Houses, Premises
Category > Houses, Premises
Defendant committed to a state hospital as an SVP had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his area in the dormitory.Defendant was committed to Coalinga State Hospital as a sexually violent predator and was found to be in possession of child pornography. He was then charged with the possession, and moved to suppress evidence claiming the CHS police conducted a warrantless search of his home - his area of the CHS dormitory. However, an SVP comittee does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his area of the CHS dormitory, and so there was no illegal search.id: 25491
The warrantless entry into the home was not justified by the protective sweep doctrine where the domestic violence suspect was handcuffed outside and there was no evidence that anyone was inside. Police were investigating a claim of domestic violence. There was no showing that the officer was justified under the protective sweep doctrine in entering defendant’s home to conduct a search where defendant was handcuffed outside, and there was no evidence that criminal activity was taking place in the home or that defendant posed a danger especially where officers knew the alleged victim was not at home.id: 22799
A child living with his family has standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. All family members who reside in a home have an expectation of privacy from government intrusion in all areas of the home, even if internal family rules restrict their access to certain areas. The trial court erred in finding the minor lacked standing to challenge the search of his sister's bedroom. Contrary to the state's claim, the inevitable discovery doctrine did not save the illegal search since the prosecutor presented no evidence showing the police would have been able to obtain a search warrant had consent (which was coerced in this case) been denied.id: 17838
Protective sweep was not justified where the officers entered the home after lawfully detaining the suspect outside.Police stopped a suspected drug dealer behind his house, handcuffed him, and had him sit on the ground. The officers then entered the home to determine whether there was anyone inside who might be in danger. They found no one but did see a package which proved to contain cocaine. The officer's initial act of drawing his gun on defendant did not convert the detention into an arrest, nor did the use of handcuffs or making defendant sit on the ground for a few minutes. However, the officer's entry into and inspection of defendant's house was not permissible as a protective sweep under Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325.id: 18006
Absent some necessity, the community caretaking exception did not allow a warrantless entry into the home of a mentally disordered person who was detained outside the residence. Due to a flaw in the statutes, the legislative scheme does not provide a constitutionally permissible way for law enforcement to confiscate a firearm in the residence of a mentally disordered person (Welfare and Inst. Code section 5150) who is detained outside the residence. Contrary to the prosecutor’s claim, the community caretaking exception did not justify the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s residence to seize his weapons. id: 20628
Officers investigating a domestic violence incident with the suspect standing outside were not constitutionally entitled to conduct a protective sweep of the apartment. Officers responded to a domestic violence call. Olson, the male suspect was standing near a car with the apartment door open several feet away. The alleged victim was known to be
at another location. The officer testified he searched the apartment because his experience with domestic violence cases suggested there may have been danger to the officers in not conducting the protective sweep. However, without probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that there were potentially dangerous people inside the apartment, the entry violated the Fourth Amendment.id: 19291
Supreme Court requires warrant or exigent circumstances to enter home for arrest.Police officers observed activity consistent with drug dealing occurring at an apartment. They stopped a person leaving the apartment and found drugs. Because the stop occurred near the apartment, the officers feared that evidence in the apartment would be destroyed. The officers therefore entered the apartment, arrested defendant, and conducted a search. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the arrest and search because the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, reiterating the rule announced in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), that "police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home."id: 20142
An overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that an overnight guest has the same Fourth Amendment rights as a householder. Thus, the defendant's warrantless arrest in a friend's duplex was illegal under <i>Payton v. New York</i>, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which held that a suspect could not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even if there is probable cause to arrest him. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented.id: 10884
Evidence gathered from a warrantless entry of a residence after a failed suicide attempt was properly admitted under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment.When a person unsuccessfully attempts suicide in her residence with a firearm, and thereafter comes outside, the police may enter the residence to perform a “cursory search” pursuant to their community caretaking function.id: 25481
Evidence supported the robbery convictions where defendants moved in on the victims’ ATM withdrawals after the victims had entered the PIN number.Defendants waited until ATM machine customers entered their PIN numbers, and then moved in and withdrew the money. Evidence was sufficient to support the robbery convictions. Defendants argued the bank, and not the victims, possessed the money, but the victims access and control of the money in their accounts continued through the time the money was withdrawn. Moreover, the money was in the immediate presence of the victims because they were present and would have taken control of it but for the defendant’s interference. While defendants claimed they should have been charged with the more specific crime of identity theft, this was a robbery due to the force or fear used. id: 25482
The warrantless entry by the second wave responders following a valid protective sweep was proper where the police presence was uninterrupted and the recovery of a shell casing not found in plain view was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine.The trial court erred by suppressing forensic evidence seized from his home pursuant to a warrantless search conducted after he was arrested and the victim was declared dead. The first wave of responders entered the house lawfully in light of the exigent circumstances, and made certain plain view observations. The entry by the second wave responders was proper where there was an uninterrupted police presence in the house and a close-in-time successive search of areas already validly searched in order to begin processing evidence observed in plain view. Moreover, the evidence discovered that was not in plain view - a shell casing and a depression under it would inevitably have been discovered by the coroner.id: 22658
Police observations from a private driveway in a rural area did not violate the “curtilage” rule.Defendants were convicted of cultivating marijuana. They argued the police who conducted the warrantless surveillance of their property intruded upon the curtilage of that property in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. However, the police made their observations from the driveway of a property in a rural area. The evidence did not show the area of the driveway was within an enclosure surrounding the residence, although they did enter through “an opening in a fence.” Finally, no steps were taken to protect the residence from observations made from the driveway. The trial court properly found the area searched was outside the curtilage of the property.id: 21936
A missing person’s report justified the warrantless entry into the house.Exigent circumstances justified the entry into the house where the police responded to a missing person’s call after being told a woman had not been heard from after a fight with her boyfriend. The entry was necessary to determine whether the woman and her son were injured inside the house. Moreover, the evidence in plain view included an open window on a cold night, a chlorine smell, a spotless bathroom in an otherwise messy apartment, provided probable cause to search the defendant’s car which was parked in front of the apartment.id: 21123
Warrantless entry into defendant's home to effectuate a drunk driving arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the seriousness of the offense, the need to prevent the dissipation of evidence, and the fact that police spoke to defendant through an open door.A concerned citizen followed defendant who was driving dangerously and erratically. Although defendant sped away and managed to get home, the police, with the citizen's assistance, arrived a short time later. The officers outside of the house spoke to defendant who was inside and visibly intoxicated. After defendant refused to come out for a blood test, the police entered without a warrant to arrest him for drunk driving. Relying on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, the appellate court found the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entries of a home to effect a DUI arrest when the asserted exigency is to
prevent the destruction of blood alcohol evidence. However, the state's intrusion into the home was the minimum necessary to effect the arrest and only extended to areas already exposed to
public view. It was reasonable for the police to enter to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence of defendant's crime.id: 19093
Officer’s limited search through a side window of the house was justified by the reasonable possibility that children may have been in danger. Police officers may enter a home to render emergency aid when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside may be seriously injured. Police may also conduct a search of a home that is less intrusive than an entry when they have an objectively reasonable basis to suspect someone might be seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury. In the present case, the officer conducted a limited search by looking through a side window from an area not accessible to the public. However, the limited search was proportional to the nature of the exigency where the officers saw an unattended child in the street, no one answered the knocks on the door of the house, and the officers were concerned about other children.id: 20294
Supreme Court says officers may keep defendant from entering home while they seek warrant.Police officers accompanied defendant's wife to the trailer where she lived with defendant, so they could "keep the peace" while she removed her belongings. When the wife emerged after collecting her possessions, she told the officers her husband had "dope" in there and she had seen him slide it underneath the couch. An officer knocked on the trailer door, told defendant what his wife had said, and asked permission to search, which was denied. While other officers left to get a search warrant, the officer told defendant (who by this time was out on the porch) that he could not re-enter the trailer unless a police officer accompanied him. He did so two or three times and each time an officer stood just inside the door to observe what he did. Two hours later the warrant was obtained, and a small amount of marijuana was found under the sofa. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that "exigent circumstances" made it reasonable to prevent the defendant from re-entering the trailer unless accompanied by an officer. The police had good reason to fear that unless restrained, defendant would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. Justice Souter concurred specially, and Justice Steven dissented, arguing that a higher value should have been placed on the sanctity of the home than on the prosecution of this "petty offense."id: 15134
The Fourth Amendment does not require police to corroborate an anonymous tip before contacting the occupant of the residence and seeking consent to enter and search. The Fourth Amendment does not require police to corroborate an anonymous tip before contacting the occupant of the residence and seeking consent to enter and search a residence. Even if acting on an anonymous, uncorroborated tip, police may knock on the door of a residence, speak with the occupant, and request permission to enter and search.id: 19677
Protective sweep was justified prior to a valid probation search where defendant appeared to be under the influence and officers knew that drug users often have weapons in the house.In Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the standard for determining when police are entitled to conduct a brief, cursory sweep of the premises before undertaking an arrest. In the present case, the protective sweep was conducted prior to a valid probation search. Defendant was not the subject of the search, but occupied a room where the evidence was found. The probation search was conducted pursuant to a probation condition imposed on a convicted drug user. Defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs when the police arrived. Since there appeared to be ongoing drug activity, and drug users often have weapons in the house, with transients coming and going at all hours, the protective sweep was justified.id: 17222
Where the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion in a public place, the warrantless entry was proper.The police acted lawfully in seeking warrantless entry into appellant's home to complete their detention of him which had been set in motion in a public place. Appellant was therefore not justified in interfering with their actions.id: 11152
Only reasonable suspicion is necessary for protective sweep of premises.In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that the 4th Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an arrest in a home when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. The protective sweep is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that such protective sweeps ought to be permitted only when the officers have probable cause to believe that their personal safety is threatened by a hidden confederate.id: 11118
The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of statement made after warrantless arrest in home.Police officers entered defendant's home without a warrant and without his consent, in violation of <i>Peyton v. New York</i>, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). They took defendant to the station house, where he confessed to murder. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the state's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of <i>Payton</i>. Here, the police had a justification to question [defendant] prior to his arrest; therefore his subsequent statement wa not an exploitation of the illegal entry into [defendant's] home. The court explained that the statement, while the product of an illegal arrest and being in custody, was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than someplace else. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens vigorously dissented, stating that the majority's reasoning amounted to nothing more than analytical sleight-of-hand.id: 10927
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245