Standing, Expectation of Privacy
Category > Standing, Expectation of Privacy
Updated 2/26/2024Prostitutes have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communication during sexual encounters at a client’s residence, and defendant was properly convicted of eavesdropping for secretly videotaping the encounter.Defendant was convicted of eavesdropping on or recording a confidential communication under Penal Code section 632(a). Defendant argued that recording a call with a prostitute did not violate the statute since prostitutes have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications during sexual encounters at a client’s residence. The trial court properly rejected that claim in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the eavesdropping charges on that basis.id: 27247
Defendant committed to a state hospital as an SVP had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his area in the dormitory.Defendant was committed to Coalinga State Hospital as a sexually violent predator and was found to be in possession of child pornography. He was then charged with the possession, and moved to suppress evidence claiming the CHS police conducted a warrantless search of his home - his area of the CHS dormitory. However, an SVP comittee does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his area of the CHS dormitory, and so there was no illegal search.id: 25491
Defendant could challenge the gun evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention even if he lacked an expectation of privacy in the searched car.The magistrate denied defendant’s request to suppress evidence of a gun found during the search of a car because defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. However, the defendant could properly challenge the gun evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention, even if he lacked an expectation of privacy in the searched car.id: 25420
The trial court erred by finding defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the car once he denied ownership.The trial court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion following the search of a vehicle. Defendant had standing to object to the search even though he denied owning the car, since he was carrying the keys and obviously possessed it.id: 24512
Because the fenced yard was not a public place for purposes of the weapon possession statute, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.The prosecution argued the investigatory detention was justified by the officer’s observation through a yard fence that defendant had a gun in his pocket. However, the fenced yard and porch area was not a public place within the meaning of Penal Code section 12031. Consequently, defendant’s possession of a gun in the yard could not have violated section 12031 and the officers had no reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed.id: 21122
A child living with his family has standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. All family members who reside in a home have an expectation of privacy from government intrusion in all areas of the home, even if internal family rules restrict their access to certain areas. The trial court erred in finding the minor lacked standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. Contrary to the state's claim, the inevitable discovery doctrine did not save the illegal search since the prosecutor presented no evidence showing the police would have been able to obtain a search warrant had consent (which was coerced in this case) been denied.id: 17838
Defendant had standing to challenge the legality of a search even though he denied the search took place.At a hearing on a suppression motion, a police officer testified that he searched defendant and found a gun in his waistband. The defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the search even though he denied the search took place.id: 17568
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the tarp structure that surrounded his truck, and the search of the truck was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. At a designated campsite, defendant pitched a tent–like structure that surrounded his Hummer, along with several smaller tents and an eating area. He then sold drugs from the area. The search of the Hummer was outside the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement because in order to access the interior of the vehicle the officers had to enter the tarp structure that enclosed the Hummer and defendant had a reasonable exception of privacy inside the tarp structure. The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule did not save the search because the prosecution provided no evidence showing that absent the search, defendant’s friends would have left the festival before it ended, abandoning the Hummer and its cargo to the police. id: 20674
Occupants retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room even though one of the bills used to pay for the room was counterfeit.The police entered a motel room without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances. The prosecution later sought to justify the entry by arguing the occupants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room because one of the $20 bills they used to pay the day’s rental was counterfeit. However, even if the bill was counterfeit the rental term had not expired and the occupants retained a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the police entered.id: 20625
The question of whether defendant abandoned the package, thus forfeiting his expectation of privacy, is a question of fact and evidence supported the court's finding that the package was not abandoned.The trial court suppressed evidence found as a result of a warrantless search of the contents of a package defendant mailed using a false name. The Attorney General appealed arguing defendant's use of a fictitious name forfeited any legitimate
expectation of privacy and necessarily constituted an abandonment of the package. However, whether a person abandons property it mails under a fictitious name is a question of fact and there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant did not abandon the package.id: 19606
Defendant had standing to challenge the search of a house to which he was a daily visitor, had a key, showered, did laundry, and occupied when the owners were away.Defendant had a legitimate expectation in his friends' residence at the time of the search even though he was not an overnight guest. He had a four year relationship with the owners of the house. He had a house key. He came to the house on a daily basis to visit, watch T.V., do laundry, shower and cook. He also had unlimited access to the residence when the owners were away. He essentially used the house as an adjunct to his mobile home which was located on the same property. Defendant had standing to challenge the search.id: 17620
A person who uses a false name to procure a cellular telephone has a privacy interest in his communications over that phone.Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that his conversations would be private. The expectation of privacy in the contents of the telephone conversations does not become unreasonable just because the phone was procured using an alias. However, the denial of the suppression motion was proper due to the necessity for a wiretap based upon affidavits which specifically described the conspiracy under investigation.id: 18700
Petitioner did not abandon his bag when he threw it on his car and turned to face the officer.As the officer identified himself and approached the petitioner, the petitioner threw his bag onto the hood of his car and turned to face the officer. The state argued that this constituted abandonment. In a short <i>per curiam</i> opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating that a citizen who attempts to protect his private property from inspection, after throwing it on a car to respond to a police officer's inquiry, clearly has not abandoned that property.id: 10907
An overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that an overnight guest has the same Fourth Amendment rights as a householder. Thus, the defendant's warrantless arrest in a friend's duplex was illegal under <i>Payton v. New York</i>, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which held that a suspect could not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even if there is probable cause to arrest him. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented.id: 10884
Supreme Court holds "media ride along" in executing arrest warrant violated Fourth Amendment.Police officers invited representatives of the media to accompany them when they executed an arrest warrant in a private home. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that such a "media ride along" violates the Fourth Amendment. The presence of reporters inside the home was "not related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion." The court also ruled, 8-1 that the officers were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the search. Justice Stevens dissented from this aspect of the opinion, arguing that the homeowner's right to protection against this type of trespass was clearly established long before April 16, 1992, when the search took place.id: 15137
Supreme Court holds officer's manipulation of carry-on luggage was unreasonable search.Defendant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus that was stopped for an immigration inspection at a Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Texas. The immigration inspector satisfied himself that all the passengers were lawfully in the United States, and then walked toward the front of the bus squeezing the soft luggage in the overhead bins. When he squeezed defendant's bag, he felt a "brick like" object. Defendant agreed to allow the agent to open the bag, and the agent discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine. In a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the agent's physical manipulation of the carry-on bag was an unreasonable search. When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another, but he "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Scalia.id: 15055
Babysitter has standing to challenge the warrantless search.A babysitter has standing to move to suppress the items seized at the place and during the time the babysitter sits. A property or possessory interest is not essential to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Moreover, the short-term nexus between the babysitter and the apartment did not undermine his otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy since he was present when the intrusion occurred.id: 10887
Court erred in excluding documents seized in the search to establish defendant's standing to contest the search.Defendant moved to suppress evidence resulting from a search. At the hearing on the motion, the court asked defendant to address his standing to contest the search. Defendant called the officer who executed the search warrant to testify that he found three documents bearing defendant's name: a fishing license and two checks payable to defendant. The court, characterizing the documents as hearsay, sustained the People's objection that the documents were irrelevant to standing. However, the documents were not irrelevant to standing because they had some tendency in reason to prove that defendant was residing in the apartment. Moreover, regardless of the truth of any statement contained in the documents, they were circumstantial evidence that a person with defendant's name resided in the searched apartment. Therefore, when introduced to show residency, they are admissible non-hearsay evidence.id: 10890
Court erred in relying on one statement by defendant that he lived at another address in finding that he lacked standing to challenge the search.Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the Lyell Avenue residence. At the suppression hearing the trial court erred in determining defendant's lack of standing based exclusively on his one statement giving his address as 4728 East Orleans without considering the other relevant evidence. Because the court did not consider all the evidence and precluded defendant from presenting additional evidence regarding his reasonable expectation of privacy in the Lyell Avenue address he was granted a new suppressing hearing.id: 10891
Defendant who regularly visited his former wife and children had standing to challenge the search of their residence.Defendant, though estranged from his wife at the time of the search and seizure, was still her legal husband and father of the children who resided at the house and whom he regularly visited overnight. Moreover, at least one document in his possession was addressed to him at that residence. Defendant had standing to bring a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to challenge the search and seizure of the residence.id: 10902
The right to inquire into a suspect's identity does not necessarily translate into the right to search the suspect's wallet for proof of identification.When defendant was stopped for questioning about a burglary in the neighborhood, he refused to produce identification and denied carrying a wallet. He then gave the officers a social security card and a California Bureau of Correction's identification card. The officers continued to demand a wallet which defendant eventually produced. Search of the wallet was unlawful since the police did not use the least intrusive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions. The officers ran no radio checks on the written identification card and did not question him further as to his identity except to ask for the wallet. Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the wallet and his initial reluctance to produce proof of identity did not, without more, justify searching the wallet.id: 10912
By holding defendant to answer based on the People's evidence thereby rejecting defendant's disassociation with the car the court could not deny standing to challenge to search based on the same showing.At the preliminary hearing the People offered evidence of defendant's ownership of the Cadillac and its contents as an indication of guilt. The trial court, by holding the defendant to answer on the People's evidence, thereby rejected defendant's attempt to disassociate himself from the car. The court erred in then finding the defendant lacked a standing to challenge the search based on his disavowing ownership in the car.id: 10888
Condo guest with unencumbered access to the premises had standing to challenge the search.Defendant was authorized to stay at the condo for at least three or four days, enjoyed unencumbered access to the premises, stayed overnight there, had joint control and supervision of the bathroom where the methamphetamine lab was located, and through his actions exhibited a subjective belief that he would be free from governmental intrusion. Such factors gave him standing to challenge the denial of the motion to suppress. The failure by defendant to close a locked door did not dispel the reasonableness of his privacy expectations.id: 10889
Defendant demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked tool box located in the motel room of his friend.Defendant had placed a padlocked tool box in the locked motel room of his friend. Although he was not present when the search was conducted, he was in relatively close proximity, had a key to the premises, and left the tool box in the unoccupied and locked room. He demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the tool box. The erroneous denial of his suppression motion based on the court's finding that he did not have standing to object to the search of the tool box required reversal of his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale.id: 10892
Officer's observation into house from a side yard window where he had no legal right to be constituted an illegal search.Police looked through a window and observed defendant packaging cocaine in his home. The officers made this observation while standing in defendant's side yard, a place they had no legal right to be. Defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy over his activities, and the officers' observation of him was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Since there was no justification for dispensing with the search warrant requirement the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence gained from the search.id: 15604
Updated 3/4/2024Defendant lacked standing to contest the search of another person’s cell phone.Defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of another person’s cell phone and he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data transferred to the searched phone.id: 28140
Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as to a video he posted on social media after a robbery. The trial court did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by admitting a video defendant posted on social media where the detective obtained the video without a warrant by portraying himself as a friend to gain access to defendant’s social media account. Defendant voluntarily shared the video of himself wearing the stolen chain with social media friends. He assumed the risk that the account for one of his “friends” could be an undercover profile for a police detective or that any other “friend” could share the information with the police. The ECPA did not apply because the state did not seek to compel access to an electronic device or information on the device.id: 26038
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder associated with the peer-to-peer network. The evidence leading to defendant’s arrest was obtained when police used software that targets peer-to-peer file-sharing networks to identify IP addresses associated with known digital files of child pornography. Defendant argued the use of this software violated his Fourth Amendment rights by infringing on his reasonable expectation of privacy on his computer. However, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder associated with peer-to-peer network.id: 24951
Any error the court made in finding defendant lacked standing to challenge the search was harmless given that the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant.Defendant argued the trial court erred by finding he lacked standing to challenge a search of the trunk of a car parked on the front lawn of his house. However, even if defendant had standing to raise the claim, the court’s error caused no harm because the car’s trunk was searched under the authority of a warrant. id: 25127
Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of envelopes an employee from a private mail receiving company spontaneously showed to police.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, including the name of his cell phone carrier and records subsequently obtained from the carrier, after an employee at a private mail facility displayed to investigating officers the exterior envelope of a bill addressed to defendant from the carrier. However, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the outside of envelopes addressed to him when the employee removed them from his postal box. The officers did not search the postal box or direct the clerk to reveal its contents - the clerk spontaneously presented the envelopes to the police.id: 21121
The use of GPS technology in determining the location of the stolen cell phone, and thus assisting in locating defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The police did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by using a Global Positioning System (GPS) to locate a stolen cell phone and detain defendant. There is no Fourth Amendment violation when the information generated by the GPS, with the owner’s consent, is only a part of the objective reasons leading up to the decision to detain. id: 23215
Admission of evidence obtained from the warrantless seizure of the sensing diagnostic module of defendant’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. She argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of the sensing diagnostic module (SDM) taken from her impounded vehicle. The vehicle was an instrumentality of the crime and was lawfully seized. The data taken from the SDM included the speed at which defendant was driving and whether she applied the brakes before impact. She had no expectation of privacy regarding this information as others could have observed these facts. There was no Fourth Amendment violation in admitting the SDM evidence.id: 23066
Defendant, who was trespassing on public land did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “curtilage” area outside of his tent. Defendant was a homeless person who had set up a campsite on secluded public land. He challenged a warrantless search of his campsite, specifically a box of shotgun shells from a tarp “immediately surrounding” his tent. He claimed the tarp was within the “curtilage” of his campsite and was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. However, defendant was camping in a prohibited area. The area around his tent was not within a defined residential curtilage in which defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.id: 22787
Defendant who ducked into a friend’s house when police were approaching did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that house that would allow him to challenge the warrantless entry by police.When defendant noticed that police officers were approaching him, he avoided them by entering the home of a friend. Though the officers lacked a warrant, they followed defendant into the house and found him in the bathroom trying to dispose of drugs. The trial court erred by granting defendant’s suppression motion because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the house at the time of the warrantless entry. It did not natter that he was a social guest in the house on numerous occasions. His presence inside the locked bathroom did not change that result.id: 22138
A subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. A subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. Therefore, defendant could not properly challenge a warrant requiring his Internet provider to identify him through his Internet Protocol (IP) number. Moreover, that Time Warner filed a letter rather than a declaration “verifying the authenticity of its records” pursuant to Penal Code section 1524.2 did not provide defendant an exclusionary relief remedy.id: 22180
The passenger in a stopped vehicle is not "seized" under the Fourth Amendment absent circumstances showing he or she was the subject of the investigation or the officer's show of authority.When a police officer directs the driver of a vehicle to pull
over for a traffic stop, but in effecting the stop, gives no indication that the passenger of the vehicle is the focus of the officer's investigation or show of authority, the passenger is not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.id: 19128
The officer’s observation of the gun by looking over a six-foot fence did not constitute a search and his entry into the yard to retrieve the gun was justified by exigent circumstances.The officer investigating a domestic disturbance, got no response at the front door of the house, and went to the side gate attempting to contact the defendant. From there, the officer standing on his toes and using a flashlight, looked over the six-foot wooden fence and saw a gun next to the sliding glass door. The officer’s observation from over the fence did not constitute a search since he did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, his subsequent entry into the yard to retrieve the revolver was justified by exigent circumstances, especially given the officer’s knowledge that a seven year-old child lived in the residence.id: 20291
The officer did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when he entered the home with a real estate agent as a prospective buyer. A police officer posed as a prospective homebuyer in order to go with a real estate agent inside a home that was listed for sale. While inside, the officer was able to corroborate details given to him by the informant and, armed with this information, later to obtain a warrant enabling him to search the home for drugs. He did not tell the real estate agent his real reason for wanting to see the home. However, the officer’s deceit did not violate the homeowner’s legitimate expectation of privacy and his actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. id: 20570
Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own car (which the police seized and installed a GPS tracking device) in light of his efforts to dissociate himself from the car. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after police seized his car and installed a GPS tracking device which allowed it to subsequently track the car. However, defendant did not have a legitimate privacy interest in his car because he disassociated himself from the vehicle to avoid having it connected to him in the event it was stopped during its use in drug trafficking.id: 20208
Defendant had no expectation of privacy as to a cell phone he abandoned at the scene of a robbery.Defendant argued the detective performed an unlawful search when he removed the battery from defendant's cell phone to find identifying numbers. However, defendant left his phone unattended at a public place. He fled the scene of the robbery and made no attempt to retrieve the phone realizing that to associate himself with it would be incriminating. All objective indications were that the phone was abandoned, and the defendant therefore relinquished any expectation of privacy with respect to it.id: 18792
Appellant's earlier possessory interest in the contraband did not give him standing to contest the search of codefendant's business.Appellants did not have standing to join in the suppression motions regarding the search of codefendant's business since they did not have a possessory interest in the contraband at the time of the search.id: 10886
There was no search of the minor's gym locker within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment since the students only had an expectation of privacy in the lockers while they were in PE class and the minor had been removed from PE class before the items were removed from the locker.The minor argued an anonymous tip could not provide a reasonable suspicion for a search of his locker by school officials. However, the locker in question was a gym locker in which students were permitted to store their belongings only while they were in PE class. Because the minor had been removed from his PE class, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sense that his personal belongings could remain in the gym locker. The officers' actions in directing the minor to remove his objects from the locker was not a search of the locker, it was simply an order that he comply with a known school rule. It was irrelevant that the police rather than the minor actually removed the items from the locker.id: 18020
There was no Fourth Amendment violation where defendant voluntarily called the Secret Witness program seeking a reward for information relating to his crimes and police monitored later calls.A private service organization in Shasta County set up the Secret Witness program to help police investigate crimes. Citizens would report crimes with the possibility of receiving a reward. Defendant called the program to discuss three murder victims. He later moved to suppress all evidence resulting from his phone calls, including evidence of his identity as the caller. Defendant initially argued the police violated the guarantee of anonymity by taping his phone calls and following him. However, the early calls were not recorded and the police only became involved once defendant became a suspect in the crimes. Next, the program only guaranteed anonymity to witness, not criminals or tipsters providing information on their own crimes. Moreover, any subjective expectation of privacy harbored by defendant was objectively unreasonable.id: 17302
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hiding place in the back yard of an apartment complex.
Police entered the back yard of a multi-unit apartment complex, lifted a piece of wood from the ground and found drugs in the hole beneath the wood. Defendant argued he had an expectation of privacy in the hole in the back yard. This would be true if the hole was in the back yard of a private residence. However, people have a diminished expectation of privacy in the yard of an apartment complex where the grounds are accessible to all occupants.id: 16759
Police did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by entering a neighbor's yard without permission and observing marijuana growing in his backyard by looking over an adjoining fence.Defendant argued the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his neighbor's yard without permission and observing the marijuana plants growing in his backyard by looking over an adjoining fence. However, defendant's rights stopped at his backyard fence because the plants were visible from his neighbor's property and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in what could be seen from there. Thus, the search did not violate his constitutional rights.id: 16742
A search warrant was not required to install a surveillance meter to monitor electrical consumption at defendant's house.Defendant argued the utility pole was located within the curtilage of his house and that he had an expectation of privacy in all things within the curtilage. However, defendant demonstrated no expectation of privacy in the utility pole, wires, or transformers which were owned by the utility company and in plain view. Moreover, the technology used here did not peer inside defendant's house or otherwise penetrate its inner sanctum. A search warrant was not required to install and monitor the surveillance meter on the utility pole standing in defendant's back yard.id: 15601
Defendant had no expectation of privacy in a plastic bag placed on top of a wall next to his mother's home.Defendant visited his mother in New Mexico after the killing, and he appeared to be on drugs. He offered to sell her jewelry. She saw him put something in a plastic bag and place it in a cinder block on top of a wall separating his mother's backyard from other property. His mother called the police. Defendant's mother had authority to consent to the search of her property and to direct police to the bag. Defendant essentially abandoned the items. He failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the contents of the bag.id: 15602
Defendant who was not legitimately on the premises lacked standing to challenge the search.Defendant used a stolen credit card to register as a guest at a hotel. The trial court properly determined she lacked standing to challenge the search and denied the motion to suppress evidence. The only factor that supported defendant's claim of standing was that she closed and locked the door to her room. However, the crucial factor that worked against her was her lack of a property or possessory interest in the room because she was not legitimately on the premises.id: 15603
Supreme Court holds defendants who were present in apartment only for commercial purpose of bagging cocaine had no expectation of privacy.Defendants were sitting in an apartment with the lessee of the apartment, bagging cocaine. A police officer saw them through a drawn window blind. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officer's viewing was an unlawful search. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendants had no expectation of privacy. They were "essentially present for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours." There was no suggestion that they had a previous relationship with the lessee of the apartment or that there was any other purpose to their visit. Because they had no legitimate expectation of privacy, the majority did not decide whether the officer's observation was a "search." Justice Kennedy concurred separately, as did Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Breyer argued that the defendants <i>did</i> have an expectation privacy, but concurred in the judgment on the ground that the officer's observation was not a "search." Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, arguing that the defendants <i>did</i> have an expectation of privacy, but that the officer's viewing them was not a search. Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas joined the court's opinion but concurred separately. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, arguing that even a business guest "should share his host's shelter against unreasonable searches and seizures."id: 15139
Supreme Court permits warrantless seizure of car on probable cause to believe it is forfeitable.Florida Police officers observed respondent using his car to deliver cocaine, giving them probable cause to believe the car was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Several months later they arrested him and seized the car without a warrant. During an inventory search, they found crack cocaine in the ashtray and charged him with possession of a controlled substance. The Florida Supreme Court found no exigent circumstances for the warrantless seizure of the car and suppressed the evidence. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed, relying on <i>Carroll v. U.S.</i>, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) which held that when officers have probable cause to believe a car contains contraband, they may search it without a warrant. The same principle applies when there is probable cause to believe that the car <i>itself</i> is contraband. Moreover, because the police seized the car from a public area - respondent's employer's parking lot - the warrantless seizure also did not invade respondent's privacy. Justices Souter and Breyer concurred, "subject to a qualification against reading our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of anything a state chooses to call 'contraband.'" Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.id: 15138
Officers' intrusion onto appellant's backyard was not unreasonable where the other options available to the officers in detaining the suspect were more intrusive.Police entry onto appellant's property to detain a third party as to whom they had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, did not unreasonably invade appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard notwithstanding that the officers had other options in dealing with the suspect because those options were more intrusive.id: 10906
Pharmacist had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the pharmacy records.Defendant was an experienced pharmacist and his premises had been inspected at least twice before. Within the past year, he had been the subject of an inquiry by the State Board of Pharmacy concerning a consumer complaint and had been visited by a Pharmacy Board inspector. He was well aware of the existence of record keeping requirements and had maintained records from previous years. Given the pervasive regulation of the pharmaceutical industry and defendant's particular familiarity with it, there was no legitimate claim that he maintained any expectation of privacy in the pharmacy records.id: 10908
Police questioning of driver after traffic stop regarding unrelated matters (small talk) did not exceed the scope of the detention as to the driver or the passenger.A typical traffic stop results in the detention of a passenger as well as the driver of a vehicle. The passenger's detention may be based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the driver or another passenger. Moreover, if a driver's detention is unlawfully prolonged, the passenger's detention is likewise unlawfully prolonged. The officer's conversation with the driver about unrelated matters took place while he was writing the ticket and did not prolong the stop. It therefore did not exceed the scope of the detention. Even if police questioning about unrelated matters could taint an otherwise permissible stop, the instant questioning was unintrusive and nonaccusatory.id: 10909
Prosecutor did not waive the issue of standing by not raising it in the municipal court.Appellant argued the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to raise the issue of standing at a special hearing in the superior court because he had waived the issue by not raising it in the municipal court. Notwithstanding the People's concession of the issue in their appellate brief, the court found the prosecutor did not waive the right to argue the issue. It was the defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who first raised the issue of standing in the superior court. Moreover, defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's argument on the standing issue thereby depriving him of making a record on the matter for appellate purposes.id: 10910
Supreme Court rejects co-conspirator standing; reverses 9th Circuit.Defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The charges arose out of the suspicionless stop of a car containing 560 pounds of cocaine. After the stop, the driver cooperated with the agents and defendants were arrested. The 9th Circuit found that several defendants had standing to challenge the stop because they were co-conspirators in an operation that indicated joint control over the place searched. In a <i>per curiam</i> opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, reiterating that a defendant has standing only if his or her own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Participants in a conspiracy may have expectations of privacy, but not because of the conspiracy. The case was remanded to consider whether each respondent had a property interest protected by the Fourth Amendment that was interfered with by the stop of the car.id: 10911
Vehicle passenger had no standing to claim that seizure of the stolen wallet violated the Fourth Amendment.The officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. After asking the passengers for identification, the officer saw appellant place a wallet containing the victim's identification under the seat. Appellant lacked standing to claim that seizure of the wallet violated the Fourth Amendment. He was merely a guest-passenger in someone else's vehicle and made no claim, possessory or otherwise, regarding the wallet, freshly stolen from the victim, nor regarding the place from which the wallet was recovered.id: 10913
A car thief has no standing to attack an allegedly illegal search and seizure of a vehicle.An auto thief has no standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car.id: 10882
A woman has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a purse left in a stolen car.One who leaves her purse in a stolen vehicle may reasonably expect someone to look in the purse to ascertain the identity of the victim or the thief. By leaving the purse in the stolen vehicle, defendant failed to take normal precautions to maintain her privacy interest in the purse and she therefore had no standing to contest a search of the purse by the officers.id: 10883
Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing standing where no evidence was presented regarding his privacy expectations at the searched residence.Because there was nothing in the preliminary hearing transcript to suggest who lived at the residence searched, the appellant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing standing to object to the search.id: 10885
Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his residence which consisted of a cardboard box located on a public street.Defendant was a homeless person who lived in a cardboard box located on a public sidewalk. He argued the search of his box without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, where an individual resides in a temporary shelter on public property without a permit or permission in violation of the law, he or she does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.id: 10893
Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the jailhouse conversation with his wife as the two talked so loudly.Defendant argued that his constitutionally cognizable expectation of privacy was violated by the Los Angeles Police Department taping of his conversation with his wife in spite of the fact that it was made in county jail. However, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant did not entertain such an expectation of privacy given that the participants talked so loudly. Defendant's reliance on Penal Code section 2600 (statutory right to privacy for prisoners) was of no help to him because the provision does not provide a suppression remedy for violations thereof.id: 10894
Defendant had no privacy interest in clothes lying on the car seat where the car owner consented to a search of the car.Defendant was a passenger in an automobile detained by police. The owner of the car gave the police consent to search the car for anything that might prove helpful in the murder investigation. Defendant conceded the owner had the authority to permit a search of the car but argued that movement and examination of defendant's clothing lying on the seat constituted a separate search for which the owner's consent was not sufficient. However, by leaving his clothes readily displayed on the seat of the car, defendant assumed the risk that the owner would consent to a search of the car and its contents. Defendant retained no legitimate privacy interest in the clothes as against the owner or the owner's invitees.id: 10895
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in loan documents submitted to institutional lenders.Appellant argued he had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the documents he submitted to the institutional lenders to obtain refinance loans. However, a potential borrower must assume the risk that the information he offers a lender, in support of a loan application, will be conveyed by the lender to the government. This is especially true where, as here, the borrower sought to defraud the lender. A defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents he offers to defraud his victim.id: 10896
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag of marijuana he placed at a distance from himself as officers approached.At the time of the officer's approach, the paper bag was already out of appellant's apparent possession and control. By placing the bag at a distance from himself, he engaged in a sort of anticipatory drop. Since there was no evidence that he attempted to reassert possession or control after the officers approached there was no objective basis on which to predicate a reasonable expectation that the bag would not be searched. Defendant, therefore, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the bag. The court erred, however, in concluding that paper bags are categorically exempt from Fourth Amendment protection. A paper bag is a container entitled to constitutional protection.id: 10897
Defendant had no standing to challenge the search of a locked suitcase located in a New Jersey residence.Defendant shipped a suitcase under another name to New Jersey. There was nothing on the suitcase that referred to defendant. The suitcase was picked up by someone at the airport in Newark and transported to the Fernandes residence. Defendant was in California when the suitcase was searched in New Jersey. Given that defendant had no right to contest a search and seizure of the Fernandes residence, she had no standing to challenge the search of a locked suitcase within that residence.id: 10898
Defendant lacked standing to challenge the legality of an auto search which, in turn, supplied probable cause for issuance of a warrant authorizing the search of her home.Police searched Mendoza's car following a plain view sighting of cocaine. Based upon the subsequent seizure of cocaine and cash from the vehicle, police obtained a warrant to search his house. Defendant, Mendoza's wife, shared the searched residence with Mendoza. Defendant sought to challenge the search warrant affidavit. However, she lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation based on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine (the poisonous tree being the automobile search) because she was not present at the time of the search and had no valid ownership or possessory interest in the car.id: 10899
Defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of a gun he had voluntarily given to his cousin.Police obtained the gun from defendant's cousin, with whom he had left it. Having voluntarily surrendered his gun to his cousin with no attempt to control or safeguard its location, defendant had no standing to complain when police obtained it from her.id: 10900
Defendant waived his right to challenge the legality of the officer's warrantless entry where he failed to object to the denial of the suppression motion on that ground.The trial court denied the Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion after finding defendant, a guest in someone else's apartment, had no legitimate expectation of privacy under an ottoman when he had put nothing under it and disclaimed any interest in what was under it. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling appellant lacked standing to object to the arresting officer's <i>illegal entry</i>. However, defendant made no such objection in the trial court and chose to only address the claimed privacy interest in what might be under the ottoman.id: 10901
Defendant, who was a visitor in the house, only had standing to challenge the seizure of his luggage.Defendant was at the residence only as a visiting guest on the day of the search. He did not attempt to show that he was involved in or had joint supervision and control of any drug operations going on at the residence. Defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence, but rather, established such expectation of privacy in his luggage and thus only had standing to challenge the search and seizure of his luggage.id: 10903
Invited visitor with no control over premises lacked standing to contest the officers' warranted entry into the apartment.Officers went to an apartment to investigate a reported narcotics violation. Henry answered the knock on the door and consented to the officers' entry. Officers observed defendant, sitting on the couch, conceal a blue container in the gap in the couch. The container was found to contain narcotics. Defendant's suppression motion was denied as he lacked standing to contest the officers' entry into the apartment. The evidence showed he came to the apartment only with Henry's permission. At most, he established his presence as an invited visitor and made no showing he was an overnight guest. He did not have control over the premises and had no legitimate expectation of privacy.id: 10904
Minor showed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the tape recorded conversation with his mother at the police interrogation room.Police surreptitiously tape recorded a conversation between a minor and his mother in an interrogation room. The record did not support the minor's Fourth Amendment claim since there was no subjective expectation of privacy as to the conversation, and any such belief would not have been objectively reasonable in the confines of a police station.id: 10905
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245