MDSO, Rehabilitation Centers, Special Programs, State Hospital for Mentally Ill
Category > MDSO, Rehabilitation Centers, Special Programs, State Hospital for Mentally Ill
The trial court had the power to grant defendant's petition challenging his MDO classification pretrial where the prosecutor's offer of proof was insufficient to establish a prerequisite for continued treatment.The trial court granted defendant's petition challenging his classification as a mentally disordered offender. The prosecution argued the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the Penal Code section 2966, subd.(b) petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence without conducting a jury trial. However, the prosecutor's offer of proof failed to establish a necessary factor - that the prisoner had been in treatment for a severe mental disorder for at least 90 days within a year prior to his release. That he was medicated for an unrelated depressive disorder did not suffice. The court had the power to grant the dispositive pretrial motion to prevent what would have been an unnecessary and futile trial. Moreover, any error in failing to hold a trial was harmless since the offer of proof was insufficient to establish one of the six prerequisites for continued treatment.id: 18140
Res judicata barred prosecutor from retrying defendant as an MDO based on the same qualifying offense.The trial court found defendant was not a mentally disordered offender (MDO) at the time he committed a criminal offense. The judgment states that he was not an MDO at the time of his prior hearing before the Board of Prison Terms. Res judicata barred the prosecution from retrying defendant as an MDO based on the same qualifying offense.id: 17558
Defendant had a statutory but not constitutional right to self-representation in an MDO proceeding.Defendant argued reversal of his mentally disordered offender finding under Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972 was necessary because the trial court denied his Faretta motion to represent himself at the trial on the MDO petition. However, because MDO proceedings are not punitive they are considered civil proceedings, and therefore there is no constitutional right of self-representation. Nevertheless, since the MDO statutes give defendants the right to appointed counsel, a defendant may refuse counsel and represent himself. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for self-representation because of the severity and complexity of the case as well as the equivocal nature of the request which was directed only toward certain evidence. Any error in denying the request was harmless since the evidence supporting continued commitment as an MDO was overwhelming.id: 17500
The trial court erred in failing to specify why it was not committing defendant to the CRC.Defendant pled no contest to certain drug offenses. The trial court thereafter erred by not stating with specificity its reasons for not committing defendant to the California
Rehabilitation Center (Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051.) The court's comment that there were a "variety of reasons" was ambiguous and required a remand to allow the trial court to specify in the record the reasons for its decision.id: 19219
Trial court must give a statement of reaons when refusing to initiate narcotic addict commitment proceeedings.When a trial court refuses to initiate civil narcotic addict commitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 because of the defendant's pattern of criminality, it must, under California Rules of Court, rule 406(b), give a statement of reasons which at least point to the factors upon which the court relied.id: 13823
Trial court has the power to modify the original sentence following rejection from CRC.Defendant was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) but returned to the trial court after the warden determined he was not a fit subject for CRC commitment because of his violent tendencies. The trial court thereafter ordered execution of the previously imposed state prison term. However, the judgment was reversed where the Court of Appeal found the trial court did not lose the power to modify the previously imposed sentence. The trial court had the power to mitigate (consider probation), but not to increase the sentence.id: 16220
Court abused its discretion in failing to order a CRC evaluation where the nonviolent burglaries were motivated by a need to support defendant's severe drug dependence.The trial court abused its discretion by failing to refer defendant for an evaluation to determine if he should be confined in the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. The court's stated reason was "excessive criminality" (as opposed to a pattern of criminality that renders him unfit for a CRC evaluation). The burglaries did not involve violence and were committed to secure funds to support defendant's drug habit. His drug dependence was severe, protracted and clearly the motivating factor in the crimes. He appeared to be the quintessential candidate for CRC.id: 15090
Court erred in failing to consider alternative federal custody commitment for treatment of convicted felons suffering from problems relating to Vietnam combat service.Once defendant made a sufficient showing of his eligibility for sentencing under Penal Code section 1170.9, the trial court erred in failing to consider the federal treatment program alternative as required by the provision.id: 13301
Res judicata barred the relitigation of defendant's mental state, which was the subject of a prior MDO proceeding.Where a trial court has found at a Penal Code section 2962 mentally disordered offender hearing, that a severe mental disorder was not an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime, the prosecution is precluded from seeking a second MDO determination based on the same underlying offense. To allow relitigation of the circumstances surrounding defendant's commitment offense would violate the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.id: 16808
Court erred in failing to instruct the jury it had to determine if defendant met the MDO criteria on the date of the most recent Board of Prison Terms hearing.The trial court ordered an extension of defendant's mentally disordered offender commitment (Penal Code section 2966) after a jury finding that he continued to represent a danger to others. The court erred in failing to instruct on the time parameter for proof of the MDO criteria. At both a hearing challenging the parolee's initial commitment and at an annual review hearing continuing that commitment, the trier of fact is required to determine that the parolee met the MDO criteria on the date of the most recent Board of Prison Terms hearing. However, the error was harmless given the substantial evidence that defendant met the MDO criteria just prior to the Board of Prison Term hearing.id: 11741
Updated 6/1/2024Considering three strikes law in setting the maximum term for an insanity acquittee at 25 years-to-life did not violate due process or equal protection.Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity for offenses stemming from his beating of a neighbor. Due to defendant’s status as a three-strike offender the court ordered a commitment to the state hospital for a maximum term of 25 years-to-life. Consideration of the three strikes law in setting the life-top term did not violate due process or equal protection even though other insanity acquittees are treated differently.id: 28273
Updated 6/1/2024The trial court did not err in committing an NGI defendant to a state hospital for 25 years-to-life but failed to properly explain how it calculated the term.Defendant was charged with several crimes related to his beating of his neighbor, and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court ordered him committed to a state hospital for a maximum term of 25 years-to-life. The court conducted a commitment hearing rather than a sentencing as defendant argued. Moreover, the court imposed the correct maximum term although it failed to adequately explain how it arrived at that term. The matter was remanded so that the trial court could provide an explanation on that point.id: 28272
A plea bargain may not be conditioned on a judicial finding that the subject offense falls outside the MDO law.The provision in defendant's plea agreement that prevents use of his offense as the qualifying offense for commitment as an MDO is not a proper subject for a plea agreement and may not be enforced by specific performance.id: 18291
The trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the untimely petition to extend defendant's commitment as an MDO where he was given sufficient time to prepare for the trial.Defendant's involuntary commitment to a state hospital was extended pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. He argued the court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the petition where it was filed two weeks before his commitment expired, and the failure to comply within the statute's 90 day notice requirement was due to inexcusable negligence. However, defendant suffered no prejudice by the delay where he was afforded at least as long to prepare the case as would have been available if the petition had been filed on time.id: 18456
Mental health experts properly relied on the probation reports as the basis of their opinions that the evading officer offense involved force or violence for MDO purposes.Defendant argued he did not qualify as a mentally disordered offender because his underlying offense (evading an officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.2) was not a crime of force or violence. Contrary to defendant's claim, there was no error in allowing the mental health experts to describe the probation report in stating the basis for their opinions on the force or violence criterion.id: 18459
The prosecutor was not required to file a petition to continue defendant's treatment as an MDO where he spent his one year term in outpatient status.The trial court committed defendant as a mentally disordered offender for a one year term. He spent the entire year on outpatient status pursuant to Penal Code section 2972, subd.(d).The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the petition for recommitment on the ground that the prosecution failed to file the recommitment petition prior to the termination of the one year term. Since he received no outpatient treatment, the recommitment procedures of section 2972.1, rather than 2972 apply. The former does not require the prosecutor to file a petition for recommitment in order to continue defendant's MDO treatment.id: 18344
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 does not violate equal protection by failing to include alcohol as a substance that can lead to civil commitment rather than confinement in prison.Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 provides for suspending execution of sentence and committing to the California Rehabilitation Center a defendant who is addicted to narcotics, but the definition for "narcotic drug" does not include alcohol. Defendant, who was convicted of felonies relating to drunk driving argued the provision violates equal protection principles by not including alcohol as an addictive substance. However, the use of alcohol is not illegal and the state does not incur a cost by confining those who use or possess alcohol. As a result, the Legislature acted rationally in deciding those who are addicted to alcohol are not similarly situated to those who are addicted to narcotics.id: 17754
A defendant waives the issue of a CRC civil commitment by failing to raise the issue in the trial court.The defendant, a former drug addict, was convicted of receiving stolen property and sought probation at sentencing. Probation was denied and he was committed to state prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the court should have considered placing him at the California Rehabilitative Center. The appellate court rejected this assertion, noting that the issue was never raised in the court below, therefore deemed it waived, agreeing with People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300. Defendant's fallback argument that his attorney was ineffective for not having argued for a CRC commitment was also rejected, in that, in seeking a grant of probation, his counsel informed the court that defendant was "not now on drugs."id: 17449
Section 1026.5, subd.(b)(8) does not violate due process or equal protection by excluding an insanity acquittee's time spent on outpatient status from the maximum term of commitment.Penal Code section 1026.5 authorizes the extended commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity beyond the maximum term of commitment to which the person could have been sentenced for the underlying offense. Contrary to defendant's claim, section 1026.5, subd.(b)(8) does not violate due process or equal protection principles by excluding time spent on outpatient status from the maximum term of commitment.id: 16996
Court's comments regarding defendant's record and the facts of the case supported its failure to refer him for a CRC evaluation.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by failing to refer him for an evaluation to determine if he should be confined at the California Rehabilitation Center. However, the trial court's comments show it was looking at defendant's prior criminal record and poor performance on probation as well as the circumstances of a current trafficking charge that was dismissed under the plea bargain. The facts were set forth in the probation report, amplified by the prosecutor at sentencing, and accepted by the court as true. Nothing more was required.id: 16718
Defense must request placement in CRC to preserve the issue of error in failing to institute such proceedings.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to institute civil proceedings to consider the appropriateness of a CRC commitment. However, a defendant must request placement in CRC to preserve the issue for review. Defense counsel's argument at sentencing constituted a rejection of a CRC commitment. <i>People v. </i>id: 16216
Taking the victim's money and struggling to keep it was sufficient force under the MDO provision.At defendant's hearing to determine whether she was a mentally disordered offender within the meaning of Penal Code section 2960 et seq., the evidence was sufficient to show she used force or violence in the underlying offense. She grabbed the money from the victim's hand, broke away from his grasp in the cab in order to escape, and struggled to retain the stolen money. Had the only evidence of force used been that required to obtain the money, it is unlikely the hearing court would have found that the force criterion was met.id: 15745
Court retained jurisdiction to consider Sexually Violent Predator petition even though the revocation of petitioner's probation for psychiatric purposes was unlawful.Petitioner challenged his commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator's Act (Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, on the basis that the revocation of his parole for psychiatric evaluation was unlawful under <i>Terhune v. Superior Court</i> (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864. However, despite the Department of Corrections' legal error in revoking petitioner's parole on that basis, the trial court still had jurisdiction to consider the SVP petition.id: 15724
Court's failure to commence MDO trial within statutory time period did not divest it of jurisdiction to proceed.Defendant was committed to one year in a state hospital under the Mentally Disordered Prisoner's Act (Penal Code section 2960 et seq.) The Act requires a court to commence trial at least 30 days before the defendant is scheduled for release from parole unless he or she waives time or the court finds good cause. Here, the trial started after defendant's scheduled release date. Although defendant did not object to the trial date, he did not waive time; nor did the court hold a hearing on the issue of good cause or make an express finding that there was good cause for the delay in commencing trial. The court's failure to comply with the statutory procedure did not divest it of jurisdiction to proceed. Moreover, defendant's failure to object to the trial date waived any claim of error based on noncompliance with the procedure. Finally, the court did not automatically lose jurisdiction to proceed after defendant's scheduled release date.id: 15725
Having defendant testify about her actions and mental condition at the MDO hearing did not violate her right against self-incrimination.At the hearing to determine whether defendant was a mentally disordered offender (Penal Code section 2960 et seq.) having the defendant testify about her actions and mental condition during the underlying offense did not violate her federal or state rights against self-incrimination.id: 15731
MDO laws are part of a civil scheme which does not implicate the rule against ex post facto laws.Defendant argued his conviction for arson of property did not qualify as mentally disordered offender crime (under Penal Code section 2962) at the time of his commitment and that a recent amendment to the MDO law, which enlarged the list of qualifying offenses to include arson of property "where the act posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others" was an ex post facto law if applied to his case. However, the MDO statutes are part of a civil scheme which does not implicate the rule against ex post facto laws. Moreover, defendant's arson offense, where he poured gasoline on his wife's car and set it on fire in a residential neighborhood, posed a "substantial danger" to the occupants of those nearby structures, within the meaning of the amended law.id: 15282
A criminal defendant must request placement in the CRC to preserve the issue for appeal.When a possibly addicted criminal defendant makes no request for civil commitment and there is no record made of any consideration of the idea by the trial judge, the defendant has waived the right to raise the issue on appeal.id: 13805
Court was authorized to impose a 16 year prison sentence after defendant failed to successfully complete a six year term at the CRC.Defendant pled guilty to sixteen counts of burglary. The court stayed sentence on all but one count and referred him to the California Rehabilitation Center for six years maximum. He was informed that if he did not complete the CRC program, he would serve a state prison sentence of up to 17 years. After several violations, he was returned to the court from the CRC. Defense counsel argued the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence defendant to a term greater than six years. However, defendant was given the benefit of his bargain with the court. He was given the opportunity to overcome his addiction or serve substantial prison time. He chose the latter and the 16 year prison sentence was proper.id: 13809
Court's error in refusing to initiate narcotics addict commitment proceeding without stating reasons was harmless where the record disclosed facts which supported the ruling.Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by failing to institute civil narcotics addict commitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. Although it was error for the court to deny the initiation of civil commitment proceedings without stating the reasons for its decision, the record indicates the error was not prejudicial. While it is not clear whether the court considered defendant addicted or in imminent danger of becoming addicted, it was obvious it believed defendant's extensive criminal background precluded him from CRC commitment. Since the record disclosed facts which adequately support the reasons for denying the initiation of CRC commitment proceedings, the sentencing court's choice was presumed to be based on these facts.id: 13810
Decision to preclude treatment at the CRC cannot be based upon the inmate's status as a crime victim.While receiving treatment for narcotic addiction at the California Rehabilitation Center, appellant was attacked by three fellow inmates as he slept. Notwithstanding appellant's desire to continue treatment at the CRC, the warden returned him to the superior court noting that he was not amenable to treatment due to his fear for his safety. The superior court upheld the warden's decision and ordered that appellant's prison sentence be carried out. The order granting exclusion from the CRC was an abuse of discretion as the decision to preclude treatment cannot be based upon the inmate's status as a crime victim.id: 13811
One-year prior prison term enhancement was proper notwithstanding that a portion of defendant's imprisonment was served in the California Rehabilitation Center.Defendant argued the trial court should not have imposed the one-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5 subdivision (b), based on the prison term served as a result of his 1982 burglary conviction because part of his term was served at the California Rehabilitation Center. It has been established that a direct commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center does not result in a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) because the commitment is for rehabilitation rather than punishment. However, defendant in this case was sentenced to prison to be punished and the Department of Corrections decision to transfer him to the California Rehabilitation Center did not exempt him from the enhanced sentence under section 667.5 for this period of incarceration.id: 13818
Quantity of narcotics involved is relevant in considering CRC commitment.Appellant was convicted of offering to sell a controlled substance under Health and Safety Code section 11352. He argued the court abused its discretion in finding him unfit for civil narcotics addict commitment proceedings based on the circumstances surrounding the case and particularly the large amount of drugs possessed. Excessive criminality is the only factor properly considered by the court in deciding whether to order the filing of a petition for commitment of a possible addict to the California Rehabilitation Center. However, the quantity of drugs possessed or sold and the apparent extent of a defendant's illegal enterprise are relevant matters to be considered by the court in making its determination.id: 13819
There is no judicial discretion to strike a prior when the defendant is an addict or in danger of becoming one.Appellant argued the prohibition which prevents the striking of Penal Code section 667 enhancements under section 1385 applies only in cases where the defendant is actually sentenced to prison on the underlying offense, and, thus, that the court has the authority to strike a section 667 enhancement for purposes of rehabilitation, and make a narcotics addict available for CRC eligibility. However, the court held there is no judicial discretion to strike a prior serious felony when the defendant is an addict or in danger of becoming one.id: 13822
Neither continuous nor involuntary treatment of a mentally disordered offender reimprisoned for parole violations is a jurisdictional prerequisite of continued treatment proceedings.When defendant had almost completed his maximum parole term and was due to be released he was recommitted for continued involuntary treatment of his mental disorder pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. He argued he received no treatment by state mental health officials for his disorder while he was in physical custody following his arrest and therefore the trial court had no jurisdiction to recommit him for continued treatment. However, neither continuous nor involuntary treatment of a mentally disordered offender reimprisoned for a parole violation is a jurisdictional prerequisite of continued treatment proceedings under sections 2970 and 2972.id: 11763
Recommitment order for continued involuntary treatment of mental disorder was proper despite the untimely submission of the remission evaluation and the untimely petition for trial of continued treatmentAfter defendant had almost completed his maximum parole term and was due to be released he was recommitted for continued involuntary treatment of his mental disorder pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. He claimed the recommitment order was void because the evaluation report was submitted by the prosecutor less than 180 days as required in section 2970. However, there was good cause for the delay as the mental health staff acted with due diligence in preparing and sending necessary documentation to the prosecutor. He also claimed error in that the continued treatment proceeding commenced less than 30 days before his parole termination date as required in section 2972, subdivision (a). However, factors beyond the prosecutor's control, including the late evaluation report and misinformation regarding the release date, were the major reasons for failing to meet the 30-day deadline. The prosecutor's ignorance of the 30-day deadline, although culpable, was not a major reason for the failure to meet the deadline.id: 11769
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245