Stare Decisis/Law of the Case
Category > Stare Decisis/Law of the Case
Supreme Court rejects stare decisis as ground for allowing broad search of vehicles.In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after police officers had removed the occupants from the vehicle. Since that decision, state and federal courts interpreted Belton to allow a search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its occupants even when there was no possibility that the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. In the course of holding that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search, the Court rejected the argument that the doctrine of stare decisis required adherence to the broad reading of Belton adopted by lower state and federal courts. The Court explained that stare decisis could not justify continuance of an unconstitutional police practice.id: 21409
The trial court erred in ruling the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant from litigating, on the basis of new evidence, the issues addressed in the first appeal. Even if the law-of-the-case doctrine makes the prior appeal conclusive on the legal principles there established, it does not foreclose new evidence on retrial indicating the dispositive facts were different than those addressed. The trial court erred in ruling the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant from relitigating, on the basis of new evidence, the issues addressed in the first appeal. The error was harmless where the trial court's denial of the suppression motion could be upheld in its entirety.id: 19058
The trial court erred in refusing to follow a controlling ruling by the Court of Appeal. In People v. Marchman (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 79, the court held the district attorney does not have statutory authority to initiate recommitment proceedings for an involuntary commitment under the MDO law unless the medical director of the treating state hospital determines the severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment. The trial court in the present case disagreed with the ruling in Marchman and refused to abide by it. However, under principles of stare decisis the trial court was required to follow Marchman.id: 19758
Law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude dismissing a strike where original appellate court, prior to Romero, stated that dismissing a strike would be an abuse of discretionAt defendant's three strike sentencing in 1995 the trial court made no reference to its ability to strike a prior in furtherance of justice. On appeal, the Court found there was no error in failing to dismiss a strike prior and stated that the trial court would have abused its discretion in doing so. The Supreme Court then published its decision in <i>Romero</i>, giving trial courts discretion to strike priors. The prosecutor argued the Court of Appeal's statement that striking a prior would be an abuse of discretion was law-of-the case, and that such action was precluded on remand. However, the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Romero</i> was an intervening decision which clarified the law and constituted an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a prior after reviewing the entire picture.id: 16342
Court of Appeal's ruling that the trial court entered into an illegal plea bargain with the defendant was law-of-the case.After the Supreme Court reversed the special circumstance and original death judgment, the trial court offered to sentence defendant to a term of life without parole if defendant admitted an intent to kill the victim. The defendant accepted the deal. The Court of Appeal ruled the plea bargain, which was opposed by the prosecutor was illegal. The court's decision was law-of-the case and cannot be reviewed absent an applicable exception. The only exception that might apply was the unjust decision exception. However, defendant could not establish that there was a manifest misapplication of existing legal principles resulting in substantial injustice.id: 18168
Updated 3/4/2024Law-of-the-case doctrine prohibited a second petition at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding.The trial court found defendant was ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 for his conviction of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder where the victim was the same person and the target offense was murder. He later filed a second section 1172.6 petition. However, the denial of the first petition was law-of-the-case.id: 28118
Updated 3/4/2024The trial court’s ineligibility ruling at defendant’s section 1172.6 proceeding was law-of-the-case.At defendant’s original petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the court found he was ineligible for relief because his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder showed the target offense, was murder, that ruling was law-of-the-case and conclusively established defendant’s ineligibility for relief at his later renewed petition proceeding.id: 28191
Defendant failed to show a systematic exclusion of Hispanics and Asian Americans from the grand jury.Defendant argued the process for selecting the grand jury that indicted him violated his rights to a representative cross-section of the community and to equal protection in light of the underrepresentation of Hispanics and Asian Americans. First, the appellate court’s earlier issuance of a writ on the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing did not become law of the case where there was no oral argument and no written decision. Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury. The trial court used a nonrandom process to solicit applications and made efforts to include all ethnic groups. While the jury commissioner failed to require signatures on hardship statements, this did not result in the systematic exclusion of minorities.id: 22649
Where defendant's 1992 conviction was reversed in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the district court's determination that the in-court ID was not independent from the illegal live lineup was not collateral estoppel or law-of-the-case.Defendant argued that under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law-of-the-case, the trial court was bound by the district court's conclusion and was precluded from determining independently whether the witness's in-court identification or defendant had an independent origin. However, the findings of the federal district court in the habeas corpus proceedings did not preclude the trial court from determining independently the admissibility of the in-court identification testimony of both witnesses had an origin independent of the illegal live lineup.id: 21520
Defendant was not entitled to a de novo hearing on a suppression motion at the retrial where she could not present additional evidence that would justify a different ruling.Defendant was convicted of murder at a retrial after her first conviction was reversed for instructional error. She was convicted based largely on her statements to police. She argued that court erred in denying a renewed suppression motion, a claim that had also been rejected at her first trial. The trial court did not err at the retrial in failing to conduct a de novo hearing. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine defendant was not entitled to have her motion redetermined on remand unless she was able to present evidence that justified a different ruling. Here, the only additional evidence presented was an enhanced CD of the interrogation but the clarity of the new CD was no greater than the clarity of the original tape. id: 20734
Law of the case prevented the Court of Appeal from reviewing an issue it had previously decided by way of a pretrial writ petition.Defendant’s conviction was vacated afer it was determined the prosecution had withheld Brady v. Maryland materials regarding the arresting officer’s disciplinary record. Defendant argued that retrial was prohibited by double jeopardy protections. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim after it was denied by the trial court. He argued the issue again on appeal following his conviction. However, the prior opinion was “law of the case” and conclusively decided the issue.id: 20560
Following a mistrial, a subsequent trial court is not bound by the rulings of the prior trial court. Defendant’s conviction was vacated afer it was discovered the prosecution had committed a Brady violation by not providing relevant discovery. He argued on retrial that he was entitled to a “sanction” jury instruction based on the failure to provide discovery and an instruction clarifying his self-defense claim. He argued a subsequent trial court may not overrule the decisions of a prior trial court. However, where a mistrial had been declared the prior rulings are vacated and there are no extant rulings to overrule. id: 20559
The failure to initially specify the degree of the murder did not require a reduction to second degree where the issue was resubmitted when the court had control of the jury, and the law of the case doctrine prevented review where the issue was decided by the Court of Appeal in a writ proceeding.Defendant argued the failure to specify the degree of the murder verdict required a reversal of the guilt and penalty phase verdicts, and a reduction of the conviction to second degree murder. However, the law of the case doctrine precluded review of the issue where the Court of Appeal decided in a writ proceeding which predated the beginning of the penalty phase that Penal Code section 1157 did not require a reduction to second degree murder. Moreover, resubmitting the question of the degree of the murder to the jury was not improper because the trial court retained control over the jury and resubmitted the questions almost immediately after the verdict.id: 18750
Following a mistrial, the new judge can overrule the previous judge's ruling on a suppression motion in limited circumstances.Following a mistrial in a criminal case, a new judge assigned to the case may overrule the previous judge's pretrial ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress statements to the police on Miranda grounds. This practice should not be encouraged and should be done only where due process requirements are met, including giving the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, for reasons of comity and public policy, trial judges should decline to reverse or modify other judges rulings unless there is a highly persuasive reason for doing so - mere disagreement with the result of the order is not a persuasive reason for reversing it.id: 17594
Law-of-the-case precluded Supreme Court review of validity of 1980 Texas murder conviction used as a special circumstance where the issue was resolved by the Court of Appeal.Defendant challenged the validity of the prior murder special circumstance (Penal Code section 190.2, subd.(a)(2)) which was based on a 1980 Texas case in which he pled guilty to "unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Antonio LeFosse, by shooting him with a gun." The trial court found the Texas offense did not include California's requisite element of express or implied malice. However, the Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion. The law-of-the-case doctrine precluded review of the present issue. Although the issue is complex and the elements of murder in the Texas statute are somewhat unclear, the Court of Appeal did not manifestly misapply existing law, and intervening decisions have not clarified the issue since the court's ruling.id: 17533
Appellate court's earlier decision denying defendant's petition for a writ of mandate was law of the case and precluded the appeal on the issue of the violation of the venue provisions of section 777.he criminal charges arose in Riverside County. The entire Riverside County Superior Court recused itself from hearing the case. The Judicial Council assigned the case to a San Bernardino judge and the case was tried in that county. Defendant argued on appeal that Penal Code section 777 precluded the trial of a Riverside County crime in San Bernardino County. However, the law of the case doctrine precluded the appeal on the ground of violation of the venue provisions of section 777 since the Court of Appeal had previously denied defendant's petition for a writ of mandate on the issue.id: 17362
Law of the case doctrine did not apply where the first petition challenged the parole board's decision and the second petition challenged the Governor's similar decision.The Court of Appeal erred by holding the law of the case doctrine established that there was no evidence supporting the Governor's decision to reverse the parole board's decision granting parole. The first petition for writ of habeas corpus challenged the Board's parole decision. The second petition challenged the Governor's parole decision. Even though the goal of both habeas corpus proceedings was to obtain petitioner's release on parole, each petition challenged, on different grounds, separate parole decisions made by independent parole authorities. Accordingly, the two proceedings constituted separate cases.id: 17116
Retrial on the prior assault conviction following a reversal for insufficient evidence was not barred by double jeopardy, res judicata or law of the case.In an earlier opinion the Court of Appeal determined the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction for assault under Penal Code section 245, subd.(a)(1), which qualified as a strike under the three strikes law. The court reversed the sentence and remanded the matter for a retrial on the prior conviction allegation. The principles of res judicata, law of the case, and double jeopardy whether singularly or in combination, do not preclude a new trial on the issue of whether defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in committing the crime underlying his prior assault conviction.id: 14984
An exception to the law of the case doctrine exists where there has been a controlling change in the law between the time of the first and second appellate decision.Capital defendants' crimes were committed before the decision in <i>Carlos v. Superior Court </i>(1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 requiring an intent to kill for a felony-murder special circumstance. <i>Carlos</i> was later overturned by <i>People v. Anderson</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 insofar as it related to the actual killer. Defendant argued at his retrial, the prior decision applying <i>Carlos</i>' intent to kill requirement to his crimes was law of the case. However, defendant overlooked the well-settled exception to the law of the case doctrine based on a controlling change in the law between the time of the first and second appellate decisions. Moreover, his argument that it is unjust to preclude a capital defendant from asserting the law of the case doctrine in his favor was without merit.id: 14753
Claim regarding testimony of jailhouse informant that had been rejected in the first guilt phase trial could not be asserted in a later penalty phase trial.Defendant argued the testimony of a jailhouse informant should have been excluded because he was an agent of the government through whom the police deliberately elicited incriminating statements in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court denied the same claim at the guilt phase at defendant's first trial. That decision became law of he case and the claim could not be raised again at a subsequent penalty phase retrial.id: 14754
Only the Supreme Court may depart from its own precedent in an appropriate case.The stare decisis doctrine permits only the California Supreme Court, not a lower court, to depart from Supreme Court precedent in an appropriate case. The court was therefore bound by the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncement in <i>People v. Superior Court (Engert)</i>, 1982 31 Cal.3d 797, that Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(14) regarding an especially atrocious, cruel or heinous murder was unconstitutionally vague.id: 14755
Supreme Court says stare decisis does not govern where earlier opinion was based upon repudiated reasoning.The government argued that stare decisis prevented the Supreme Court from requiring that materiality be determined by the jury in a perjury prosecution. It relied upon <i>Sinclair v. U.S.</i>, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) which held that the question of pertinency was properly decided by prosecution. However, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, noted that the role of stare decisis is reduced when the alleged rule is procedural and rests on an interpretation of the Constitution. Stare decisis is not controlling at all where, as here, the reasoning of the earlier opinion, <i>Sinclair</i> here, had already been repudiated in several later Supreme Court opinions.id: 14756
Law-of-the-case doctrine applies to the search issues in a capital case.Capital defendant raised the same search issues he raised unsuccessfully in his pretrial petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. He argued the Supreme Court's duty to review judgments of death precludes application of the law-of-the-case doctrine to decisions of intermediate appellate courts. However, absent a manifest misapplication of the law resulting in substantial injustice or an intervening change in the law, the Court of Appeal decision should stand as the law of the case.id: 14193
Relitigation of admissibility of confessions was not precluded after reversal of the judgment.Following conviction and a sentence imposing death the Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding the confessions were obtained in violation of the constitution. Defendant was retried. At the second trial, a new pretrial hearing was held to determine the admissibility of the confessions, new evidence was presented and the trial court ruled the confessions were admissible. The trial court did not err in permitting relitigation of the issue. There was no stipulation by the parties or statutory provision precluding relitigation. The law-of-the-case doctrine would have controlled the outcome only if the evidence at the rehearing of the issue was substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based. Finally, while Penal Code section 1538.5 may preclude relitigation of the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, defendant included Fifth and Sixth Amendment bases for exclusion of his confessions in the section 1538.5 motion.id: 11815
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245