Warrantless Searches, generally
Category > Warrantless Searches, generally
Updated 2/4/2024Police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of defendant’s unattended car on private property. When executing a search warrant at defendant’s home, police learned that one of his cars was a short distance away at a ranch. Police went to the ranch and towed the car to be stored until they could obtain a warrant to search it. However, the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of the unattended car on private property. The failure to suppress evidence obtained later during a search of the car was prejudicial error. id: 27776
Updated 1/31/2024Probable cause to search the passenger compartment does not permit a search of the trunk under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.When an officer had probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk. the officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of the warrantless search under the automobile exception.id: 28044
Implied consent doesn’t justify the warrantless blood extraction from an unconscious suspect. The trial court found the blood extraction from an unconscious defendant suspected of drunk driving was permissible without a warrant or exigent circumstances because of California’s “implied consent” law, which declares that one who drives a vehicle in the state is deemed to consent to blood alcohol testing. The consent imputed to drivers under that law, cannot, by itself, justify the warrantless seizure. However, the officer reasonably relied on the statute in seizing defendant’s blood, bringing the case within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.id: 24567
Provision in the DNA Act requiring a DNA sample from all felony arrestees violates the California Constitution.The provision of the DNA Act of 1998 (Penal Code section 295 et seq) which requires that a DNA sample be taken from all adult arrestees arrested for or charged with any felony offense might not violate the Fourth Amendment following Maryland v. King (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1958. The provision does violate article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution which undoubtedly prohibits this practice. id: 23892
The seizure of defendant’s DNA taken after his arrest but before any determination of probable cause violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The DNA Act of 1998, to the extent it requires felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases, without independent suspicion, or warrant or even a determination of probable cause unreasonably intrudes on the arrestee’s expectation of privacy and violates the Fourth Amendment.id: 22338
The warrantless entry into the home was not justified by the protective sweep doctrine where the domestic violence suspect was handcuffed outside and there was no evidence that anyone was inside. Police were investigating a claim of domestic violence. There was no showing that the officer was justified under the protective sweep doctrine in entering defendant’s home to conduct a search where defendant was handcuffed outside, and there was no evidence that criminal activity was taking place in the home or that defendant posed a danger especially where officers knew the alleged victim was not at home.id: 22799
A warrantless search cannot be justified based on smell alone.Defendant consigned a sealed package to Federal Express for shipment. The package reeked of marijuana. Fed Ex notified the police who seized the package and later opened it at the police station. The police did not seek a warrant even though no exigent circumstances existed at the time of the search. However, the warrantless search was not justified based on smell alone, and smelling something is different from seeing something. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. id: 22452
Supreme Court says school authorities’ search of girl’s underwear was unreasonable. School officials received reports that students were bringing drugs and weapons to school and that plaintiff, a 13-year-old student, had held a party at which alcohol had been served. A week later, a student gave a school official a prescription pain reliever, said that a girl named Marissa had given it to him, and stated that students were planning to take the pills at lunch. Officials confronted Marissa, who had several pills and a razor blade in her possession; Marissa told the officials that plaintiff had given her the pills, but she did not say when. In a day planner seized from Marissa, officials found knives, lighters, and a cigarette. When called to the school office, plaintiff admitted that the day planner belonged to her, but said that she had lent it to Marissa, that none of the contents belonged to her, and that she did not know anything about the pills seized from Marissa. The officials then searched plaintiff; during the search, which was conducted by two female school officials in the nurse’s office, the officials directed plaintiff to remove all of her clothes except her bra and underpants. The officials directed plaintiff to pull her bra out and shake it and to pull out the elastic on her underpants. No pills were found. The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision written by Justice Souter, held that the search of plaintiff’s underwear violated the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court found that the school officials had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a search of plaintiff’s outer clothing, it held that the officials lacked sufficient grounds to search her underwear.id: 21433
Teacher's search of student's purse for identification following the student's disruptive behavior violated the Fourth Amendment.The teacher opened the student's purse to find an identification document so she could write a referral for the student's disruptive behavior. She had no suspicion that the student was involved in criminal behavior. Mere disruptive behavior by the student did not justify the search. The teacher's initial limited search of the student's purse for identification was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the knife found in the purse.id: 18306
Protective sweep was not justified where the officers entered the home after lawfully detaining the suspect outside.Police stopped a suspected drug dealer behind his house, handcuffed him, and had him sit on the ground. The officers then entered the home to determine whether there was anyone inside who might be in danger. They found no one but did see a package which proved to contain cocaine. The officer's initial act of drawing his gun on defendant did not convert the detention into an arrest, nor did the use of handcuffs or making defendant sit on the ground for a few minutes. However, the officer's entry into and inspection of defendant's house was not permissible as a protective sweep under Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325.id: 18006
The officer’s observation of a staggering person enter defendant’s car did not justify the stop of the vehicle under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
A police officer may utilize the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement to justify the stop of a vehicle to ensure the safety of an occupant where the officer lacks a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, the information available to the officer in this case was insufficient to justify the detention where the officer observed a person walking with an unsteady gait and sweating. The officer’s belief that the passenger may have been suffering from a drug overdose was purely speculative and there was no evidence that he needed additional help.id: 20676
Absent some necessity, the community caretaking exception did not allow a warrantless entry into the home of a mentally disordered person who was detained outside the residence. Due to a flaw in the statutes, the legislative scheme does not provide a constitutionally permissible way for law enforcement to confiscate a firearm in the residence of a mentally disordered person (Welfare and Inst. Code section 5150) who is detained outside the residence. Contrary to the prosecutor’s claim, the community caretaking exception did not justify the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s residence to seize his weapons. id: 20628
Police request from private citizen to produce images from defendant’s room, other than the ones he volunteered was an illegal search.Defendant pled guilty to burglary arising from an entry into his roommate’s bedroom to use her webcam to obtain images of her having sex with her boyfriend, Sadler. Defendant moved to suppress evidence claiming Sadler became an agent for police who went into defendant’s room and seized a number of discs containing images from the webcam that defendant had copied from his roommate’s computer. However, Sadler was not a police agent when he took the discs from defendant’s room and no illegal search occurred when he showed the images to police. An illegal search did occur when police, acting without a warrant, directed Sadler to show them additional images and, on their own, looked at some of the discs without knowing whether they were the ones Sadler had already viewed. Because the trial court ruled there was no illegal search, it never reached the issue of what evidence, if any, was subject to suppression as a product of the illegal search – including subsequent incriminating statements. id: 20527
Officers investigating a domestic violence incident with the suspect standing outside were not constitutionally entitled to conduct a protective sweep of the apartment. Officers responded to a domestic violence call. Olson, the male suspect was standing near a car with the apartment door open several feet away. The alleged victim was known to be
at another location. The officer testified he searched the apartment because his experience with domestic violence cases suggested there may have been danger to the officers in not conducting the protective sweep. However, without probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that there were potentially dangerous people inside the apartment, the entry violated the Fourth Amendment.id: 19291
Warrantless entry onto defendant's property was not justified by the community caretaking exception where the officer's conclusion that defendant was a victim of a marijuana rip off was not supported by evidence.The police entry onto defendant's private property was justified by the community caretaking exception to the search warrant requirement. Defendant's neighbor found two marijuana leaves on his side of the fence. He reported to police the marijuana was not his. Police concluded the marijuana must belong to the defendant, that he was cultivating it, and because of a hole under the fence, the marijuana must have been stolen from defendant during the night. The facts did not support the officer's belief that the marijuana belonged to defendant or that he was cultivating it. Since the conclusion of the "marijuana rip off" was not supported by the evidence, the warrantless entry onto defendant's property could not be justified by the community caretaking exception which is designed to protect a defendant's life or property.id: 17692
Court erred in ordering defendant to submit blood and saliva samples following robbery conviction.Defendant was convicted of robbery. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to order defendant at sentencing to submit blood and saliva samples under Penal Code section 296 because that provision did not include robbery as an enumerated offense. Moreover, the failure to object did not waive the issue because an unauthorized sentence may be attacked for the first time on appeal.id: 14854
Supreme Court reaffirms that there is no "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement.In a brief per curiam opinion granting certiorari and summarily reversing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in <i>Mincey v. Arizona</i>, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), that there is no "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the defendant summoned police to a cabin in a state park. The police found defendant outside with injuries to his head and legs, and took him to a hospital. In the cabin, they found the body of his wife. Over the next sixteen hours, they thoroughly searched the cabin without a warrant, including opening a brief case in which they found various photographs and negatives which were introduced against defendant at trial. The state courts upheld defendant's murder conviction, but the Supreme Court reversed, noting that under <i>Mincey</i>, police may make warrantless entries if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene for possible other victims or a killer on the premises. However, <i>Mincey</i> rejected any general "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement.id: 15140
The court erred in excluding defendant's testimony concerning warrantless searches of his house which did not turn up anything as such testimony was relevant to the issue of the use of parole searches for harassment purposes.Appellant argued the court erred by excluding his proffered testimony concerning warrantless searches in the past four and one-half months by the Kings County Narcotics Task Force, none of which turned up anything at the suppression hearing. The evidence was clearly relevant to the issue of whether he had been subjected to repetitive parole searches for harassment purposes. Moreover, the testimony was relevant on the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to search appellant.id: 11098
Even if probable cause existed a search of the motel room absent exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.Officers were free to handcuff defendant in the threshold while standing in the doorway or the interior of the motel room. This was because they had an arrest warrant. The officers observed two cocaine pipes while handcuffing defendant. Seizure of the pipes observed in plain view did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the discovery of the cocaine pipes may have created probable cause to believe other narcotics were present in the room. However, the trial court erred in finding that because there was probable cause, no warrant was required. No amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent exigent circumstances. Absent consent or exigent circumstances, the search of the remainder of the room violated the Fourth Amendment.id: 15634
Agent's belief that defendant's car tripped the Border Patrol sensor, without more, did not justify a stop for an immigration check.A person who may have driven by a Border Patrol sensor which had been placed along a public roadway, without more, cannot be lawfully stopped on a public highway for an "immigration check". More facts, consistent with criminal activity, are required to establish reasonable suspicion justifying such detention.id: 15633
Reply to justification for warrantless search need not challenge the justification to preserve the issue for review.Under Penal Code section 1538.5 and People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, a defendant satisfies the initial pleading burden by alleging a warrantless search along with facts and authorities showing there was a warrantless search and that the search was therefore illegal. The prosecution may respond by showing specific grounds justifying the warrantless search - in this case a valid inventory search. While the defendant may reply and challenge the justification, he is not required to do so. The trial court erred by denying defendant's section 1538.5 motion on the ground that defendant did not in his reply assert there was no standardized police inventory search policy. Once the justification of the inventory search was raised, the burden of establishing a standardized police policy remained with the prosecution. The local San Diego rule on the subject was valid only to the extent is was not inconsistent with this procedure. Finally, because defendant was entitled to litigate the adequacy of the inventory search justification, the court erred in denying defendant's supplemental section 1538.5 motion.id: 16630
Officers' warrantless reentry into the bathroom after appellants were arrested was improper.Officers' reasonably believed the subject of the felony arrest warrant was inside of the motel room, and their entry of the room and then the bathroom was justified. However, officers' reentry into the bathroom after appellants were arrested and removed from the room was improper. The court reversed judgment of conviction as to the appellant who pled guilty after his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion was denied. However, the court found the error harmless as to the defendant who was convicted following a jury trial due to the strength of the properly admitted evidence.id: 11095
Warrantless search of a privately leased garage was not justified by the landlord's consent or by the provision that allows officers to inspect public garages.Defendant leased a space in a commercial warehouse to replace the engine in his truck. After he failed to pay part of the rent, the landlord entered the premises, saw what looked to be stolen auto parts and called a CHP theft investigator. The warrantless search of the privately leased garage was not authorized under Vehicle Code section 2805 which permits an officer investigating a vehicle theft to enter a public garage. Moreover, the landlord's consent to enter the leased premises did not justify the warrantless search because the officer's assumption that the landlord retained the authority to unlock the door with his key was unreasonable.id: 11099
Officer's observation into house from a side yard window where he had no legal right to be constituted an illegal search.Police looked through a window and observed defendant packaging cocaine in his home. The officers made this observation while standing in defendant's side yard, a place they had no legal right to be. Defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy over his activities, and the officers' observation of him was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Since there was no justification for dispensing with the search warrant requirement the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence gained from the search.id: 15604
Updated 2/22/2024Warrantless search of computer files by Google before governmental search was was justified by the private search doctrine.The government’s warrantless search of four computer files that had been flagged by Google as child pornography did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless search was permissible under the private search doctrine. Google’s private search had already frustrated defendant’s expectation of privacy before the government viewed them, and the government’s search did not expand on the one conducted by Google. Moreover, the private search doctrine as used here did not amount to privacy violations as established in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, or Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S. Ct. 2206. id: 27068
It was reasonable under the state and federal constitutions to require defendant to submit to a swab of his check as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson.Defendant was validly arrested on probable cause to believe he had committed felony arson. The DNA Act of 2004, requiring the collection of a DNA sample following arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the California Constitution. The court noted its holding may not apply to defendants in other circumstances such as where an arrest is made without probable cause, or the offense is a misdemeanor.id: 25606
The warrantless search of the minor’s cell phone was reasonable where it occurred on school grounds after officials had discovered a firearm and the minor was evasive.The warrantless search of the minor’s cell phone at the high school was reasonable under New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, where school officials found a firearm and magazine on school grounds, and the minor was evasive and resistant to school officials. The search was not invalid under Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473 (decided after the present search) because it involved a school search in a threatening situation rather than a search incident to arrest.id: 24605
The suspicionless search of the high school student was justified after he broke the policy of leaving school grounds and later returning. The suspicionless administrative search of the student by the high school assistant principal was justified by the fact that the student left and returned to campus during the school day. The search of the backpack and request that the student empty his pockets was conducted pursuant to an established policy, the purpose of which was to keep the school environment safe. id: 21958
The odor of marijuana and the observation of burnt marijuana inside a vehicle provided probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception.The odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle and the observation of burnt marijuana in a pipe inside the vehicle created probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. This is so even though possession of not more than an ounce of cannabis is an infraction punishable by fine. Moreover, the possession of a medical marijuana card does not vitiate probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception. id: 23510
Mandatory and warrantless collection and analysis of buccal swab DNA samples from felony arrestees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The police took a buccal (inner cheek) swab sample from defendant without a warrant while he was under lawful arrest for a sex offense, as authorized by Penal Code sections 296, subd.(a)(2)(c ), and 296.1, subd.(a)(1)(A) as amended in 2004 by the passage of Prop 69. The 2004 amendment authorizing the mandatory and warantless collection and analysis of buccal swab DNA from felony arrestees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.id: 23401
Search of the minor’s locker by school officials was reasonable after a report that a boy who had a nearby locker had shot someone the day before. The minor’s locker was searched by a high school security guard who found a gun in his backpack. The search was reasonable as the school received a report from an identified student who overheard that another student shot someone on the bus the previous day. Defendant’s locker was adjacent to the locker of the suspected shooter and searching defendant’s locker was not improper.id: 23559
The warrantless entry by the second wave responders following a valid protective sweep was proper where the police presence was uninterrupted and the recovery of a shell casing not found in plain view was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine.The trial court erred by suppressing forensic evidence seized from his home pursuant to a warrantless search conducted after he was arrested and the victim was declared dead. The first wave of responders entered the house lawfully in light of the exigent circumstances, and made certain plain view observations. The entry by the second wave responders was proper where there was an uninterrupted police presence in the house and a close-in-time successive search of areas already validly searched in order to begin processing evidence observed in plain view. Moreover, the evidence discovered that was not in plain view - a shell casing and a depression under it would inevitably have been discovered by the coroner.id: 22658
Testing the key in the front door lock did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the information gained from the testing could be considered in applying the independent source doctrine.Police officers made a warrantless entry into 321 Sanford using a key retrieved from the abandoned Volkswagen. Defendant argued that testing the key in the lock was a search that could only be performed pursuant to a warrant. Assuming that the key insertion was a search, it was based on reasonable suspicion and served a legitimate investigative purpose (confirming that defendant had access to 321 Sanford). The testing was therefore not an unreasonable search even though it was not authorized by a warrant and even if police did not have probable cause to believe there was evidence in the house before inserting the key in the lock. The information could be considered in determining whether the warrant issued after the illegal entry was supported by probable cause. id: 22470
Dog sniff of truck bed was proper where the dog was well-trained and the alert justified a search of the backpack and the dog’s subsequent sniff of the pickup truck’s bed.A well-trained detection dog’s sniff of the exterior of a pickup truck does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Defendants argued the prosecution failed to prove the dog used in the present case was reliable. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, no evidence of the dog’s success rate was required. Morever, the alert from the dog established probable cause to search the backpack found in the truck. Finally, the dog did not exceed the allowable scope of a dog sniff by putting his paws on the pickup truck and sniffing inside the bed of the truck. This was an instinctive action which followed the original detection from a point outside of the truck. id: 22318
Warrantless entry into the locked upstairs bedroom was justified by the emergency aid exception where police had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude the shooting victim was inside the locked room.The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement justified a warrantless entry by police into a residence to search for additional victims of a recent shooting. The police did not err by entering a locked upstairs bedroom where marijuana and firearms were found in plain view. Police did not need ironclad proof of a likely serious injury to invoke the emergency aid exception to enter the bedroom, but rather an objectively reasonable basis for believing medical assistance was necessary or persons were in danger. id: 22075
Investigations request for records at defendant’s medical office was not an unreasonable search where they gave defendant seven days to produce the relevant invoices.Defendant was a physician convicted of Medi-Cal fraud. He argued the search of his office (where investigators showed up unannounced and requested documents) violated the Fourth Amendment. However, an otherwise lawful request for records at a doctor’s office does not violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, the investigators did not demand immediate production of the records. Here, they gave defendant seven days to produce the documents, thereby substantially complying with the notice requirement.id: 22524
The reasonable suspicion standard for searches of students by school officials applies even where police provide information and are present during the search.In New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, the court held that searches of students by school officials were justified if reasonable, though no warrant had been obtained and the probable cause required for a police search did not exist. When a school official independently decides to search a student and then conducts a search, the T.L.O. standard applies, even if the police provide the information justifying the search and are present when it occurs.id: 21490
Warrantless entry into defendant's home to effectuate a drunk driving arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the seriousness of the offense, the need to prevent the dissipation of evidence, and the fact that police spoke to defendant through an open door.A concerned citizen followed defendant who was driving dangerously and erratically. Although defendant sped away and managed to get home, the police, with the citizen's assistance, arrived a short time later. The officers outside of the house spoke to defendant who was inside and visibly intoxicated. After defendant refused to come out for a blood test, the police entered without a warrant to arrest him for drunk driving. Relying on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, the appellate court found the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entries of a home to effect a DUI arrest when the asserted exigency is to
prevent the destruction of blood alcohol evidence. However, the state's intrusion into the home was the minimum necessary to effect the arrest and only extended to areas already exposed to
public view. It was reasonable for the police to enter to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence of defendant's crime.id: 19093
There was no Fourth Amendment violation where the search of defendant’s barracks was authorized by the base commander rather than a civilian warrant.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence that was the product of two warrantless searches of his barracks at the air force base. He did not question the existence of probable cause to procure a warrant or procedural compliance with military law. He argued that since he was tried by a jury in state court, a search warrant founded in civilian law was the only legally cognizable basis for the search of his quarters. However, the search which was valid under military law did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and if it did, the investigating officers’s reasonable good faith reliance on that authorization justified the denial of the suppression motion.id: 20624
Officers search of minor's apartment was reasonable after minor told the officer he was searchable for weapons even though he was not under a search condition.The minor was not subject to a search condition. Nevertheless, when the officer who stopped him asked the minor if he was searchable, the minor said, Yes, for weapons. The officer was reasonable in relying on the minors statement that he had a search condition. The subsequent search of the minors apartment was not improper.id: 15636
Collecting DNA samples from juveniles who have committed a felony does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The Fourth Amendment does not preclude the collection of DNA samples in accordance with Penal Code section 296, subd.(a)(1) from a juvenile who is adjudicated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for committing a felony.id: 19597
The collection of DNA samples while defendant was in state prison did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The collection of DNA samples from defendant who was in state prison, under former Penal code section 290.2. did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.id: 19087
Mandatory collection of DNA samples from all felons does not violate the Fourth Amendment.The forced extraction and collection of DNA samples from all felony offenders under the amended Penal Code section 296.1 is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. While the compulsory nonconsensual extraction is a search and seizure, the utility of precise identification to all felons continues to justify the search, particularly where the intrusion is minor in nature and the expectation of privacy is minimal.id: 19088
Army narcotics detection dog's alert to locker, at the direction of a DEA agent, did not constitute direct involvement of the military in a civilian law enforcement procedure.Defendants argued the court erred in finding that a DEA officer did not impermissibly use military personnel to obtain the evidence supporting the search warrant in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. id: 17720
Collecting blood from a person convicted of a serious crime for inclusion in a DNA database does not violate the Fourth Amendment.Defendant argued the collection of his blood when he was a state prisoner under Penal Code section 295 for inclusion in the state's convicted offender DNA database violates the Fourth Amendment. He claimed the extraction of blood was a search requiring reasonable suspicion or a warrant, and that the state must show a special need for the procedure. However, Fourth Amendment privacy interests do not prohibit gathering information concerning identity from a person convicted of a serious crime, or of retaining that information.id: 17723
The reasonable suspicion standard applicable to school officials applied to a resource officer on a special two year assignment.The minor argued the specially assigned police officer who conducted the search was not a school official and thus was required to have probable cause, rather than merely a reasonable suspicion, to conduct the search. However, the officer, who was on a two year assignment as a resource officer at the high school, was a school official for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and his search was justified by a reasonable suspicion that the minor was engaging in conduct that violated school rules.id: 17571
Protective sweep was justified prior to a valid probation search where defendant appeared to be under the influence and officers knew that drug users often have weapons in the house.In Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the standard for determining when police are entitled to conduct a brief, cursory sweep of the premises before undertaking an arrest. In the present case, the protective sweep was conducted prior to a valid probation search. Defendant was not the subject of the search, but occupied a room where the evidence was found. The probation search was conducted pursuant to a probation condition imposed on a convicted drug user. Defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs when the police arrived. Since there appeared to be ongoing drug activity, and drug users often have weapons in the house, with transients coming and going at all hours, the protective sweep was justified.id: 17222
Law permitting compelled DNA samples of certain prisoners is not unconstitutional as applied to death row inmates. Death row inmates argued Penal Code section 295 et seq., which requires DNA samples for persons convicted of specified crimes, violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches because the primary justification for the law - deterrence of future crimes - was inapplicable to them. While deterrence and crime prevention is one purpose of the law, it was also implemented to help solve crimes. Moreover, the inmates' argument was based upon the false premise that a person confined pursuant to a sentence of death is thereby incapable of future criminality.id: 16800
Police were permitted to search under the driver's seat where defendant was detained for a traffic citation and failed to produce a registration or identifying documentation.When a driver who has been detained for citation for a Vehicle Code infraction fails to produce a registration or personal identification documentation upon the request of the citing officer, the officer may conduct a warrantless search for such documentation. In that circumstance, the Fourth Amendment permits limited warrantless searches of areas within a vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.id: 16639
A random border search of incoming mail does not violate the Fourth Amendment.If a customs agent violates an administrative regulation by conducting a random search of mail from a foreign county, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the contraband found in the package. The federal Constitution does not prohibit random border searches of incoming international mail, nor is there any legislative provision for the exclusion of evidence recovered by the customs agents. Therefore, such evidence is admissible in California courts.id: 15632
Former provision requiring DNA samples upon release from prison did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Penal Code section 290.2, as in effect in 1991, required that certain offenders upon release from prison provide two specimens of blood and a saliva sample. The procedure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The scope of the intrusion was not great, and the subjects were already subject to blood tests for AIDS testing. Moreover, the government interests furthered by DNA analysis are important because of their potential to solve crimes and protect innocent persons from needless investigation. Finally, the DNA testing is an efficient means of promoting the governmental interest at stake.id: 15635
Random metal detector weapons searches in high school are not unconstitutional.Random metal detector weapons searches of high school statutes do not violate the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.id: 15637
Warrantless search of residence with door open and "shambles inside" was justified as an exigent circumstance or as a "community caretaking function."Officers received a police dispatch that the door of the residence had been open all day, and "its all a shambles inside." The warrantless search of the residence was justified either under the exception for exigent circumstances, or because the police were exercising a "community caretaking function."id: 15638
A search warrant was not required to install a surveillance meter to monitor electrical consumption at defendant's house.Defendant argued the utility pole was located within the curtilage of his house and that he had an expectation of privacy in all things within the curtilage. However, defendant demonstrated no expectation of privacy in the utility pole, wires, or transformers which were owned by the utility company and in plain view. Moreover, the technology used here did not peer inside defendant's house or otherwise penetrate its inner sanctum. A search warrant was not required to install and monitor the surveillance meter on the utility pole standing in defendant's back yard.id: 15601
Supreme Court permits warrantless seizure of car on probable cause to believe it is forfeitable.Florida Police officers observed respondent using his car to deliver cocaine, giving them probable cause to believe the car was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Several months later they arrested him and seized the car without a warrant. During an inventory search, they found crack cocaine in the ashtray and charged him with possession of a controlled substance. The Florida Supreme Court found no exigent circumstances for the warrantless seizure of the car and suppressed the evidence. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed, relying on <i>Carroll v. U.S.</i>, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) which held that when officers have probable cause to believe a car contains contraband, they may search it without a warrant. The same principle applies when there is probable cause to believe that the car <i>itself</i> is contraband. Moreover, because the police seized the car from a public area - respondent's employer's parking lot - the warrantless seizure also did not invade respondent's privacy. Justices Souter and Breyer concurred, "subject to a qualification against reading our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of anything a state chooses to call 'contraband.'" Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.id: 15138
Court properly denied suppression motion where inventory search took place after DMV records that were accurate 28 hours prior to the stop showed the car's registration had expired.Defendant argued the police were not entitled to impound and search his car based on an incorrect Department of Motor Vehicle computer record that reported his car's registration had been expired for more than eight months. The record was inaccurate because defendant had registered the car the day before the stop. However, the officer's reliance on the pertinent DMV computer information was at most 28 hours "stale" and was objectively reasonable. There was no evidence of negligence or inadequate record keeping by the DMV.id: 14921
AIDS test for convicted prostitute was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.Petitioners were convicted in the San Francisco Municipal Court of soliciting an act of prostitution. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.6, they were ordered to undergo AIDS counseling and testing. The testing mandated by that provision is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amend. The blood testing is a minimal physical intrusion given the compelling need to stop the spread of AIDS. Moreover, the statutory scheme of section 1202.6 comports with due process given the reasonable relation between the statute's means and ends.id: 11094
Search of the residence which resulted in the seizure of the murder weapon was justified as a protective sweep for accomplices.Police were informed that defendant, a murder suspect, was inside the house. They ordered him out of the house and arrested him outside. Other officers were told to search the house for confederates. In searching the bedroom an officer found a weapon under a pile of laundry. The trial judge specifically found the officer's entry into the bedroom and belief that a person may have been in the room was reasonable. The search was justified as a protective sweep for accomplices.id: 11096
Supreme court upholds sobriety checkpoints against Fourth Amendment challenge.Writing for a five-person majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist upheld a Michigan sobriety checkpoint at which all motorists were stopped for brief questioning and observation in an effort to detect persons driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, even though no individualized suspicion supported the stops. The Court found the governmental interest in the checkpoints outweighed their intrusion on privacy, rejecting respondents' argument that a balancing test is inappropriate in the absence of showing of special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement. Disapproving the state court's conclusion that sobriety checkpoints are ineffective, the Court concluded that elected officials are free to choose among reasonable law-enforcement alternatives without judicial second-guessing as to whether other alternatives might work better. The Court reserved the question whether more extensive field sobriety testing requires individualized suspicion. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.id: 11097
Warrantless seizure of telephone records from the murder victim's residence was not an unreasonable search as to the other occupants.The officer's request for the telephone records, without a warrant, was not an unreasonable search. When the inspectors obtained the records they had no knowledge that anyone but the Boggs family was permanently residing at the apartment. Although they had reports of another couple temporarily staying with the Boggs, there was no reason for the inspectors to suspect that the telephone subscriber was not Ray or Angie Boggs. The officers requested the Boggs' telephone records. They knew that all members of the Boggs family were dead and reasonably drew the inference that no living person had an expectation of privacy in the billing records.id: 11100
X-Ray search of prisoner was not violative of the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding the lack of reasonable suspicion that he was carrying unsealed contraband.Appellant argued the court erred in denying his motion to suppress an X-ray search conducted on him as he entered Tehachapi State Prison. Since the prisoner was being transported from one high risk security housing unit to another the X-ray search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.id: 11101
A search warrant was not required before suspected contraband seized at the crime scene could be inspected at the police laboratory.Narcotics officers seized the packages appellants had concealed on their bodies at the airport and informally tested the contents to verify the substance as contraband. The officers then turned the packets over to a laboratory for further analysis. A warrant was not required before the further examinations were conducted at the police laboratory.id: 11093
Drugs abandoned prior to seizure were not subject to suppression and there was no seizure where defendant failed to yield to a show of authority.Police were conducting surveillance at the residence of a probationer (who had admitted dealing drugs from his home). They observed three men including probationer and defendant leave the residence with a large brown paper bag. When the men had entered probationer's home a few minutes earlier they carried a smaller brown bag and looked around in a hurried manner. Officers pursued the three men in the car and activated their lights. The driver attempted to elude the officers but crashed into a wall. Defendant opened the car door and discarded a weapon and brown paper bag containing cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress those items. The officers' show of authority in pursuing defendants did not amount to a seizure that may have subjected the abandoned items to suppression. Moreover, the detention of defendant was proper given the officer's expertise in drug trafficking, the furtive actions he witnessed and the knowledge that probationer was selling drugs from his residence.id: 11046
Supreme Court upholds traffic stop even though officer's motive was to look for drugs.Plain clothes policemen patrolling a high drug area in an unmarked vehicle saw defendant commit a minor traffic violation. They stopped the vehicle and saw drugs in plain view. The petitioners moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the stop was pretextual because the officers would not have made the stop but for the suspicions that the petitioners were engaged in drug activities. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the stop and temporary detention of a motorist where there is probable cause to believe he has committed a traffic violation is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the officer would not have made the stop without some additional law enforcement objective. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis.id: 10988
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245