Interrogation after Counsel is Obtained (Massiah)
Category > Interrogation after Counsel is Obtained (Massiah)
Supreme Court holds that Massiah violation occurs at time of interrogation.In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment bars the State from deliberately eliciting statements about a charged offense from an indicted defendant when the defendant’s counsel is not present. In Massiah and its progeny, however, the Court did not resolve the question whether the Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the State elicits the statement or when the statement is introduced at trial. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by six other Justices, held that “the Massiah right is a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of interrogation.” Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.id: 21417
The prosecutor violated defendant's Massiah rights and likely committed misconduct by interrogating defendant after the complaint was filed, but the failure to object forfeited the issue on appeal.The prosecutor violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah by interrogating her concerning the subject matter of a felony complaint previously filed against her. However, defendant's failure to object at trial precluded appellate review of the issue. Moreover, while the interrogation may be viewed as prosecutorial misconduct, it was not so egregious as to justify outright dismissal of the charges. Finally, reversal of the conviction was not required due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to the use of the statement at trial because it was impossible to conclude on the face of the record that trial counsel lacked a tactical reason for failing to object.id: 18853
Statements obtained in violation of Massiah may not be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant.Following his arrest for rape, the defendant was told the victim wanted to speak with him so he telephoned her from the jail. The victim recorded the conversation during which the defendant admitted the rape. Because he had invoked his right to counsel, defendant later moved to suppress the statements on the ground they violated the Sixth Amendment. The statements should have been suppressed because the victim was working for the public and was paid with a hotel room at taxpayer expense. Moreover, the statements obtained in violation of Massiah may not be used to impeach the testimony of the defendant.id: 11389
Statements were inadmissible under Massiah where government agent actively engaged petitioner in conversation by impersonating an assassin and making inquiries as to petitioner's plan.Petitioner's cellmate contacted the district attorney's office and informed them of petitioner's statements regarding his desire to find a hit man to eliminate a possibly troublesome witness in his murder case. A district attorney's investigator then impersonated a hit man and arranged two telephone conversations with petitioner where petitioner made incriminating statements. Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where the government agent actively engaged him in conversations by impersonating an assassin and making inquiries as to defendant's plan. The error was prejudicial where the statements represented the strongest evidence against petitioner.id: 11392
Statement taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment itself, rather than a prophylactic rule designed to ensure voluntariness may not be used for impeachment.Officer, as head of the jail's classification unit went to talk with appellant and confronted him regarding threats made by appellant to a witness. Appellant admitted making the threats. The statement, taken after appellant was indicted, and without any waiver of his right to counsel, simply and unequivocally violated the Sixth Amendment. The trial court erred in permitting use of the statement for impeachment purposes. Although a statement taken in violation of a prophylactic rule may be used for impeachment, a statement taken in violation of the Constitution may not. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 11239
Updated 2/24/2024There was no Sixth Amendment Massiah violation where police recorded a statement defendant made to a jailhouse snitch regarding the murder after defendant had invoked his right to counsel on an unrelated federal charge.Defendant challenged the admission of his recorded statement with a jailhouse snitch. He argued that even though he had not yet been charged with the murder, he had invoked counsel on a federal charge for a money licensing violation, and admitting the statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, the right to counsel did not apply where the two offenses were unrelated.id: 26724
Updated 2/7/2024There was no Massiah violation where the inmate who elicited the incriminating statements was acting on his own rather than as a governmental agent. Defendant argued the incriminating statements elicited by a jail inmate outside the presence of his counsel was a Massiah violation. However, while there was some evidence showing the inmate was looking to trade the information seeking a deal with the prosecutor, there had been no discussion of such a deal, he was operating on his own and was not a government agent at the time the statements were made.id: 27219
Admission of defendant’s jailhouse confession to his cellmate did not violate Massiah where the cellmate was not acting at the direction of the deputies. Defendant argued the trial court committed Massiah error by allowing the testimony of his cellmate describing defendant’s incriminating statements. However, nothing in the record showed that the informant acted under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting agreement. The deputy did not ask the cellmate to do anything and did not promise any benefit for the information he would provide. The fact that the cellmate solicited information and the government knew about it did not establish a de facto agency relationship for Massiah purposes. Moreover, the statements were not testimonial and their admission did not violate the confrontation clause.id: 25479
There was no Massiah violation where the prosecution used a statement made by defendant to a jail informant that was not a product of a deal struck with police.Defendant argued a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah based on statements made after his arrest to a person in his jail cell who had provided the information to the police. Defendant argued the informant was motivated to cooperate because he was also a suspect in the shootings. However, the record did not show the detective encouraged the informant to help himself by reporting defendant’s statements. The officer simply provided an opportunity for the suspect to talk by suggesting “my door is always open.” id: 21661
Statements made after defendant reported threats to correctional officers during the intake interview were not involuntary and did not violate Miranda or Massiah.During a routine prison intake interview, defendant reported threats to his safety. When the officers questioned him about the source of the threats, he made incriminating statements. The statements were not coerced. Moreover, they were analogous to statements admitted under the "booking exception" to the Miranda requirements. Finally, they were not deliberately elicited by the officers and did not violate Massiah.id: 23075
There was no Massiah violation where the inmate receiving defendant’s notes was not a government agent. Defendant argued the trial court committed Massiah v. U.S. (1964) 377 U.S. 201, error by admitting evidence of defendant’s written statements in the jail (kites) because they were surreptitiously obtained by a government informant. However, the inmate who received the kites, had not previously been an informant and was not a government agent at the time. He did not become an agent for Massiah purposes simply because he began a debriefing process with prison authorities to end his gang affiliation before he met defendant. id: 22497
Miranda warnings were not required where an inmate wearing a wire spoke with defendant about the murders which had not yet been charged.A fellow inmate wore a wire which recorded his conversation with defendant while they were being transported in a sheriff’s van. Assuming the inmate was acting as a government agent, Miranda warnings are not required whenever a suspect converses with someone who happens to be an agent. Miranda forbids coercion not strategic deception, and although defendant misplaced his trust in the inmate, his statements were voluntary. Moreover, the questioning did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right under Massiah because he had not yet been charged with the murders at the time of the conversation.id: 22323
Supreme Court finds post-charge statement obtained by jailhouse informant admissible to impeach defendant.After defendant had been charged with murder, police officers put a confidential informant in his cell. The informant elicited from defendant an admission that he had committed the murder. At trial, defendant testified that his accomplice committed the murder. Although the State conceded that the defendant’s statement had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to use the statement to impeach defendant’s testimony. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that a statement obtained by a confidential informant in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies at trial. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.id: 21416
Police did not violate defendant's right to counsel where, after his invocation of the Sixth Amendment right on the Missouri offense, he was questioned regarding the California murder. Defendant was jailed in Missouri and charged with a crime. His
California attorney advised him by telephone that he should not discuss the case with anyone. There was no Sixth Amendment violation in later questioning regarding the capital crime in
California since that right is offense-specific and applies only as to offenses for which criminal proceedings have formally begun.id: 19790
Defendant was properly impeached with statements from a pretext call with his daughter which predated the attachment of his right to counsel.Defendant argued that impeachment with his statements from a pretext call with his daughter violated his constitutional rights to silence and counsel since she deliberately acted as a police agent to secure incriminating statements from him. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the language of
Siebert v. Missouri (2004) 542 U.S. 600, about police questioning that intentionally violates Miranda, did not put an end to the impeachment exception set forth in Harris v. New York
(1971) 401 U.S. 222. Moreover, there was no violation of Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, since defendant's daughter made the pretext call eight days before he was charged with the crime.id: 19283
There was no Massiah violation in allowing the testimony of a jailhouse informant who acted on her own initiative.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to suppress statements defendant made to an inmate who was in jail on a parole violation. Officials were aware of the informant's practice, while in custody, of engaging in mock fortune telling with playing cards as a means of gathering statements. However, the evidence showed the informant acted on her own initiative and there was no showing that authorities had encouraged her to gather or supply information, or that she would benefit from doing so. She was therefore not a police agent and there was no Massiah error in allowing her testimony.id: 18057
There was no Massiah violation where police enlisted an informant to speak with defendant while the case was still in the investigatory phase.Defendant argued the police violated his Massiah rights by using an informant to elicit incriminating statements from defendant at the deli. Although formal charges had not been filed, the police had the deli surrounded and they were in the process of executing search warrants at defendant's residence and club. However, there was no Sixth Amendment violation since the prosecution was still in the investigatory, fact-finding stage when it enlisted the help of an informant to talk with the defendant. The right to counsel had not yet attached.id: 17999
The commencement of extradition proceedings is not enough, by itself, for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach.Defendant moved to suppress a statement he made at the Utah jail where he was held pending extradition to California. He argued that, because he was represented by Utah counsel for purposes of the extradition proceedings, the prosecutor's questioning in the absence of an attorney constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah. However, the commencement of extradition proceedings is not enough, by itself, for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach.id: 17812
There was no Massiah violation in questioning defendant who was represented on the capital charges about an uncharged stabbing in the jail.When defendant was interviewed regarding the uncharged jailhouse assault, counsel had already been appointed to represent him. The questioning did not constitute a Massiah violation where there was no discussion as to the charged capital offense and defendant was offered and waived the assistance of counsel before any questioning concerning the jailhouse stabbing. Defense counsel was not ineffective at the penalty phase in failing to object to the introduction of the statements made.id: 17414
There was no Massiah violation where police assisted defendant's girlfriend in recording inculpatory phone conversations based on her fear of threats, while defendant was represented by counsel in a murder case.Defendant argued his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the police arranged for his girlfriend to secretly record inculpatory telephone conversations while he was represented by counsel. Initially, defendant did not waive his Sixth Amendment rights by talking with his girlfriend if she was acting for the government. However, the police only facilitated the recording of the conversations by providing the equipment. There was no showing that the woman was acting as an agent of the police. Moreover, evidence supported the trial court's finding that the woman initiated contact with the police in an effort to record threats against her (in light of her possible testimony in the pending murder case) and she was therefore not an agent of the police. She undertook the interrogation on her own and the state did not impermissibly create a situation likely to induce incriminating statements. Finally, the officers did not knowingly circumvent defendant's right to counsel by participating in the recording because the right to counsel had not yet attached to the witness intimidation offense that was being investigated, even if it was closely related to the charged murder investigation.id: 16796
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to uncharged offenses that are inextricably intertwined factually with charged offenses.Defendant was charged with an auto theft in Riverside and entered a not guilty plea. San Bernardino police officers then questioned him regarding a burglary in Upland without notifying his attorney. Apparently, the keys used to take the car in Riverside were obtained during the burglary in Upland. In McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. However, many courts found there was an exception to this rule where the charged and uncharged offenses are "inextricably intertwined." The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled in Texas v. Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162, that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to uncharged offenses that are inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing the burglary charge. However, the court properly suppressed the statements and dismissed the Riverside auto theft charge.id: 16520
The minor's confession to perjury was not taken in violation of Massiah since the perjury admission which followed the dispositional hearing was unrelated to the offenses underlying the juvenile court case.At a December 3, 1997, juvenile court hearing, the minor denied charges of vandalism and assault. The Court nevertheless found the allegations true and the minor was placed in a detention camp. Several weeks later he was questioned by the police at the camp. The officers provided <i>Miranda</i> warnings. The minor admitted testifying falsely at the earlier hearing. Thereafter, a petition was filed alleging perjury. He argued the court erred in admitting his confession to perjury because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He argued the right to counsel extended through the 60 day time period to file the appeal, and during that time he should not have been interviewed in the absence of counsel. However, the perjury was unrelated to the charges of assault and vandalism for the present purpose even though the lies involved a denial of those charges.id: 15687
There was no Massiah violation where the interrogated defendant was represented by counsel in a related juvenile court proceeding.Defendant argued the interrogation violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under <i>Massiah</i>, since at the time of the interrogation, he was represented by counsel in a related juvenile court proceeding concerned with placement of his children. However, the right to counsel applies only when a person stands "accused" in a "criminal prosecution." A juvenile dependency proceeding is simply not a criminal prosecution.id: 15688
There was no Sixth Amendment violation where an inmate who was not acting under an agreement with the state continued to pass on defendant's notes in hopes of a reduced sentence.Defendant wrote notes concerning his involvement in the killings to Symkiewicz who was awaiting sentencing on another charge. These notes were passed along to the prosecutor. There was no explicit agreement between the prosecutor and Symkiewicz about a reduced sentence in exchange for the notes. While he may have hoped for leniency and ultimately received a reduced sentence, he was not a police agent. The fact that the prosecutor blocked defendant's jail transfer so that the information exchange would continue did not alter the result. The trial court properly denied defendant's Massiah motion.id: 15689
Supreme Court says for Miranda purposes, right to counsel is "offense specific."Defendant confessed to a home burglary but denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. Counsel was appointed to represent him on the burglary offense, and he was released on bail. He then confessed to his father that he killed the woman and child, and the father reported this to the police, who arrested defendant and obtained a <i>Miranda</i> waiver. Defendant then confessed to the murders. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that questioning the defendant did not violate his right to counsel because that right is "offense specific" and does not necessarily extend to "factually related" offenses. The majority adopted the test in <i>Blockburger v. U.S.</i>, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): offenses are not the same if either requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The majority thus overruled the Ninth Circuit's contrary opinion in <i>U.S. v. Covarrubias</i>, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the opinion but questioned the continued validity of <i>Michigan v. Jackson</i>, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) which held that a defendant's purported waiver of the right to counsel is invalid if the defendant has requested counsel and the police initiate interrogation in counsel's absence. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.id: 15130
The rule barring interrogation after counsel is obtained in a separate investigation, is not retroactive.In <i>Arizona v. Roberson</i>, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the 5th Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation after a suspect requests counsel in a separate investigation. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the <i>Roberson</i> rule is not retroactive to cases that became final before the date of the decision. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 12701
Defendant who initiated the conversation with police relinquished his right to have counsel present.Defendant, previously Mirandized and still possessing counsel, still independently and voluntarily contacted the detective. The detective did not re-Mirandized defendant nor did he attempt to contact defendant's attorney. He did, however, advise defendant not to make a statement without his attorney present. Defendant nonetheless proceeded to make a statement voluntarily without any interrogation or prompting whatsoever. The court reasonably found an intentional relinquishment of the right to have counsel present under the circumstances.id: 11383
Defendant's right to counsel was not violated where an undercover officer listened to his incriminating statements in the visiting room at the jail.An undercover officer met with defendant in the jail visiting room in hopes of obtaining incriminating statements regarding attempts to dissuade the victims from testifying. The meeting was arranged by an inmate who disliked defendant. On his own, and unknown to law enforcement, the inmate set up a jailhouse encounter so defendant could meet the inmate's friend who would silence the victims. When the inmate informed the D.A.'s office of the planned meeting, it was decided that an undercover officer would attend as the inmate's friend. At the meeting, defendant made incriminating statements. Under the circumstances, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated becausebery charges. The latter charges were not pending at the time of the postarraignment interrogation and no attorney had been requested or appointed to represent him on those charges. Moreover, defendant initiated the conversation about the murder himself. Because defendant had no Sixth Amendment right with respect to the uncharged crimes of robbery and murder, the use of his statement could not violate such a right.id: 11384
Evidence supported the court's finding the jailhouse informant gathered incriminating testimony from defendant before striking a deal for leniency and he was therefore not a government agent.Defendant argued his confession was involuntary. A jail inmate testified defendant told him defendant's statements to the police were voluntary. On cross-examination, the witness was impeached as a notorious jailhouse informant. Defendant argued the use of the government agent/informant violated his Sixth Amendment rights. However, the record showed any leniency provided the witness was agreed to only after his testimony and the only thing he had been promised before the testimony was safe housing when incarcerated. Therefore, the record supported the court's finding the witness gathered the information on his own initiative and he was not a state agent.id: 11385
Jailhouse informant's testimony was admissible where it was not motivated by the police and they had no prior working relationshipDefendant argued that the informant's testimony should be excluded because he was a government agent through whom the police deliberately elicited incriminating admissions in violation of defendant's right to counsel. However, absent evidence of direct motivation by the police, or of a prior working relationship between the informant and authorities from which such encouragement might be inferred, there is no basis to hold the police accountable for the informant's decision to question defendant.id: 11386
Right to counsel had not attached as to the offenses against Tina (as opposed to the offenses against Cecilia) so the recorded conversation with Tina did not violate the Sixth Amendment.Appellant was arrested on charges of child molest against Cecilia. Police subsequently tapped Tina's (another potential child molest victim's) phone and told appellant that Tina called the jail looking for him. Appellant called Tina on two consecutive days and the conversations were recorded. The first conversation mentioned Cecilia while the second did not. Appellant argued that admission of the second tape violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. At the time of the recordings, counsel had been appointed to represent appellant on charges relating to Cecilia. However, no right to counsel had attached as to the offenses against Tina and no charges were pending as to her at that time. The offenses against Cecilia did not embrace the offenses against Tina for purposes of attachment of the Sixth Amendment.id: 11387
Since defendant had not been charged at the time of the initial interviews he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.Defendant argued his statements were inadmissible because the officer failed to advise the deputy public defender who was appointed to represent defendant in the North Las Vegas matter that the officer would question defendant regarding certain capital charges in California. However, since defendant had not been charged with the capital offenses at the time of the initial interviews, he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, no Sixth Amendment violation occurs as a result of a failure to notify counsel who represent defendant in a prosecution for a separate offense of the intent to interview the defendant as a suspect in an unrelated criminal investigation when the defendant has waived his right to have counsel present during the interview.id: 11388
Statements obtained in violation of Michigan v. Jackson may be used for impeachment.In <i>Michigan v. Jackson</i>, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Supreme Court held that once a criminal defendant invokes his 6th Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of that right <197> even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards <197> is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist the Supreme Court held that statements taken in violation of the <i>Jackson</i> prophylactic rule may be used to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent testimony. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.id: 11390
Statements to police regarding uncharged crimes did not violate defendant's Massiah rights as to the charged crime.After defendant was arraigned on the Searcy murder and counsel was appointed to represent him, officers interviewed him in connection with the Golden Gate Park barrel murders. After full Miranda advisements and a waiver he gave a recorded interview. Defendant's Sixth Amendment Massiah rights did not apply to statements regarding the barrel murders because his Sixth Amendment rights had not yet attached. He argued that his uncounseled statements with respect to the barrel murders materially interfered with his right to representation on the Searcy murder charge. Although there was a pattern to defendant's crimes, they involved distinct events, different victims, and different times. He failed to show how the questioning regarding the barrel murders interfered with his right to counsel as to the Searcy crime.id: 11391
That the suspect did not know that a complaint had been filed against her did not affect the validity of the waiver of the right to counsel.Appellant argued that the <i>Miranda</i> waiver she made prior to her interview was ineffective in view of the fact that she had not been informed that a complaint for multiple murders had already been filed against her. She argued the statement was taken in violation of her 6th Amendment right to counsel. However, the fact that she may not have known that a complaint had been filed was of no significance since she knew that the victims had been murdered, that she was under arrest, and that she was speaking with homicide inspectors. The waiver of her right to counsel at the outset of the statement was a valid and knowing waiver.id: 11393
There was no Sixth Amendment violation regarding statements made to undercover officer where defendant was the focus of the investigation but proceedings on these offenses had not yet been initiated.Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the January 16 conversation with an undercover police officer arguing that the statements were taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, by January 16, the prosecution for the November 15 burglary and murder had not been commenced. By that date, criminal proceedings against him on those offenses had not been initiated. Defendant argued that by January 16, he had become the focus of the investigation into the November 15 burglary and murder. Focus, however, is insufficient. It was not helpful to defendant's position that by January 16, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached as to other offenses.id: 11394
Trial counsels's failure to investigate and raise a Massiah objection to the admission at trial of a tape recorded van conversation set up by police involving codefendants required reversal of the murder conviction.A codefendant agreed to cooperate with officers in exchange for some form of leniency. Officers arranged for the three codefendants to be transported together in a van. During the ride defendant made incriminating statements in response to codefendant's questions. The facts known to defendant's trial counsel relating to the tape recording of the van conversation should have prompted further investigation, and in light of the facts that would have been discovered following diligent investigation, trial counsel should have raised an objection to the admission of the tape recording on the ground that it was procured in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial as there was a reasonable probability that , absent the tape recording, there would have been a result more favorable to defendant.id: 11395
Trial court did not err in permitting statements taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be used for impeachment.The exclusion of a defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, from the case-in-chief sufficiently vindicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. However, when the defendant takes the stand and testifies inconsistently with those statements, protection of the truth-finding purpose of a criminal trial requires that such statements be admissible for impeachment.id: 11396
Supreme Court permits questioning on unrelated offense even after defendant invokes right to counsel during judicial proceeding.Defendant was arrested for armed robbery. He refused to waive his <i>Miranda</i> rights, but did <i>not</i> request an attorney. A deputy public defender represented him at his initial appearance. After his appearance, the police contacted him about an unrelated murder. This time he waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights, and he eventually signed a statement admitting his involvement in the murder. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's invocation of the right to counsel on the armed robbery charge was offense specific, and therefore did not apply to unrelated offenses. The majority contrasted this with the general invocation of the right to counsel in <i>Arizona v. Roberson</i>, 486 U.S. 675 (1989), where the court held that once a suspect invokes the <i>Miranda</i> right to counsel on one offense, he may not be re-approached on <i>any</i> offense unless counsel is present. Justice Kennedy concurred, suggesting that <i>Arizona v. Roberson</i> was wrongly decided. Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.id: 11365
Admission of jailhouse informant's testimony was not improper where she merely overheard conversations and was not promised anything in return for her testimony.Jailhouse informant was housed with defendants according to normal housing procedures. She was directed by the police only to keep her ears open regarding a case that had nothing to do with the defendants. The informant did not question the defendants, but merely overheard them talking. She was not promised anything in return for her testimony and stated that her only motivation was her concern for the child victims. Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the admission of the jailhouse informant's testimony.id: 11378
Admitting tape-recorded statement in which defendant refused to comply with an order to provide a handwriting sample did not violate the right to counsel.An officer contacted defendant in jail with a defense investigator present, and requested a handwriting exemplar explaining that the court had ordered defendant to produce it. He advised defendant of the adverse evidentiary consequences of refusing to comply with the order. Defendant remarked that he did not see why he should assist the district attorney in putting him away. Defendant argued the manner in which the tape-recorded statement was elicited constituted impermissible interrogation and a deliberate elicitation of an incriminating statement in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, the spontaneous or gratuitous comments made by defendant during the exchange with the officer could not be attributed to the officer's permissible attempt to obtain the handwriting sample.id: 11379
Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time of the interview there was no showing that it had been invoked.At the penalty phase of defendant's trial, an officer testified to statements defendant had made to him admitting involvement in four robberies. Defendant argued his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the officer's interrogation of him after the capital charge was filed. However, although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached in the capital case at the time of the interview, defendant failed to demonstrate that it had been invoked. The record did not show that defendant asked for a lawyer to represent him in the capital case at or before his interview. Accordingly, no Sixth Amendment violation was established.id: 11380
Cellmate was not a government agent for Massiah purposes prior to his contacting the prosecutor's office.Cellmate's initial jailhouse conversations with petitioner prior to his contacting the district attorney's office did not violate petitioner's federal or state constitutional right to counsel. The statements concerning petitioner's desire to find a hit man to eliminate a possibly troublesome witness in his murder case were not elicited improperly from him by a government agent.id: 11381
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245