Updated 2/26/2024Police searched defendant’s car after finding he possessed marijuana. The prosecution argued the police action was justified as an inventory search. However, the search served no community caretaking function. Police asked defendant and the passengers if there was anything illegal in the car rather than whether there were valuables in the car defendant needed to inventory. The trial court reasonably found the primary purpose of the search was not to inventory the contents of the car, but rather to investigate the defendant for possible criminal behavior.id: 26433
Updated 2/4/2024When executing a search warrant at defendant’s home, police learned that one of his cars was a short distance away at a ranch. Police went to the ranch and towed the car to be stored until they could obtain a warrant to search it. However, the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of the unattended car on private property. The failure to suppress evidence obtained later during a search of the car was prejudicial error. id: 27776
Updated 2/3/2024Police stopped defendant’s car after smelling marijuana and learned he was driving on a suspended license. They then impounded the car and conducted an inventory search. Defendant’s car was legally parked and could easily have remained where it was. Moreover, they did not allow him call someone to move the car. The record shows the impound decision was based on an investigative pretext rather than serving a community caretaking function. Evidence from the search should have been suppressed. id: 27738
Updated 2/3/2024In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, allowed police to conduct warrantless vehicle searches for personal identification documents at traffic stops when the driver failed to provide a license or other personal identification upon request. However, the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and Arturo D. should no longer be followed.id: 26529
Updated 1/31/2024When an officer had probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk. the officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of the warrantless search under the automobile exception.id: 28044
The search of defendant’s car parked two blocks from the site of his arrest did not take place where he was apprehended and was not a valid search incident to arrest. However the officer’s observation of a bag of marijuana in plain view on the passenger seat established probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity.id: 25603
Removal of the dashboard console exceeded the scope of an inventory search. However, the search was supported by probable cause, as the officer found packaged drugs under the driver’s seat and noticed the dashboard had been tampered with, and so the search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.id: 25426
While arguing the propriety of a vehicle search under the incident to arrest theory in light of Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___, the prosecution argued on appeal that the auto search was also valid as an inventory or impound search. However, that theory was not raised in the trial court and there was no evidence the officers intended to conduct such a search or that police followed some standardized criteria or established routine in conducting the search as the law on inventory searches requires.id: 21585
Police stopped defendant for traffic violations. When he refused to leave the car, officers broke the windshield, tased and pepper sprayed him. They arrested him for interfering with a police investigation. When searching the car they found 11 empty sandwich bags and $65 but no drugs. When they searched the car again at the impound yard they found cocaine in an air vent. The searches were not justified under the search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement following Arizona v. Gant (2009) 129 S.C. 1710, as the first was conducted while defendant was lying face down on the ground outside the vehicle with the officers on top of him. It was not reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest (interfering with an investigation) would be found in the search. Nor was the search justified by the automobile exception as defendant’s erratic driving and nervous behavior did not provide probable cause to search the car at the scene or later at the impound yard. id: 22464
The officer testified that he decided to impound the truck to facilitate an inventory search as he was hoping to find drugs. He also said he was impounding the truck because it was driven by an unlicensed driver but he did not describe a standardized policy to impound all vehicles of unlicensed drivers. And he did not offer any community caretaking function served by impounding the truck.id: 21805
In New York v. Belton, U.S. 453 (1981), the Court held that when a police officer lawfully arrests the occupant of a vehicle, the officer may, incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile and any containers therein. Here, police officers arrested defendant after he had parked his car, gotten out of it, and was standing about 10 to 12
feet from the car. The officers then searched the passenger compartment of the car and found a gun and cocaine. In a 5 to 4 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee
has been secured and cannot obtain access to the interior of the car. Instead, the Court held, police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion;
Justice Breyer and Justice Alito wrote dissents.id: 21356
Following defendant's arrest for an outstanding warrant, police impounded defendant's car pursuant to Vehicle code section 22651, subd.(h)(1). However, impounding the car, which was legally parked in front of defendant's house was unconstitutional, as it served no caretaking purpose. The subsequent inventory search was therefore also unconstitutional.id: 19367
Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested for driving with a suspended license. The car was then impounded and searched without a warrant. The search was improper where the arresting officer stated that one, if not the only, purpose of the impound was to conduct an investigatory search.id: 11184
At the time defendant was searched, the officers had probable cause to search the van and its contents. However, defendant's mere presence in the van was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search him. Nor can defendant's clothing be thought of as separate from his person and thus like his duffel bag, among the contents of the van. Moreover, the search could not be justified as incident to a yet-to-be-executed arrest because if there was no probable cause to search defendant then there was no probable cause to arrest him.id: 11156
Police officers conducted a traffic stop of a car in which defendant was a passenger. An officer recognized defendant as a parole violator, ordered him out of the car, and arrested him. A search of the car revealed materials used to manufacture methamphetamine, and defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine. The California Supreme Court held that the traffic stop did not result in defendant's seizure, that defendant was not seized until the officers ordered him out of the car, and therefore, that he could not challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a traffic stop results in the seizure of a vehicle's passenger and that the passenger may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.id: 20191
Updated 2/4/2024Probable cause supported the warrantless search of defendant’s car that was parked haphazardly, blocking a resident’s driveway and across from the narrow street where the victim’s truck was shot. id: 27332
Updated 2/3/2024When officers approached a car because of the expired registration, they smelled burnt marijuana. One of the officers recognized the occupants of the car as minors due to a prior encounter, and it is illegal for a person under 21 to possess recreational marijuana. Notwithstanding the passage of Prop 64, which legalized marijuana possession for adults, the officers had probable cause to search the car under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement, despite the occupants’ claim that they had smoked the marijuana hours earlier.id: 27613
Defendant argued the justification for the pat search was officer safety during the intended search of the vehicle, but there was no probable cause to search the vehicle based on the smell of marijuana following the enactment of Prop 64. However, because marijuana possession and use is still highly circumscribed by law, even after the passage of Prop 64, the odor and presence of marijuana in a vehicle driven in a high crime area, combined with evasive conduct by the occupants of the vehicle was reasonably suggestive of unlawful drug possession and transport, and justified the Terry frisk. Moreover, the smell also provided probable cause to search the vehicle as it created a fair probability that a search might yield additional contraband or evidence.id: 25872
Defendant was standing outside of her car when a police officer who watched her park asked if she had a driver’s license. When she said she did not he asked whether she had other identification and defendant said she thought she had ID in the car. He then handcuffed her, and another retrieved a purse from the car. When opening the purse the officer found amphetamine. The search was justified under In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60. The trial court erred by finding the search was illegal under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, since the search was limited to the purse that might contain ID and did not include a search of the entire passenger compartment.id: 24944
Police searched defendant’s car “incident to arrest” after he had been arrested and was outside of the car. He argued on appeal that the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___, which refined the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle. Despite defendant’s claim that Gant must be applied retroactively, the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the good faith exception established in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 because the officers relied in good faith upon the law that existed at the time of the search.id: 21584
Police officers stopped defendant for speeding. Immediately after the stop, while one officer was writing defendant a speeding ticket, another officer came to the scene and walked a drug-detection dog around defendant's car. The dog alerted to the car, and a subsequent search revealed marijuana. The state courts held that in the absence of some reasonable suspicion, police officers could not use a drug-detecting dog during a routine traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a dog sniff during a legal traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has the right to possess does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.id: 20124
The odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle and the observation of burnt marijuana in a pipe inside the vehicle created probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. This is so even though possession of not more than an ounce of cannabis is an infraction punishable by fine. Moreover, the possession of a medical marijuana card does not vitiate probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception. id: 23510
Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. She argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of the sensing diagnostic module (SDM) taken from her impounded vehicle. The vehicle was an instrumentality of the crime and was lawfully seized. The data taken from the SDM included the speed at which defendant was driving and whether she applied the brakes before impact. She had no expectation of privacy regarding this information as others could have observed these facts. There was no Fourth Amendment violation in admitting the SDM evidence.id: 23066
A police officer, aware that the front seat passenger was on parole, searched the backseat of defendant’s car and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant, the driver, sought to suppress the evidence. However, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as the Constitution permits a search of those areas of the passenger compartment where the officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity. Also, the officer may search personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them. id: 22984
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and secured in a patrol car. The search of the vehicle incident to arrest was proper under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 129 S. Ct. 1710, where it was reasonable that evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle. While searching the vehicle, police could also search containers including defendant’s cell phone, even where the cell phone was not on defendant’s person at the time.id: 22396
Incident to defendant’s arrest, police search the glove compartment of his car while he was seated in the rear seat of the patrol car. The procedure was proper at the time of the search pursuant to New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, but improper later under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___. Gant must be applied retroactively and therefore applies in the present case. However, reversal is not required because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies as the officers performed a search that was lawful at the time.id: 21322
Police officers stopped a car because its vehicle registration had been suspended. The
car contained a driver and two passengers. An officer asked defendant, the passenger in the back seat, to step out of the car. During a frisk of defendant, the officer discovered a gun. The
Supreme Court unanimously held, in a decision written by Justice Ginsburg, that when officers
make a lawful traffic stop of a vehicle, the officers may lawfully detain the vehicle and its
occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The Court held that the temporary detention of the vehicle and its occupants remains reasonable for the duration of the stop.id: 21352
Exigent circumstances justified the entry into the house where the police responded to a missing person’s call after being told a woman had not been heard from after a fight with her boyfriend. The entry was necessary to determine whether the woman and her son were injured inside the house. Moreover, the evidence in plain view included an open window on a cold night, a chlorine smell, a spotless bathroom in an otherwise messy apartment, provided probable cause to search the defendant’s car which was parked in front of the apartment.id: 21123
After the officer found a firearm on defendant’s person he had probable cause to make an arrest and could then conduct a search incident to arrest. The officer was thus justified in searching the passenger compartment of the vehicle next to defendant. Gant v. Arizona (2009) 556 U.S. ___, did not prohibit the search where the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for firearm possession. It did not matter whether the police had probable cause to believe the automobile contained evidence of a crime since this was not an automobile search but rather a search incident to arrest.id: 21164
When a police officer directs the driver of a vehicle to pull
over for a traffic stop, but in effecting the stop, gives no indication that the passenger of the vehicle is the focus of the officer's investigation or show of authority, the passenger is not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.id: 19128
When a police officer tried to pull plaintiff's car over for speeding, plaintiff led officers on a high-speed chase. During the chase, plaintiff used his car to ram a police car in order to evade being cornered. After the chase lasted about six minutes and ten miles, an officer intentionally bumped the rear of defendant's car with the front bumper of his police car in an effort to stop plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff lost control, crashed, and was rendered a quadriplegic. Plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the officer alleging that the officer's bumping of plaintiff's vehicle was a use of excessive force that resulted in an unlawful seizure. The Supreme Court held that because the car chase that plaintiff initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk to others, the officer acted reasonably in trying to force plaintiff off the road, and the officer's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment.id: 20190
Where a police officer arrests the occupant of a car, places him in the back seat of a patrol car, and immediately conducts a search of the passenger compartment of the occupant's car, the search is lawful under <i>Belton v. New York</i> (1981) 453 U.S. 454.id: 11180
After stopping the defendant for a traffic infraction, the officer told him he had reason to believe he was carrying narcotics in the car and asked permission to search the car, after explaining that defendant did not have to consent. Defendant gave permission to search the automobile. The officer searched the car, found a brown paper bag, opened it and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. In a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within the automobile. Since the officer told defendant he believed he was carrying narcotics, it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. The court rejected the argument that if the police wished to search containers within a car, they must separately request permission to search each container. Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 11149
Police investigating a missing person obtained a warrant to search defendant's car seeking specific items belonging to the missing person. The police actions in searching the car and then transporting it to a crime lab to search for trace evidence
relating to those items did not exceed the scope of the search. The warrant's failure to specify that police were to search for trace evidence did not render the search invalid. Neither did the seizure of the vehicle violate the Fourth Amendment because it could not have been properly searched without being seized. Likewise, the 12 day delay in searching the car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Finally, since probable cause existed to search the vehicle, the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.id: 19632
Officers who lawfully stopped the vehicle determined a passenger to be a drug dealer, and noticed marijuana in plain view. Under the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe they might find additional contraband in the trunk of the car. The court erred in granting the motion to suppress the evidence found in the trunk.id: 18796
Following a traffic stop for a broken taillight, the officer requested consent to search the car. Defendant argued the evidence found in the search needed to be suppressed. According to defendant, the police need an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing before requesting consent to search. However, this is not so as long as the detention is not unreasonably prolonged as a result of the request to search. The request did not unreasonably prolong the stop where only two minutes elapsed from the time of the stop to the request for consent.
id: 18602
When a driver who has been detained for citation for a Vehicle Code infraction fails to produce a registration or personal identification documentation upon the request of the citing officer, the officer may conduct a warrantless search for such documentation. In that circumstance, the Fourth Amendment permits limited warrantless searches of areas within a vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.id: 16639
The magistrate denied defendant's suppression motion at the time of the preliminary hearing. Defendant's failure to renew the motion in superior court waived the issue for appellate purposes. Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to renew the issue in superior court because the search was justified by concerns for officer safety. Defendant and a man were having a romantic rendezvous in a van which was parked in a residential neighborhood in the middle of the night. The officer investigating possible burglary activity noted the van was parked illegally. The occupants did not respond to the officer's inquiry. Defendant was unable to provide identification although given several minutes to do so. The officer asked the occupants to exit the van. He then saw defendant's purse and searched it for ID but found narcotics. The search was reasonable due to the officer's fear that the purse may have contained a concealed weapon.id: 15649
The inventory search of the side bags of a motorcycle was not unreasonable in scope. The search was conducted pursuant to the sheriff's department policy to catalogue the contents of an impounded vehicle to prevent unverifiable theft and to protect officers from concealed weapons. Contrary to defendant's claim, motorcycles need not be treated differently than cars and the side bags are considered "in" the motorcycle for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the policy is sufficiently specific to prevent officers from exercising their discretion to rummage indiscriminately through a person's belongings.id: 15650
Defendant moved to suppress the warrantless seizure of contraband from the handlebar tube of his bicycle. However, there was no need for a warrant since the officers had probable cause to believe it contained contraband. The officers recognized defendant as a prior drug arrestee riding his bike in an area where drugs are sold, and after running a stop sign, he refused the officer's order to stop and later stuffed something into the handlebar. The warrantless search of the handlebar tube was proper.id: 15651
Police stopped defendant's car for the lack of an updated registration sticker on his license plate. A dispatcher advised the officer that the defendant had a history of possessing weapons and that he was violent. The dispatcher was relying on information that was six years old but the officer believed it was current. Contrary to defendant's claim, the six year-old information was not unreasonably stale, and the officer's search of the passenger compartment of the car was reasonable.id: 14924
The presence of a useable quantity of marijuana among defendant's effects in the passenger compartment of the vehicle he was driving provided probable cause for the search of the vehicle's trunk.id: 14925
Defendant was stopped for driving 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile per hour zone. When the officers noticed the odor of fresh beer they were entitled to search the truck, including the passenger compartment, for open containers of alcohol. The officers noticed knives and a billy club in plain view when looking through the passenger compartment. Once they discovered the knives, they had reason to believed their safety was in danger and were entitled to search any container in the truck for weapons. Therefore searching the duffel bag and toiletry bag was not improper.id: 11169
In <i>U.S. v. Chadwick</i>, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a warrant was required to search a footlocker, even though it had been placed in the trunk of a car moments before the arrest. The <i>Chadwick</i> rule was extended in <i>Arkansas v. Sanders</i>, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), when the court held that a warrant was required to search a suitcase actually being <i>transported</i> in the trunk of a car. In <i>U.S. v. Ross</i>, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the court explained that the automobile exception applied when the police had probable cause to search an <i>entire</i> vehicle but that the <i>Chadwick</i> doctrine applied when the officers had probable cause to search only a particular container in the vehicle. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court overruled <i>Chadwick</i> and <i>Sanders</i> and held that even when the police only have probable cause to believe that a particular container contains contraband, they may search that container without a warrant if it is inside of an automobile. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, arguing for an even broader rule<197>that no warrant is required to search a container outside of a privately-owned building at all, whether inside <i>or </i> outside an automobile. Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.id: 11171
Police may search the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle when the police contact and arrest the person at the rear of his vehicle a brief time after he got out of the vehicle. Such a warrantless search was incident to defendant's arrest within the meaning of <i>New York v. Belton</i>, (1981) 453 U.S. 454.id: 11172
Defendant's car was impounded after he was arrested for drunk driving. An inventory search revealed a locked suitcase in the trunk of the car which contained a garbage bag containing marijuana. The U.S. Supreme Court held that since the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy with respect to opening close containers during an inventory search, the search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. However, a 5-4 majority of the court disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that in order to be constitutional, an inventory policy must mandate either that all containers will be opened or that no containers will be opened. The majority held that some discretion was permissible. Thus, a policy may allow the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers' exteriors, as long as the search is not a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. Judges Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in suppressing the evidence, but complained of the majority's activism in reaching out to make new law in this case.id: 11173
Defendant argued the automobile search pursuant to <i>New York v. Belton</i>, (1981) 453 U.S. 454, was inapplicable because he was afoot and not an occupant of the car when he was detained and arrested. However, defendant was standing next to the car when arrested after being identified by a reliable informant as a drug dealer. In view of the nexus between the car and defendant, the fact that defendant had the car keys, but not his identification on his person, and the probability that he left his ID in the car, there existed a justification to search the car for his ID<197>evidence related to the misdemeanor false identification offense.id: 11174
When an officer impounds a vehicle and conducts an inventory search of it, the holding of <i>Colorado v. Bertine</i>, (1987) 479 U.S. 367, requiring that the officer must act pursuant to a standardized procedure, does not require that the procedure be written.id: 11175
Highway patrol officer stopped defendant's car for speeding. After arresting defendant, the driver, based on an outstanding warrant, the officer asked who owned the car. He received negative responses from the passengers. The officer acted properly when he removed the occupants from the car and entered for the purpose of finding the registration. The officer then observed a wallet lying in plain view. Given that none of the occupants of the car claimed ownership, it was proper for the officer to open the wallet to notify the owner of lost property. <i>People v. Webster</i>, 54 Cal.3d 411, 285 Cal.Rptr 31 (1991). <$Iid: 11176
Defendant argued the officer's entry of the abandoned car solely to search the glove box for the registration was unlawful because the officer did not first attempt to obtain the same information through less intrusive electronic means. However, since the car was abandoned, and the person observed to be a passenger who had been identified as a parolee had denied knowledge or ownership, the officer was entitled to search the vehicle for its registration. The officer properly confined his search to the glove compartment which is the traditional repository for auto registrations.id: 11177
Appellant argued that if police have probable cause to believe that contraband is contained in a particular closed container in a vehicle, they may only seize the container and must await a warrant to open it. However, according to <i>California v Acevedo</i> (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, the police may without a warrant search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.id: 11178
Officer encountered two men in a car parked in a dark area behind the 24-hour market. Upon recognizing the passenger as a recent arrestee for possession of drugs and a dangerous weapon, the officer became alarmed for his safety. Under the circumstances, his alarm was reasonable to justify a <i>Terry</i> search of the passenger compartment.id: 11179
Officers stopped defendant for driving without a license. Officers impounded the vehicle as there was no person with a valid drivers license to take control of the car while defendant was taken to jail. The officers followed standard procedures in impounding the vehicle. Moreover, the subsequent inventory search of the impounded vehicle was also proper. There was no indication the search was merely a ruse to discover evidence of criminal activity. The discovery of the rock cocaine on the carseat pursuant to standard procedures was valid.id: 11181
Police were furnished a description of defendant's van by a person who was allegedly kidnapped and raped by defendant in the van. The victim also selected defendant's photograph out of a photographic lineup of potential suspects. While her description of the van lacked specificity, the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle was not merely a container of evidence, but an instrumentality of the crime. Moreover, once the officers were legally in the van, they were entitled to seize, without a warrant, those items in plain view which evidenced criminal acts.id: 11182
Defendant argued the warrantless search of his car was not supported by probable cause because there were no objective facts to lead officers to believe cocaine would be found in his car. However, two reliable confidential informants told officers that defendant was selling drugs from his car. This information was corroborated by officers who conducted surveillance of a location where a drug deal involving defendant was to occur. Defendant was detained and he was carrying a concealed and loaded firearm. Moreover, he lied to officers by disclaiming ownership of the car. The false statements designed to mislead the officers added to the probable cause to search the vehicle.id: 11183
Pursuant to the arrest of an occupant of a vehicle, police may search the passenger compartment and any containers therein, including containers belonging to nonarrested individuals.id: 11154
Defendant argued the search of his automobile was not justified as incident to arrest where he was not in the car at the time of the arrest. However, the trial court found that defendant was immediately adjacent to the car when he was arrested, the car was likely to contain drugs, weapons, and the defendant's identification, and there was an on-the-scene unequivocal identification by a citizen informant of defendant as the person who tried to sell the informant drugs. Search of the car incident to defendant's arrest was proper.id: 11155
In <i>Pennsylvania v. Mimms</i>, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a police officer may, as a matter of course, order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle. Here, in a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court extended that rule to apply to passengers as well. The majority reasoned that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. The court recognized that although there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented, arguing that this case takes the unprecedented step of authorizing seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion whatsoever.id: 10985