Defendant was convicted of perjury by declaration under Penal Code section 118, subd. (a). However, Vehicle Code section 10501, subd. (a) report of a vehicle theft, preempts section 118, subd. (a) and that conviction was reversed.id: 26101
Defendant was charged with perjury due to his failure to acknowledge the existence of a loan on a political form. However, the trial court properly found the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did not support a perjury charge based upon defendant’s making of a false statement for not disclosing a promissory note as a loan, because the note was not a loan and did not memorialize one.id: 21159
Defendant was convicted of perjury. However, the 2003 version of CALJIC 7.20 incorrectly defined "materiality" for the jury. The instruction defined a false material statement as one that "could influence the proceedings in which it was uttered." The correct definition of false material statement is one that "could probably have influenced the outcome" of the proceeding in which it was uttered. However, the error was harmless under Chapman since the defendant essentially conceded the element of materiality by focusing on another element of perjury - whether he had the specific intent to testify falsely.id: 18047
The trial court erred by instructing with CALJIC 7.22 that under Penal Code section 125 perjury is committed by a person who unqualifiedly asserts the truth of something as to which he has knowledge but is mistaken. However, the instructional error was harmless since the jury necessarily found defendant committed perjury when he testified the release allowing defendant to sell photos of the victim was not forged.id: 19315
In <i>U.S. v. Gaudin</i>, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that the element of materiality in a false statement prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001 is a question of fact that must be presented to the jury, not a question of law for the court. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed. The court rejected the government's argument that historically materiality has been treated as a question for the courts. Concurring, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, emphasized that the court was not deciding that materiality was an essential element of perjury nor that the failure to instruct on materiality would never be harmless error.id: 10828
Since defendant made two false statements during his testimony he was properly convicted of two counts of perjury. However, Penal Code section 654 precluded imposition of sentence on both counts where defendant had only one criminal objective - to exonerate himself on the three offenses for which he was being tried at the first trial.id: 10827
Defendant was convicted of two sex offenses and the sentencing court cited defendant's perjury as an aggravating factor in imposing the upper term. When imposing a sentence enhancement because of perjury at trial, the sentencing judge is constitutionally required to make on-the-record findings encompassing all the elements of a perjury violation. Those elements are a willful statement, under oath, of any material matter which the witness knows to be false. However, the court's failure to make such findings was not prejudicial since the record provided adequate assurance that there was no violation of the constitutional right to testify <197> i.e., that the court's reliance on perjury as an aggravating factor was properly based on untruthfulness.id: 10829
The jury was instructed that for purposes of perjury, the false statement given had to be material. However, the jury was not given a legal definition of the term material and the materiality requirement was not included in the specifically enumerated list of elements of the charge. The instruction was therefore deficient. The error was harmless where the perjury charge was based on one statement - a representation that the lien was for extensive improvements - and since the purpose of the document was to state a claim for money owed for materials or services, it was inconceivable the jury could have found the reason for the claim was immaterial.id: 10826
During voir dire the court asked the prospective jurors whether they had ever been arrested or whether any family members had been arrested. Defendant answered that his son was arrested. While that fact was true he negated to mention he had also been arrested. Defendant was later charged with perjury. He argued that while his answer may have been misleading, it was literally true. Because the defendant's answer was literally true (though nonresponsive) he could not be charged with perjury. It was up to the judge and attorneys to be more thorough with the follow-up questions to arrive at the whole truth.id: 15589
A person who makes a material and knowingly false statement in an affidavit is guilty of perjury only if he delivers the affidavit to another person with the intent that it be uttered or published as true. A declaration should be treated in the same manner as an affidavit in a perjury prosecution. Therefore, defendant could not be guilty of perjury unless he delivered the completed security guard registration form to another person with the intent that it be uttered or published as true.id: 15588
The evidence was insufficient to support defendant's perjury convictions arising from the workers compensation fraud case where she never executed the deposition transcript introduced in evidence during her trial. However, under those conditions a conviction of attempted perjury is proper.id: 16596
A party testified falsely under oath at his deposition. The original transcript of the deposition, unseen by the deponent, was sent to his attorney where it remained. Although the testimony may have been false, it was contained in a document that was yet to be delivered, and therefore, did not constitute perjury in violation of Penal Code section 118.id: 14910
A constitutionally valid perjury conviction under Penal Code section 118 requires the jury, not the court, to determine all elements of the charge including materiality, i.e., whether the statement or testimony might have been used to affect the proceeding in or for which it was made.id: 10825
Defendant was convicted of willfully making and subscribing a tax return without belief in its truth (former Revenue and Taxation Code section 19405, subdivision (a)(1).) Willfulness as an element of that offense requires the prosecution to prove the defendant made the perjurious statement in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.id: 15591
In a perjury prosecution based on errors or omissions in disclosure statements required by the Political Reform Act of 1974, the materiality of the errors or omissions is an element of the offense to be determined by the jury. The trial court's failure to submit the materiality issue to the jury required reversal of the defendant's perjury convictions where the factual questions presented to the jury were complex, the defense did not concede the issue of materiality, and the trial court's instruction completely deprived the jury of an opportunity to consider the materiality of defendant's omissions.id: 10823
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was a city council member who was facing a recall petition and submitted declarations in support of her request for injunctive relief. She also submitted the declarations to law enforcement. She duped several people who had signed the recall petition into signing these declarations that contained false information. She was properly convicted of preparing false evidence under Penal Code section 134.id: 26489
Updated 2/26/2024Defendant was convicted of preparing a false document under Penal Code section 134. The trial court did not err in denying her request to instruct on “materiality.” The absence of a materiality requirement did not create First Amendment problems. id: 26490
Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for offering false evidence into a trial in violation of Penal Code section 132, where the document was used by counsel in cross-examination, read into the record and marked for identification. It was offered into evidence for these purposes even though it was not actually moved into evidence.id: 21160
Defendant argued he could not be convicted of misrepresentation and perjury arising from the same activities (lying on applications for food stamps and cash aid) because the misrepresentation statute (Welfare Institutions Code section 10980, subd.(c)(2)) is a specific statute precluding prosecution under the more general perjury statute. However, the Legislature’s requirement that statement by aid recipients be filed under penalty of perjury shows that simultaneous prosecutions may be maintained for both offenses. To protect defendant from dual punishment, the trial court appropriately stayed the punishment for the misrepresentation conviction.id: 20665
A fishing activity report required to be filed under the Fish and Game Code and Fish and Game Department regulations is an instrument within the meaning of Penal Code section 115. Therefore, a fishing boat operator who files a false fishing activity report with the Department may be prosecuted under Penal Code section 115 for knowingly offering a false instrument to be filed with a state public office.id: 17807
Following an evidentiary hearing, the California Supreme Court denied the capital defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus which alleged the prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony at trial. The court rejected the referee's finding that three witnesses testified falsely. It was not clear that the trial testimony rather than the subsequent recantations were false. This is especially true where the witnesses later disavowed the recantations. Moreover, the inducements provided to the witnesses, and relied upon by the referee, were presented to the jury which convicted the defendant.id: 17140
Defendant was convicted of perjury. He argued the court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, with CALJIC 7.23 which requires corroboration regarding the falsity of a defendant's statement. In the present case, defendant admitted the signature on the document submitted to the DMV was forged, but he argued he was not the party who forged the signature. The court had no sua sponte duty to give CALJIC 7.23 since the focus of the corroboration requirement in the perjury statute is on the falsity of the statement, and not the identity of the perjurer.id: 15590
Defendant was convicted of making fraudulent statements to obtain workers' compensation benefits, perjury, and grand theft by false pretenses. A surreptitiously recorded videotape depicted him as a robust commercial fisherman rather than a sedentary invalid entitled to $42,000 worth of "in home attendant care." He argued he did not violate the charged offenses because his statements about pain were opinion rather than fact, and he should be subject to criminal liability for exaggerating symptoms to obtain care that others might deem unnecessary. However, the convictions were proper where the evidence showed defendant did not honestly hold the opinions he expressed.id: 15479
Defendant was convicted of committing perjury in an application for a duplicate driver's license (Penal Code section 118). He argued the court erred in failing to instruct the jury in the amended language of Vehicle Code section 12802 which would have prevented the jury from finding him guilty unless they also found the application containing the false statements was an application for an original driver's license. However, the word original did not become an element of the offense of perjury in a DMV application and the court did not err in refusing the proposed instruction.id: 10820
Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to make on-the-record findings necessary to enhance defendant's sentence for perjury violations. However, defendant's failure to object at the sentencing hearing barred him from presenting the issue for the first time on appeal.id: 10821
Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the perjury conviction based on the driver's license application where the declaration was not dated and the place of execution was not stated. The lack of a stated place of execution was not fatal here where the application form expressly states I hereby certify under penalty of perjury of the laws of the state of California . . . . This was signed by defendant and the instrument itself sufficiently recited the place of execution to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. Moreover, the failure to date the application form was harmless where there was substantial evidence from which to deduce the date the application was executed.id: 10822
The trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that the alleged perjurious statements were material. In a perjury prosecution based on false testimony (as opposed to errors or omissions in disclosure statements) the materiality of the false testimony is a question of law for the court.id: 10824