Release of Juror Information
Category > Release of Juror Information
Updated 3/5/2024The trial court improperly prohibited contact with jurors years after they had agreed to speak with the defense.Following defendant’s conviction in a capital case in 1993, three jurors agreed to speak with defense counsel. Years later, while defendant’s case was on appeal, the trial court issued an order prohibiting counsel’s contact with the jurors absent court approval. However, the no-contact order was improper since the court’s role was to function as the gatekeeper and three jurors had already agreed to speak with defense representatives. id: 26870
The trial court must assume supporting declarations are credible when ruling on a motion for the disclosure of jurors’ identifying information.In deciding whether to hold a hearing on a motion for the disclosure of jurors’ identifying information, the trial court must assume that the declarations supporting the motion are credible. id: 24427
The trial court has discretion to order jurors to appear at a post-trial hearing to investigate potential juror misconduct.The statutory provisions allowing the denial of access to jurors contact information do not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. However, in this case, the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked discretion to order jurors to appear at a post-trial hearing to discuss potential juror misconduct. The error was harmless where it was otherwise determined that the claim of juror misconduct was not credible. id: 21151
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s request for juror identifying information based on defendant’s parents declaration suggesting certain jurors considered defendant’s failure to testify.Defendant was convicted of felony drunk driving and despite an incriminating statement by defendant, there was an issue at trial about whether he was the driver of the car that caused the accident. After trial, he filed a motion for the disclosure of the juror’s identifying information based on his parents’ sworn statements that certain jurors found defendant was the driver partly because he did not testify. The trial court erred in denying that motion. It did not matter that the parents’ declarations consisted of hearsay. Next, while some of the jurors’ statements were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, the jurors would commit misconduct by discussing defendant’s failure to testify, and such an act of misconduct would be admissible under section 1150. By overlooking the admissible evidence the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.id: 23428
Court erred in denying defense counsel's post-trial request for the jurors' telephone numbers and addresses.Prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure sections 206, subdivision (f) and 237, before a defendant was entitled to discovery of jurors' names and addresses he or she was required to make a preliminary showing of possible juror misconduct. However, the mandatory language of section 206, subdivision (f) ("the court shall provide the information requested") abrogate the requirement of a preliminary showing of possible juror misconduct. Under the newly enacted statute, a court is required to give such information upon request, subject only to limits on dissemination.id: 12643
Superior Court procedure sealing juror identifying information prior the return of verdict conflicted with the current law and was therefore invalid.The superior court instituted a procedure in civil and criminal cases which barred the parties, counsel, and others from access to juror identifying information, absent the granting of a petition for access to that information. By mandating the sealing of juror identifying information prior to the return of jury verdict, the procedure directly conflicts with Code of Civil Procedure section 237, which mandates the sealing of such information only in criminal proceedings after the return of jury verdicts. The court's procedure was therefore invalid and unenforceableid: 12696
Superior court order limiting the defense access to jurors was not appealable by the prosecution.After defendant was sentenced to death, the Supreme Court appointed appellate counsel to handle the direct appeal, and the Habeas Corpus Resource Center was later appointed to handle habeas corpus proceedings. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a motion to restrict juror access by the defense. The superior court granted the motion in part, holding that any contact must be subject to the rules set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 206. The prosecution appealed the order arguing it did not go far enough. However the order appealed from is not an appealable order within the meaning of Penal Code section 1238, subd. (a)(5) since it does not affect the substantial rights of the People.id: 16843
Updated 2/3/2024If any juror objects to the release of identifying information under section 237, the court must determine whether good cause exists. When a defendant moves for the disclosure of identifying juror information under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, the court must release the information if none of the jurors protest the disclosure. If any juror objects (six of the 12 jurors objected here) the court must determine whether good cause for the disclosure exists. Defendant was wrong in arguing the court must release the information of any jurors who did not object.id: 27769
The juror’s written letter to the judge after trial suggested an opinion of guilt but it did not amount to good cause requiring release of the juror’s contact information.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for juror contact information after he learned the juror had written the judge two letters discussing the verdict after the trial had ended. However, the juror’s written opinion was speculative and the court did not err in finding it was insufficient to establish good cause to release sealed juror information.id: 26043
A juror’s nonresponsiveness to the court’s letter was a protest to the release of her identifying information under section 237.Defendant filed a motion to disclose juror identifying information under Code of Civil Procedure section 206 and 237. Defense counsel’s declaration stated that he spoke with Juror No. 11 in the hallway after the conviction, and she reported that Juror No. 6 had brought extraneous materials into the deliberations. Juror No. 11 never responded to the court’s multiple contacts regarding the release of her contact information. Defendant claimed the jurors nonresponsiveness was not a protest to the disclosure of her information. However, the court reasonably found the juror’s silence was a “protest” under section 237.id: 25165
Trial counsel did not err by failing to subpoena two witnesses at the retrial where they had been subpoenaed by the prosecutor who agreed they would be available to testify in the defense case.Defendant was convicted of certain sex offenses at a retrial following a hung jury. She argued her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena two police officers who testified at her first trial. However, the witnesses were not subpoenaed because, like at the first trial, the prosecutor had subpoenaed them and the court agreed it would not excuse the witnesses until the defense agreed. In light of the professional courtesy extended by the prosecution, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to subpoena the witnesses.id: 25166
Petition for juror information made years after the appeal was over was untimely and the denial was not appealable. A Code of Civil Procedure section 237 motion to release personal juror identifying information made after conviction, sentence and affirmance on appeal is untimely. The superior court should not rule on the merits of such a petition, but if it does, and denies relief, the order is not appealable as an appealable order affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. id: 24047
The jurors use of newly purchased toy cars to reenact the various accounts of the accident was not an improper experiment during deliberations and did not establish good cause for the release of juror identifying information. The defense moved for access to juror identifying information based on evidence that the jurors had improperly conducted an experiment while deliberating. One of the jurors purchased toy cars to reenact the accident. However, there was no improper experiment as the cars were used to reenact the versions of the incident described by the witnesses at trial. There was no showing of an attempt to discover new evidence through an experiment. The trial court properly found there was no good cause for the release of juror information. id: 24069
The jurors did not commit misconduct in using toy cars to reenact the accident and therefore defendant was not entitled to the release of the juror information.Defense counsel petitioned the trial court for the jurors identifying information upon learning after the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction that a juror had purchased toy cars to attempt to reenact the accident. This was not an improper juror experiment going beyond the evidence presented at trial but was more of a visual aid used to consider the evidence presented. It was not juror misconduct and the trial court did not err by finding there was no good cause to support the release of the juror information.id: 23414
The trial court did not err in denying release of juror information where the use of toy cars to show the position of the cars before the crash did not amount to an improper experiment during deliberations.Defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter. He learned that a juror had purchased two cars to use as props during deliberations. Defense counsel later sought juror identifying information so that he could contact the jurors to investigate juror misconduct. The trial court did not err in denying his request for juror contact information because there was no misconduct. The jurors did not conduct an improper experiment by simply using the toy cars as visual aids showing the relative positioning of the cars in the crash.id: 23118
Deliberating jurors’ references to their own sexual experiences at defendant’s SVP trial did not show misconduct and there was no reversible error in refusing to unseal juror identifying information. After defendant’s SVP trial, the court ordered the jury identifying information sealed. Defendant petitioned under Code of Civil Procedure sections 206, subd.(g) and 237 to unseal the information to support the filing of a motion for new trial based on jury misconduct. Defendant first argued the court’s authority to seal juror information is limited to criminal proceedings, which an SVP trial is not. However, even if the court erred in sealing the information, defendant failed to show reversible error in failing to unseal it. The comments made by older jurors about their own sexual experiences were based on their life experiences and did not constitute misconduct. Likewise, the claim that two holdout jurors were pressured showed nothing more than ordinary give and take of deliberations.id: 20808
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s postverdict request for juror identifying information where a juror equivocated during the polling but later said she found defendant guilty. Following the guilty verdict, the trial court polled the jurors. Juror No. 2 acknowledged her guilty verdict, but then expressed reservations. During an inquiry outside the presence of the others she said she had a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt when someone suggested it was a felony but she otherwise believed defendant was guilty. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s subsequent motion for juror identifying information to explore the issue. id: 20404
Allowing jurors to leave the courtroom through a private passage did not violate defendant's right to be present or to due process. Following the verdict, the jurors informed the court clerk they did not wish to speak with anyone. The court thereafter arranged
for the jurors to leave the courthouse through a private corridor. The defense had not been informed of the arrangement before the jurors left. Contrary to defendant's claim, this was not a critical stage of the proceedings at which he was entitled to be present. Morever, Code of Civil Procedure, section 237, which restricts a defendant's access to jurors after trial, did not violate substantive due process as applied because there is no historical right to question jurors about the verdict and there was no hint of juror misconduct in the record.id: 19452
The trial court did not abuse its authority in requiring capital defendant's appellate counsel to obtain the court's approval before contacting jurors.Defendant, who is in the process of appealing a death sentence, challenged an order from the superior court, entered sua sponte, prohibiting appellate counsel from contacting trial jurors without first obtaining the court's approval. The order preceded the legislative enactments which currently govern the issue. Even though the case had become subject to appellate jurisdiction, the trial court had authority to issue the order while presiding over proceedings to correct the record. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the no-contact order since the court was merely attempting to ensure that any juror contact was consensual and reasonable.id: 15965
Absent the request for personal juror identifying information, section 237 does not apply to a request for access to voir dire questionnaires.Following a death sentence, a juror told a defense investigator she believed death was the appropriate sentence any time a person was intentionally killed. Defense counsel requested access to the jury questionnaires to determine whether that juror's answers provided during voir dire accurately reflected her views. The trial court denied the motion ruling the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 237 were not met. However, since there was no request for personal juror identifying information, section 237 does not apply. The questionnaires were part of the voir dire, and absent personal juror identification information, there was no legal reason to preclude defense counsel from having access to them.id: 15947
Counsel's representation that a juror told defendant's girlfriend the jury was deadlocked was insufficient to require a hearing on disclosure of jurors' identifying information.The trial court did not err in denying defendant's post-trial application for disclosure of jurors' identifying information. Counsel's declaration stated that during deliberations a juror told defendant's girlfriend the jury was deadlocked. Assuming the assertion was true, the juror disclosed no more than was disclosed by a jury note to the court stating they were "having a hard time reaching a verdict." Defendant did not show how the alleged statement harmed him, and counsel's declaration and later representations to the court did not constitute a good cause showing of juror misconduct justifying a subsequent hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 237.id: 15951
Court did not err in failing to investigate juror misconduct or provide juror information where court clerk overheard juror comments regarding 27 years to life terms which could not have referred to capital defendant.A court clerk informed the parties that during penalty phase deliberations she overheard two jurors discussing a newspaper article referring to the possibility of a 27 years to life term for each of seven counts. However, no recent newspaper articles referenced such a topic and the clerk could not tell the identity of the jurors, or the context of the discussion. Even if the conversation related to the codefendant (who did not face capital consequences) there was no way the discussion was prejudicial to defendant. Defense counsel did minimal investigation into the matter and did not file a new trial motion. The court did not err in failing to hold a hearing on jury misconduct, and did not err in declining to provide the juror addresses and phone numbers.id: 15955
Despite new provision court may refuse defense post trial access to jurors' addresses and telephone numbers where jurors withhold consent to discuss case with counsel.Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (f) does not require the court to provide the defense with addresses and telephone numbers of jurors post trial upon request where jurors have exercised their absolute right to refuse to discuss the deliberations or verdict with counsel under subdivision (a).id: 12654
After two jurors received phone calls from someone claiming to be defendant, the court did not err in asking the other jurors whether they had received similar calls.Prior to the start of the penalty phase, two jurors reported receiving telephone calls from someone identifying himself as the defendant. The trial court did not prejudice the entire panel in inquiring of the remainder of the jurors whether they had received calls reported to be from defendant or from an interested party in the case. Moreover, the two jurors who received calls did not act improperly in discussing the fact they received the calls with friends and family. The prohibition not to discuss the case did not extend to these telephone calls.id: 12625
Court properly denied the untimely request for disclosure of juror information which was made six weeks after the alleged juror misconduct was discovered.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request for the juror's personal information that would have allowed him to further investigate his claim of juror misconduct. However, defense investigators did not contact the juror until six weeks after they learned of her relationship with an unrelated murder victim's relative. Since defendant failed to show due diligence in pursuing the claim there was no basis to continue the hearing on the new trial motion. Since defendant sought the information to support the new trial motion, there was no longer a purpose to be served by releasing the information. The trial court therefore acted properly in denying the untimely request for juror information.id: 12647
Defendant who had interviewed the juror who was the object of the misconduct claim did not make a sufficient showing for addresses and phone numbers of the remaining jurors.Following a conviction the defendant moved for a new trial alleging juror misconduct. Friends and relatives of the defendant stated in affidavits they had observed a juror's husband discussing the case with the juror and witnesses. Code of Civil Procedure section 206 allows defendants access to jurors' personal information if necessary to establish a claim of misconduct but section 237 provides the information should remain confidential absent a compelling governmental interest. Defendant was given the personal information of the juror in question. He contacted her and she denied any impropriety. Defendant never interviewed the juror's husband. Defendant failed to make the necessary showing that he was entitled to the phone numbers and addresses of the remaining members of the jury.id: 12652
Defense counsel's speculative account as to how the jurors arrived at the verdict did not constitute good cause to require disclosure of the jurors' addresses and telephone numbers.Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder but was curiously acquitted on the underlying felony. The conviction was reversed for <i>Wheeler</i> error. The prosecution decided to retry defendant on the theory of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant requested the disclosure of the jurors' addresses and telephone numbers and described the theory the jurors must have used in arriving at their verdict. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for juror information. Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (f) was not enacted to provide disclosure upon request and the defense must show good cause before the information is divulged. Defense counsel' request did not show good cause and merely speculated as to the jurors' thought process.id: 12653
A convicted defendant alleging juror misconduct is allowed only limited access to jurors' addresses and telephone numbers.Disclosure of juror names, addresses and telephone numbers is required only when a defendant, upon timely motion, makes a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial.id: 12623
The court did not err in restricting access to jurors after being apprised of juror anxiety resulting from contacts by defense investigators.After being apprised of juror anxiety resulting from contacts by defense investigators, the court did not overstep its authority in directing that all future communication would be through the court clerk unless jurors were already agreeable. Moreover, the record did not establish any connection between the prosecutor's conduct in speaking with the press and juror reluctance to communicate with the defense.id: 12128
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Exclusion of 18-25 year-olds from the youthful offender provisions of section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Penal Code section 3051 establishes a parole eligibility hearing for juveniles convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Excluding persons 18-25 from the youthful offender parole hearing provision did not violate equal protection principles.id: 27245