Order/Presumptions/Burdens/Inferences
Category > Order/Presumptions/Burdens/Inferences
The presence of conflicting evidence on the predicate question of whether there was sufficient evidence to trigger the permissive inference instruction did not preclude giving the instructions.Defendant was convicted of second degree Watson murder, and misdemeanor drunk driving. He argued that instructions on permissive inferences applied to the drunk driving but not the murder convictions, and the jurors should have been so instructed. However, the jurors were told a murder verdict required a finding of malice and so there was no reasonable liklihood that the jury used the inference instructions to find malice. Moreover, the presence of conflicting evidence on the predicate question of whether there was sufficient evidence to trigger the inference instructions did not preclude giving the instructions.id: 25921
Defense experts properly rebutted the presumption of the reliability of the red light cameras.Defendant was cited for failing to stop at a red light based on a red light camera photograph. Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553 provide a presumption for the existence and content of computer information and digital images taken from them and establish preliminarily that a computer’s print function worked properly. However, these presumptions were improperly viewed as presumptions affecting the burden of proof rather than the burden of producing evidence. Defense expert testimony rebutted the presumption of reliability of the photographic evidence. The judgment was reversed.id: 23941
Instruction that the failure to prove the gun was real did not establish reasonable doubt impermissibly lightened the prosecutor’s burden. The issue at trial was whether the defendant used a real gun when committing the robberies. The court gave a pinpoint instruction saying the victim’s inability to conclusively establish the gun was real did not create a reasonable doubt as a matter of law that the gun was not a firearm. The instruction did not direct a verdict but it did impermissibly lighten the prosecution’s burden. However, the error was harmless in light of the lack of any evidence suggesting defendant used a toy gun.id: 22532
The trial court erred in giving CALJIC 12.61.1 at defendant's drunk driving trial where the permissive inference was not rationally connected to the proven fact. At defendant's drunk driving trial, the court instructed with CALJIC 12.61.1, which allowed the jury to infer that defendant had a blood alcohol content of at least 0.08 percent while he was driving if a blood alcohol test administered within three hours of the time he stopped driving revealed a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was no rational connection between the proved fact and the fact to be inferred sufficient to justify giving the instruction. The error was prejudicial.id: 19969
Instructing the jury any violation of the basic speed law is inherently dangerous to human life created an impermissible mandatory presumption. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that for purposes of determining implied malice a violation of California's "basic speed law" is an act inherently dangerous to human life. The instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption. The error was prejudicial as the facts were not otherwise necessarily sufficient to establish implied malice.id: 17738
Court committed prejudicial error in instructing that possession of a weapon with defaced serial numbers creates the presumption that the possessor defaced the number.The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that possession of a weapon with obliterated serial numbers creates the presumption that the possessor defaced the numbers. A presumption must not undermine the fact finder's responsibility to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence adduced by the state.id: 10644
Evasion of pursuing officer statute doesn’t create a mandatory presumption by allowing proof of three traffic violations to establish reckless disregard for safety.Defendant was convicted of evading an officer while driving with a reckless disregard for safety in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2. He argued that section 2800.2, subd.(b) establishes a mandatory presumption by allowing the state to prove reckless disregard based on the commission of three traffic violations. However, section 2800.2, subd.(b) doesn’t create an improper presumption regarding the required mental state, it modifies the statutory elements of the offense.id: 25504
Erroneous combination of instructions that created a permissive inference that defendant was aware of his guilt when he made the false statements was forfeited for lack of an objection.Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury during the guilt phase of the trial, with CALCRIM 362, on consciousness of guilt, along with CALCRIM 3428 on the limited use of evidence of mental illness or impairment. Defendant failed to object to either instruction at trial. While the instructions were erroneous by creating a permissive inference that defendant was aware of his guilt when he made the false statements, the error did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. Therefore, the claim was forfeited.id: 24671
The trial court did not direct a verdict by instructing that for purposes of section 12031, a driveway may be a public place when it is accessible to the public, and the instruction did not violate the Second Amendment under Heller.Defendant was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm in a public place in violation of Penal Code section 12031, subd.(a)(1). He argued the trial court erred in responding to a jury inquiry during deliberations by suggesting that a private driveway may be a public place for purposes of section 12021 if it was accessible to the public. However, the court’s response did not constitute a directed verdict on the public place element because the instruction left the jury with the task of deciding whether defendant was on the driveway and whether the driveway was reasonably accessible to the public. Moreover, the court’s definition of “public place” did not violate the Second Amendment as defined in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 128 S.Ct. 2783. id: 20709
Supreme Court holds that government is not required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt.At defendant's trial for illegally purchasing firearms, she claimed that she had acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him. Defendant argued that the government should bear the burden of disproving duress beyond a reasonable doubt. Following applicable law, the district court instead instructed the jury that defendant had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor modern common law required the government to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's jury instructions were proper.id: 20184
CALCRIM instruction on section 1108 evidence did not reduce the prosecution's burden of proof.The trial court admitted evidence of defendant's prior sex
offenses under Evidence Code sections1108 and later instructed with CALCRIM No. 1191, which is the equivalent of CALJIC No. 2.50.01. The courts have previously rejected claims that
the CALJIC instruction reduced the prosecution's burden of proof, and the CALCRIM instruction is likewise proper.id: 19575
Evidence supported the torture conviction notwithstanding defendant's claim of a reasonable inference showing the acts were spontaneous rather than calculated.Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the torture conviction because his brutal and repeated assaults on the victim were spontaneous rather than calculated, and thus, he
did not act with the specific intent to cause the victim to experience cruel or extreme pain and suffering. Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence giving rise to an inference that he acted spontaneously did not require reversal on appeal. Moreover, an inference that defendant acted in anger would not dispel the intent required for torture. Finally, the evidence supported the inference that defendant inflicted pain in revenge because the victim reneged on her agreement to submit to rape.id: 19242
Section 2800.2, subd. (d) does not create a mandatory resumption by allowing a finding of willful or wanton conduct based on the commission of three traffic offenses.Defendant was convicted of driving with a willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from police in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2. He argued the Legislature's addition of subdivision (b) to section 2800.2 created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption by allowing a finding of willful or wanton disregard based solely on a finding the
defendant committed three traffic offense resulting in violation points, thus relieving the prosecution of it burden of proving willful or wanton disregard. However, subdivision (b)provides a definition of substantive law, and does not create an impermissible mandatory presumption.
id: 18965
MDO law requires a positive finding on the "remission" criterion and does not establish an unlawful mandatory presumption.Under the Mentally Disordered Offender law a patient "cannot be kept in remission without treatment if during the year prior to the question being before the Board of Prison Terms or a trial court, he or she has been in remission and he or she has been physically violent, except in self-defense..." This provision is a rule of substantive law and not, as defendant argued, an unlawful mandatory presumption.id: 18719
Section 2800.2 does not employ a mandatory presumption by describing the willful or wanton disregard element in terms of specific Vehicle Code violations.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder which the prosecutor tried on two theories, implied malice and second degree felony-murder based on a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, driving in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property "while attempting to elude a pursuing officer. Defendant argued that subdivision 2800.2 employs a constitutionally prohibited mandatory presumption by describing the willful or wanton disregard element in terms of specific Vehicle Code violations. However, section 2800.2 dos not employ a mandatory presumption, it simply establishes a rule of substantive law by setting forth the Legislature's definition of what qualifies as a violation of that section.id: 18643
CALJIC 2.50.02, regarding admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence did not create an unconstitutional permissive inference at defendant's murder trial.Defendant challenged the constitutionality of CALJIC No. 2.50.02 arguing the instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference. He claimed the instruction improperly permitted the jury to rely on prior acts of domestic violence to infer that he had a propensity to commit premeditated murder and did, in fact, commit premeditated. However, the instructions make clear that the prosecution has the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and nothing in CALJIC No. 2.50.02 authorized the jury to use the preponderance of the evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination of whether the defendant committed a prior domestic violence offense.id: 17914
Section 11383's expansion of hydriodic acid to include its essential chemicals did not create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.The Legislature, by extending the prohibition on possessing hydriodic acid to include its essential chemicals, clearly intended to criminalize the possession of red phosphorous and iodine where these two chemicals are found in sufficient quantity to manufacture hydriodic acid and are possessed with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Therefore, Health and Safety Code section 11383, subd.(f) does not create an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption. Instead, it expands the definition of hydriodic acid to encompass its essential chemicals and thus defines, in precise terms, the substantive crime of possession of the essential chemicals sufficient to manufacture hydriodic acid.id: 17709
Allowing proof of willful conduct in evasion statute by proof of three traffic infractions does not constitute an improper mandatory presumption.Evading an officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.2 requires proof that defendant was attempting to elude a pursuing officer and that he was driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. Under section 2800.2, subd.(b) (added in 1996), the prosecution can prove willful or wanton disregard for safety by showing three one point traffic violations, or property damage. The jury was instructed in this regard pursuant to CALJIC 12.85. Defendant argued section 2800.2, subd.(b) constitutes a constitutionally prohibited mandatory presumption which told the jury willful or wanton conduct was established by three traffic violations. However, the provision does not state a mandatory presumption. Rather it merely defines in precise terms, one way in which the prosecution may prove the element of willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others.
id: 17581
CALJIC No. 2.15 does not create an improper presumption of guilt arising from the mere fact of possession of stolen property.Defendant argued that by instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC 2.15 on the slight corroborating evidence necessary to permit an inference of guilt of robbery or burglary from evidence defendant was in conscious possession of recently stolen property, the trial court unconstitutionally lightened the prosecution's burden of proof as to both the felony murder charge and the special circumstance allegation. However, the instruction does not create an improper presumption of guilt. Rather, it provides a burglary or robbery may not be presumed from mere possession absent corroborating evidence. The inference created by CALJIC No. 2.25 is permissive not mandatory.id: 17603
The testimony of the prosecution's psychiatric expert did not create a legal presumption of intent.In challenging the testimony of the prosecution's psychiatric expert, defendant argued the doctor's opinions were likely to mislead the jury into believing that if any individual performs a particular act, he or she necessarily intended to do so. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the testimony of one witness could not have created a legal presumption of intent.id: 16024
Court did not err in instructing the burden rests with defendant to show lawful acquisition of the hypodermic needle.Defendant was convicted of being in possession of a hypodermic needle pursuant to Penal Code section 4149. He argued the court erred in instructing with CALJIC 16.005 because the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof as to an element of the crime by requiring defendant to show that his acquisition of the hypodermic needle was lawful, rather than requiring the prosecutor to show that defendant's acquisition was unlawful. However, it is not unduly harsh or unfair to place the burden of proving authorized possession under section 4149 upon the defendant. This is a fact peculiarly within the defendant's personal knowledge and relatively difficult for the prosecutor to prove.id: 12959
Court did not err in instructing on permissive inference as to possession of stolen property where defendant possessed the property and admitted participation in the burglaries.Defendant was convicted of burglary and receiving stolen property. He argued the court erred in instructing with CALJIC 2.15 regarding permissive inferences to be drawn from the possession of stolen property. Defendant argued the instruction undercut the presumption of innocence because it permitted the jury to convict him on the basis of slight evidence. However, it was defendant's possession of the stolen property combined with his admissions that he participated in the burglaries that allowed the instruction on the permissive inference to be given. There was no instructional error.id: 12960
Court may properly use the official duty presumption to find that a defendant served and completed a prison term.If there is no evidence to the contrary to rebut the statutory presumption, the court may consider the appropriate abstract of judgment (imposing a prison sentence) and the facts of the particular case, and may use the official duty presumption (that the warden carried out the judgment) to find that a defendant served and completed his term of imprisonment.id: 12961
Evidence of defendant's involvement in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate the inference of guilt from possession of the stolen property.Defendant argued the trial court's instructing with CALJIC 2.15 violated his due process rights because the instruction allowed the jury to infer his guilt of robbery from circumstances, i.e., possession of recently stolen property plus slight corroboration, that did not afford a rational basis for such inference. However, the corroborating evidence of defendant's involvement was as follows: attempts had been made to remove serial numbers from the weapons and the barrels of the shotguns had been shortened; defendant admitted he was present when the victim was beaten and killed; he gave the police a false alibi. This evidence corroborated the inference of guilt from the possession of the stolen property. Thus, the jury could rationally make the inference the presumption permits.id: 12962
Supreme Court holds that defendant may be forced to bear burden of proving mitigating circumstances in death cases.Under the Arizona death penalty statute, defendants are required to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence before the sentencer is to weigh those circumstances against any aggravating circumstances. Defendant argued that this allocation of the burden of proof violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. In an opinion for four members of the Court, Justice White disagreed. While noting past disapproval of state-imposed restrictions on what mitigating circumstances might be considered at capital sentencing, the plurality stated that those cases did not speak to how the burden of proof must be allocated regarding mitigating circumstances. Because placement of the burden did not lessen the state's burden to prove every element of the offense charged and every aggravating circumstance, constitutional rights were not infringed. Refusing to follow past cases recognizing eighth amendment claims that a sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully restricted, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. In three separate opinions, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall dissented.id: 12963
The rule of convenience applies to the burden of proof upon the charge of driving without a license.The court found appellant had violated Vehicle Code section 12500, driving without a valid driver's license. The court relying on CALJIC 16.631 found that because the matter was within appellant's own personal knowledge, the burden was shifted to appellant to prove that he had a valid license. This rule of convenience applies to the instant facts and appellant's failure to show he was a licensed driver supported the conviction.id: 12964
Instructing that assault is a general intent crime did not create a mandatory presumption as to defendant's intent.Defendant argued the trial court's improper instructions on assault and assault with a deadly weapon impermissibly relieved the prosecution of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because it created a mandatory presumption as to his intent. However, contrary to defendant's underlying claim, assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime. The language at issue describes or defines conduct constituting an assault, including the element of general criminal intent. If the predicates are proven to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, the requisite intent is not presumed; rather, it is established by the evidence.id: 9734
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245