Updated 3/4/2024Defendant was detained at gunpoint and handcuffed before the officer asked why he ran. This was custodial interrogation, and inadmissible absent Miranda warnings.id: 27397
Even though police told the minor he was not under arrest, they knew at the time of the questioning that he was a suspect in the shooting. Five officers came to this house early in the morning, and at least two wore police vests and were armed during the questioning. The minor was never told he was free to leave and it would not have been reasonable to assume he was. He was in custody for Miranda purposes and the police erred in failing to provide the warnings. The violation was prejudicial as he would have had a legitimate self-defense claim absent the Miranda-violative statements.id: 27377
Defendant was 16, had been arrested, handcuffed and shackled to the floor of an interrogation room and left alone for 90 minutes. A detective then came and told him he was free to leave. But a different detective then told him he could only leave after the police had extracted the data from his cell phone. No reasonable person would have felt free to leave at that time. The detective was required to give him Miranda advice before taking any statements.id: 25883
The interrogation was not “custodial” when it began, but it later became custodial and defendant should have received Miranda warnings when the detectives essentially told defendant that they would not leave and he could not go home until he told them the truth based on the evidence they had against him. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress defendant’s statement based on the lack of Miranda advice.id: 25786
Defendant, who was suspected of molesting three young girls, voluntarily appeared at the police station for questioning. The detective told defendant he could leave when he wanted and would not be arrested “right now.” However, the detective then closed the door and began a persistent and accusatory interrogation using classic interrogation techniques such as conveying the absolute belief that defendant was guilty and providing him with moral justification and face saving excuses for committing the crime. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes, and the failure to provide the Miranda advisement before questioning required the reversal of his convictions.id: 25480
The police station interview turned custodial when officers, before giving Miranda warnings, repeatedly accused defendant - the prime suspect in the homicide - of lying after informing him that he failed the polygraph test. The post-Miranda statements made at the police station also should have been suppressed as the “fruit” of the coercive interrogation. And statements made four days later should also have been suppressed as the product of the tainted statement where defendant was not given new Miranda warnings before the questioning resumed. The error was prejudicial in light of the prosecutor’s repeated references to defendant’s statements during closing argument.id: 24190
Following a collision, responding officers searched defendant and found two syringes. Defendant admitted they were used to inject methamphetamine and that he was on parole. The two officers then handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of the patrol car awaiting additional officers. His subsequent statements should have been suppressed due to the failure of the police to give Miranda warnings. He was in custody at that point and the officers’ questions were likely to elicit a response. The results of the “Romberg” field sobriety test should also have been suppressed. That test requires a drunk driving suspect to estimate the passage of 30 seconds and also required Miranda warnings. However, the error in denying the suppression motion was harmless in light of the other properly admitted evidence showing defendant’s intoxication. id: 22678
The prosecutor used defendant's prearrest statements to an investigating officer to impeach his testimonial account of the alleged crime. Because the officer failed to provide Miranda warnings even though defendant was handcuffed (and therefore in custody) the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that they could consider his prearrest statements only on the issue of his credibility, per CALJIC 213.1. However, the error was harmless in light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 19042
Reversing an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held that whether a suspect is in custody so as to require <i>Miranda</i> warnings is a mixed question of law and fact requiring independent federal habeas corpus review. A state court's in custody ruling does not qualify for a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) because it does not resolve a factual issue. The court acknowledged that the question of what circumstances surrounded the interrogation is distinctly factual and state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. But the question of whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave, requires the court to apply the controlling legal standard to the historical facts and thus presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent federal review. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of this new standard. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.id: 11264
The People argued that since defendant agreed to accompany the officers for questioning, and was not under formal arrest, he was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made his incriminating statements. This argument was foreclosed by the court's finding that defendant's interrogation occurred during an illegal detention. Moreover, the record disclosed no custodial reason why, once defendant had invoked his right to counsel, it was necessary to approach him again to tell him a couple of things about the investigation.id: 11257
Two officers unlocked defendant's door with a passkey, announced they were officers and entered his room. At least one of the officers had his gun drawn. A reasonable person subjected to an interrogation under these circumstances would believe that he had been deprived of his freedom in a significant way. The error was harmless where the statements defendant subsequently made were consistent with his testimony at trial and several witnesses testified as to the nature of the victim's injuries.id: 11255
Following the shooting of his wife defendant agreed to accompany police to a substation to answer questions and subsequently agreed to go downtown to the main police station for more questioning. Before questioning began at the downtown station the investigation had focused on defendant as a suspect. He was guarded by uniformed officers the entire time. He was then asked a series of questions by Officer Valle. Detective Penalosa then entered the room with additional information from the crime scene that conflicted with defendant's story. He was then advised of his Miranda rights. Under the circumstances a reasonable person would have understood that he or she was not free to leave and that he or she was in custody at the start of the downtown interview. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statements made in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The error was prejudicial where the prosecutor relied heavily on the statements.id: 11256
Updated 3/6/2024Defendant was under arrest and held in county jail for a parole violation, but was questioned about the related disappearance of the murder victim. All interactions with police after the arrest concerned the murder investigation. Defendant understood that his custody status, although technically a parole hold, was connected to the investigation. He was in custody for Miranda purposes when interrogated by police.id: 26522
The 15 year-old was convicted of the murder of her newborn baby. She argued the police erred by failing to provide Miranda advisements when they asked her to participate in a reenactment to support her claim of an accidental killing. However, the reenactment occurred in the minor’s apartment with her parents present. The officer was not confrontational, said she did not have to participate and was free to leave. The minor was not in custody and no Miranda requirements were necessary.id: 26106
The minor was found to have murdered his younger sister. The statements made by the juvenile constituted custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings where the 12 year-old’s father agreed to the interview (raising an inference that he expected I.F. to answer the questions), I.F. was separated from his father (increasing the feeling of isolation), and the officers used coercive interrogation techniques. The next interview was also custodial given the additional fact that the boy’s father repeatedly urged him to confess. The fact that the minor’s father was also the father of the victim did not create an intolerable conflict of interest, although it was a circumstance to consider on the Miranda issue.id: 25527
The officers told defendant at the hospital that they were taking him the to the detective bureau because they wanted to talk to him there and he said, “Fine.” Defendant later claimed he was in custody at the time of the statement which required Miranda advisements, and that his response, ‟Fine,” was an acquiescence to the officers’ show of force. Moreover, he was transported in a locked cage in the back of a patrol car. However, the facts show a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have believed he was free to leave the interview so there was no error in failing to give the Miranda warnings.id: 24073
The police properly detained defendant during a search of the suspected drug house pursuant to a warrant. Before giving Miranda advisements the police asked if everything in the residence was his and he said it was. Contrary to defendant’s claim, admission of his statement did not violate Miranda principles because he was not in custody, even though he sat handcuffed in the residence. While he was temporarily detained during the execution of the warrant to prevent flight or minimize the risk of harm to the officers, he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. id: 23692
The minor was not in custody for Miranda purposes where the police were investigating a reported assault and the minor’s mother invited the officers inside their home. The officer said he was looking to get all sides of the story from the three youths. There was no objective indicia of arrest and the questioning was not prolonged or aggressive.id: 22742
On the day of the killing, a police officer talked to defendant briefly in his trailer, which lacked heat, and asked if he could continue the talk in the patrol car. The officer was armed and in uniform but he never drew his weapon, searched or handcuffed defendant. Defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. He was also not in custody later when transported to the police station for an interview by an officer who left the interview room door open and told defendant he was not under arrest, but the police were looking for information since he was the last person to have seen the victim.id: 22055
Defendant was placed in the back seat of the patrol car where he was told he was being “detained” until the detectives could interview him. An officer then let defendant out of the car, walked him to the rear of the vehicle and asked him what happened. Assuming defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes while in the car, he was not in custody at the time of questioning. Miranda warnings were not required.id: 22045
The minor appeared voluntarily at the police department (with his foster mother), was expressly told during the interview that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time, and was questioned for only 15 - 20 minutes, while his foster mother was in the next room with the door open. Under those circumstances, he was not "in custody" and Miranda warnings were not required.id: 18787
In finding that defendant was in custody for purposes of determining whether the police erred in failing to give him Miranda warnings, the Ninth Circuit relied on defendant's age (17) at the time of the interrogation. After rejecting the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that defendant was in custody, the Supreme Court explained that the determination whether a suspect is in custody is an objective test. Without definitively stating that a suspect's age can never enter into the determination whether a suspect is in custody, it found that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that the state court's conclusion that the suspect was not in custody was unreasonable.id: 17924
Miranda warnings were not required for the defendant who was
interrogated at the police station and escorted by police when he went to the bathroom. He was repeatedly told he was free to leave and was taken home after the questioning which showed he
was not in custody when questioned. The court reached this conclusion even using the assumption that defendant's youth, low intelligence and developmental disability were relevant to the question of whether a reasonable person in his circumstances would feel free to leave.id: 19615
Defendant, an inmate in the jail, was questioned by officers about an incident that took place in jail. However, he was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes at the time of his questioning since he was told he could leave the interview at any time and a reasonable person in his situation would have realized he could leave the interview even though he was incarcerated at the time.id: 19549
Detectives asked defendant to come to the station for an interview. They told him he was being interviewed voluntarily and was not under arrest or the focus of their suspicion. He was told he could have a friend drive him to the station, and that a friend could (and did) drive him home afterwards. Defendant argued that as a parolee he would reasonably consider himself a suspect in the deaths of two acquaintances, and that his handcuffing by the parole officer led him to believe he was compelled to give the interview. Even though temporarily restrained a reasonable person in defendant's situation would have believed he was free to leave, and a Miranda warning was not required.id: 17934
An officer encountered defendant at the gate to the backyard of Jane Doe's house where defendant often did repair work. The officer confirmed defendant's identification and casually asked if he knew why the officer was there. When the officer mentioned two girls accused defendant of molesting them, defendant asked "where is the evidence." No weapon was drawn, defendant was not informed he was under arrest, and defendant voluntarily responded without indicating a desire to remain silent. Moreover, the remark was made in a public place with no restraint placed on defendant's freedom of movement. This was not a coercive atmosphere in which a reasonable person would believe he was under arrest. The trial court properly concluded defendant was not in custody for purposes of the Miranda requirement. id: 17166
Police violated Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, by reinitiating conversation with a defendant who had first waived and then invoked his right to counsel at a police station interrogation. Defendant confessed to the murder of his wife. Thereafter, they released defendant but visited his home two days later. They assured him he would not be arrested and did not re-Mirandized him. He then provided a more detailed version of the assisted suicide story. The police then left as promised. He was later charged with murder. Edwards was not violated by the interrogation at defendant's home where he was recontacted by the police after a break in custody which gave him reasonable time, while free from coercive custodial pressures, to consult counsel. Moreover, since defendant was not rearrested before requestioning at home, but was reinterviewed in a noncustodial setting, new Miranda advisements were not required. Further, by releasing and then reapproaching defendant the police were not involved in an improper ruse or pretext. Finally, the home interview was not the tainted product of the earlier Edwards violation since the earlier statement was not coerced, and the two day interval between interviews further attenuated any taint.id: 16976
Evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant was not "in custody" at the time of the questioning. Initially, defendant sat unguarded in a public waiting room at the police station. The fact that he was questioned in the polygraph room did not require a finding of custody, especially where defendant signed a formal advisement stating that the questioning was voluntary. Under the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.id: 15664
Defendant was being treated by paramedics following a shooting. A police officer then entered the ambulance. He did not intend to arrest defendant, but sought only to find out what happened. He did not know how defendant was involved. The entire conversation lasted only a couple of minutes during which the paramedics continued their work. The questioning by the officer did not constitute custodial interrogation for <i>Miranda</i> purposes because defendant was not "in custody."id: 15665
A police officer questioned the minor about a recent rock throwing incident. When the questioning began the minor had been released from the temporary restraints he experienced while the officer tended to another aspect of his investigation. The minor was never told he would be arrested. In fact, he was told he need not answer the questions. The encounterer lasted 15-20 minutes and the officers left without arresting the minor (who they arrested 6 weeks later). The court did not err in admitting the minors statement acknowledging his involvement in the crime. The statement was not taken in violation of the <i>Miranda</i> requirement because it was not the product of custodial interrogation.id: 15666
Officers had information the murder victim was last seen talking to an ice cream truck driver. They interviewed one driver whom they suspected and sent another officer to defendant's house to see if he would come to the station for an interview. Officers stated they considered defendant a witness and not a suspect. When the officer arrived at defendant's house his gun was in his hand but not pointed at anyone. Defendant was invited not commanded to come to the station and was given the option of driving his own car. He was interviewed in a locked room but there was no evidence that he felt he could not ask to leave. During the interview defendant mentioned a turquoise car that officers believed to be connected to the murder. At this point they stopped the interview and advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation before he mentioned the turquoise car.id: 11258
Officer in an area known for curb service drug sales observed defendant contact four vehicles and exchange something with the occupants. Officer then approached defendant, asked him for identification, and asked if he was selling dope. Defendant admitted possessing dope for his personal use and when asked by the officer where it was located, defendant pointed to his pocket. He argued the court erred in denying the motion to suppress the marijuana taken from his pocket because, at the time of the admission he was the subject of custodial interrogation, which triggered the officer's duty to give Miranda advisements. However, defendant was not arrested or led to believe the encounter was anything but a brief stop. He was not told he was the focus of an investigation and was unaware of the officer's suspicions or that the officer had been watching him. Defendant was not in custody and Miranda warnings were not required.id: 11259
Officers talked to appellant who was at the scene of the murder. They escorted him to the police station for further questioning although they did not treat him as a suspect. The questioning of appellant at the station was extensive and included many inquiries concerning his drug use and money habits, as well as one pointed question regarding his complicity in the crime. Although the questions were detailed, they were not accusatory in nature. Therefore, the questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.id: 11260
Officers received a call indicating a man had threatened his neighbor with a gun. Officers arrived at the address provided and through a screen door told a man fitting the description given that they were investigating a complaint that he had brandished a weapon and threatened his neighbor. Defendant told officers he pointed the gun, but that it was unloaded. The officers' questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation. Defendant was not in custody nor was he prevented from simply returning to his house's interior without speaking to the officers.id: 11261
Nebraska police officers were told that a green Doge van with California plates was full of marijuana. Officers spotted the van in a hotel parking lot and knocked on defendant's door. Officers asked defendant who he was and whether he owned the van. He said yes and was arrested for possession of marijuana. No Miranda advisements had been given. The statements were properly admitted because the questioning was noncustodial. The inquiry was brief and nonaccusatorial. It was not accompanied by traditional indicia of arrest and defendant freely consented to the officers' entry.id: 11262
Officer knew defendant was a boyfriend of the murder victim and was also an ex-convict. Defendant was handcuffed in the parole office when the officer arrived. The handcuffs were removed and defendant was transported to the police station although the officer stated defendant would have been free to leave if he had desired. Defendant stated he did not feel he was free to leave the interview room and go home. Defendant was never read <i>Miranda</i> advisements and the interview was tape recorded. <i>Miranda</i> warnings were not required because defendant agreed to come to the police station for an interview and was told that he was not under arrest but that any statements would be evaluated by the district attorney.id: 11263
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of whether the individual is in custody for purposes of <i>Miranda</i>. The court said its prior cases make it clear, in no uncertain terms, that any inquiry into whether the interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being questioned (assuming those suspicions remain undisclosed) is not relevant. Accordingly this case was remanded to the California Supreme Court to determine whether, based on the objective circumstances, the defendant was in custody during the interrogation.id: 11265
Officers were investigating a report of several youths throwing rocks at cars. Defendant was in a group of youths fitting the description, in the same area and walking away as though attempting to avoid detection. An officer stopped the entire group and questioned them all at once. He recognized defendant was a gang member and asked him about an object in his pocket. The length and form of the questioning amounted to preliminary investigation as opposed to custodial interrogation and <i>Miranda</i> warnings were not required.id: 11250
Officer was investigating a car accident and was told by a witness that defendant left the driver's side of the vehicle and walked across the street. The officer then approached defendant and asked whether he was the driver. No Miranda advisements were necessary at this point. Defendant was not stopped by the police and the police exerted no extra effort to detain him. The questions about defendant's identity and whether he was driving did not transform the accident investigation into custodial interrogation.id: 11251
In analyzing the question whether a defendant is in custody for the purpose of determining if <i>Miranda</i> advisements should be given, the subjective impressions of police officers regarding the defendant's custody status or status as a suspect are irrelevant unless they were communicated to the defendant. In the instant case the beliefs of the police were not communicated to the defendant and he was not in custody for <i>Miranda</i> purposes. He was admitted to the jail section of the police department through locked doors. However, there was no evidence a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The officer told him he was being interviewed as a possible witness, rather than suspect. He was under no restraint in the interview room which had tables and chairs but no bars. Finally, the questioning was not accusatory. <i>Miranda</i> warnings were not required.id: 11252
Defendant argued that since he was taken into custody at the border his statements to the CHP officer were taken in violation of <i>Miranda</i> requirements. Defendant was detained in the customs office for over an hour. However, the length of the delay was caused by the time it took the CHP officer to arrive at the San Ysidro Port of Entry. Although defendant was detained in the customs office he was not in custody for <i>Miranda</i> purposes. He was not under arrest. He was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the detention. The record did not establish how many customs officials were present. Finally, there was nothing overbearing about the officer's demeanor and the questioning was not compulsive.id: 11253
Defendant was present at his house when officers came to take a young pregnant girl into protective custody. Defendant was told that he was not under arrest. He was not handcuffed or physically restrained. The officer merely asked him who resided at the house and questioned him about the ownership of the marijuana plants. Under the circumstances, defendant was not in custody and no Miranda warnings were required.id: 11254