defendant's mental state did not constitute improper psychological coercion.id: 11296
Officer's statement that appellant get this off his chest did not render the confession involuntary.Appellant argued his confession was induced by improper police conduct where it followed police suggestions that it was time he got this off his chest, and that he would feel better once he gave them the scoop. Notwithstanding the officer's knowledge that appellant was under 20 years old, and had a substantial drug problem, the officer's suggestions amounted to nothing more than the benefits that would flow from pursuing a truthful and honest course of conduct. They were not improper inducements which would render the confession involuntary.id: 11297
Police deceptions did not render the confession involuntary.The police falsely told defendant of incriminating evidence that would tend to prove him guilty, then suggested that he had blackouts, and might have forgotten that he had committed the crime. Deception alone is not sufficient to invalidate a confession. Since the police never promised to help defendant, the confession was not involuntary.id: 11298
Probation officer, in advising appellant to be responsible for what he had done, did not improperly coerce appellant's confession.Appellant argued that the confession to his probation officer should have been suppressed because it was the product of psychological coercion. However, the probation officer, in advising appellant to be responsible for what he had done, advised no more than that he tell the truth. He did not imply it would be better for him if he did so. No threats or promises were made. Finally, appellant did not testify to any undue influence or suggest that his will was overborne.id: 11299
Promises of leniency did not render the admissions involuntary where the promises were not the primary motivating cause of the admissions.The detective promised defendant leniency when he suggested, somewhat equivocally that if defendant cooperated in the investigation the District Attorney might not seek the death penalty. However, the detective's comments did not render defendant's admissions involuntary, because those comments were not the motivating cause of defendant's admissions.id: 11300
Sending police psychiatrist into a rubber room to interview defendant before the Mental Health person did not amount to manipulation.After defendant's confession, he was placed naked into a so called rubber room and was told that he would not be released until he was cleared by Mental Health. He argued that he was deceived when the police psychiatrist came to visit him in place of the expected visitor from Mental Health. However, prior to the interview, defendant was Mirandized and there was no coercion or deception by authorities. There was no showing that defendant's confession was the product of police manipulation.id: 11301
State courts are obligated to follow federal rules when constitutional issues arise and therefore evidence is not excluded where defendant's mental state precluded a voluntary decision to confess.Appellant argued that his confession was involuntary not because the police were coercive but because his mental state was such as to preclude a knowledgeable and voluntary decision to make incriminating statements. Under federal law as articulated in <i>Colorado v. Connelly</i>, (1986) 479 U.S. 157, exclusion of evidence on this ground is improper. The state courts are now obliged to follow federal precedent in determining admissibility of confessions dependent upon the factor of voluntariness because this is an alleged constitutional violation. Where no constitutional violation has occurred, state rules of evidence are appropriate to govern the admissibility of evidence.id: 11302
The voluntariness of a minor's confession in a juvenile proceeding is not cognizable on appeal following an admission.The issue of the voluntariness of a minor's confession is not cognizable on an appeal following an admission in whole or in part of the juvenile court petition.id: 11303
Under California law, the erroneous admission of a coerced confession is no longer reversible per se.The United States Supreme Court has established in <i>Arizona v. Fulminante</i> (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 that as a matter of federal constitutional law, the erroneous admission of a coerced confession should be evaluated, for purposes of the federal Constitution under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of <i>Chapman v. California</i> (1967) 386 U.S. 18. California law independent of federal constitutional requirements, likewise does not require automatic reversal of a criminal conviction despite the admission of a coerced confession. The prejudicial effect of the error is now to be determined under the federal harmless error standard.id: 11304
Wavier of Miranda rights was not involuntary where the government did not coerce a defendant with low intelligence and psychiatric symptoms.Defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was involuntary due to his low I.Q. and cerebral deficits. However, where the government did not coerce a confession, defendant's low intelligence and psychiatric symptoms did not render his waiver of Miranda rights involuntary.id: 11305
A five-minute talk with a girlfriend is not sufficient inducement to render a murder confession involuntary.Defendant argued his statement was involuntary and should have been suppressed because he was improperly induced to confess by being permitted to speak with a girlfriend, a conversation which he called a direct inducement. However, a five minute talk with a girlfriend is not sufficient inducement to render a murder confession involuntary.id: 11266
Confession need only be proven voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.According to <i>People v. Jimenez</i> (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, the People were required to prove the voluntariness of defendant's confession beyond a reasonable doubt. The <i>Jimenez</i> rule has been abrogated by Article I section 28(d) of the California Constitution. The new rule is that of <i>Lego v. Twomey</i> (1972) 404 U.S. 477, which states that the federal constitution requires only that the prosecution prove a confession voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.id: 11267
Confession was not coerced where police told appellant his mother was in the other room and he could see her after the interrogation.Prior to appellant's confession, the police told him that his mother was in the other room and that he could see her when he was finished. The confession was not involuntary where the police made no express or implied threat and the desire to confess was entirely self-motivated.id: 11268
Confession was not inadmissible where the impled threat or promise of release of defendant's girlfriend was made hours before the actual confession.Regarding defendant's girlfriend, the officer told defendant If you truly loved her, you wouldn't allow her to sit in jail if you knew information that would help her. However, defendant's incriminating statements were not made until several hours after the conversation had turned from the girlfriend to other subjects. From this fact, the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant's statements were not induced by the implied threat or promise.id: 11269
Confession was not the product of improper psychological coercion where there was conflicting evidence as to whether leniency was offered in exchange for the confession.Appellant argued that the confession was the product of psychological coercion due to the manner of questioning. However, the interrogation was not extraordinarily lengthy and there was no undue pressure placed on appellant. The attempt to play on his religious and family values was unproductive. The only approach that did work was a technique which allowed appellant to share the blame with the victim. There was a conflict as to whether appellant was offered leniency in exchange for a confession, but appellant signed a written statement eschewing any promise of leniency. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision to deny the suppression motion.id: 11271
Confession was voluntary despite the officer's gross miscalculation of possible penalty when asked by defendant.Defendant waived his Miranda rights and began speaking with officers. When an officer told him he was lying defendant stated he wished to speak to a lawyer and the interrogation ceased. Later when defendant was being transported to a hospital for a blood sample he asked, What can someone get for something like this, thirty years? The officer responded not unless you were a mass murderer and stated he had never seen anyone serve more than seven and one-half years. Defendant then confessed. The record did not establish that defendant was subject to psychological ploys or compelling influences. Rather, evidence supports the conclusion that there was no reason for the officer to know his casual estimate of possible penalties would produce an incriminating response. Moreover, defendant who later received a death sentence, could not claim that since he was misled regarding the penalties that his assessment regarding whether he should waive his rights was not knowing and intelligent.id: 11272
Conversation initiated by defendant in an effort to receive a better plea offer was not the result of interrogation.Defendant invoked his right to remain silent under <i>Miranda</i>. He subsequently telephoned the detective to see if he could get a better plea offer. He stated that he thought the offer of a 16-year term was excessive because he was not the one with the gun. Defendant obviously did not perceive that he was being interrogated but, rather, wanted to voluntarily assert a reason for leniency. The preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the statement was voluntary and not the product of interrogation.id: 11273
Court did not err in admitting pretrial statement to prosecutor which was a precondition to the initiation of plea negotiations.The trial court denied defendant's motion to exclude statements made by defendant during a pretrial interview with the prosecutor, his investigator, and a police detective. The prosecutor and defense counsel arranged the interview as a precondition to a polygraph examination which could ultimately have led to a plea bargain for defendant in exchange for testimony against codefendant. Defendant argued the court erred because the statement was made on the advice of his own counsel and was made in the course of plea negotiations. However, there was no coercive police activity, defendant was advised of his right against self-incrimination, was advised the statement would be used against him, stated he understood and then voluntarily waived his rights. Moreover, the statement was not made in the course of plea negotiations, but as a precondition to initiation of any discussion of disposition of the charges.id: 11274
Defendant has the burden of proving codefendant's statements were involuntary.When a defendant seeks to exclude the allegedly involuntary testimony of a witness or codefendant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the admitted statements were involuntarily obtained.id: 11275
Defendant's request for the death penalty prior to his confession did not render the statement involuntary as the product of an official promise.Four months after defendant confessed to a corrections officer, he offered to discuss the crimes with a police detective only if the officer guaranteed the death penalty would be imposed. He later claimed the second confession was involuntary because it was given in exchange for an official promise of a desired outcome. However, the detective made no promises or threats. He merely stated that assuming the robbery murder had occurred the death penalty would be appropriate and would be sought. The confession was a product of the defendant's free will and there was no evidence he was frightened by the officer or confessed to ensure a particular outcome.id: 11277
Defendant's statements to the police were voluntary notwithstanding a dosage of morphine administered almost two hours earlier.Defendant was arrested after a chase, in the course of which he was shot. He argued his subsequent statement to the police was involuntary in that he lacked the mental capacity to waive his Miranda rights due to the effect of morphine administered at the hospital. The morphine was administered at 5:30 a.m. The Miranda advisements were given at 6:30 a.m., and the interview began sometime after 7:00 a.m. The doctor testified the effects of the morphine last from one to two hours. However, evidence in the form of testimony from two physicians and a nurse supported the court's finding of voluntariness and a lack of undue pressure. Nothing in the record indicated that defendant did not understand the questions that were posed to him.id: 11278
Delay in the arraignment did not render defendant's statements involuntary.Defendant argued his statement to the police was involuntary and should have been suppressed because of delay in his arraignment. However, there is no legal authority that would justify suppressing a voluntary statement merely because defendant was arraigned a few hours after his companions and on the same day as his arrest.id: 11280
Detective's statement that he would speak to the District Attorney if defendant told the truth was not a promise of leniency rendering the confession involuntary.Defendant argued that during his interview with the detective he was told that if he spoke the truth the detective would talk to the District Attorney. Defendant argued this was a promise of leniency which made his confession involuntary. However, mere advice that it would be better to tell the truth when unaccompanied by a threat or promise does not render a confession involuntaryid: 11281
Exhortation by defendant's wife at the jail to tell the truth did not implicate the Fifth Amendment.Defendant waived his Miranda rights but continued to maintain that he had no involvement in the shooting. His wife visited him in the jail, urged him to tell the truth, and not to continue shielding his friend. He then made statements to the police indicating that he was present at the shootings. He later argued his wife was a police agent who coerced him to make confessions. However, an exhortation by one's wife at the jail, to tell the truth cannot be categorized as a cognizable violation of constitutional rights.id: 11282
Failure to mention Miranda advisements and waiver in the officers' notes did not render the confession involuntarily.Defendant argued the United States and California Constitutions require the contemporaneous memorializing of Miranda advisements and waivers, and the preservation of such memorializations. In the instant case, the officers notes made no mention of an advisement or waiver. The court held that memorializing the advisements was not necessary to the determination of voluntariness.id: 11283
Harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions.By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that the harmless error rule applies to erroneously admitted coerced confessions. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented from this portion of the court's ruling. However, on other issues Justice White's opinion commanded a majority. Thus, the court held that the defendant's confession was coerced, and that the error was not harmless in this case. The Arizona Supreme Court's ruling vacating the conviction was affirmed.id: 11285
In juvenile cases as in the prosecution of adults, the People need only prove voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence.Minor argued that the voluntariness of his confession should have been evaluated under a fundamentally different standard of proof than is applicable to adult criminal defendants. However, in juvenile cases, as in the prosecution of adults, the People need only prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.id: 11286
Interrogation over a twelve hour period was not unduly lengthy and thus coercive.Defendant argued that approximately eight hours of interrogation (in five separate sessions) over a twelve hour period was unduly lengthy, and thus coercive rendering involuntary his third recorded statement. However, the interrogation took place during normal waking hours, the breaks were significant, defendant was presented with food and restroom breaks, and he never requested any break in the interrogation or asked that it be terminated. The length of time of the interrogation, in and of itself, did not render the statements involuntary.id: 11287
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245